TRADE-UNIONS

§ I. THE OBJECTS OF TRADE-UNIONS

1. A trade-union is an association of wage-workers for purposes of mutual information, mutual help, and for the raising of wages. The term trade-union is used in a general sense both of combinations of workers in the same trade, and of men in different trades, though usually the latter are called labor-unions. The "Knights of Labor" is a good example of the labor-union, the "American Federation of Labor" of a combination of trade-unions. The Knights of Labor is composed of local branches to which workers of every class except lawyers and saloon-keepers are admitted. The Federation of Labor, however, is composed of chapters, or lodges, that are homogeneous, all the men of each lodge being in the same trade.

The definition given is broad enough to include the various degrees of help given and the various methods adopted by trade-unions to accomplish their objects. Trade-unions are mutual-benefit associations: insurance against accident, sickness, death, or lack of employment, forms an important part, and in some cases almost the whole of their work. All unions in a measure serve their members as employment bureaus, while in some unions this is a most important feature. Through trade-papers, correspondence, and personal meetings, information is exchanged regarding trade conditions, and great mutual service is thus rendered. But a great deal of the help given is in the more impersonal economic ways: help to get from the employers better wages, to secure shorter hours, to improve in various ways the conditions of employment.

2. The organization of workers has resulted from the separation of the economic and personal interests of employers and workmen. The control of industry has become more concentrated during the age of machinery, and this has reduced the feeling of economic unity among the different ranks of industry. There is now to the average workman no possibility of becoming a master, an employer. The largeness of industry forbids, moreover, the meeting and personal acquaintance of employer and workman which were before possible. Misunderstandings grow when men cannot talk over their differences. The social chasm has widened between the workmen and the responsible director of industry. As a result of these changes, the attitude of the employer very often has become that of the buyer of labor as a mere ware. He has with the mass of his employees no personal relations whatever. Under these conditions, when the employer feels the presence of competition, he is more likely to force the lowest wage that is possible. It is not unusual for the immediate direction of factories to be intrusted to paid managers, who are responsible to the stockholders and whose work is judged only by the dividends they succeed in earning. Many examples might be found where the managers or the resident owners have wished to pursue a more liberal policy than the absentee shareholders would permit.

3. The need of organization of labor has grown with the growth of factories and with the loss of personal touch among the workers. This is another aspect of the point just mentioned. The smaller the number of employers, the easier is it by an understanding to suppress competition on their side. If there is only one factory of a kind in a town or city, the employer is able to drive a harder bargain with the worker. Especially in times of industrial depression is a change of employment difficult for the laborer; it involves much risk, and loss of time and money in moving. In the long run competition must be felt even in such cases. The unfair employer will find his workmen drifting away, his force reduced in number and quality, and his evil reputation going abroad among workmen. But there is a great deal of friction in this adjustment and the loss falls largely upon the workman. In a large industry, especially, the workers have no personal acquaintance with each other, nothing to give them a sense of unity and power. In the old-fashioned shop, with its close association and its interchange of views, could grow up a strong public opinion; but in the wilderness of a modern factory the worker may be unknown in name and character to the man who touches elbows with him. Moreover, in America differences in nationality and in speech among immigrant workers is often an effective factor in preventing the assertion of their interests. There is an analogy (though it is only an analogy) between these conditions and the political conditions that have led pure democracies to give way to representative governments. So long as a community is small and men know each other personally, there may be popular government, but when the number becomes larger the only way in which public opinion can be concentrated and made effective is by delegating the functions of government to representatives.

4. The main objects of labor-unions to-day are to improve conditions in their working places, to maintain or increase wages, and to shorten working hours. Better conditions of safety and sanitation in their work were not the first thought of the unions. The workers, as a result of habit and ignorance, were strangely unconcerned about this matter. Reforms in this direction at the outset had to come largely from sympathetic observers. But since better ideals have been developed, organized laborers strive to improve the sanitary, moral, and other conditions in the places of work. Their main object, however, was for a long time to raise wages, or to resist any decrease. Shorter hours have been a prime object of recent years, and almost coördinate with that of higher wages. The eight-hour movement has declined somewhat of late, but a few years ago it seemed possible that the eight-hour day would become the rule. This aim has never been lost sight of, however, and now and then another step is taken toward it. Labor leaders have repeatedly asserted in recent years, when the two demands have been made together, that shorter hours were more desirable than increased wages.

§ II. THE METHODS OF TRADE-UNIONS

1. The union's first aim is to get control of all the labor force in the market, and to minimize competition among workers. Every labor federation aims to extend its control to every branch of its trade. A sense of wrong is one of the strongest forces to bring the workers into the organization. The appeal to a common interest is effective in times of great grievance, as it was effective in the dangerous times of the American Revolution, though failing during the Confederation. The unwilling are first persuaded, then coerced by threats, by petty persecutions, by the most cruel of all peaceful weapons, social ostracism, and finally by personal violence. The "public opinion" and class feeling fostered among workers by their organization are analogous to the sense of patriotism and loyalty in the country at large, and at times displace it, as is seen in the opposition to the militia and to the maintenance of public order at times of strikes. The individual who declines to enter the union is denounced as a traitor and made to feel the scorn of his associates. When all these measures fail, pressure is brought to bear upon the employer to get him to force the unwilling workers into the union.

2. Its next aim is to use collective in the place of individual bargaining, to force as much as the competitive wage, and more if possible. The term collective bargaining has been much used to describe bargaining between a group of labor leaders, the delegated representatives of the workingmen, and a group of employers or directors. It is sometimes claimed that all the trade-union seeks is to put the workman on an equality with the employer in bargaining, enabling him to get all he would if competition were free on both sides. It is said that organized labor simply prevents the employer from following the maxim of Napoleon to "divide and conquer," from meeting his employees one by one and forcing his own terms upon them. But the most effective argument in organizing the trade-union is that it forces a higher wage, more than the market would warrant. It is sometimes assumed by labor leaders that competitive wages would be very low, almost starvation wages, and anything above that level is credited to the work of the union; while in other cases where the wages are already large, the purpose frankly avowed is to limit the labor supply in the particular trade and to force a monopoly wage by any means possible. One's opinion of trade-unions is likely to differ according as they work in one or the other of these ways. The impartial onlooker sympathizes with the efforts of the trade-unions in so far as they serve merely to put the workers on an equality with the employers in bargaining. The public wants to see "fair play," and up to a certain point the union is merely a device to get fair play. But if the union is a device to defeat competition, to force artificially high wages, it will be judged differently. The public readily sees that if the unions force more than a fair and open market affords, it is rarely at the expense of the employer; that in the long run it is at the expense of the purchasing public itself, including the unprivileged workmen shut out from the monopoly of labor.

3. In order to accomplish their ends, the trade-unions seek to control their employers' business in various ways. They demand, first, that no non-union men shall be employed even at union wages; they demand that the employer shall help them to force his employees into the unions. In this very usual demand for the "closed shop" or "union shop" the public can see very little justice. On this point, nearly always, unions forfeit in a strike the sympathy of the public; yet the unions assert that it is almost absolutely necessary to gain this point in order to carry out their objects. If a union and a non-union man work side by side there are many ways in which the employer may make the union man suffer. If business slackens, it is likely to be the union man that is discharged; if any preference is given, it is to the non-union man. Certainly all will agree that if the unions are to get the strength to enforce all their demands it is essential that they make good this claim which leaves the employer almost helpless. Yet it certainly is not essential to the accomplishing of valuable services for the members of the union. The educational and mutual-benefit features are attained without this means; and much experience shows that, if their cause is strong, the organized men can carry with them a large proportion of the workers and the sympathy of the public in a contest for higher wages. It never has seemed to any considerable portion of the public any more desirable that organized labor through its officers should be able to dictate to employees, than that employers should crush the workmen. It is by just this assumption that union advocates beg the question of the "union shop."

Further, the unions direct and control the employment of labor, often limit the number of apprentices in a trade, and assume to determine who shall enjoy the privilege of learning it. They limit the output, fix the maximum amount, and forbid the use of labor-saving machinery. Whenever the unions are charged with these acts, labor leaders either deny the facts or avoid giving a direct answer, but there is no doubt that the charge is true in many ways and in many cases. The requirement that each special kind of work shall be controlled by a special trade, and disputes between rival trades, for which their jealousies are responsible, give rise to great annoyance, expense, and loss to employers and to the entire public.

4. The strike is a threat and a mode of attack to enforce the demands of the union. To most newly organized laborers the union appeals mainly as an instrument for striking, for threatening the employer or for making him suffer. When a new union is formed, it is nearly always dedicated by a strike, which is the simultaneous stopping of work by a number of workers. A strike is intended to force the employer to grant the wages and conditions demanded. Its effectiveness lies in the injury which it occasions or threatens in the stopping of machinery, the ruin of material, the loss of custom, and the failure to complete contracts undertaken. Its success being dependent on the inability of the employer to fill the places of the strikers, their energies are bent on persuading or coercing other workers from taking employment. There are many ways of coercing workers without personal violence. Public opinion does much, and probably the severest of all coercive measures is the social ostracism of the worker. What may be called the endless-chain boycott is an excommunication, without measure or limit, of the non-union worker and of every one in any way befriending him or the employer. So far as in their power lies, the enraged strikers dissolve the very bonds of society, brother casts off brother, and mother disowns son. The unhappy conditions in the coal regions in 1902 rivaled the tragedies of civil war. A reasonable use of the boycott, refusal to maintain social relations with the person who offends one, is doubtless a part of personal liberty; but the boycott, as experience shows, has moral limits, and it should have strict legal limits. Its use beyond the moderate limit of the first degree of personal relations is antisocial to the degree of criminality, whether it be used as the weapon of organized workers or of organized wealth.

When peaceable means fail, often there is a recourse to violence both against the employer and his property and against the non-union men. The evils of violence in strikes often are tardily recognized by the public, whose sympathy up to a certain point is with the striker as "the under dog." It is slow to realize that strike violence is mob-law. Whenever men of one group assume the right to coerce forcibly and to wreak their hatred against one of their fellow-workers, it is a blow at political liberty. No free society can safely go the first step in permitting one group of men to usurp control over others in this way.

5. The great losses caused by strikes are the penalty of an unsolved industrial problem. The losses to workers in wages, to employers and to investors in income and property, and to the public in interruption of business, aggregate an enormous sum. It is, however, impossible to estimate it at all exactly, as the losses are in many cases indirect and intangible. The strikers are concerned not with the balance of total losses and total gains to society as a whole, but with the net gain that in the long run accrues to them. It is true that there are indirect gains not easily calculable, as the advance of wages made to avoid a strike while the lesson of the consequences is still fresh. Opinion among workingmen is not a unit as to the value of strikes. A few years ago it seemed safe to say that strikes were declining as compared with the period of the early eighties. It is probably true, as is often said, that as laborers become educated they put less faith in strikes. The epidemic of labor troubles, marking the years from 1899 to 1903, gave no evidence of a decrease in the use of strikes, yet many of these were due to the recent organization in various trades. The coal strike of 1902, though doubtless due to real grievances, was opposed by the officers of the union, an unusually capable set of men, but the more violent and discordant elements overruled the more pacific counsels. The public is perhaps as favorable as it has ever been to the cause of labor, but it appears to have less patience with strikes than it had fifteen years ago, and strikes usually fail if not backed by public opinion. The public has not as yet thought out consistent conclusions on the question of the rights of the union. It is just now much impressed with the value of arbitration. As experience destroys the unsound sentiments, and divides the wise from the unwise measures, a peaceable solution of industrial differences must and will be found.

§ III. COMBINATION AND WAGES

1. Wages in particular industries often are maintained above the competitive rate. The older economic writers were somewhat unsympathetic with trade-unions, and were even inclined to deny that organization could be helpful in any way in raising wages. This view, it must now be recognized, was mistaken, and overlooked the hindrances to competition and the effective economic forces that organization can bring into play. The sympathies of most men favor the wage-earner so strongly that they hesitate to express an opinion in any way unfavorable to his efforts to raise wages. But the view of the economic theorist as to the services of the union cannot be as roseate as is that of the union labor leader. The general proposition, however, is applicable, that wherever it is possible to limit supply, prices may be raised. If men fitted to do a certain work are not permitted to do it, labor in the special industry becomes more scarce and consequently more highly valued. This involves the result that some men are forced to remain where they get lower wages than they could earn if free to act. The temporary need of the employer may enable the union to force from him a division of his profits. If the trade-union watches its opportunity and takes occasion to strike when a failure to fill orders would cause him great loss, it may compel him to pay for a time more than the normal value of the labor. It may well be doubted whether such action on the part of labor is generous, fair, honest, or in the long run wise; but that it may be immediately effective cannot be denied. By the principle of complementary goods an essential kind of labor can be given an artificially high value, if its supply can be controlled. If only the labor that is ready and willing to come in to take the place of the strikers can for a time be kept out, wages may be fixed practically according to monopoly principles, later to be discussed in connection with capitalistic organization.

2. Trade-unions can, in various but limited ways, set in motion economic forces to increase the productiveness of labor. It is difficult to take a moderate view of trade-unions; it is easier to go to one extreme or the other. In a book by Trant, reprinted from the English edition and circulated by the American Federation of Labor as representing its theory and claims, all the advances in wages that have been made are said to be due to the trade-unions. This claim is believed by many besides the members of trade-unions. The thought is sometimes expressed even by social students that but for the trade-unions wages in America would be the same as in 1850. Many well-known facts should cause such an opinion to be accepted with hesitation, to say the least. Only about one tenth of the workers in England are unionists and of the twenty-two million workers in the United States, far less than ten per cent. are organized. Can it be maintained that one tenth of the labor supply fixes the value of all? In many lines where labor is not organized, as in teaching, clerical positions, professional and domestic service, wages have risen even more than in organized trade. The evidence advanced to support the extreme claim is that wages are higher in some organized trades than in other unorganized trades requiring the same grade of laborers. Trant says that "where there are no unions wages should be lower. This is exactly the case"; and he quotes: "Wherever we find union principles ignored, a low rate of wages prevails and the reverse where organization is perfect." But he later explains in part this difference: "The union men are the best workmen and often employers pay a man more than union wages. This is not surprising as no man can be a union carpenter unless he be in good health, have worked a certain number of years at his trade, be a good workman, of steady habits and good moral character."

If this be true, it is in accordance with strict competitive principles that, as the elite of the trade, they should get higher wages than those outside. Moreover the unions exist mainly in the more populated places where cost of living, wages, and all prices range higher than in the towns. A much higher standard of work prevails in the cities, both among union and non-union men, and the old men and the inefficient drift away to the smaller towns and the places where wages are lower. Many of the differences are explicable without taking any account of the union. So far as unions tend toward intelligence, education, sobriety, efficiency, fuller and fairer competition, they are economic factors in all branches of industry, and it cannot be doubted that they do work in some measure in all these ways. So far also as they strengthen the bargaining power of the laborers, or as they can enforce a monopoly of labor in a particular trade and locality, they can secure the full competitive or even a monopoly price.

3. Wages viewed in general industry, and in the long run, are determined mainly by impersonal economic forces. That implies the converse, that they are not determined mainly by the trade-unions. This statement, in fact, is admitted in calmer moments by the extreme partisans of the unions. Even the book before quoted says somewhat vaguely that "it is an error to think that the trade-union seeks to determine the rate of wages. It cannot do that. It can do no more than affect them." Again it says: "Capital is increasing faster than population.... It seems therefore merely in obedience to natural laws that wages should rise." Men can easily see personal and immediate results. They cannot follow out the impersonal and ultimate workings of economic forces. The leaders make exaggerated claims; laborers believe them and pay their dues more readily; the public believes them and is the more inclined to pardon the excesses of so important an institution. That wages in a number of special trades are raised in a considerable degree cannot be questioned. The open or secret use of violence and other antisocial forces make much of this boasted service to some of the workers, an injury to others, and an occasion of reproach from the citizen who condemns the spirit of lawlessness thus encouraged. The chief factors tending to raise the general standard of wages are the productiveness of industry, peace, order, and security to wealth, honesty in man and master, in lawmaker and in judge, the efficiency and intelligence of the workers, and an earnest effort on their part to get the share that competition would accord them. Chiefly, though not exclusively, because of their bearing on this last factor, trade-unions have a useful, even though subordinate, part in the regulating of wages over the whole field of employment.