LIFE OF CHRYSIPPUS.
I. Chrysippus was the son of Apollonius, and a native of
either Soli or Tarsus, as Alexander tells us in his Successions;
and he was a pupil of Cleanthes. Previously he used to
practise running as a public runner; then he became a pupil
of Zeno or of Cleanthes, as Diocles and the generality of
authors say, and while he was still living he abandoned him,
and became a very eminent philosopher.
II. He was a man of great natural ability, and of great
acuteness in every way, so that in many points he dissented
from Zeno, and also from Cleanthes, to whom he often used
to say that he only wanted to be instructed in the dogmas of
the school, and that he would discover the demonstrations for
himself. But whenever he opposed him with any vehemence,
he always repented, so that he used frequently to say:—
And he had such a high reputation as a dialectician, that most
people thought that if there were such a science as dialectics
among the Gods; it would be in no respect different from that
of Chrysippus. But though he was so eminently able in matter,
he was not perfect in style.
III. He was industrious beyond all other men; as is plain
from his writings; for he wrote more than seven hundred and
five books. And he often wrote several books on the same
subject, wishing to put down everything that occurred to him;
and constantly correcting his previous assertions, and using a
great abundance of testimonies. So that, as in one of his
writings he had quoted very nearly the whole of the Medea of
Euripides, and some one had his book in his hands; this latter,
when he was asked what he had got there, made answer,
“The Medea of Chrysippus.” And Apollodorus, the Athenian,
in his Collection of Dogmas, wishing to assert that what
Epicurus had written out of his own head, and without any
quotations to support his arguments, was a great deal more
than all the books of Chrysippus, speaks thus (I give his
exact words), “For if any one were to take away from the
books of Chrysippus all the passages which he quotes from
other authors, his paper would be left empty.”
These are the words of Apollodorus; but the old woman
who lived with him, as Diocles reports, used to say that he
wrote five hundred lines every day. And Hecaton says, that
he first applied himself to philosophy, when his patrimony had
been confiscated, and seized for the royal treasury.
IV. He was slight in person, as is plain from his statue
which is in the Ceramicus, which is nearly hidden by the
equestrian statue near it; in reference to which circumstance,
Carneades called him Crypsippus.[102] He was once reproached
by some one for not attending the lectures of Ariston, who
was drawing a great crowd after him at the time; and he
replied, “If I had attended to the multitude I should not have
been a philosopher.” And once, when he saw a dialectician
pressing hard on Cleanthes, and proposing sophistical fallacies
to him, he said, “Cease to drag that old man from more
important business, and propose these questions to us who are
young.” At another time, when some one wishing to ask him
something privately, was addressing him quietly, but when he
saw a multitude approaching began to speak more energetically
he said to him:—
And at drinking parties he used to behave quietly, moving his
legs about however, so that a female slave once said, “It is
only the legs of Chrysippus that are drunk.” And he had so
high an opinion of himself, that once, when a man asked him,
“To whom shall I entrust my son?” he said, “To me, for if
I thought that there was any one better than myself, I would
have gone to him to teach me philosophy.” In reference to
which anecdote they report that people used to say of him:—
He has indeed a clear and subtle head,
The rest are forms of empty æther made.
[104]
And also:—
For if Chrysippus had not lived and taught,
The Stoic school would surely have been nought.
VI. But at last, when Arcesilaus and Lacydes, as Sotion
records in his eighth book, came to the Academy, he joined
them in the study of philosophy; from which circumstance
he got the habit of arguing for and against a custom, and discussed
magnitudes and quantities, following the system of the
Academics.
VII. Hermippus relates, that one day, when he was teaching
in the Odeum, he was invited to a sacrifice by his pupils;
and, that drinking some sweet unmixed wine, he was seized
with giddiness, and departed this life five days afterwards,
when he had lived seventy-three years; dying in the hundred
and forty-third olympiad, as Apollodorus says in his Chronicles.
And we have written an epigram on him:—
But some people say that he died of a fit of immoderate
laughter. For that seeing his ass eating figs, he told his old
woman to give the ass some unmixed wine to drink afterwards,
and then laughed so violently that he died.
VIII. He appears to have been a man of exceeding arrogance.
Accordingly, though he wrote such numbers of books,
he never dedicated one of them to any sovereign. And he
was contented with one single old woman, as Demetrius tells
us, in his People of the same Name. And when Ptolemy wrote
to Cleanthes, begging him either to come to him himself or to
send him some one, Sphærus went to him, but Chrysippus
slighted the invitation.
IX. However, he sent for the sons of his sister, Aristocreon
and Philocrates, and educated them; and he was the first
person who ventured to hold a school in the open air in the
Lyceum, as the before mentioned Demetrius relates.
X. There was also another Chrysippus, a native of Cnidos,
a physician, from whom Erasistratus testifies that he received
great benefit. And another also who was a son of his, and the
physician of Ptolemy; who, having had a false accusation
brought against him, was apprehended and punished by being
scourged. There was also a fourth who was a pupil of Erasistratus;
and a fifth was an author of a work called Georgics.
XI. Now this philosopher used to delight in proposing
questions of this sort. The person who reveals the mysteries
to the uninitiated commits a sin; the hierophant
reveals them to the uninitiated; therefore the hierophant
commits sin? Another was, that which is not in the city, is
also not in the house; but a well is not in the city, therefore,
there is not a well in the house. Another was, there is a
certain head; that head you have not got; there is then a
head that you have not got; therefore, you have not got a
head. Again, if a man is in Megara, he is not in Athens;
but there is a man in Megara, therefore, there is not a man in
Athens. Again, if you say anything, what you say comes out
of your mouth; but you say “a waggon,” therefore a waggon
comes out of your mouth. Another was, if you have not lost
a thing, you have it; but you have not lost horns; therefore,
you have horns. Though some attribute this sophism to
Eubulides.
XII. There are people who run Chrysippus down as having
written a great deal that is very shameful and indecent. For
in his treatise on the Ancient Natural Historians, he relates
the story of Jupiter and Juno very indecently, devoting six
hundred lines to what no one could repeat without polluting
his mouth. For, as it is said, he composes this story, though
he praises it as consisting of natural details, in a way more
suitable to street walkers than to Goddesses; and not at all
resembling the ideas which have been adopted or cited by
writers in paintings. For they were found neither in Polemo,
nor in Hypsicrates, nor in Antigonus, but were inserted by
himself. And in his treatise on Polity, he allows people to
marry their mothers, or their daughters, or their sons. And
he repeats this doctrine in his treatise on those things which
are not desirable for their own sake, in the very opening of it.
And in the third book of his treatise on Justice, he devotes a
thousand lines to bidding people devour even the dead.
In the second book of his treatise on Life and Means of
Support, where he is warning us to consider beforehand, how
the wise man ought to provide himself with means, he says,
“And yet why need he provide himself with means? for if it
is for the sake of living, living at all is a matter of indifference;
if it is for the sake of pleasure, that is a matter of indifference
too; if it is for the sake of virtue, that is of itself
sufficient for happiness. But the methods of providing one’s
self with means are ridiculous; for instance, some derive
them from a king; and then it will be necessary to humour
him. Some from friendship; and then friendship will become
a thing to be bought with a price. Some from wisdom; and
then wisdom will become mercenary; and these are the
accusations which he brings.”
But since he has written many books of high reputation, it
has seemed good to me to give a catalogue of them, classifying
them according to their subjects. They are the following:—
Books on Logic; Propositions; Logical Questions; a book
of the Contemplations of the Philosopher; six books of
Dialectic Terms addressed to Metrodorus; one on the Technical
Terms used in Dialectics, addressed to Zeno; one called
the Art of Dialectics, addressed to Aristagoras; four books of
Probable Conjunctive Reasons, addressed to Dioscorides.
The first set of treatises on the Logical Topics, which concern
things, contains: one essay on Propositions; one on
those Propositions which are not simple; two on the Copulative
Propositions, addressed to Athenades; three on Positive
Propositions, addressed to Aristagoras; one on Definite Propositions,
addressed to Athenodorus; one on Privative Propositions,
addressed to Thearus; three on the Best Propositions,
addressed to Dion; four on the Differences between Indefinite
Propositions; two on those Propositions which are enunciated
with a reference to time; two on Perfect Propositions.
The second set contains, one essay on a Disjunctive True
Propositions, addressed to Gorgippides; four on a Conjunctive
True Proposition, also addressed to Gorgippides; one
called, the Sect, addressed to Gorgippides; one on the argument
of Consequents; one on questions touched upon in the
three preceding treatises, and now re-examined, this also is
addressed to Gorgippides; one on what is Possible, addressed
to Clitus; one on the treatise of Philo, on Signification; one
on what it is that Falsehood consists in.
The third set contains, two treatises on Imperative Propositions;
two on Interrogation; four on Examination; an
epitome of the subject of Interrogation and Examination;
four treatises on Answer; an abridgment on Answer; two
essays on Investigation.
The fourth set contains ten books on Categorems, addressed
to Metrodorus; one treatise on what is Direct and Indirect,
addressed to Philarchus; one on Conjunctions, addressed to
Apollonides; four on Categorems, addressed to Pasylus.
The fifth set contains, one treatise on the Five Cases; one
on Things defined according to the Subject; two on Enunciation,
addressed to Stesagoras; two on Appellative Nouns.
The next class of his writings refers to rules of Logic,
with reference to words, and speech which consists of
words.
The first set of these contains, six treatises on Singular and
Plural Enunciations; five on Words, addressed to Sosigenes
and Alexander; four on the Inequality of Words, addressed
to Dion; three on the Sorites which refer to Words; one on
Solecisms in the Use of Words, addressed to Dionysius; one
entitled Discourses, contrary to Customs; one entitled Diction,
and addressed to Dionysius.
The second set contains, five treatises on the Elements of
Speech and of Phrases; four on the Arrangement of Phrases;
three on the Arrangement, and on the Elements of Phrases,
addressed to Philip; one on the Elements of Discourse,
addressed to Nicias; one on Correlatives.
The third set contains, two treatises against those who do
not admit Division; four on Ambiguous Expressions, addressed
to Apollos; one, Ambiguity in Modes; two on the
Ambiguous Use of Figures, in Conjunctive Propositions; two
on the essay on Ambiguous Expressions, by Panthoides; five
on the Introduction to the Ambiguous Expressions; one,
being an abridgment of the Ambiguous Expressions,
addressed to Epicrates; and a collection of instances to serve
as an Introduction to the Ambiguous Expressions, in two
books.
The next class is on the subject of that part of logic
which is conversant about reasonings and modes.
The first set of works in this class, contains, the Art of
Reasoning and of Modes, in five books, addressed to Dioscorides;
a treatise on Reasoning, in three books; one on the
Structure of Modes, addressed to Stesagoras, in five books;
a comparison of the Elements of Modes; a treatise on Reciprocal
and Conjunctive Reasonings; an essay to Agathon,
called also an essay on Problems, which follow one another;
a treatise, proving that Syllogistic Propositions suppose one or
more other terms; one on Conclusions, addressed to Aristagoras;
one essay, proving that the same reasoning can
affect several figures; one against those who deny that the
same reasoning can be expressed by syllogism, and without
syllogism, in two books; three treatises against those who
attack the resolution of Syllogisms; one on the treatise on
Modes, by Philo, addressed to Timostratus; two treatises on
Logic, in one volume, addressed to Timocrates and Philomathes;
one volume of questions on Reasonings and Modes.
The second set contains, one book of Conclusive Reasonings,
addressed to Zeno; one on Primary Syllogisms, which
are not demonstrative; one on the resolution of Syllogisms;
one, in two books, on Captious Reasonings, addressed
to Pasylus; one book of Considerations on Syllogisms; one
book of Introductory Syllogisms, addressed to Zeno; three
of Introductory Modes, addressed also to Zeno; five of False
Figures of Syllogism; one of a Syllogistic Method, for the
resolution of arguments, which are not demonstrative; one of
Researches into the Modes, addressed to Zeno and Philomathes
(but this appears to be an erroneous title).
The third set contains, one essay on Incidental Reasonings,
addressed to Athenades (this again is an incorrect title);
three books of Incidental Discourses on the Medium (another
incorrect title); one essay on the Disjunctive Reasons of
Aminias.
The fourth set contains, a treatise on Hypothesis, in three
books, addressed to Meleager; a book of hypothetical reasonings
on the Laws, addressed also to Meleager; two books
of hypothetical reasoning to serve as an Introduction; two
books of hypothetical reasonings on Theorems; a treatise in
two books, being a resolution of the Hypothetical Reasonings
of Hedylus; an essay, in three books, being a resolution
of the Hypothetical Reasonings of Alexander (this is an
incorrect title); two books of Expositions, addressed to
Leodamas.
The fifth set contains, an introduction to Fallacy, addressed to
Aristocreon; an introduction to False Reasonings;
a treatise in six books, on Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon.
The sixth set contains, a treatise against those who believe
Truth and Falsehood to be the same thing. One, in two
books, against those who have recourse to division to resolve
the Fallacy, addressed to Aristocreon; a demonstrative
essay, to prove that it is not proper to divide indefinite terms;
an essay, in three books, in answer to the objections against
the non-division of Indefinite Terms, addressed to Pasylus; a
solution, according to the principles of the ancients, addressed
to Dioscorides; an essay on the Resolution of the Fallacy,
addressed to Aristocreon, this is in three books; a resolution
of the Hypothetical Arguments of Hedylus, in one book,
addressed to Aristocreon and Apollos.
The seventh set contains, a treatise against those who
contend that the premisses on the Fallacy, are false; a
treatise on Negative Reasoning, addressed to Aristocreon, in
two books; one book of Negative Reasonings, addressed to
Gymnasias; two books of a treatise on Reasoning by Progression,
addressed to Stesagoras; two books of Reasonings by
Interrogation, and on the Arrest,[105] addressed to Onetor;
an essay, in two books, on the Corrected Argument, addressed
to Aristobulus; another on the Non-apparent Argument,
addressed to Athenades.
The eighth set contains, an essay on the Argument Outis,
in eight books, addressed to Menecrates; a treatise, in two
books, on Arguments composed of a finite term, and an indefinite
term, addressed to Pasylus; another essay on the
Argument Outis, addressed to Epicrates.
The ninth set contains, two volumes of Sophisms, addressed
to Heraclides, and Pollis; five volumes of Dialectic Arguments,
which admit of no solution, addressed to Dioscorides;
an essay, in one book, against the Method of Arcesilaus,
addressed to Sphærus.
The tenth set contains, a treatise in six books, against
Custom, addressed to Metrodorus; and another, in seven
books, on Custom, addressed to Gorgippides.
There are, therefore, works on Logic, in the four grand
classes which we have here enumerated, embracing various
questions, without any connection with one another, to the
number of thirty nine sets, amounting in the whole to three
hundred and eleven treatises on Logic.
The next division comprises those works which have for
their object, the explanation of Moral Ideas.
The first class of this division, contains an essay, giving a
description of Reason, addressed to Theosphorus; a book of
Ethical questions; three books of Principles, to serve as the
foundation of Dogmas, addressed to Philomathes; two books
of definitions of Good-breeding, addressed to Metrodorus;
two books of definitions of the Bad, addressed to Metrodorus;
two books of definitions of Neutral Things, addressed also
to Metrodorus; seven books of definitions of Things, according
to their genera, addressed to Metrodorus; and two books
of Definitions, according to other systems, addressed to
Metrodorus.
The second set contains, a treatise on Things Similar, in
three books, addressed to Aristocles; an essay on Definitions,
in seven books, addressed to Metrodorus.
The third set contains, a treatise, in seven books, on the
Incorrect Objections made to Definitions, addressed to Laodamas;
two books of Probable Arguments bearing on Definitions,
addressed to Dioscorides; two books on Species and
Genus, addressed to Gorgippides; one book on Divisions;
two books on Contraries, addressed to Dionysius; a book of
Probable Arguments relating to Divisions, and Genera, and
Species; a book on Contraries.
The fourth set contains, a treatise, in seven books, on
Etymologies, addressed to Diocles; another, in four books, on
the same subject, addressed to the same person.
The fifth set contains, a treatise in two books, on Proverbs,
addressed to Zenodotus; an essay on Poems, addressed to
Philomathes; an essay, on How one Ought to Listen to
Poems, in two books; an essay, in reply to Critics, addressed
to Diodorus.
The next division refers to Ethics, looked at in a general
point of view, and to the different systems arising out of
them, and to the Virtues.
The first set contains, an essay against Pictures, addressed
to Timonax; an essay on the Manner in which we express
ourselves about, and form our Conceptions of, each separate
thing; two books of Thoughts, addressed to Laodamas; an
essay, in three books, on Conception, addressed to Pythonax;
an essay, that the Wise Man is not Guided by Opinion;
an essay, in five books, on Comprehension, and Knowledge,
and Ignorance; a treatise on Reason, in two books; a treatise
on the Employment of Reason, addressed to Leptines.
The second set contains, a treatise, that the Ancient
Philosophers approved of Logic, with Proofs to support the
Arguments, in two books, addressed to Zeno; a treatise on
Dialectics, in four books, addressed to Aristocreon; an answer
to the Objections urged against Dialectics, in three
books; an essay on Rhetoric, in four books, addressed to
Dioscorides.
The third set contains, a treatise on Habit, in three books,
addressed to Cleon; a treatise on Art and Want of Art, in
four books, addressed to Aristocreon; a treatise, in four books,
on the Difference between the Virtues, addressed to Diodorus;
a treatise, to show that all the Virtues are Equal; a treatise
on the Virtues, in two books, addressed to Pollis.
The next division refers to Ethics, as relating to Good and
Evil.
The first set contains, a treatise in ten books, on the
Honourable, and on Pleasure, addressed to Aristocreon; a
demonstration, that Pleasure is not the Chief Good of Man,
in four books; a demonstration that Pleasure is not a Good
at all, in four books; a treatise on what is said by …[106]
