The Ethics Of Aristotle - free ebook by Aristotle

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The Ethics Of Aristotle

Aristotle

125 chapters

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125 chapters

Introduction by J. A. Smith

Introduction by J. A. Smith

The Ethics of Aristotle is one half of a single treatise of which his Politics is the other half. Both deal with one and the same subject. This subject is what Aristotle calls in one place the “philosophy of human affairs;” but more frequently Political or Social Science. In the two works taken together we have their author’s whole theory of human conduct or practical activity, that is, of all human activity which is not directed merely to knowledge or truth. The two parts of this treatise are m

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The following is a list of the works of Aristotle:—

The following is a list of the works of Aristotle:—

First edition of works (with omission of Rhetorica, Poetica, and second book of Economica), 5 vols by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1495 8, re impression supervised by Erasmus and with certain corrections by Grynaeus (including Rhetorica and Poetica), 1531, 1539, revised 1550, later editions were followed by that of Immanuel Bekker and Brandis (Greek and Latin), 5 vols. The 5th vol contains the Index by Bomtz, 1831-70, Didot edition (Greek and Latin), 5 vols 1848 74 ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS Edited by T Ta

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ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

Every art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like manner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some good: for which reason a common and by no means a bad description of the Chief Good is, “that which all things aim at.” Now there plainly is a difference in the Ends proposed: for in some cases they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible results beyond and beside the acts of working: and where there are certain Ends beyond and beside the a

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Chapter I.

Chapter I.

We must be content then, in speaking of such things and from such data, to set forth the truth roughly and in outline; in other words, since we are speaking of general matter and from general data, to draw also conclusions merely general. And in the same spirit should each person receive what we say: for the man of education will seek exactness so far in each subject as the nature of the thing admits, it being plainly much the same absurdity to put up with a mathematician who tries to persuade i

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced, since all knowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or another, what good is that which we say πολιτικὴ aims at? or, in other words, what is the highest of all the goods which are the objects of action? So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for HAPPINESS both the multitude and the refined few call it, and “living well” and “doing well” they conceive to be the same with “being happy;” but about the Nature of

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

But to return from this digression. Now of the Chief Good ( i.e. of Happiness) men seem to form their notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect: the many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are content with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines of life which stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and the life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation. Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

And now let us revert to the Good of which we are in search: what can it be? for manifestly it is different in different actions and arts: for it is different in the healing art and in the art military, and similarly in the rest. What then is the Chief Good in each? Is it not “that for the sake of which the other things are done?” and this in the healing art is health, and in the art military victory, and in that of house-building a house, and in any other thing something else; in short, in ever

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

But, it may be, to call Happiness the Chief Good is a mere truism, and what is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this object may be easily attained, when we have discovered what is the work of man; for as in the case of flute-player, statuary, or artisan of any kind, or, more generally, all who have any work or course of action, their Chief Good and Excellence is thought to reside in their work, so it would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him. Are we t

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

We must now enquire concerning Happiness, not only from our conclusion and the data on which our reasoning proceeds, but likewise from what is commonly said about it: because with what is true all things which really are are in harmony, but with that which is false the true very soon jars. Now there is a common division of goods into three classes; one being called external, the other two those of the soul and body respectively, and those belonging to the soul we call most properly and specially

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

And hence too a question is raised, whether it is a thing that can be learned, or acquired by habituation or discipline of some other kind, or whether it comes in the way of divine dispensation, or even in the way of chance. Now to be sure, if anything else is a gift of the Gods to men, it is probable that Happiness is a gift of theirs too, and specially because of all human goods it is the highest. But this, it may be, is a question belonging more properly to an investigation different from our

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

Are we then to call no man happy while he lives, and, as Solon would have us, look to the end? And again, if we are to maintain this position, is a man then happy when he is dead? or is not this a complete absurdity, specially in us who say Happiness is a working of a certain kind? If on the other hand we do not assert that the dead man is happy, and Solon does not mean this, but only that one would then be safe in pronouncing a man happy, as being thenceforward out of the reach of evils and mis

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

Now that the fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally, contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is plainly a very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions. But since things which befall are many, and differ in all kinds of ways, and some touch more nearly, others less, to go into minute particular distinctions would evidently be a long and endless task: and so it may suffice to speak generally and in outline. If then, as of the misfortunes which hap

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Chapter X.

Chapter X.

Having determined these points, let us examine with respect to Happiness, whether it belongs to the class of things praiseworthy or things precious; for to that of faculties [38] it evidently does not. Now it is plain that everything which is a subject of praise is praised for being of a certain kind and bearing a certain relation to something else: for instance, the just, and the valiant, and generally the good man, and virtue itself, we praise because of the actions and the results: and the st

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Chapter XI.

Chapter XI.

Moreover, since Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way of perfect Excellence, we must enquire concerning Excellence: for so probably shall we have a clearer view concerning Happiness; and again, he who is really a statesman is generally thought to have spent most pains on this, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. (For examples of this class we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians and whatever other such there have been.) But if this inv

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

Since then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation, as it is of some others (for we are enquiring not merely that we may know what virtue is but that we may become virtuous, else it would have been useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we are to do them, because, as we have just said, the quality of the habits that shall be formed depends on these. Now, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a general maxim, and may for the present be taken

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

Now I can conceive a person perplexed as to the meaning of our statement, that men must do just actions to become just, and those of self-mastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery; “for,” he would say, “if men are doing the actions they have the respective virtues already, just as men are grammarians or musicians when they do the actions of either art.” May we not reply by saying that it is not so even in the case of the arts referred to: because a man may produce something grammatical either

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

Next, we must examine what Virtue is. [9] Well, since the things which come to be in the mind are, in all, of three kinds, Feelings, Capacities, States, Virtue of course must belong to one of the three classes. By Feelings, I mean such as lust, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, compassion, in short all such as are followed by pleasure or pain: by Capacities, those in right of which we are said to be capable of these feelings; as by virtue of which we are

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

Now what the genus of Virtue is has been said; but we must not merely speak of it thus, that it is a state but say also what kind of a state it is. We must observe then that all excellence makes that whereof it is the excellence both to be itself in a good state and to perform its work well. The excellence of the eye, for instance, makes both the eye good and its work also: for by the excellence of the eye we see well. So too the excellence of the horse makes a horse good, and good in speed, and

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

Virtue then is “a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and [14] as the man of practical wisdom would determine.” It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed, what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but Virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean. And

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

It is not enough, however, to state this in general terms, we must also apply it to particular instances, because in treatises on moral conduct general statements have an air of vagueness, but those which go into detail one of greater reality: for the actions after all must be in detail, and the general statements, to be worth anything, must hold good here. We must take these details then from the well-known scheme. [15] I. In respect of fears and confidence or boldness: The Mean state is Courag

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

Now as there are three states in each case, two faulty either in the way of excess or defect, and one right, which is the mean state, of course all are in a way opposed to one another; the extremes, for instance, not only to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to the extremes: for just as the half is greater if compared with the less portion, and less if compared with the greater, so the mean states, compared with the defects, exceed, whether in feelings or actions, and vice versa . T

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

Now that Moral Virtue is a mean state, and how it is so, and that it lies between two faulty states, one in the way of excess and another in the way of defect, and that it is so because it has an aptitude to aim at the mean both in feelings and actions, all this has been set forth fully and sufficiently. And so it is hard to be good: for surely hard it is in each instance to find the mean, just as to find the mean point or centre of a circle is not what any man can do, but only he who knows how:

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Chapter I.

Chapter I.

Some acts perhaps there are for which compulsion cannot be pleaded, but a man should rather suffer the worst and die; how absurd, for instance, are the pleas of compulsion with which Alcmaeon in Euripides’ play excuses his matricide! But it is difficult sometimes to decide what kind of thing should be chosen instead of what, or what endured in preference to what, and much moreso to abide by one’s decisions: for in general the alternatives are painful, and the actions required are base, and so pr

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

Now every action of which ignorance is the cause is not-voluntary, but that only is involuntary which is attended with pain and remorse; for clearly the man who has done anything by reason of ignorance, but is not annoyed at his own action, cannot be said to have done it with his will because he did not know he was doing it, nor again against his will because he is not sorry for it. So then of the class “acting by reason of ignorance,” he who feels regret afterwards is thought to be an involunta

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

Now since all involuntary action is either upon compulsion or by reason of ignorance, Voluntary Action would seem to be “that whose origination is in the agent, he being aware of the particular details in which the action consists.” For, it may be, men are not justified by calling those actions involuntary, which are done by reason of Anger or Lust. Because, in the first place, if this be so no other animal but man, and not even children, can be said to act voluntarily. Next, is it meant that we

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

Having thus drawn out the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action our next step is to examine into the nature of Moral Choice, because this seems most intimately connected with Virtue and to be a more decisive test of moral character than a man’s acts are. Now Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive, voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first, children and all other animals share in voluntary action but not in Moral Choice; and next, sudden ac

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

Well then; do men deliberate about everything, and is anything soever the object of Deliberation, or are there some matters with respect to which there is none? (It may be as well perhaps to say, that by “object of Deliberation” is meant such matter as a sensible man would deliberate upon, not what any fool or madman might.) Well: about eternal things no one deliberates; as, for instance, the universe, or the incommensurability of the diameter and side of a square. Nor again about things which a

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

That Wish has for its object-matter the End, has been already stated; but there are two opinions respecting it; some thinking that its object is real good, others whatever impresses the mind with a notion of good. Now those who maintain that the object of Wish is real good are beset by this difficulty, that what is wished for by him who chooses wrongly is not really an object of Wish (because, on their theory, if it is an object of wish, it must be good, but it is, in the case supposed, evil). T

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

Now since the End is the object of Wish, and the means to the End of Deliberation and Moral Choice, the actions regarding these matters must be in the way of Moral Choice, i.e. voluntary: but the acts of working out the virtues are such actions, and therefore Virtue is in our power. And so too is Vice: because wherever it is in our power to do it is also in our power to forbear doing, and vice versâ : therefore if the doing (being in a given case creditable) is in our power, so too is the forbea

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

Well now, we have stated generally respecting the Moral Virtues, the genus (in outline), that they are mean states, and that they are habits, and how they are formed, and that they are of themselves calculated to act upon the circumstances out of which they were formed, and that they are in our own power and voluntary, and are to be done so as right Reason may direct. But the particular actions and the habits are not voluntary in the same sense; for of the actions we are masters from beginning t

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

Here we will resume the particular discussion of the Moral Virtues, and say what they are, what is their object-matter, and how they stand respectively related to it: of course their number will be thereby shown. First, then, of Courage. Now that it is a mean state, in respect of fear and boldness, has been already said: further, the objects of our fears are obviously things fearful or, in a general way of statement, evils; which accounts for the common definition of fear, viz. “expectation of e

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Chapter X.

Chapter X.

Again, fearful is a term of relation, the same thing not being so to all, and there is according to common parlance somewhat so fearful as to be beyond human endurance: this of course would be fearful to every man of sense, but those objects which are level to the capacity of man differ in magnitude and admit of degrees, so too the objects of confidence or boldness. Now the Brave man cannot be frighted from his propriety (but of course only so far as he is man); fear such things indeed he will,

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Chapter XI.

Chapter XI.

Courage proper is somewhat of the kind I have described, but there are dispositions, differing in five ways, [18] which also bear in common parlance the name of Courage. We will take first that which bears most resemblance to the true, the Courage of Citizenship, so named because the motives which are thought to actuate the members of a community in braving danger are the penalties and disgrace held out by the laws to cowardice, and the dignities conferred on the Brave; which is thought to be th

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Chapter XII.

Chapter XII.

We have described then what kind of men the Brave are, and what they who are thought to be, but are not really, Brave. It must be remarked, however, that though Courage has for its object-matter boldness and fear it has not both equally so, but objects of fear much more than the former; for he that under pressure of these is undisturbed and stands related to them as he ought is better entitled to the name of Brave than he who is properly affected towards objects of confidence. So then men are te

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Chapter XIII.

Chapter XIII.

Next let us speak of Perfected Self-Mastery, which seems to claim the next place to Courage, since these two are the Excellences of the Irrational part of the Soul. That it is a mean state, having for its object-matter Pleasures, we have already said (Pains being in fact its object-matter in a less degree and dissimilar manner), the state of utter absence of self-control has plainly the same object-matter; the next thing then is to determine what kind of Pleasures. Let Pleasures then be understo

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Chapter XIV.

Chapter XIV.

Now the vice of being destitute of all Self-Control seems to be more truly voluntary than Cowardice, because pleasure is the cause of the former and pain of the latter, and pleasure is an object of choice, pain of avoidance. And again, pain deranges and spoils the natural disposition of its victim, whereas pleasure has no such effect and is more voluntary and therefore more justly open to reproach. It is so also for the following reason; that it is easier to be inured by habit to resist the obje

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Chapter I.

Chapter I.

Furthermore: all the actions done in accordance with virtue are honourable, and done from the motive of honour: and the Liberal man, therefore, will give from a motive of honour, and will give rightly; I mean, to proper persons, in right proportion, at right times, and whatever is included in the term “right giving:” and this too with positive pleasure, or at least without pain, since whatever is done in accordance with virtue is pleasant or at least not unpleasant, most certainly not attended w

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

But the Prodigal man goes wrong also in these points, for he is neither pleased nor pained at proper objects or in proper manner, which will become more plain as we proceed. We have said already that Prodigality and Stinginess are respectively states of excess and defect, and this in two things, giving and receiving (expenditure of course we class under giving). Well now, Prodigality exceeds in giving and forbearing to receive and is deficient in receiving, while Stinginess is deficient in givin

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

Next in order would seem to come a dissertation on Magnificence, this being thought to be, like liberality, a virtue having for its object-matter Wealth; but it does not, like that, extend to all transactions in respect of Wealth, but only applies to such as are expensive, and in these circumstances it exceeds liberality in respect of magnitude, because it is (what the very name in Greek hints at) fitting expense on a large scale: this term is of course relative: I mean, the expenditure of equip

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

The very name of Great-mindedness implies, that great things are its object-matter; and we will first settle what kind of things. It makes no difference, of course, whether we regard the moral state in the abstract or as exemplified in an individual. Well then, he is thought to be Great-minded who values himself highly and at the same time justly, because he that does so without grounds is foolish, and no virtuous character is foolish or senseless. Well, the character I have described is Great-m

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

This then is my idea of the Great-minded man; and he who is in the defect is a Small-minded man, he who is in the excess a Vain man. However, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed, these extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only mistaken, for they do no harm. The Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from not having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

Well, the virtue of Great-mindedness has for its object great Honour, as we have said: and there seems to be a virtue having Honour also for its object (as we stated in the former book), which may seem to bear to Great-mindedness the same relation that Liberality does to Magnificence: that is, both these virtues stand aloof from what is great but dispose us as we ought to be disposed towards moderate and small matters. Further: as in giving and receiving of wealth there is a mean state, an exces

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

Meekness is a mean state, having for its object-matter Anger: and as the character in the mean has no name, and we may almost say the same of the extremes, we give the name of Meekness (leaning rather to the defect, which has no name either) to the character in the mean. The excess may be called an over-aptness to Anger: for the passion is Anger, and the producing causes many and various. Now he who is angry at what and with whom he ought, and further, in right manner and time, and for proper le

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

Next, as regards social intercourse and interchange of words and acts, some men are thought to be Over-Complaisant who, with a view solely to giving pleasure, agree to everything and never oppose, but think their line is to give no pain to those they are thrown amongst: they, on the other hand, are called Cross and Contentious who take exactly the contrary line to these, and oppose in everything, and have no care at all whether they give pain or not. Now it is quite clear of course, that the sta

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

The mean state which steers clear of Exaggeration has pretty much the same object-matter as the last we described, and likewise has no name appropriated to it. Still it may be as well to go over these states: because, in the first place, by a particular discussion of each we shall be better acquainted with the general subject of moral character, and next we shall be the more convinced that the virtues are mean states by seeing that this is universally the case. In respect then of living in socie

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Chapter X.

Chapter X.

Next, as life has its pauses and in them admits of pastime combined with Jocularity, it is thought that in this respect also there is a kind of fitting intercourse, and that rules may be prescribed as to the kind of things one should say and the manner of saying them; and in respect of hearing likewise (and there will be a difference between the saying and hearing such and such things). It is plain that in regard to these things also there will be an excess and defect and a mean. Now they who ex

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Chapter XI.

Chapter XI.

To speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more like a feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be “a kind of fear of disgrace,” and its effects are similar to those of the fear of danger, for they who feel Shame grow red and they who fear death turn pale. So both are evidently in a way physical, which is thought to be a mark of a feeling rather than a moral state. Moreover, it is a feeling not suitable to every age, but only to youth: we do think that the young

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

We said that the violator of Law is Unjust, and the keeper of the Law Just: further, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just, because by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the legislative power and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too give directions on all points, aiming either at the common good of all, or that of the best, or that of those in power (taking for the standard real goodness or adopting some other estimate); in one way we mean by Just, those thing

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

But the object of our enquiry is Justice, in the sense in which it is a part of Virtue (for there is such a thing, as we commonly say), and likewise with respect to particular Injustice. And of the existence of this last the following consideration is a proof: there are many vices by practising which a man acts unjustly, of course, but does not grasp at more than his share of good; if, for instance, by reason of cowardice he throws away his shield, or by reason of ill-temper he uses abusive lang

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

Now that there is more than one kind of Justice, and that there is one which is distinct from and besides that which is co-extensive with, Virtue, is plain: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are its characteristics. Well, the Unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unequal, and the Just accordingly into the lawful and the equal: the aforementioned Injustice is in the way of the unlawful. And as the unequal and the more [7] are not the same, but differing as part to whole (bec

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

Now of the Particular Justice, and the Just involved in it, one species is that which is concerned in the distributions of honour, or wealth, or such other things as are to be shared among the members of the social community (because in these one man as compared with another may have either an equal or an unequal share), and the other is that which is Corrective in the various transactions between man and man. And of this latter there are two parts: because of transactions some are voluntary and

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

Well, the unjust man we have said is unequal, and the abstract “Unjust” unequal: further, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal, that is to say, the equal or exact half (because in whatever action there is the greater and the less there is also the equal, i.e. the exact half). If then the Unjust is unequal the Just is equal, which all must allow without further proof: and as the equal is a mean the Just must be also a mean. Now the equal implies two terms at least: it follows then t

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

And the remaining one is the Corrective, which arises in voluntary as well as involuntary transactions. Now this just has a different form from the aforementioned; for that which is concerned in distribution of common property is always according to the aforementioned proportion: I mean that, if the division is made out of common property, the shares will bear the same proportion to one another as the original contributions did: and the Unjust which is opposite to this Just is that which violate

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

There are people who have a notion that Reciprocation is simply just, as the Pythagoreans said: for they defined the Just simply and without qualification as “That which reciprocates with another.” But this simple Reciprocation will not fit on either to the Distributive Just, or the Corrective (and yet this is the interpretation they put on the Rhadamanthian rule of Just, If a man should suffer what he hath done, then there would be straightforward justice;”) for in many cases differences arise:

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

We have now said then what the abstract Just and Unjust are, and these having been defined it is plain that just acting is a mean between acting unjustly and being acted unjustly towards: the former being equivalent to having more, and the latter to having less. But Justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not after the same manner as the forementioned virtues, but because it aims at producing the mean, while Injustice occupies both the extremes. And Justice is the moral state in virtue of

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Chapter X.

Chapter X.

[Again, since a man may do unjust acts and not yet have formed a character of injustice, the question arises whether a man is unjust in each particular form of injustice, say a thief, or adulterer, or robber, by doing acts of a given character. We may say, I think, that this will not of itself make any difference; a man may, for instance, have had connection with another’s wife, knowing well with whom he was sinning, but he may have done it not of deliberate choice but from the impulse of passio

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Chapter XI.

Chapter XI.

Now of Justs and Lawfuls each bears to the acts which embody and exemplify it the relation of an universal to a particular; the acts being many, but each of the principles only singular because each is an universal. And so there is a difference between an unjust act and the abstract Unjust, and the just act and the abstract Just: I mean, a thing is unjust in itself, by nature or by ordinance; well, when this has been embodied in act, there is an unjust act, but not till then, only some unjust th

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Chapter XII.

Chapter XII.

Now a question may be raised whether we have spoken with sufficient distinctness as to being unjustly dealt with, and dealing unjustly towards others. First, whether the case is possible which Euripides has put, saying somewhat strangely, “My mother he hath slain; the tale is short, Either he willingly did slay her willing, Or else with her will but against his own.” I mean then, is it really possible for a person to be unjustly dealt with with his own consent, or must every case of being unjust

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Chapter XIII.

Chapter XIII.

There remain yet two points on which we purposed to speak: first, is he chargeable with an unjust act who in distribution has given the larger share to one party contrary to the proper rate, or he that has the larger share? next, can a man deal unjustly by himself? In the first question, if the first-named alternative is possible and it is the distributor who acts unjustly and not he who has the larger share, then supposing that a person knowingly and willingly gives more to another than to hims

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Chapter XIV.

Chapter XIV.

Now men suppose that acting Unjustly rests entirely with themselves, and conclude that acting Justly is therefore also easy. But this is not really so; to have connection with a neighbour’s wife, or strike one’s neighbour, or give the money with one’s hand, is of course easy and rests with one’s self: but the doing these acts with certain inward dispositions neither is easy nor rests entirely with one’s self. And in like way, the knowing what is Just and what Unjust men think no great instance o

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Chapter XV.

Chapter XV.

We have next to speak of Equity and the Equitable, that is to say, of the relations of Equity to Justice and the Equitable to the Just; for when we look into the matter the two do not appear identical nor yet different in kind; and we sometimes commend the Equitable and the man who embodies it in his actions, so that by way of praise we commonly transfer the term also to other acts instead of the term good, thus showing that the more Equitable a thing is the better it is: at other times followin

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Chapter XVI.

Chapter XVI.

The answer to the second of the two questions indicated above, “whether it is possible for a man to deal unjustly by himself,” is obvious from what has been already stated. In the first place, one class of Justs is those which are enforced by law in accordance with Virtue in the most extensive sense of the term: for instance, the law does not bid a man kill himself; and whatever it does not bid it forbids: well, whenever a man does hurt contrary to the law (unless by way of requital of hurt), vo

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Chapter XVII.

Chapter XVII.

It is obvious, moreover, that being Unjustly dealt by and dealing Unjustly by others are both wrong; because the one is having less, the other having more, than the mean, and the case is parallel to that of the healthy in the healing art, and that of good condition in the art of training: but still the dealing Unjustly by others is the worst of the two, because this involves wickedness and is blameworthy; wickedness, I mean, either wholly, or nearly so (for not all voluntary wrong implies injust

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

There are in the Soul three functions on which depend moral action and truth; Sense, Intellect, Appetition, whether vague Desire or definite Will. Now of these Sense is the originating cause of no moral action, as is seen from the fact that brutes have Sense but are in no way partakers of moral action. [5] [Intellect and Will are thus connected,] what in the Intellectual operation is Affirmation and Negation that in the Will is Pursuit and Avoidance, And so, since Moral Virtue is a State apt to

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

Commencing then from the point stated above we will now speak of these Excellences again. Let those faculties whereby the Soul attains truth in Affirmation or Negation, be assumed to be in number five: [10] viz. Art, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, Intuition: (Supposition and Opinion I do not include, because by these one may go wrong.) What Knowledge is, is plain from the following of considerations, if one is to speak accurately, instead of being led away by resemblances. For we all conc

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

Matter which may exist otherwise than it actually does in any given case (commonly called Contingent) is of two kinds, that which is the object of Making, and that which is the object of Doing; now Making and Doing are two different things (as we show in the exoteric treatise), and so that state of mind, conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Do, is distinct from that also conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Make: and for this reason they are not included one by the other, that is, Doing is n

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

As for Practical Wisdom, we shall ascertain its nature by examining to what kind of persons we in common language ascribe it. [16] It is thought then to be the property of the Practically Wise man to be able to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for himself, not in any definite line, [17] as what is conducive to health or strength, but what to living well. A proof of this is that we call men Wise in this or that, when they calculate well with a view to some good end in a case

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

Now Knowledge is a conception concerning universals and Necessary matter, and there are of course certain First Principles in all trains of demonstrative reasoning (that is of all Knowledge because this is connected with reasoning): that faculty, then, which takes in the first principles of that which comes under the range of Knowledge, cannot be either Knowledge, or Art, or Practical Wisdom: not Knowledge, because what is the object of Knowledge must be derived from demonstrative reasoning; not

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

Science is a term we use principally in two meanings: in the first place, in the Arts we ascribe it to those who carry their arts to the highest accuracy; [22] Phidias, for instance, we call a Scientific or cunning sculptor; Polycleitus a Scientific or cunning statuary; meaning, in this instance, nothing else by Science than an excellence of art: in the other sense, we think some to be Scientific in a general way, not in any particular line or in any particular thing, just as Homer says of a man

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

But Practical Wisdom is employed upon human matters, and such as are objects of deliberation (for we say, that to deliberate well is most peculiarly the work of the man who possesses this Wisdom), and no man deliberates about things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor about any save those that have some definite End and this End good resulting from Moral Action; and the man to whom we should give the name of Good in Counsel, simply and without modification, is he who in the way of calcu

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

Now the acts of enquiring and deliberating differ, though deliberating is a kind of enquiring. We ought to ascertain about Good Counsel likewise what it is, whether a kind of Knowledge, or Opinion, or Happy Conjecture, or some other kind of faculty. Knowledge it obviously is not, because men do not enquire about what they know, and Good Counsel is a kind of deliberation, and the man who is deliberating is enquiring and calculating. Neither is it Happy Conjecture; because this is independent of r

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Chapter X.

Chapter X.

There is too the faculty of Judiciousness, and also its absence, in virtue of which we call men Judicious or the contrary. Now Judiciousness is neither entirely identical with Knowledge or Opinion (for then all would have been Judicious), nor is it any one specific science, as medical science whose object matter is things wholesome; or geometry whose object matter is magnitude: for it has not for its object things which always exist and are immutable, nor of those things which come into being ju

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Chapter XI.

Chapter XI.

Now all these mental states [41] tend to the same object, as indeed common language leads us to expect: I mean, we speak of γνώμη, Judiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition, attributing the possession of γνώμη and Practical Intuition to the same Individuals whom we denominate Practically-Wise and Judicious: because all these faculties are employed upon the extremes, [42] i.e. on particular details; and in right of his aptitude for deciding on the matters which come within the prov

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Chapter XII.

Chapter XII.

Well, we have now stated the nature and objects of Practical Wisdom and Science respectively, and that they belong each to a different part of the Soul. But I can conceive a person questioning their utility. “Science,” he would say, “concerns itself with none of the causes of human happiness (for it has nothing to do with producing anything): Practical Wisdom has this recommendation, I grant, but where is the need of it, since its province is those things which are just and honourable, and good

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

On ἐπισπήμη, from I. Post. Analyt. chap. i. and ii. (Such parts only are translated as throw light on the Ethics.) All teaching, and all intellectual learning, proceeds on the basis of previous knowledge, as will appear on an examination of all. The Mathematical Sciences, and every other system, draw their conclusions in this method. So too of reasonings, whether by syllogism, or induction: for both teach through what is previously known, the former assuming the premisses as from wise men, the l

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Chapter I.

Chapter I.

V. Some confound the two characters of the man who has no Self-Control, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control , while others distinguish between them. VI. It is sometimes said that the man of Practical Wisdom cannot be a man of Imperfect Self-Control, sometimes that men who are Practically Wise and Clever are of Imperfect Self-Control. VII. Again, men are said to be of Imperfect Self-Control, not simply but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of anger, of honour, and gain. Thes

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

Now a man may raise a question as to the nature of the right conception in violation of which a man fails of Self-Control. That he can so fail when knowing in the strict sense what is right some say is impossible: for it is a strange thing, as Socrates thought, that while Knowledge is present in his mind something else should master him and drag him about like a slave. Socrates in fact contended generally against the theory, maintaining there is no such state as that of Imperfect Self-Control, f

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

Now we must examine first whether men of Imperfect Self-Control act with a knowledge of what is right or not: next, if with such knowledge, in what sense; and next what are we to assume is the object-matter of the man of Imperfect Self-Control, and of the man of Self-Control; I mean, whether pleasure and pain of all kinds or certain definite ones; and as to Self-Control and Endurance, whether these are designations of the same character or different. And in like manner we must go into all questi

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

The next question to be discussed is whether there is a character to be designated by the term “of Imperfect Self-Control” simply, or whether all who are so are to be accounted such, in respect of some particular thing; and, if there is such a character, what is his object-matter. Now that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of men of Self-Control and of Endurance, and also of men of Imperfect Self-Control and Softness, is plain. Further, things which produce pleasure are either necessary,

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

As there are some things naturally pleasant, and of these two kinds; those, namely, which are pleasant generally, and those which are so relatively to particular kinds of animals and men; so there are others which are not naturally pleasant but which come to be so in consequence either of maimings, or custom, or depraved natural tastes: and one may observe moral states similar to those we have been speaking of, having respectively these classes of things for their object-matter. I mean the Bruti

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

It is plain then that the object-matter of Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control is restricted to the same as that of utter absence of Self-Control and that of Perfected Self-Mastery, and that the rest is the object-matter of a different species so named metaphorically and not simply: we will now examine the position, “that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of Lusts.” In the first place, it seems that Anger does in a way listen to Reason but mi

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

Now with respect to the pleasures and pains which come to a man through Touch and Taste, and the desiring or avoiding such (which we determined before to constitute the object-matter of the states of utter absence of Self-Control and Perfected Self-Mastery), one may be so disposed as to yield to temptations to which most men would be superior, or to be superior to those to which most men would yield: in respect of pleasures, these characters will be respectively the man of Imperfect Self-Control

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

Next comes the question, whether a man is a man of Self-Control for abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of what kind they may, or only by the right one; or again, a man of Imperfect Self-Control for not abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of whatever kind; or, to put the case we did before, is he such for not abiding by false conclusions and wrong moral choice? Is not this the truth, that incidentally it is by conclusions and moral choice of any kind that the one

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

Moreover as there is a character who takes less pleasure than he ought in bodily enjoyments, and he also fails to abide by the conclusion of his Reason, [20] the man of Self-Control is the mean between him and the man of Imperfect Self-Control: that is to say, the latter fails to abide by them because of somewhat too much, the former because of somewhat too little; while the man of Self-Control abides by them, and never changes by reason of anything else than such conclusions. Now of course sinc

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APPENDIX. Book VII. Chapters 12 to 15. (Bekker.)

APPENDIX. Book VII. Chapters 12 to 15. (Bekker.)

To consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain falls within the province of the Social-Science Philosopher, since he it is who has to fix the Master-End which is to guide us in dominating any object absolutely evil or good. But we may say more: an enquiry into their nature is absolutely necessary. First, because we maintained that Moral Virtue and Moral Vice are both concerned with Pains and Pleasures: next, because the greater part of mankind assert that Happiness must include Pleasure (which by

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

Again, some men push their enquiries on these points higher and reason physically: as Euripides, who says, “The earth by drought consumed doth love the rain, And the great heaven, overcharged with rain, Doth love to fall in showers upon the earth.” Heraclitus, again, maintains, that “contrariety is expedient, and that the best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things come into being in the way of the principle of antagonism.” Empedocles, among others, in direct opposition to t

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

Our view will soon be cleared on these points when we have ascertained what is properly the object-matter of Friendship: for it is thought that not everything indiscriminately, but some peculiar matter alone, is the object of this affection; that is to say, what is good, or pleasurable, or useful. Now it would seem that that is useful through which accrues any good or pleasure, and so the objects of Friendship, as absolute Ends, are the good and the pleasurable. A question here arises; whether i

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

As the motives to Friendship differ in kind so do the respective feelings and Friendships. The species then of Friendship are three, in number equal to the objects of it, since in the line of each there may be “mutual affection mutually known.” Now they who have Friendship for one another desire one another’s good according to the motive of their Friendship; accordingly they whose motive is utility have no Friendship for one another really, but only in so far as some good arises to them from one

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men wish one another’s good in similar ways; in so far as they are good (and good they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who wish good to their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus towards them on their own account and not as a mere matter of result; so the Friendship between these men continues to subsist so long as they are good; and

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are termed good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of acts of working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who live together take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but they who are asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but only are in such a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at all: distance has in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only prevents the a

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

The connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship par excellence , as has already been frequently said: since that which is abstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendship and choice-worthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him; and the good man to the good man for both these reasons. (Now the entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship itself like a state: because the former may have for its object even things inanimate, but requital

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

Now all the kinds of Friendship which have been already mentioned exist in a state of equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to both and they wish the same things to one another, or else they barter one thing against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it has been said already that Friendships of this latter kind are less intense in degree and less permanent. And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which makes them to be thought to be and not to

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same persons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some principle of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends, for instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in like manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in other ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is co-extensive with the Communi

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Chapter X.

Chapter X.

Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number are the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them. The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the principle of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I give to it the name of a political constitution because people commonly do so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst. From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being Monarchies but widely differing f

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Chapter XI.

Chapter XI.

Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that between a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that he is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends his flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, “shepherd of the people.” And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only that

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Chapter XII.

Chapter XII.

Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been already stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest the Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men of the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly, it would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in right of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank also the Friendship of Hospitality, The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of

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Chapter XIII.

Chapter XIII.

There are then, as was stated at the commencement of this book, three kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends on a footing of equality and friends in the relation of superior and inferior; we find, I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become friends, and better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their mutual profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then, those who are equal sho

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Chapter XIV.

Chapter XIV.

Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are unequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater share, and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up. The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater share pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the good man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than that other to him: “one who is useless,” they say, “ought not to share equally, for it c

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

Questions also arise upon such points as the following: Whether one’s father has an unlimited claim on one’s services and obedience, or whether the sick man is to obey his physician? or, in an election of a general, the warlike qualities of the candidates should be alone regarded? In like manner whether one should do a service rather to one’s friend or to a good man? whether one should rather requite a benefactor or give to one’s companion, supposing that both are not within one’s power? Is not

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

A question is also raised as to the propriety of dissolving or not dissolving those Friendships the parties to which do not remain what they were when the connection was formed. Now surely in respect of those whose motive to Friendship is utility or pleasure there can be nothing wrong in breaking up the connection when they no longer have those qualities; because they were friends [not of one another, but] of those qualities: and, these having failed, it is only reasonable to expect that they sh

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

Now the friendly feelings which are exhibited towards our friends, and by which Friendships are characterised, seem to have sprung out of those which we entertain toward ourselves. I mean, people define a friend to be “one who intends and does what is good (or what he believes to be good) to another for that other’s sake,” or “one who wishes his friend to be and to live for that friend’s own sake” (which is the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of friends who have come into collisio

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

Kindly Feeling, though resembling Friendship, is not identical with it, because it may exist in reference to those whom we do not know and without the object of it being aware of its existence, which Friendship cannot. (This, by the way, has also been said before.) And further, it is not even Affection because it does not imply intensity nor yearning, which are both consequences of Affection. Again Affection requires intimacy but Kindly Feeling may arise quite suddenly, as happens sometimes in r

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

Unity of Sentiment is also plainly connected with Friendship, and therefore is not the same as Unity of Opinion, because this might exist even between people unacquainted with one another. Nor do men usually say people are united in sentiment merely because they agree in opinion on any point, as, for instance, on points of astronomical science (Unity of Sentiment herein not having any connection with Friendship), but they say that Communities have Unity of Sentiment when they agree respecting po

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

Benefactors are commonly held to have more Friendship for the objects of their kindness than these for them: and the fact is made a subject of discussion and enquiry, as being contrary to reasonable expectation. The account of the matter which satisfies most persons is that the one are debtors and the others creditors: and therefore that, as in the case of actual loans the debtors wish their creditors out of the way while the creditors are anxious for the preservation of their debtors, so those

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

A question is also raised as to whether it is right to love one’s Self best, or some one else: because men find fault with those who love themselves best, and call them in a disparaging way lovers of Self; and the bad man is thought to do everything he does for his own sake merely, and the more so the more depraved he is; accordingly men reproach him with never doing anything unselfish: whereas the good man acts from a sense of honour (and the more so the better man he is), and for his friend’s

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Chapter IX.

Chapter IX.

A question is raised also respecting the Happy man, whether he will want Friends, or no? Some say that they who are blessed and independent have no need of Friends, for they already have all that is good, and so, as being independent, want nothing further: whereas the notion of a friend’s office is to be as it were a second Self and procure for a man what he cannot get by himself: hence the saying, “When Fortune gives us good, what need we Friends?” On the other hand, it looks absurd, while we a

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Chapter X.

Chapter X.

Are we then to make our friends as numerous as possible? or, as in respect of acquaintance it is thought to have been well said “have not thou many acquaintances yet be not without;” so too in respect of Friendship may we adopt the precept, and say that a man should not be without friends, nor again have exceeding many friends? Now as for friends who are intended for use, the maxim I have quoted will, it seems, fit in exceedingly well, because to requite the services of many is a matter of labou

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Chapter XI.

Chapter XI.

Again: are friends most needed in prosperity or in adversity? they are required, we know, in both states, because the unfortunate need help and the prosperous want people to live with and to do kindnesses to: for they have a desire to act kindly to some one. To have friends is more necessary in adversity, and therefore in this case useful ones are wanted; and to have them in prosperity is more honourable, and this is why the prosperous want good men for friends, it being preferable to confer ben

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Chapter XII.

Chapter XII.

May we not say then that, as seeing the beloved object is most prized by lovers and they choose this sense rather than any of the others because Love “Is engendered in the eyes, With gazing fed,” in like manner intimacy is to friends most choice-worthy, Friendship being communion? Again, as a man is to himself so is he to his friend; now with respect to himself the perception of his own existence is choice-worthy, therefore is it also in respect of his friend. And besides, their Friendship is ac

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Chapter II.

Chapter II.

And he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from the contrary: that is, since Pain was in itself an object of avoidance to all the contrary must be in like manner an object of choice. Again he urged that that is most choice-worthy which we choose, not by reason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure is confessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to what purpose he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself choice-worthy. Again, that whe

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Chapter III.

Chapter III.

Now what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take up the subject afresh. An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to say, it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete its whole nature. Well, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say; and one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose whole nature would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for this reason it is not a Movement: for all Mo

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Chapter IV.

Chapter IV.

Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be much what I have described; and we will not raise any question about saying “the Faculty” works, instead of, “that subject wherein the Faculty resides”), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty in its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And this will be, f

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Chapter V.

Chapter V.

Now that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, and Friendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch out Happiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things: and we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was stated before. Well then, we said that it is not a State merely; because, if it were, it might belong to one who slept all his life through and merely vegetated, or to one who fell into very great calamities: and so, if these possibi

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Chapter VI.

Chapter VI.

Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course that Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the best Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or some other which is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of noble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or the most divine of all our internal Principles, the Working of this in accordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect Happiness. That it

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Chapter VII.

Chapter VII.

So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity, because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all kinds. However, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and great goods in order to be happy: for neither Self-sufficiency, nor Action, sta

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Chapter VIII.

Chapter VIII.

Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way on these subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and Pleasure; are we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must we not rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of moral action mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but rather Practice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge enough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and take whatever other means t

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BOOK I

BOOK I

[6] Or “prove themselves good,” as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25, [Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d’ upo ton epieikon kai eidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri auton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton krisei] [7] [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by any philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any dialect

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BOOK II

BOOK II

[1] Which we call simply virtue. [2] For nature must of course supply the capacity. [3] Or “as a simple result of nature.” [4] This is done in the Sixth Book. [5] It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit. [6] The words ἀκόλαστος and δειλὸς are not used here in their strict signif

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BOOK III

BOOK III

[1] A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because “particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle.” But he is responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed, he “might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the moral principle, suppo

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BOOK V

BOOK V

[1] Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice. [2] But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, “to love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5. [3] Things are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is close therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no English expressio

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BOOK VI

BOOK VI

[1] I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for instance, in a building. [2] Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter. [3] One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common language, he has a turn for Mathematics, i e something in his mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the bump denoting this aptitude. [4] And therefore the question resolves itself in

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BOOK VII

BOOK VII

[1] The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men may be than what they are . In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development. [2] This illustrates the expression, “ Deceits of the Flesh.” [3] Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he were now acting on conviction, he might st

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BOOK VIII

BOOK VIII

[1] “Owe no man anything, but to love one another for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the Law .” Romans XIII. 8. [2] [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod, [Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton]. [3] In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she “two stone bottles found, To hold the liquor that she loved , And keep it safe and sound.” [4] Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is here adopted, as yielding a bett

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BOOK IX

BOOK IX

[1] “Neither the Son of man, that He should repent .” Numbers xxiii. 19. “In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.” Whately, Logic, iii. 10. [2] “I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command him to come to the window, and the other to the t

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BOOK X

BOOK X

[1] See note, p. 43. [2] See Book II. chap. ix. [3] See Book I. chap. v. ad finem. [4] The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its participation in that. [5] See note on page 136, 1. 15. [6] Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds: From not being to being . . . . Generation From being to not being . . . . Destruction From being to being more .

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