The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes And Issues
Kan'ichi Asakawa
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24 chapters
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The issues of the conflict that forms the topic of this little volume are bound inevitably to influence the future of the civilized world for many years. Dr. Asakawa presents them with a logical thoroughness that reminds us of the military operations of his countrymen now in evidence elsewhere, and recalls very pleasantly to my own mind the sane and accurate character of his scholastic work while a student at Yale. It is the sort of presentation which a great subject needs. It is content with a
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PREFACE
PREFACE
This is an attempt to present in a verifiable form some of the issues and the historical causes of the war now waged between Russia and Japan. Powerfully as it appeals to me, I would not have discussed a subject so strange to the proper sphere of my investigation, had it not been for the fact that no one else has, so far as I am aware, undertaken the task in the same spirit in which I have endeavored to write these pages. Although I deeply regret that I do not read the Russian language and canno
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SOME OF THE ISSUES OF THE CONFLICT
SOME OF THE ISSUES OF THE CONFLICT
The deeper significance of the present dramatic struggle between Russia and Japan over territories belonging to neither of the contestants cannot perhaps be understood, until we examine some of the issues at stake between them. The more fundamental of these issues, however, as in many another international crisis, seem to be oftener understood than expressed, and hence understood only vaguely, although it may fairly be said that they constitute the very forces which have with irresistible certai
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY[109]
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY[109]
According to an estimate made by a Russian expert of the carrying capacity of the great Siberian railway system, [110] the Siberian section alone will carry at least 190 million poods, and the Manchurian section from 100 to 150 million poods, making a total of 300 to 350 million poods, approximately. It is contended, however, that, while the present conditions of the inhabitants of Siberia and Manchuria make it possible for the railway to carry only raw and crudely manufactured goods, these are
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CHAPTER I RETROCESSION OF THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA
CHAPTER I RETROCESSION OF THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA
The way in which the momentous issues already discussed in the introductory chapter have been at work and have steadily culminated in the present conflict is with unusual clearness and in the most instructive manner illustrated by the historic events which led up to the outbreak of the war. The study of these events also appears essential for an intelligent understanding of the situation, for, in this crisis, as in many another in history, the contestants do not seem to be always conscious of ev
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CHAPTER II THE “CASSINI CONVENTION” AND THE RAILWAY AGREEMENT
CHAPTER II THE “CASSINI CONVENTION” AND THE RAILWAY AGREEMENT
Regarded, however, from a broader point of view, no one could predict a happy consequence of so ominous a beginning, as has been described, of the new Eastern situation. By her successful intervention, Russia had conferred upon China a signal favor, for which a reward was expected; but the reward, again, assumed such a form that it at the same time served as a new favor looking toward a fresh reward, so that the final resultant of the repeated process proved altogether out of proportion to the i
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CHAPTER III KIAO-CHAU
CHAPTER III KIAO-CHAU
Kiao-chau, in the Province of Shan-tung, was, as will be remembered, a port marked in the so-called Cassini Convention for the use of the Russian squadron. Its value as a commercial and strategical point d’appui , as well as the greatness of the mineral wealth of Shan-tung, must have been as well known to the Germans as to the Russians. [180] How it happened that Russia forsook this important position, or, more accurately, how Germany succeeded in securing its lease without a protest from Russia
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CHAPTER IV PORT ARTHUR AND TALIEN-WAN
CHAPTER IV PORT ARTHUR AND TALIEN-WAN
As has been said, it appears impossible at the present state of our knowledge to trace the exact connection of Russia with the German occupation of Kiao-chau. [198] What is of more direct interest to our study, and is more easily established by evidence, is the fact that, with the plea that she could not be denied what had been granted to Germany, [199] Russia closely followed the latter’s example, [200] and, under similar terms to hers, [201] demanded a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, and
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CHAPTER V SECRETARY HAY’S CIRCULAR NOTE
CHAPTER V SECRETARY HAY’S CIRCULAR NOTE
It is unnecessary for us to describe how, between 1897 and 1899, other so-called spheres of influence and of economic concessions than those already mentioned were marked out in China by the Powers, for, important as they are in the general history of the modern East, they have little bearing upon our immediate subject. It suffices to recall that the process was begun by the German seizure of Kiao-chau; that unfortunately Great Britain felt obliged to have recourse to the policy of the balance o
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CHAPTER VI THE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA
CHAPTER VI THE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA
We have given only an incomplete account of the manner in which certain Powers seemed, during the years 1897 and 1898, to vie with one another in transgressing, in effect, the principle of the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, to which they at the same time professed their adherence. Another principle, however,—that of the open door, or of the equal opportunity in China for the commercial and industrial enterprise of all nations,—was, as we have seen, not as openly ignored even by the
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CHAPTER VII NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA
CHAPTER VII NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA
The problem stated at the close of the last chapter forms an index to a period of Eastern diplomacy the singular features of which hardly find a parallel in the world’s history. The affairs of the Extreme Orient had in general advanced to such a stage that no single Power could again seek to enforce its will without due regard to the interests of some other Powers. The Russian problem in Manchuria was, as will be seen after a little reflection, of such a nature that it could hardly be literally
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CHAPTER VIII THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT
CHAPTER VIII THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT
When we recall that even before 1900 Russia desired to control the railway enterprises, not only in Manchuria, but also on the right side of the Liao River, it is not altogether strange that, simultaneously with the occupation of Manchuria, the northern Chinese line was seized by her troops. This action, however, did not stop at the Great Wall. Had it not been for the protest of Great Britain, the Russians would have seized the entire line from Niu-chwang up to Peking. During the latter part of
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CHAPTER IX A MODUS VIVENDI: THE ALEXIEFF-TSÊNG AGREEMENT
CHAPTER IX A MODUS VIVENDI: THE ALEXIEFF-TSÊNG AGREEMENT
In the mean time, the Chinese Court [318] having largely emancipated itself from the sway of the reactionary Prince Tuan and his associates, the Representatives at Peking of the eleven interested Powers had agreed in September to open discussions among themselves of the terms of peace to be presented to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang. [319] The German Government, however, proposed, as a prerequisite of peace negotiations with China, a drastic measure demanding the
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CHAPTER X A “STARTING-POINT”—THE LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU CONVENTION
CHAPTER X A “STARTING-POINT”—THE LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU CONVENTION
It was as early as January 12 that the Japanese Government had made inquiries directly at the Russian Government regarding the contents of the Agreement reported to have been made between Count Lamsdorff and Yang-yu at St. Petersburg. [341] The report was apparently premature, for its contents were unknown for more than a month after, and even on February 18, Dr. Morrison reported from Peking that, according to a telegram to the Chinese Government from Yang-yu, it would be several days before Co
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CHAPTER XI FURTHER DEMANDS
CHAPTER XI FURTHER DEMANDS
Russia did not wait long before reaching another “starting-point.” No sooner did the effort of Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and the late Viceroy Liu Kun-yi to create among the Representatives of some Powers a sentiment in favor of opening all Manchuria to foreign trade, so as to forestall the annexation of the territory by Russia, miscarry, [379] than Sir Ernest Satow reported from “a thoroughly trustworthy source,” on August 14, 1901, that Russia was resuming her negotiations with China to bring abo
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CHAPTER XII THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AND THE RUSSO-FRENCH DECLARATION
CHAPTER XII THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AND THE RUSSO-FRENCH DECLARATION
The details of the negotiations preliminary to the consummation of this remarkable stroke of diplomacy have not been made public, but we are in possession of some salient facts from which successive steps leading up to the final conclusion may be inferred with tolerable certainty. It is well known that Great Britain, which had always occupied a predominant place in the foreign relations of Japan, had persistently opposed the latter’s ardent wish and continual struggle to revise the humiliating t
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“AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA RESPECTING MANCHURIA
“AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA RESPECTING MANCHURIA
“His Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, with the object of reëstablishing and confirming the relations of good neighborhood, which were disturbed by the rising in the Celestial Empire of the year 1900, have appointed their Plenipotentiaries to come to an agreement on certain questions relating to Manchuria. These Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers, which were found to be in order, agreed as follows:— “ Article 1. His Imperial Maj
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CHAPTER XIV THE EVACUATION
CHAPTER XIV THE EVACUATION
Unsatisfactory as the Manchurian Agreement of April 8, 1902, appeared to Great Britain and Japan, they refrained from entering any protest against its conclusion. They probably preferred the imperfect obligation the Convention imposed upon the contracting parties to an indefinite prolongation of the dangerous conditions which had prevailed. What remained for them and for China was to watch the conduct of Russia in Manchuria and test her veracity according to their own interpretations of the Agre
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CHAPTER XV DEMANDS IN SEVEN ARTICLES
CHAPTER XV DEMANDS IN SEVEN ARTICLES
The most important section of Manchuria, strategically, namely, that part of the Province of Sheng-king which lies east of the Liao River and the entire Province of Kirin, was to be evacuated, according to the Agreement, before April 8, 1903. As that date drew near, and long afterward, the disposition of the Russian forces appeared incompatible with even the nominal withdrawal which characterized the first period of evacuation. It is true that in the Sheng-king Province, except the regions borde
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CHAPTER XVI DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE IN KOREA, I
CHAPTER XVI DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE IN KOREA, I
Manchuria, however, constituted only one half—perhaps the less important half—of the great Eastern problem which perplexed the world and imperiled the future life of Japan. In the other half, namely, Korea, Japan was confronted by a situation similar and closely allied to that in Manchuria, and more directly menacing to herself. Let us briefly describe the evolution of the complex Korean question which ensued upon the Chinese-Japanese war of 1894–5. The war had arisen from the conflicting wishes
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CHAPTER XVII DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE IN KOREA, II
CHAPTER XVII DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE IN KOREA, II
From 1899, both Japan and Russia were represented at Seul by new Ministers, Mr. G. Hayashi and M. Paul Pavloff. The latter had been the Chargé at Peking, where he had recently made a brilliant success in securing for Russia a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, and the right to connect these ports by rail with the great Siberian line. The contrast of character between the bold and ambitious Pavloff and the slow, tenacious Hayashi was an interesting index to the dramatic struggle which ensued in
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CHAPTER XVIII THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, I
CHAPTER XVIII THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, I
It was in view of these dangerously unstable circumstances in Manchuria and Korea that, on June 23, 1903, the four principal members of the Japanese Cabinet [580] and five Privy Councilors [581] met before the Throne, and decided on the principles upon which negotiations with Russia should be opened. [582] Having thus formulated the policy to be pursued, Baron Komura telegraphed to the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, Mr. Kurino, on July 28, as follows [583] :— BARON KOMURA Japanese Foreign
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO CHAPTER XIX
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO CHAPTER XIX
In view of the singular circumstances under which the war broke out, it would be a matter of permanent interest to the student of international law to observe the difference of opinion which arose between the contending Powers respecting the legality of opening hostilities before war was formally declared, and also respecting the so-called neutrality of Korea. We reproduce below, without comment, the charges of Russia and replies of Japan regarding these subjects. On February 18, the Russian Gov
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CHAPTER XX CHINESE NEUTRALITY AND KOREAN INTEGRITY
CHAPTER XX CHINESE NEUTRALITY AND KOREAN INTEGRITY
No sooner had the war broken out than the Japanese Government notified other Powers, on February 9, that it had advised the Chinese Government to observe a strict neutrality during hostilities. Below is a translation of the identical note addressed on that day by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Representatives at London, Washington, Paris, Vienna, and Rome:— “The Imperial Government have carefully considered the question as to what attitude China should assume to the best advanta
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