Engineering and the Metal Trades

The large and steadily increasing army of operatives in the various processes connected with metals (who are combined in Germany in a single gigantic Metal Workers’ Union) can be noticed here only in its three principal sections, the engineering industry, boilermaking and ship-building, and the production of iron and steel from the ore.

Trade Unionism in the engineering industry, though it has, during the past thirty years, greatly increased in aggregate membership, notably among the unskilled and semi-skilled workmen employed in engineering shops, can hardly be said to have grown in strength, whether manifested in effect upon the engineering employers, who have become very strongly combined throughout the whole kingdom, or in influence in the Trade Union world. This relative decline must be ascribed to the continued lack of any systematic organisation of the industry as a whole; to a failure to cope with the changing processes and systems of remuneration which the employers have introduced; and to the persistence of internecine war among the rival Unions themselves.

The trouble in the engineering world came to a head in 1897, precipitated perhaps by the employers, who wanted, as they said, to be “masters in their own shops.” The Amalgamated Society of Engineers, which had maintained its predominant position among the engineering workmen, but only commanded the allegiance of a part of them, after a series of bickerings with the employers about the technical improvement of the industry, in which the workmen had shown themselves, to say the least, very conservative, found itself involved in a general strike and lock-out in all the principal engineering centres, nominally about the London engineering workmen’s precipitate demand for an Eight Hours Day, but substantially over the employers’ insistence on being masters in their own workshops, entitled to introduce what new methods of working they chose, and whatever new systems of remuneration according to results that they could persuade the several workmen to accept. The Union, to which apparently it did not occur to use the methods of publicity on which William Newton and John Burnett would have relied, failed to make clear its case to the public; and public opinion was accordingly against the engineering workmen, believing them to be at the same time obstructive to industrial improvements and unable to formulate conditions that would safeguard their legitimate interests. The result was that the prolonged stoppage, which reduced the funds of the A.S.E. down to what only sufficed to meet the accrued liabilities for Superannuation Benefit, ended in a virtual victory for the employers. The A.S.E. quickly resumed its growth and stood, in the autumn of 1919, at 320,000 members, or over five times its membership of 1892. But the sectional societies also increased in size, and down to 1919 they counted in the aggregate, as in 1892, about half as many members as the A.S.E. itself.[605] Meanwhile, the great development of the engineering industry, and the successive changes in the machinery employed, have been accompanied by the introduction of various forms of “Payment by Results,” in which the engineering Trade Unions have not known how to prevent the reintroduction of individual bargaining. Owing to its quarrels with the various sectional societies in the industry, the A.S.E. has been alternately in and out of the Trades Union Congress; and, on general issues, has seldom sought to influence the Trade Union world as much as its magnitude and position would have entitled it to do. The same may be said of the other Trade Unions in the engineering industry, which were contented to hold their own against their greater rival, and to see their membership progress with the growth of the industry itself.

The elaborate constitution of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, which we described in a preceding chapter, has been, during the past thirty years, repeatedly tinkered with by delegate meetings, but without being substantially changed. There has been a perpetual balance and deadlock of opinion, which has led to successive modifications and reactions. Alongside the skilled engineering craftsmen, of different specialities in technique, there has grown up a vast number of unapprenticed and semi-skilled men, whom the Union has failed to exclude, not only from the workshops but also from the jobs formerly monopolised by the legitimate craftsmen. Should these interlopers be admitted to membership? At one delegate meeting (1912) the rules were altered so as to admit (“Class F”) not only all varieties of skilled engineering craftsmen, but also practically any one working in an engineering shop. This was counteracted by the tacit refusal of most branches to carry out the decision of their own delegates; and “Class F,” which never obtained as many as 2000 members, was abolished by the next delegate meeting (1915.) The method of remuneration has been another bone of contention. Especially since the disastrous conflict of 1897, the employers have more and more insisted on the adoption of systems of “payment by results” instead of the weekly time rates, to which the engineering operatives, like those of most of the building trades, devotedly cling. What is to be the Union policy with regard to these varieties of piecework and “premium bonus” systems? Failing to discover any device by which (as among the cotton operatives, the boot and shoe makers, and the Birmingham brassworkers) “payment by results” can be effectively safeguarded by being subjected to collective bargaining, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers has wavered, in its decisions and in the policy of its various districts, between (a) refusing to allow any other system than timework; (b) limiting systems of payment by results to “those shops in which they have already been introduced”; (c) insisting, as a condition of permitting payment by results, on the “Principle of Mutuality,” which amounts to no more than the claim that the workman shall not have the piecework rates or “bonus times” arbitrarily imposed upon him, but shall be permitted individually to bargain with the foreman or rate-fixer for better terms. The result is a chaos of inconsistent customs and practices varying from shop to shop; and withal, a tendency to a continuous decline in piecework rates (mitigated only by the greater or less extent to which collective “shop bargaining” prevails, and by its efficiency) which leads, in sullen resentment, to “ca’ canny,” or slow working. The third bone of contention has been how to deal with the competing Trade Unions, which are either societies of varieties of skilled engineers who prefer to remain unabsorbed in the A.S.E., or societies of new classes of operatives such as machine workers, workers in brass and copper, electrical craftsmen, and others, with whom the A.S.E. found itself disputing the control of the industry. Should these much smaller organisations be (a) ignored and their members treated as non-unionists; or (b) admitted to joint deliberation and action in trade matters with the view to formulating a common policy; or (c) dealt with by amalgamation on a still broader basis than that of the A.S.E.? It would be useless to trace the results of the ebb and flow of these contrary views, which were, in the autumn of 1919, for the time being, partly reconciled by an agreement by which six of the competing Unions[606] are in 1920, with the A.S.E., to be merged in the Amalgamated Engineering Union with a membership of 400,000 and accumulated funds amounting to nearly four millions sterling. It remains to be seen whether this wider amalgamation will bring to engineering Trade Unionism the formulation of a systematic policy, national organisation, and competent leadership.

Underlying all these issues, and aggravating all the disputes to which they give rise, is the fundamental divergence between those who insist on an extreme local autonomy—the district being free to strike, and free to refuse to settle a local strike,—and those who maintain the importance of a national unity in trade policy, and the necessity, with centralised funds, of centralised control. Still more keen is the controversy between those who wish to maintain the present craftsmen’s organisation, and those who seek to enlarge it into an organisation comprising all the workers in the industry, whether skilled or unskilled. During the past decade the discontent against the Central Executive, especially on the Clyde, has led to a so-called “rank and file” movement; the development of the shop steward from a mere “card inspector” and membership recruiting officer into an aggressive strike leader; and the joining together of the shop stewards (as at Glasgow, Sheffield, and Coventry) into such new forms of organisation as the “Clyde Workers’ Committee,” actively promoting their own local trade policies irrespective of the views of the Union as a whole.

The “Shop Stewards’ Movement,” which assumed some importance in the engineering industry in 1915-19, was a new development of an old institution in Trade Unionism—we have referred elsewhere to the “Father of the Chapel” among the compositors, and to the checkweighman among the coal-miners—which acquired a special importance owing to the growing lack of correspondence between the membership of the Trade Union Branch or District Council and the grouping of the workmen in the different establishments, and also from the fact that the workmen in each establishment found themselves belonging to different Trade Unions. “The shop steward,” it has been pointed out, “was originally a minor official appointed from the men in a particular workshop and charged with the duty of seeing that all the Trade Union contributions were paid. He had other small duties. But gradually, as the branch got more and more out of touch with the men in the shop, these men came to look to the official who was on the spot to represent their grievances. During the war the development of the shop steward movement was very rapid, particularly in the engineering industry. In some big industrial concerns, composed of a large number of workshops, the committees of stewards from the various shops very largely took over the whole conduct of negotiations and arrangement of shop conditions. Further, a national organisation of shop stewards was formed, at first mainly for propagandist purposes. The existing unions have considered some of the activities of shop stewards to be unofficial, and there has been a good deal of dissension within the unions on this score. Attempts have been made to reach an agreement by which Shop Stewards’ Committees shall be fully recognised at once by the unions and by the managements. So far there has been no final settlement. An agreement was made in the early summer of 1919 between the Engineering Employers’ Federation and the Unions; how this will work in practice is not yet certain.” [607]

It must, in fact, be said that although the Engineering Trade Unions have during the past thirty years not taken much part in general Trade Union issues, they have (in contrast with some other sections) contributed freely in both men and ideas. We have already dwelt upon the activities of Mr. John Burns and Mr. Tom Mann. We shall mention the political progress of Mr. George Barnes, who is also of the A.S.E.; whilst the Friendly Society of Ironfounders has given Mr. Arthur Henderson to the Movement. And, in the long run possibly more important even than men, the ideas emanating from the engineering workshops have had a more than proportionate share in the ferment of these years. The vacancy in the office of General Secretary, occasioned by the election to the House of Commons of Mr. Robert Young, was filled in the autumn of 1919 by the election of Mr. Tom Mann; and this election, together with the great amalgamation of competing Unions brought about at the same time, may perhaps open up a new era in engineering Trade Unionism.

In contrast with the failure of Trade Unionism in the engineering trades either to develop a systematic organisation or to cope with the changes in processes and methods of remuneration, the two powerful Unions of boilermakers and shipwrights have gone from strength to strength, doubling their numbers, absorbing practically all the remaining local societies in their industry, and closely combining with each other in policy and other activities, concluding, indeed, in the autumn of 1919 an agreement to submit to their respective memberships a proposal for a formal amalgamation which may be joined by the strong society of Associated Blacksmiths. This would mean the consolidation, in one powerful Union of 170,000 members, of practically all the skilled craftsmen working in the construction of the hulls of ships, of boilers and tanks, and of steel bridge-work of all sorts. Concentrated largely in the ports of the north-east coast and those of the Clyde, with strong contingents in the relatively small number of other shipbuilding centres, the boilermakers and shipwrights have held their own in face of all the changes in their industry, and have known how to maintain a fairly uniform national policy.

Passing from engineering and shipbuilding to the smelting of the iron and steel from the ore, the one marked advance in organisation is that of the British Steel Smelters, which, established in 1886, and in 1892 having still only 2600 members, had by 1918, under the prudent leadership of Mr. John Hodge, drawn to itself over 40,000. The British steel smelters have the credit of equipping themselves with the most efficient office in the Trade Union world, with a real statistical department and a trained staff, including, for all their legal business, especially that connected with compensation for accidents, a qualified professional solicitor. Already before the outbreak of war a far-seeing policy of amalgamation had been virtually decided on; and in 1915 a scheme was prepared for the merging of all the six important Unions in the industry of obtaining the metal from the ore, including the operatives in the tinplate and rolling mills. The plan for surmounting the legal and other difficulties of amalgamation, of which we may ascribe the authorship to Mr. John Hodge, Mr. Pugh, and Mr. Percy Cole, the able officials of the British Steel Smelters’ Union, was one of extreme ingenuity as involving no more than a bare majority of the members voting, which deserves the attention of other societies as a “New Model.” Three only out of the six societies (the British Steel Smelters’ Association, the Associated Iron and Steel Workers of Great Britain, and the National Steel Workers’ Association) were able to go forward in 1917,[608] when a new society, the British Iron, Steel, and Kindred Trades Association, was formed. The four societies then created the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, to which they formally ceded powers and functions affecting the members of more than one of the constituent bodies, and therefore all general negotiations with the employers. The three old societies continued formally in existence, but they bound themselves not to enrol any new members, who were all to be taken by the new society, to which all the existing members were to be continuously urged to transfer themselves voluntarily. This process has already gone so far that the new society has swallowed up the British Steel Smelters’ Society, which has been wound up and completely merged in the new body, into which the empty shells of the other two old bodies will presently fall. The Iron and Steel Trades Confederation will then be composed of one society only, and may be kept alive only to serve the same transitional purpose for other incoming societies.