Fundamental Philosophy - free ebook by Jaime Luciano Balmes

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Fundamental Philosophy

Jaime Luciano Balmes

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FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

BY REV. JAMES BALMES . TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH BY HENRY F. BROWNSON, M.A. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. I. D. &amp; J. SADLIER &amp; CO., 164 WILLIAM STREET, BOSTON:—128 FEDERAL STREET. MONTREAL:—COR. OF NOTRE DAME AND ST. FRANCIS XAVIER STS. 1856 . Entered according; to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, By D. &amp; J. Sadlier &amp; Co. , In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. NEW YORK: BILLIN &amp; BROTHER, PRINTER

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INTRODUCTION.

INTRODUCTION.

The following translation of the great work of the lamented James Balmes on Philosophy, was undertaken at my suggestion and recommendation, and thus far I hold myself responsible for it. I have compared a considerable portion of it with the original, and as far as I have compared it, I have found it faithfully executed. The translator appears to me to have rendered the author's thought with exactness and precision, in a style not inferior to his own. I have not added, as was originally contempla

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

IMPORTANCE AND UTILITY OF THE QUESTION OF CERTAINTY. 1. We should begin the study of philosophy by examining the question of certainty; before raising the edifice, we must lay the foundation. Ever since there has been philosophy, that is, ever since men first reflected on themselves and the beings around them, they have been engaged with those questions which have for their object the basis of human knowledge, and this shows that on this subject serious difficulties are encountered. Inquirers, h

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

TRUE STATE OF THE QUESTION. 5. That we have certainty, common sense assures us, but what is its basis, and how it is acquired, are two difficult questions, which it is for philosophy to answer. Three very different questions are involved in that of certainty; and if confounded, they contribute not a little to the creation of difficulties, and the confusion of matters which, even when they have their various aspects most accurately marked, are sufficiently hard and complicated. It will greatly co

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

CERTAINTY OF THE HUMAN RACE, AND PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY. 16. Certainty does not originate in reflection; it is the spontaneous product of man's nature, and is annexed to the direct act of the intellectual and sensitive faculties. It is a condition necessary to the exercise of both, and without it life were a chaos; we therefore possess it instinctively, and without any reflection, and we enjoy the fruit of this as of all those other benefits of the Creator, which are inseparably joined to our e

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

EXISTENCE OF TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE IN THE ABSOLUTE INTELLECTUAL ORDER. 38. Philosophers have sought a first principle of human knowledge; each has assigned his own, and now after so much discussion it is doubtful who is right, or even if any one is right. Before inquiring what the first principle is, they ought to have ascertained whether there be any such principle. We cannot suppose this last question to be answered affirmatively; for it is, as we shall hereafter see, susceptible of different

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE IN THE HUMAN INTELLECTUAL ORDER CANNOT EMANATE FROM THE SENSES. 53. In the human intellectual order, such as it is in this life, there is no one truth from which all others flow: philosophers have sought one in vain; they have found none, for there was none to be found. In fact, where could it be found? 54. Would it emanate from the senses? Sensations are as various as the objects which produce them: by them we acquire knowledge of individual and material things; but no on

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE.—INSUFFICIENCY OF REAL TRUTHS. 64. We have thought proper briefly to refute Condillac's system, not on account of its intrinsic importance, or because it was not before in sufficiently bad repute, but in order to clear the field for higher and more strictly philosophical discussions. We should not omit to guard philosophy against the prejudice cast upon it by a system as vain as it is profitless. All that is most sublime in the science of the mind disappears with the statu

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ME CANNOT PRODUCE TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE. 70. The testimony of consciousness is sure and irresistible, but it has no connection with that of evidence. The object of the one is a particular and contingent fact; that of the other, a necessary truth. That I now think, is to me absolutely certain; but this thought of mine is not a necessary but a decidedly contingent truth; for I might never have thought, or even existed: it is a purely individual fact, is confined to me, and i

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

UNIVERSAL IDENTITY. 85. In order to give unity to science, some appeal to universal identity; this, however, is not to discover unity, but to take refuge in chaos. Universal identity is not only an absurdity, but a groundless hypothesis. Excepting the unity of consciousness, we find in ourselves nothing that is one; but multiplicity of ideas, perceptions, judgments, acts of the will, impressions of various kinds; and in relation to external objects, we perceive multitude in the beings which surr

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

UNIVERSAL IDENTITY,—CONTINUED. 100. These systems, as absurd as they are fatal, although under distinct forms, and by various means, they tend to prepare the way for pantheism, contain a profound truth which, disfigured by vain cavils, seems to be an abyss of darkness, whereas it is in itself a ray of most brilliant light. The human mind seeks that by reason to which it is impelled by an intellectual instinct; how to reduce plurality to unity, to re-unite, as it were, all the variety of existenc

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION: MONADS OF LEIBNITZ. 105. The pretension to find a real truth, the fountain of all others, is dangerous in the extreme, however indifferent it may at first sight appear. Pantheism, and the deification of the me , two systems which coincide at bottom, are a consequence not easy to be avoided if it be attempted to establish all human science upon one fact. 106. The real truth or fact, which would serve as the basis of all science, should be immediately perceived, otherwis

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION EXAMINED. 111. All our knowledge is by representation, without which it would be inconceivable; and yet what is representation in itself considered? We cannot say: it enlightens us as to other objects, but not as to itself. It is obvious that we do not attempt to conceal the very grave difficulties which the solution of this problem offers: on the contrary, we point them out with all clearness, in order to avoid that vain presumption which is as fatal to science as to e

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

IMMEDIATE INTELLIGIBILITY. 120. Neither active nor passive representation can be predicated of all things; we mean to say, that there are some beings which are not endowed with intellectual activity, and cannot be even passively the object of the acts of the intellect. As regards the power of active representation, which is at bottom only the faculty of intelligence, it is evident that many beings are destitute of it. There may be greater difficulty with regard to passive representation, or the

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

REPRESENTATION OF CAUSALITY AND IDEALITY. 126. Besides the representation of identity, there is what I have called the representation of causality. A being may represent itself, a cause its effect. Productive activity is inconceivable, if the principle of the productive act does not in some manner contain the thing produced. Therefore we say that God, the universal cause of all that does or can exist, contains in his essence all real and possible beings in a virtual or eminent manner. A being ca

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINDING THE FIRST PRINCIPLE IN THE IDEAL ORDER. 138. We shall in vain seek in the region of ideas for that which we could not find in that of facts, for there is no ideal truth, the origin of all other truths. Ideal truth only expresses the necessary relation of ideas, abstracting the existence of the objects to which they relate: hence it follows, first of all, that ideal truths are absolutely incapable of producing the knowledge of reality. No ideal truth can lead to any resul

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CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

THE INDISPENSABLE CONDITION OF ALL HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.—MEANS OF PERCEIVING TRUTH. 143. We have not been able to discover, either in the real or the ideal order, a truth, the origin of all other truths to our intellect while in this life. Therefore it stands proved that transcendental science properly so called is for us a chimera. Our cognitions must, doubtless, have some resting-point, and this we shall now investigate. For the better understanding of the subject now before us, we will recall the

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CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVI.

CONFUSION OF IDEAS IN DISPUTES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE. 160. There are, in our opinion, various principles, which, with regard to the human intellect, may be called equally fundamental, both because they serve as foundation in the common and scientific orders, and because they do not rest upon any other, since it is impossible to assign any one which enjoys this quality as an exclusive privilege. In seeking the fundamental principle, it is customary in the schools to observe that they do no

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CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVII.

THOUGHT AND EXISTENCE.—DESCARTES' PRINCIPLE. 163. Am I certain that I exist? Yes. Can I prove it? No. Proof supposes reasoning; there is no solid reasoning without a firm principle on which to rest it; and there is no firm principle unless we suppose the existence of the reasoning being. In effect, if he who reasons is not certain of his own existence, he cannot be certain of his own reasoning, since there will be no reasoning if there be no one to reason. Therefore there are, unless we suppose

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CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DESCARTES, CONTINUED.—HIS METHOD. 170. Descartes did not always express himself with, sufficient accuracy when announcing and explaining his principle; and hence his words have been misinterpreted. In the passage where he establishes consciousness of our own thought and existence as the foundation whereon all our cognitions must rest, he uses terms from which it can be inferred that he not only means to declare a fact, but that he also intends to afford a true argument. Neverthe

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CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XIX.

VALUE OF THE PRINCIPLE. I THINK: ITS—ANALYSIS. 178. We have already seen that Descartes' principle, considered as an enthymema, cannot aspire to be fundamental. In every argument there are premises and a consequence; and to be conclusive, the premises must be true, and the consequence legitimate. To say that an argument may be a fundamental principle, is a manifest contradiction. But if we take Descartes' principle in the sense above explained, that is, not as an argument but as the declaration

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CHAPTER XX.

CHAPTER XX.

TRUE SENSE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION.—KANT'S OPINION. 189. Before examining the value of the principle of contradiction as a basis for our cognitions, it will be well to fix its true and exact sense. This renders necessary some considerations upon an opinion of Kant, advanced in his Critic of Pure Reason , when treating of the form in which the principle of contradiction has hitherto been enunciated in all schools of philosophy. The German metaphysician grants, that whatever may be the m

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CHAPTER XXI.

CHAPTER XXI.

DOES THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION MERIT THE TITLE OF FUNDAMENTAL; AND IF SO, IN WHAT SENSE? 204. Having cleared up the true sense of the principle of contradiction, let us now see whether it merits to be called fundamental, whether it possesses all the characteristics requisite to such a dignity. These characteristics are three in number: first, that it depend on no other principle; secondly, that its fall involve the ruin of all others; thirdly, that it may, while it remains firm, be conclusi

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CHAPTER XXII.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIDENCE. 216. Among the principles which, by their pretensions to the title of fundamental, have most figured in the schools, is one called the principle of the Cartesians: "whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of any thing, may be affirmed of it with all certainty." We have already seen Kant resuscitate this principle, although in other words, equivocally taking it as synonymous with that of contradiction. Upon close examination we shall easily perceive that th

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CHAPTER XXIII.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE CRITERION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 225. Having established the worth of the principles of consciousness, of evidence, and of contradiction, in relation to the dignity of fundamental, we will now examine the intrinsic value of the different criteria. And here the doctrine of the preceding chapters, of which the following are the development and complement, furnishes much light. We will begin with consciousness, or the internal sense. The testimony of consciousness includes all phenomena, either acti

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CHAPTER XXIV.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE CRITERION OF EVIDENCE. 239. There are two species of evidence, mediate and immediate. We call immediate evidence that which requires only understanding of the terms; and mediate evidence that which requires reasoning. That the whole is greater than its part is evident by immediate evidence; that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides, is known by mediate evidence, that is, by demonstrative reasoning. 240. We have said that one of the distincti

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CHAPTER XXV.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE OBJECTIVE VALUE OF IDEAS. 247. The transition from subject to object, from subjective appearance to objective reality, is a problem which vexes fundamental philosophy. Consciousness will not permit us to doubt that certain things appear to us in such a manner; but are they in reality what they appear to us? How are we to know this? What shall assure us of this conformity of the idea with the object? The question does not relate solely to sensations; it also extends to purely intellectual ide

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CHAPTER XXVI.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CAN ALL COGNITIONS BE REDUCED TO THE PERCEPTION OF IDENTITY? 264. Immediate evidence has for its objects those truths which the intellect sees with all clearness, and to which it assents without the intervention of any medium , as its name denotes. These truths are enunciated in propositions called per se notæ , first principles, or axioms, in which it is suffi cient to know the meaning of the terms to see that the predicate is contained in the idea of the subject. Propositions of this class are

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CHAPTER XXVII.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT. 269. It is even ridiculous to say that the cognitions of the sublimest philosophers may be reduced to this equation: A is A. This, absolutely speaking, is not only false, but contrary to common sense; but it is neither contrary to common sense nor false to say that all cognitions of mathematicians are perceptions of identity, which, presented under different conceptions, undergoes infinite variations of form, and so fecundates the intellect and consti tutes scie

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CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT. 274. We will now explain how the doctrine of identity is applied in general to all reasoning, whether upon mathematical objects or not: with this view we will examine some of the dialectical forms in which the art of reasoning is taught. Every A is B; M is A: therefore M is B. In the major of this syllogism we find the identity of every A with B; and in the minor, the identity of M with B. In each of these propositions there is affirmation, and, consequently, pe

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CHAPTER XXIX.

CHAPTER XXIX.

ARE THERE TRUE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI IN THE SENSE OF KANT? 278. The great importance attributed by the German philosopher to his imaginary discovery, requires us to examine it at length. This importance may be estimated from what he himself says: "If any of the ancients had only had the idea of proposing the present question, it would have been a mighty barrier against all the systems of pure reason down to our days, and would have saved many vain attempts which were blindly made without

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CHAPTER XXX.

CHAPTER XXX.

VICO'S CRITERION. 294. The doctrine of Vico on the criterion of truth is connected with the matter of the preceding chapters on immediate and mediate evidence. This philosopher thinks that the criterion consists in having made the truth which is known; that our cognitions then only are completely certain, and that they lose their certainty in proportion as the intellect loses its character of cause with respect to its objects. God, the cause of all, knows every thing perfectly: creatures, whose

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CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXI.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT. 304. If the Neapolitan philosopher's criterion be anywhere admissible, it can only be in ideal truths; for as these are absolutely cut off from existence, we may well suppose them to be known even by an understanding which has not in reality produced them. So far as known by the understanding they involve no reality, and consequently no condition that exacts any productive force not referable to a purely ideal order. In this order the human reason seems really t

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CHAPTER XXXII.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE CRITERION OF COMMON SENSE. 313. Common sense is an exceedingly vague expression. It should, like all expressions which contain many and different ideas, be considered under two aspects: that of its etymological, and that of its real value. These two values are not always the same; they are sometimes greatly discrepant; but even in their discrepancy, they usually preserve intimate relations. We must not, in order duly to appreciate the meaning of such expressions, confine ourselves to their p

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CHAPTER XXXIII.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

ERROR OF LAMENNAIS ON COMMON CONSENT. 329. The instinctive faith in human authority, of which we have just treated, is a fact attested by experience, and one which no philosopher has presumed to call in doubt. This faith, duly directed by reason, constitutes one criterion of truth. The errors to which it may sometimes lead are inherent in human weakness, and are amply compensated for by the advantages derived from it by society and individuals. A celebrated writer undertook to include all criter

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CHAPTER XXXIV.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 337. In concluding this book, I wish to give a summary of my views on certainty, wherein I shall show the connection between the doctrines exposed in the different chapters. When philosophy meets a necessary fact its duty is to accept it. Such a fact is certainty. To dispute its existence, is to dispute the splendor of the sun at mid-day. Mankind are certain of many things; philosophers, skeptics not excluded, are equally so. Absolute skepticism is impossible. Setting asi

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

SENSATION IN ITSELF. 1. Sensation considered in itself is simply an internal affection; but it is almost always accompanied by a judgment. This judgment may be more or less explicit and more or less noticed by the subject of the sensation. Suppose I see two architectural ornaments at a proper distance, and I discover no difference between them. In this sensation there are two things to be considered. I. The internal affection which we call seeing . On this point all doubt is impossible. Whether

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

MATTER IS INCAPABLE OF SENSATION. 12. The phenomenon of sensibility reveals to us the existence of an order of beings distinct from matter. However perfect we may suppose material organization, it cannot rise to sensation; matter is wholly incapable of sensation; and the absurd system of materialism can neither explain the phenomena of intelligence, nor even of sensation. It is of little consequence to us that we do not know the intrinsical nature of sensitive being, or of matter; it is enough t

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

SLEEP AND WAKING. 20. The fact of sensation is connected with many others, and from this connection results a great part of our knowledge. It has been said in a tone of great confidence, that it was not possible to demonstrate by sensations the existence of bodies; for as sensations are something purely internal, they cannot enable us to infer the existence of any thing external, and there is no reason for not regarding all our sensations as a collection of individual phenomena, inclosed in our

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATION OF SENSATIONS TO AN EXTERNAL WORLD. 24. Have our sensations any relation to external objects, or are they merely phenomena of our nature? Can we infer the existence of an external world from the existence of that internal world resulting from the union of the scenes presented by sensations? This question is theoretical, not practical, and depends solely on the force of reasoning, not on the voice of nature,—a voice stronger than all argument, and irresistible. To whatever result the phi

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

AN IDEALIST HYPOTHESIS. 29. The system of the Idealists cannot stand without supposing the connection and dependence which we refer to external objects, to exist only within us, and the causality which we attribute to external objects, to belong solely to our own acts. I pull a rope in my chamber, and a bell never fails to ring; or in idealist language, the sensation formed from that union of sensations into which enters what we call the rope and pulling it , produces or involves that other, whi

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

IS THE EXTERNAL AND IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF SENSATIONS A FREE CAUSE? 32. A difficulty, at first sight serious, but in reality futile, may be brought against the existence of bodies. Who knows, it may be asked, but what some cause, not at all resembling the idea which we form of bodies, produces in us all the phenomena that we experience? God may, if he pleases, cause one or many sensations in us; and who shall assure us that he does not? Who shall assure us that other beings may not do the same, and

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVENESS OF SENSATIONS. 37. Is the external world such as we believe it to be? Are the beings, called bodies , which cause our sensations in reality what we believe them? May we not, even after having demonstrated the existence of these beings, and their necessary subjection to constant laws, still doubt whether we have demonstrated the existence of bodies? Does it suffice for this to have proved the existence of external beings in relation among themselves and with us by me

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

SENSATION OF EXTENSION. 43. Two of our senses perceive extension; sight and touch. Sound, taste, and smell accompany extension, but are something different from it. The sight perceives nothing not extended; extension is every way inseparable from this sensation. We may be so enchanted by the sweet harmony of many instruments as to forget the extension of the instruments, the air, and our organs; but we cannot, in contemplating a painting even in the midst of our most ardent enthusiasm, make its

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

OBJECTIVENESS OF THE SENSATION OF EXTENSION. 49. Having proved the testimony of the senses sufficient to assure us of the existence of bodies, we now come to examine how far the ideas it makes us form are correct. It is not enough to know that we may be sure of the existence of extension; we must inquire if it in reality be such as the senses represent it; and what we say of extension is applicable to the other properties of bodies. In our opinion, the only sensation that we transfer, and cannot

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

FORCE OF TOUCH TO MAKE SENSATIONS OBJECTIVE. 54. It has been said that touch is the surest, and perhaps the only witness of the existence of bodies; for without it, all sensations would be nothing more than simple modifications of our being, to which we could attribute no external object. But this I do not believe to be true. We receive by touch an impression, just as we do by the other senses; this impression is in all cases an affection of our being, and not something external. When, from the

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

INFERIORITY OF TOUCH COMPARED WITH OTHER SENSES. 58. That superiority, or rather that exclusive privilege, conceded by Condillac and other philosophers to touch, not only has no foundation, as we have just seen, but seems to be in contradiction to the very nature of this sense. In short, it assigns the first place to the coarsest, the most material of all the senses. It cannot be known what ideas a man reduced to the one sense of touch would form of things; but it seems to me that far from enter

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

CAN SIGHT ALONE GIVE US THE IDEA OF A SURFACE? 64. I have, I believe, made the inferiority of touch to sight and hearing palpable, and have, consequently, shown the extravagance of endeavoring to make it the basis of all cognitions, to found upon it the certainty of the judgments to which our other senses lead us, and to make it a supreme judge to decide in the last appeal upon the doubts that may arise. I hold it to be manifestly untrue that we cannot make the transition from the internal to th

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

CHESELDEN'S BLIND MAN. 75. Cheselden's blind man, of whom Condillac spoke, in confirmation of his opinions, presents no phenomenon upon which they can rest. This blind person was a youth of thirteen or fourteen years of age, upon whom Cheselden, a distinguished London surgeon, performed the operation of removing cataracts, first from one eye, then from the other. He could before the operation tell day and night, and in a very strong light distinguish, white, black, and red. This is an important

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAN SIGHT GIVE US THE IDEA OF A SOLID? 78. It has been asserted that sight can not give us the idea of size or of a solid, but that this can be obtained only by the help of touch. I believe the contrary may be proved with convincing certainty. What is a solid? It is the union of three dimensions. If sight can give us the idea of surfaces which consist of two, why not also of solids which consist of three dimensions? This one reflection is enough to show that it has been denied without reason; bu

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CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

SIGHT AND MOTION. 85. I said that the observer could not distinguish between his own motion and that of the object; sight alone can not give us a true idea of motion. Thus in a boat, although we are certain that we are moving, the motion seems to us to be in the objects along the shore. Also if the motion of the object and that of the observer are simultaneous, in the same direction, and with the same velocity, all appearance of motion is lost. But if there are two objects, one of which moves in

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CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVI.

POSSIBILITY OF OTHER SENSES. 91. Lamennais writes: "Who can say that a sixth sense would not disturb the harmony of the others by a contrary impression? On what foundation could he deny it? If we suppose other senses different from those which nature gave us, might not our sensations and our ideas be different? Perhaps a slight modification in our organs would be sufficient to ruin our whole science. Perhaps there are beings so organized that their sensations are wholly opposed to ours, and what

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CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVII.

EXISTENCE OF NEW SENSES. 98. Is it certain that we have only five ways of sensation? I have some doubts on this point. In order to present them with the greatest clearness, and solve the questions which they raise, it is well to settle the meaning of the terms. What is sensation? In the ordinary acceptation of the word, it is the perception of the impression transmitted to us by one of the organs of the five senses. Thus understood it is clearly limited to the action of the organs, but if consid

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CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SOLUTION OF LAMENNAIS' OBJECTION. 106. From the preceding observations we shall now deduce an important consequence,—the solution of the difficulty presented by Lamennais. The existence of new senses would involve new sensations, it is true; but they would not disturb the harmony of those we already have. We have shown that bodies affect our organs in a different manner, and produce impressions different from those of the five senses; but this does not disturb the agreement of our sensations, no

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

EXTENSION INSEPARABLE FROM THE IDEA OF BODY. 1. Having seen that among the objects of our sensations, extension alone has any external existence for us as any thing more than a principle of causality, let us now try to understand what extension is. The idea of extension seems to be inseparable from that of body; at least, I am unable to conceive a body without extension. Take away extension, and the parts disappear, and with them all that has relation with our senses; there is no longer an objec

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

EXTENSION NOT PERCEPTIBLE AS THE DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE OBJECT OF SENSATIONS. 9. Extension has the remarkable peculiarity of being perceived by different senses. As regards sight and touch this is evident; it is also true as far as concerns the other senses. We perceive taste in different parts of the palate, and we refer sound and smell to distinct points in space, and this involves the idea of extension. But what is more strange is, that although extension is the indispensable basis of all sensa

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

SCIENTIFIC FRUITFULNESS OF THE IDEA OF EXTENSION. 13. In order to understand the superiority of the idea of extension over mere sensations; or rather, in order to understand that there is a true idea of extension considered in itself, and that there is no such idea of the direct and immediate objects of sensation, I wish to call attention to the fact that among all the objects of the senses, extension alone gives origin to a science . This is a very important fact;—to explain it as it deserves,

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

REALITY OF EXTENSION. 27. We now come to more difficult questions. Is extension any thing in itself, abstracted from the idea of it? If any thing, what is it? Is it identified with bodies, or is it confounded with space? I have proved [39] that extension exists outside of ourselves, that it is not an illusion of the senses; and this solves the first question, whether extension is any thing. Whatever may be its nature or our ignorance on this point, there is in reality something which corresponds

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

GEOMETRICAL EXACTNESS REALIZED IN NATURE. 31. The disagreement which we discover between the phenomena and the geometrical theory makes us apt to think that reality is rough and coarse, and that purity and exactness are found only in our ideas. This is a mistaken opinion caused by want of reflection. The reality is as geometrical as our ideas; the phenomenon realizes the idea in all its purity and vigor. Be not startled by this seeming paradox; for it will soon appear to you a very true, reasona

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

REMARKS ON EXTENSION. 37. If extension is something as we have proved; what is it? We find extension in bodies and also in space because in both we find that which constitutes its essence, which is dimension. Is the extension of bodies the same as the extension of space? I see and hold in my hand a pen: it is certainly extended. It moves, and its extension moves with it. The space in which its motion is executed remains immovable. At the instant A the extension of the pen occupies the point A′;

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

SPACE.—NOTHING. 42. It may have been remarked in the preceding chapters that the idea of extension is always united with that of space, and when we endeavor to determine the real nature of the former, we encounter the questions which relate to the latter. It is not possible to explain one, while the other remains in obscurity. It is for this reason that I have concluded to examine carefully the questions concerning space under its ideal as well as under its real aspect; since only in this manner

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

DESCARTES AND LEIBNITZ ON SPACE. 54. If space is something, what is it? Here is the difficulty. To overthrow the opinion of our adversaries was easy, but to maintain our position is more difficult. Can we say that space is only the extension of bodies; that conceived in the abstract it gives us the idea of what we call pure space; and that the different points and positions are mere modifications of extension? It is easy to see that if space is the extension of bodies, where there is no body the

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

OPINION OF THOSE WHO ATTRIBUTE TO SPACE A NATURE DISTINCT FROM BODIES. 62. The preceding considerations seem to me to establish beyond any question, that space and nothing are contradictory terms. If space is a capacity with dimensions that can be really measured, it has real properties, and therefore is distinct from a pure nothing. We have the idea of space, on it is based a certain and evident science, that of geometry; this idea is also necessary for the conception of motion. A pure nothing

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

OPINION OF THOSE WHO HOLD SPACE TO BE THE IMMENSITY OF GOD. 67. Overwhelmed by these difficulties, and unable to reconcile the reality which space offers us with nothing, or to conceive in any thing created the immobility, infinity, and perpetuity which we imagine in space, some philosophers have put forth the opinion that space is the immensity of God. At first sight this seems an extravagant absurdity, but if we wish fairly to prove the falsity of this opinion, we must do justice not only to t

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

FENELON'S OPINION. 72. Clarke's opinion is very similar to that of Fenelon, who in his Treatise on the existence and attributes of God , explains immensity in a very surprising manner. He says: "After considering the eternity and immutability of God, which are the same thing, I ought to examine his immensity. Since he is by himself, he is sovereignly, and since he is sovereignly, he has all being in himself. Since he has all being in himself, he has without doubt extension; extension is a manner

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

WHAT SPACE CONSISTS IN. 77. Descartes' opinion wholly confounds space and bodies, making the essence of bodies consist in extension, and asserting that wherever there is space, there is body. This opinion we have seen to be void of all reasonable foundation. Perhaps he would come nearer the truth who should say, that in reality space is nothing more than the extension of bodies, without reference to the question whether extension does or does not constitute the essence of bodies, and denying its

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

NEW DIFFICULTIES. 84. If space is the extension of bodies, it follows that extension has no recipient, that is to say, no place in which it can be situated. This seems to be in direct contradiction to our most common ideas; for when we conceive any thing to be extended, we conceive the necessity of a place equal to it in which it can be contained and situated. This difficulty, which seems so serious at first, immediately vanishes if we deny that every extended thing needs a place in which it may

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE. 89. I now proceed to deduce the last consequence of the principle explained above. It is of the greatest importance, and seems to deserve the careful attention of all those who unite their metaphysical and physical studies. The existence of universal gravitation may be demonstrated a priori . Universal gravitation is a law of nature by which some bodies are directed to others. [We abstract here the manner.] This direction is metaphysically necessary, if we suppose

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CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

ILLUSION OF FIXED POINTS IN SPACE. 96. Since space is only the extension of bodies, and there is no space where there are no bodies, it follows that the extension which we conceive distinct from bodies, with fixed points and dimensions, immovable in itself, and the receptacle of all that is movable, is a pure illusion, and there is nothing in reality corresponding to it. In order to explain this doctrine and at the same time to solve certain objections which may be made, it will not be out of pl

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CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVI.

OBSERVATIONS ON KANT'S OPINION. 104. We have already shown that extension considered in us, is something more than a mere sensation, that it is a true idea, the basis of some sensations, and at the same time a pure idea. As far as it relates to sensations, it is the foundation of our sensitive faculties; and in so far as it is an idea, it is the root of geometry. This is an important distinction, and we shall find it useful to enable us rightly to appreciate the value of Kant's opinion of space.

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CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVII.

INABILITY OF KANT'S DOCTRINE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCE. 118. I think that Kant's Transcendental Æsthetics , or theory of sensibility, is not sufficiently transcendental. It is too much confined to the empirical part, and does not rise to the height which we should expect from the title. The problem of the possibility of experience which Kant proposed to solve, either is not at all touched by his doctrine, or else it is solved in a strictly idealist sense. It leaves th

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CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PROBLEM OF SENSIBLE EXPERIENCE. 124. The great problem of philosophy does not consist in the explanation of the possibility of experience; but in establishing the reason of the consciousness of experience, as experience. Experience in itself is a fact of our soul attested by consciousness, but to know that this fact is a fact of experience, is something very different from mere experience; for, by knowing this, we pass from the subjective to the objective, referring to the external world wha

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CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XIX.

EXTENSION ABSTRACTED FROM PHENOMENA. 133. That which is extended is not one being only; it is a collection of beings. Extension necessarily contains parts, some outside of, and consequently distinct from, others. Their union is not identity; for, the very fact that they are united, supposes them distinct, since any thing is not united with itself. It would seem from this that extension in itself and distinguished from the things extended, is nothing; to imagine extension as a being whose real na

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CHAPTER XX.

CHAPTER XX.

ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDES? 144. The preceding doctrine will seem much more probable if we reflect that all purely intellectual perceptions of extension may be reduced to the knowledge of order and relation. There is nothing absolute in the eyes of science, not even of mathematical science. The absolute, in relation to extension, is an ignorant fancy which the observation of the phenomena is sufficient to dissipate. In the order of appearances there are no absolute magnitudes; all are relatio

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CHAPTER XXI.

CHAPTER XXI.

PURE INTELLIGIBILITY OF THE EXTENDED WORLD. 152. Objects in themselves do not change their nature, by the variety of appearances which they produce in us. A polygon turning with rapidity has the appearance of a circle; the stars appear like small points; and considering the various classes of objects, we may observe that there is a great variety of appearances depending on circumstances. The nature of a being does not consist in what it appears, but in what it is. Suppose there were no sensitive

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CHAPTER XXII.

CHAPTER XXII.

INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 162. The divisibility of matter is a question that torments philosophers. Matter is divisible because it is extended, and there is no extension without parts. These parts are extended or are not: if they are, they are again divisible; if they are not, they are simple, and in the division of matter we must come to unextended points. This last consequence can be avoided only by recourse to the infinite divisibility of matter, and even this is a means of escaping the difficul

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CHAPTER XXIII.

CHAPTER XXIII.

UNEXTENDED POINTS. 166. There are two strong arguments against the existence of unextended points: the first is, that we must suppose them infinite in number, for otherwise it does not seem possible to arrive at the simple, starting from the extended: the second is, that even supposing them infinite in number they are incapable of producing extension. These arguments are so powerful as to excuse all the aberrations of the contrary opinion, which, however strange they may seem, are not more stran

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CHAPTER XXIV.

CHAPTER XXIV.

A CONJECTURE ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL NOTION OF EXTENSION. 171. The arguments for or against unextended points, for or against the infinite divisibility of matter seem equally conclusive. The understanding is afraid that it has met with contradictory demonstrations; it thinks it discovers absurdities in infinite divisibility, and absurdities in limiting it; absurdities in denying unextended points, and absurdities in admitting them. It is invincible attacking an opinion, but its strength is turned

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CHAPTER XXV.

CHAPTER XXV.

HARMONY OF THE REAL, PHENOMENAL, AND IDEAL ORDERS. 178. We may consider two natures in the external world, the one real, the other phenomenal; the first is particular and absolute, the second is relative to the being which perceives the phenomenon; by the first the world is, by the second it appears . A pure intellectual being knows the world as it is ; a sensitive being experiences it as it appears . We can discover this duality in ourselves; in so far as we are sensitive beings, we experience

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CHAPTER XXVI.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CHARACTER OF THE RELATIONS OF THE REAL ORDER TO THE PHENOMENAL. 186. Is the agreement of the idea, the phenomenon, and the reality necessary, is it founded on the essence of things, or has it been freely established by the will of the Creator? If the world had no other reality than that expressed by the sensible representation, if the appearances were an exact copy of the essence of things, we should have to say that this agreement is unalterable, that things are what they appear, and that if we

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CHAPTER XXVII.

CHAPTER XXVII.

WHETHER EVERY THING MUST BE IN SOME PLACE. 190. Is it necessary that whatever exists should be in some place? This question may seem strange, but it is profoundly philosophical. To be is not the same as to be in a place . To be, whether taken substantively as signifying to exist, or copulatively, as expressing the relation of the predicate to the subject, does not involve the idea of being in a place. The relation of an object to place is not necessary to it; for it is not contained in the notio

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CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CONTINGENCY OF CORPOREAL RELATIONS. 199. Position in place is the relation of a body to other bodies. Is this relation necessary? I distinguish: conditionally, yes; essentially, no. God has established this relation, and therefore it is necessary; but God might have ordered it otherwise, and can even now change it, without varying the essence of things. If we admit, as we must, a correspondence between the subjective and the objective, or between the appearance and the reality, we cannot deny th

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CHAPTER XXIX.

CHAPTER XXIX.

SOLUTION OF TWO DIFFICULTIES. 206. Must not the theory which supposes the relations of bodies to be variable, put an end to all the natural sciences? Can there be science without a necessary object? and can there be a necessity which is compatible with variability? The natural sciences have two parts: one physical, and the other geometrical. The first supposes the data furnished by experience; the second forms its calculations relative to these data. Change the relations of external beings, and

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CHAPTER XXX.

CHAPTER XXX.

PASSIVE SENSIBILITY. 210. Active sensibility, or the faculty of perceiving by the senses, has been a subject of great dispute among philosophers. Passive sensibility, or the capacity of an object to be perceived, is a question of not less interest. Can every thing which exists be perceived by the senses? Before answering this question, let us remember that to be perceived by the senses may be understood in two ways: First, it may mean, to cause an impression in a sensitive being; and secondly, t

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CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXI.

POSSIBILITY OF A GREATER SPHERE IN ACTIVE SENSIBILITY. 219. Having treated of passive sensibility in the order of possibles, a similar question naturally arises with respect to the active sensibility of beings subject to different conditions from those of our soul while united to the body. I speak only of possibility, for, limited to what experience teaches us, we know not what may be in the sphere of beings with which we have no communication. Whatever we know of them is by divine revelation; a

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CHAPTER XXXII.

CHAPTER XXXII.

POSSIBILITY OF THE PENETRATION OF BODIES. 245. The more we meditate on the corporeal world, the more we discover the contingency of many of its relations, and the consequent necessity of recourse to a higher cause which has established them. Even those properties which seem most absolute cease to appear so when submitted to the examination of reason. What more necessary than impenetrability? Yet from the moment it is carefully analyzed, it becomes reduced to a fact of experience not founded on t

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CHAPTER XXXIII.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

A TRIUMPH OF RELIGION IN THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY. 249. There are two things in extended objects: multiplicity and continuity. The first is absolutely necessary to extension; it supposes distinct parts, and that which is distinct cannot be identical without evident contradiction. The continuity represented in the sensible impression is not essential to extension, because it is only the result of a union of relations inseparable in the present order of sensibility, but not absolutely necessary in

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CHAPTER XXXIV.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMING UP. 262. Before passing to another subject, let us fix our attention for a few moments on the nature and origin of the idea of extension. We shall thus collect the fruit of the preceding investigations, and prepare the way for those which follow. The scientific fruitfulness of this idea to our mind proves how distant sensible impressions are from intellectual perception. We cannot know whether this idea existed in our mind before the sensible impression; if it did exist we

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NOTES TO BOOK FIRST.

NOTES TO BOOK FIRST.

ON CHAPTER I. (1) We must distinguish between certainty and truth: there are intimate relations between them, yet they are very different things. Truth is the conformity of the intellect with the object. Certainty is a firm assent to a real or apparent truth. Certainty is not truth, but it must at least have the illusion of truth. We may be certain of what is false, but not unless we believe it to be true. There is no truth so long as there is no judgment; for without judgment there is only perc

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NOTE TO BOOK SECOND.

NOTE TO BOOK SECOND.

ON CHAPTER II. (29) The immateriality of the souls of brutes is not a discovery of modern philosophy, the scholastics maintained it, and carried their ideas on this subject so far as to assert that no vital principle can be a body. In this sense they taught that even the principle of life, or the soul of plants, was something superior to the body. St. Thomas (P. I., Q. LXXV., A. I.) asks, in general, if the soul is a body: "Utrum anima sit corpus," and answers as follows: "Respondeo dicendum, qu

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FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

BY REV. JAMES BALMES . TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH BY HENRY F. BROWNSON, M.A. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II. D. &amp; J. SADLIER &amp; CO., 164 WILLIAM STREET, BOSTON:—128 FEDERAL STREET. MONTREAL:—COR. OF NOTRE DAME AND ST. FRANCIS XAVIER STS. 1856 . Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, By D. &amp; J. Sadlier &amp; Co. , In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. NEW YORK: BILLIN &amp; BROTHER, PRINTER

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

CURSORY VIEW OF SENSISM. 1. Having spoken of sensations, we come now to ideas. We must, however, before making this transition, inquire if there be in our mind ought else than sensation, if all the inward phenomena which we experience be ought else than sensations transformed. Man, when he rises from the sphere of sensations, from those phenomena which place him in relation with the external world, meets a new order of phenomena, of whose presence he is equally conscious. He cannot reflect upon

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

CONDILLAC'S STATUE. 5. Condillac supposes a statue, which he animates successively with each of the senses: then beginning with the sense of smell, he says; "So long as our statue is limited to the sense of smell, its knowledge cannot go beyond odors; it can neither have any idea of extension, of space, or of any thing beyond itself, nor of other sensations, such as color, sound, taste." [2] If, according to the conditions of the supposition, all activity and every faculty be denied to this stat

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GEOMETRICAL IDEAS AND THE SENSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS WHICH ACCOMPANY THEM. 17. Sensible representations always accompany our intellectual ideas. This is why in reflecting upon the latter we are apt to confound them with the former. We say, in reflecting upon them, not in making use of them. We none of us, have any trouble in making use of ideas according to circumstances; the error lies in the reflex, not in the direct act. It will be well to bear this last observation in mind.

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

THE IDEA AND THE INTELLECTUAL ACT. 21. Having shown that geometrical ideas are not sensible representations, we can safely conclude that no kind of ideas are. Could there be a difficulty concerning any, it would be concerning geometrical ideas, for the objects of the latter can be sensibly represented. When objects have no figure, they cannot be perceived by any of the senses; to speak in such a case of sensible representations is to fall into a contradiction. 22. These considerations draw a div

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

COMPARISON OF GEOMETRICAL WITH NON-GEOMETRICAL IDEAS. 29. The idea is a very different thing from the sensible representation, but it has certain necessary relations with it which it will be well to examine. When we say necessary , we speak only of the manner in which our mind, in its actual state, understands, abstracting the intelligence of other spirits, and even that of the human mind when subject to other conditions than those imposed by its present union with the body. So soon as we quit t

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

IN WHAT THE GEOMETRICAL IDEA CONSISTS; AND WHAT ARE ITS RELATIONS WITH SENSIBLE INTUITION. 38. In the preceding chapters we have distinguished between pure ideas and sensible representations, and we seem to have sufficiently demonstrated the difference between them, although we limited ourselves to the geometrical order. But we have not explained the idea in itself; we have said what it is not, but not what it is; and although we have shown the impossibility of explaining simple ideas, and the n

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ACTING INTELLECT OF THE ARISTOTELIANS. 45. I shall now briefly explain the scholastic theory of the manner in which the understanding knows material things. This explanation will show how much reason we had to assert that this doctrine of the schools can be ridiculed only when not understood, and that, whatever its foundation, it cannot be denied to possess an ideological importance. 46. The schoolmen began with this principle of Aristotle, nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in se

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

KANT AND THE ARISTOTELIANS. 51. Lest I be accused of levity in comparing Kant's philosophy with that of the schools, in what relates to the distinction between the sensitive and intellectual faculties, I shall give a rapid examination of this philosopher's doctrine so far as the present matter is concerned. Since the German philosopher is in the habit of expressing himself with great obscurity, and of using an obsolete language liable to different interpretations, I shall insert his own words, s

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE VALUE OF PURE IDEAS. 55. Now that we have shown the points of similarity between Kant's system and that of the scholastics, we propose to note their differences chiefly in what concerns the application of these doctrines. To give an idea of the gravity and transcendentalism of these differences, we have only to remark the discrepancy of their results. The Aristotelians built upon their principles a whole system of metaphysical science, which they considered the noblest of

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

SENSIBLE INTUITION. 69. Intuition, properly so called, consists in the act of the soul by which it perceives an object that effects it: this the signification of the Latin word derived from the verb intueri , to see a thing which is present, indicates. 70. Intuition belongs only to perceptive powers, to those by which the subject affected distinguishes between its affection and the object causing it. We do not pretend to say that this must be a reflex distinction, but simply that the internal ac

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

TWO COGNITIONS: INTUITIVE AND DISCURSIVE. 76. Now that I have explained sensible, I pass to intellectual intuition. There are two modes of knowing; the one is intuitive, the other discursive. Intuitive cognition is that in which the object is presented to the understanding, such as it is, and upon which the perceptive faculty has to exercise no function but that of contemplation; it is therefore called intuition , from intueri , to see. 77. This intuition may take place in two ways. It may eithe

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SENSISM OF KANT. 80. Kant maintained that while in the present life, we have only sensible intuition; and he considers the possibility of a purely intellectual intuition, whether for our own or for other minds doubtful. But as we have seen elsewhere (ch. IX.) that he does not attribute any value to conceptions separated from intuition, we infer that he is, notwithstanding his long dissertations upon the pure understanding, a confirmed sensist; and that the authors of the Critic of Pure Reaso

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

EXISTENCE OF PURE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION. 83. It is not true that the human mind even in this life has no intuition other than the sensible. There are within us many non-sensible phenomena, of which we are clearly conscious. Reflection, comparison, abstraction, election, and all the acts of the understanding and will, include nothing of the sensible. We should like to know, to what species of sensibility, abstract ideas, and the acts by which we perceive them, belong; these among others: I desir

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS.—ABSTRACTION MADE FROM INTELLECTUAL INTUITION. 89. Although we should admit that our mind can have no intuition but the sensible, it could not thence be inferred that conceptions of the purely intellectual order are empty forms, and in nowise conducive to the knowledge of objects in themselves. It has always been understood that general ideas are not intuitive, since by the very fact that they are general they cannot be referred immediately to a determinate obje

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CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE VALUE OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 96. However vague the ideas an isolated being would form of objects distinct from itself, they will never be so vague as not to refer to a real thing. The mind may not know the nature of this reality, but it knows for certain that it exists. A man blind from his birth can form no clear idea of colors, nor of the sensation of seeing; but is he therefore ignorant that sensation exists, and that the words, color, seeing, and others which refer to s

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CHAPTER XVI

CHAPTER XVI

VALUE OF PRINCIPLES, INDEPENDENTLY OF SENSIBLE INTUITION. 101. The principle of contradiction, indispensable condition of all certainty, of all truth, and without which the external world, and intelligence itself, would become a chaos, offers us a good example of the intrinsic value of purely intellectual conceptions independent of sensible intuition. No determinate idea is united to the conception of being when we affirm the impossibility of a thing being and not-being at the same time, or the

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CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVII.

RELATIONS OF INTUITION WITH THE RANK OF THE PERCEPTIVE BEING. 106. The perfection of intelligence involves extension and clearness of its intuitions; the more perfect it is, the more intuitive it will be. The infinite intelligence does not know by discursion, but by intuition: it does not need to seek objects: it sees them all before itself. It sees with intuition of identity what belongs to its own essence, and with intuition of causality every thing that does or can exist outside of itself. Ot

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CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ASPIRATIONS OF THE HUMAN SOUL. 111. A close observation of internal phenomena shows that the human soul aspires to something far beyond all that it actually possesses. Not satisfied with the objects given to it in immediate intuition, it darts forward in pursuit of others of a superior order; and even in those that are offered to it immediately, it is not contented with the aspect under which they appear , but seeks to know what they are . The purely individual does not satisfy the soul. Nailed

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CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XIX.

ELEMENTS AND VARIETY OF THE CHARACTERS OF SENSIBLE REPRESENTATION. 114. I now come to examine the primitive elements of our mental combinations. I shall begin with their sensible elements. Extension enters into every act of representative sensibility; without it nothing is represented to us, and sensations are reduced to mere affections of the soul, having no relation to any object. 115. Extension, of itself, abstracted from its limitability, is susceptible of no combination; it only offers a va

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CHAPTER XX.

CHAPTER XX.

INTERMEDIATE REPRESENTATIONS BETWEEN SENSIBLE INTUITION AND THE INTELLECTUAL ACT. 125. The question now occurs, whether the understanding, in order to perceive the geometrical relations offered in sensible intuition, does or does not need some intermediate representations which bring it into contact with the sensible order? [10] Such a necessity would, at first sight, seem to exist, since, as the understanding is a non-sensible faculty, sensible elements cannot be its immediate object. But on ma

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CHAPTER XXI.

CHAPTER XXI.

DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE IDEAS. 128. We must, under pain of falling into sensism, by limiting the understanding to the perception and combination of objects presented by sensibility, admit other than intellectual acts referable to sensible objects in general. And what, in this case, is the object of the intellectual act, is a question as difficult as it is interesting. 129. The pure understanding can exercise its functions either upon determinate or indeterminate ideas; that is, upon ideas

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CHAPTER XXII.

CHAPTER XXII.

LIMITS OF OUR INTUITION. 137. Could we assign limits to the field of experience, and determine exactly how much they inclose, we could also determine the characteristics by which a being may be presented to us as existing or as possible. 138. Passive sensibility, active sensibility, understanding, and will, are, if we be not mistaken, all that our understanding contains; and this is why we cannot conceive of any attribute characteristic of being, except these four. Let us examine these, each in

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CHAPTER XXIII.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE NECESSITY INVOLVED IN IDEAS. 144. In all ideas, even in those that relate to contingent facts, there is something of the necessary, something from which science may spring, but something which cannot emanate from experience, however multiplied we suppose it. Every induction resulting from experience is confined to a limited number of facts,—a number, which, even if augmented by all the experience of all men of all ages, would still remain infinitely below universality, which extends to al

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CHAPTER XXIV.

CHAPTER XXIV.

EXISTENCE OF UNIVERSAL REASON. 152. General truths have some relation to particular truths; for since they are not a vain illusion, they must of necessity be connected with some object either existing or possible. Whatever exists is particular; not even possible being can be conceived of, if it be not, so to speak, particularized in the regions of possibility. God himself, being by essence, is not a being in abstract, but an infinite reality. In him, the general idea of the plenitude of being, o

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CHAPTER XXV.

CHAPTER XXV.

IN WHAT DOES UNIVERSAL REASON CONSIST? 156. What is universal reason? If we consider it as a simple idea, as an abstraction from individual reason, as something separate from them, but not real, we strike upon the very rock we try to shun. We endeavor to assign a cause of the unity of human reason; and appeal to universal reason; and then to explain in what universal reason consists, we recur to an abstraction from individual reason. Evidently, this is a vicious circle; we place the cause of a f

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CHAPTER XXVI.

CHAPTER XXVI.

REMARKS ON THE REAL FOUNDATION OF PURE POSSIBILITY. 162. Since the argument proving the necessity of a being in which is laid the foundation of all the relations in the possible order, is one of the most transcendental in all metaphysics, and at the same time one of the most difficult to be perfectly understood, we judge it advisable to enlarge somewhat upon the considerations thrown out in the preceding chapter. An example, in which we undertake to establish the possibility of things, independe

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CHAPTER XXVII.

CHAPTER XXVII.

INDIVIDUAL AND INTELLECTUAL PHENOMENA EXPLAINED BY THE UNIVERSAL SUBSISTING REASON. 172. Starting from the phenomena observable in individual reason, we have arrived at universal reason. Let us, so to speak, make the counterproof; taking this universal subsisting reason, let us see if individual reason in itself and in its phenomena can be explained by it. I. What are necessary truths? They are the relations of beings, such as they are represented in the being which contains the plenitude of bei

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CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATION OF LANGUAGE TO IDEAS. 175. The relation between thought and language is one of the most important ideological phenomena. When we speak we think; and when we think we speak with an internal language. The understanding needs speech as a kind of guiding thread in the labyrinth of ideas. 176. The connection of ideas by a sign seems necessary. The most universal and most convenient of these signs is language; but we must not forget that it is an arbitrary sign, as is prov

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CHAPTER XXIX.

CHAPTER XXIX.

ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND IDEAS. 183. Many ideas seem to be like sensations and sentiments; simple facts, incapable of decomposition, for which reason we cannot explain them with words. Words illustrate ideas; but do they not sometimes also confuse them? When we speak of an idea, we reflect upon it, and I have already remarked [11] that the reflective force of our perceptive ideas is much inferior to their direct force. 184. We have sometimes thought that we do, p

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CHAPTER XXX.

CHAPTER XXX.

INNATE IDEAS. 192. Among the adversaries of innate ideas there exist profound differences. The materialists maintain that man has received every thing through the senses, in such a way as to make our understanding nothing more than the product of an organism which has been advancing in perfection, just as a machine acquires, by use, a greater facility and delicacy of movement. They suppose nothing but the faculty of sensation to pre-exist in the mind; or, to speak more correctly, they admit no m

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

IDEA OF BEING. 1. There is in our understanding the idea of being. Independent of sensations, and in an order far superior to them, there exist ideas in our understanding, which extend to, and are a necessary element of all thought. The idea of being, or of ens , holds the first rank among these. When the scholastics said that the object of the understanding was being, "objectum intellectus est ens," they enunciated a profound truth, and pointed out one of the most certain and important of all i

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

SIMPLICITY AND INDETERMINATENESS OF THE IDEA OF BEING. 7. Nothing can be conceived more simple than the idea of being. It cannot be composed of elements. It allows of nothing determinate, since it is in itself absolutely indeterminate. The instant that something determinate is made to enter it, it is in a manner destroyed; it is no longer the idea of being , but of such a being ; an idea applied, but not the idea of the being in all its generality. 8. How shall we make it understood what we woul

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

SUBSTANTIVE AND COPULATIVE BEING. 11. For the more thorough understanding of this matter, it will be well to distinguish between the absolute and relative ideas of being; that is between what is expressed by the word being, when it designates reality, simple existence, and when it marks the union of a predicate and its subject. In the two following propositions we see very closely the different meaning of the word is ; Peter is ; Peter is good. In the former the word is designates the reality of

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

BEING, THE OBJECT OF THE UNDERSTANDING, IS NOT THE POSSIBLE, INASMUCH AS POSSIBLE. 22. One very important point concerning the idea of being remains to be illustrated, and that is, whether this idea has possible or real being for its object. The scholastics taught that the object of the understanding was being; nor were they altogether without reason in so doing, since one of the things we conceive of with the greatest distinctness, and which is found to be the most fundamental in all our ideas,

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

A DIFFICULTY SOLVED. 36. What means the idea of purely possible being? If we maintain that the object of the idea of being is reality, these two ideas, being, and purely possible, would seem to be contradictory: reality is not purely possible, for were it purely possible, it would not exist, and in the non-existing there is no reality. Let us examine this difficulty, and investigate the origin of the idea of pure possibility. 37. Surrounded as we are by contingent beings, contingent beings ourse

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

IN WHAT SENSE THE IDEA OF BEING IS THE FORM OF THE UNDERSTANDING. 40. When it is asserted that the object of the understanding is being, there is room to doubt whether it is meant that the idea of being is the general form of all conceptions, or only that all the understanding conceives is being; or, in other words, whether the quality of object is attributed to being, as being, in such a way that under this form alone objects are conceivable, or only that the quality of being belongs to all tha

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

ALL SCIENCE IS FOUNDED IN THE POSTULATE OF EXISTENCE. 47. We have said that the idea of being is not the sole form perceived, but that it is a form necessary to all perception. We do not mean by this to say that we cannot perceive without the actually existing; but that existence enters in some degree as a condition of every thing perceived. We will explain ourselves. When we simply perceive an object, and affirm nothing of it, it is always offered to us as a reality. Our idea certainly expresse

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FOUNDATION OF PURE POSSIBILITY, AND THE CONDITION OF ITS EXISTENCE. 53. We have said that the foundation of the pure possibility of things, and of their properties and relations, is founded in the essence of God, wherein is the reason of every thing. [22] And it may at first sight seem that science needs only this foundation, and does not require to rest upon the condition of the existence of things; because, if essences are represented in God, the object of science is found in the Divine es

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

IDEA OF NEGATION. 60. It is said that the understanding does not conceive nothing: this is true in the sense that we do not conceive nothing as something, which would be a contradiction; but it does not therefore follow, that we do not in any mode conceive nothing. Not-being is nothing, and yet we conceive not-being. This perception is necessary to us; without it we could not perceive contradiction; for which reason the principle of contradiction: "It is impossible for a thing to exist and not t

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

IDENTITY; DISTINCTION; UNITY; MULTIPLICITY. 69. Let us examine how we may draw from the idea of not-being the explication of the ideas of identity and distinction, unity and multiplicity. Let us conceive a being, and fix our attention solely on it, and compare it with nothing which is not it, nor permit any idea of not-being to come in; we shall then, with respect to it, have the ideas of identity and unity; or, to speak more exactly, these ideas of identity and unity will be nothing else than i

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BEING. 74. If it be impossible to think without the idea of being, it exists prior to any reflex act, and it cannot have sprung from reflection. The idea of being must therefore be innate. Let us investigate this question. 75. We have shown in the preceding chapter that we cannot think without the idea of being; let whoever doubts this consult his own experience, and make, if he can, a reflex act into which the idea of being will not enter. We have already seen that we cann

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. 88. It has been much disputed in the schools whether existence is distinct from essence. At first sight, this seems an indifferent question; but such it is not, if we attend to the consequences which, in the opinion of respectable authors, flow from it; for they pretend to no less than establishing upon the distinction between essence and existence a characteristic note of the finite, attributing to infinite being alone, the identity of its essence with

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

KANT'S OPINION OF REALITY AND NEGATION. 95. Kant numbers among his categories reality and negation, or existence and non-existence, and, conformably to his principles, defines them thus: "Reality is a pure conception of the understanding; it is what corresponds, in general, to any sensation whatever, consequently that whose conception denotes a being in itself, in time. Negation is that whose conception represents a not-being in time. The opposition of these two things consists in the difference

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

RECAPITULATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE IDEA OF BEING. 100. We wish now to recapitulate the doctrine brought out in the preceding chapters, so that it may be seen at a glance in all its bearings and connections. The idea of being is so fruitful in results, that we must sound it under all its aspects, and never lose sight of it in investigating transcendental philosophy. 101. We have the idea of ens , or of being in general; reason and our inward sense both attest it. 102.

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IDEA OF UNITY. 1. Before analyzing the idea of number, let us examine its simplest element, unity. Number is a connection of unities. We cannot know what number is, if we do not know what unity is. [25] 2. What is unity? When is a thing one? We all seem to know what unity is, since upon it we found the fabric of all our arithmetic cognitions. We all know when a thing is one, and we never equivocate on the meaning of the word. In this the learned and the unlearne

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

WHAT IS UNITY. 6. The scholastics were right in teaching that every being is one, and that whatever is one is being. Unity is a general attribute of every being, but is not distinct from it. However little we reflect, we cannot fail to perceive that unity and being are not distinguished: the unity of unity, by itself, offers us nothing real or even possible. What then would become of unity, if nothing but unity? This idea is involved in that of being; it is an aspect of it, a reason under which

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

UNITY AND SIMPLICITY. 16. Real unity and simplicity are identical. What is really one has no distinction in itself; nor is it composed of parts, of which it can be said, this is not that. Evidently simplicity requires nothing more; the simple is opposed to the composite, to what is formed of many beings whereof one is not the other. 17. We meet this simplicity in none of the objects of our intuitions, excepting the acts of our own mind; so that even when we know, by discursion, that there are su

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

ORIGIN OF THE TENDENCY OF OUR MIND TO UNITY. 26. Since we encounter multiplicity in all sensible objects, which are those chiefly demanding our attention, how does our mind acquire the idea of unity? In science, in literature, in the arts, and in every thing, we seek unity; and whence this irresistible tendency towards unity, which makes us seek a factitious when we cannot find a real unity, and this, too, notwithstanding the multiplicity presented by all the objects of our perception? 27. Two o

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

GENERATION OF THE IDEA OF NUMBER. 37. Unity is the first element of number, but does not of itself alone constitute number, which is not unity, but the collection of unities. 38. Two is a number. What is our idea of the number two ? Evidently it is not confounded with its sign, for signs are many and very different, but it is one and always the same. 39. It would seem at first sight that the idea of two is independent of the mode of its generation, and that, being one, it may be formed by additi

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

CONNECTION OF THE IDEAS OF NUMBER WITH THEIR SIGNS. 51. The connection of ideas and impressions, in a sign, is a most wonderful intellectual phenomenon, and at the same time of the greatest help to our mind. Were it not for this connection, we could scarcely reflect at all upon objects somewhat complex, and above all our memory would be exceedingly limited. [26] 52. Condillac made some excellent remarks upon this matter: in his opinion, we cannot, unaided by signs, count more than three or four.

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF NUMBER IN ITSELF AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH SIGNS. 58. In order clearly to conceive the idea of number, and the way it is engendered in our mind, let us study its formation in a deaf and dumb person. We have no better way of giving such a one an idea of unity than by presenting an object to him. Now, if we would convey to him the idea of two, we show him two fingers, then two oranges, then two books, and in each of these operations make a sign which must be always the same

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY OF THE SUBJECT. 1. The explanation of the idea of time is not a matter of mere curiosity, but of the highest importance. To convince ourselves of this we have only to consider that the explanation of the whole edifice of human cognitions is based upon it. The most fundamental and indispensable principle which supports all others, includes the idea of time. A thing cannot be and not be at the same time: "impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse." The impossibility of

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

IS TIME THE MEASURE OF MOVEMENT? 6. Time is said by many philosophers to be the measure of movement. This idea is fruitful, but it needs to be illustrated. When we measure movement we refer to something fixed. Thus we measure the rapidity with which we have traversed a certain space by noticing the time denoted by a watch. But how do we measure time by a watch? By the space passed over by the hand on the dial. If we reflect carefully, we shall see that this is purely conventional, or rather, tha

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TIME AND SPACE. 15. Time seems to us to be something fixed. An hour is neither more nor less than an hour, no matter how our time-pieces go, or the world itself; just as a cubic foot of space is always a cubic foot, neither more nor less, whether occupied or not occupied by bodies. 16. Time exists independent of all movement, of all suc cession; if it is something absolute, has a determinate value of its own, is applicable to all that changes without itself c

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

DEFINITION OF TIME. 22. Time is duration; but duration without something which endures, is an absurdity. There can then be no time without something existing. The duration which we conceive, after reducing every thing to nihility, is a vain imagination; it is not an idea, but is rather in contradiction with ideas. An important consequence flows from this; it is, that time in itself, cannot be defined with absolute elimination of every thing to which it refers. Time, then, has no proper existence

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

TIME IS NOTHING ABSOLUTE. 29. Is time something absolute? The definition given in the last chapter shows clearly enough that it is not. Time in things is not being only, nor not-being only, but the relation of being and not-being. Time in the understanding, is the perception of this relation. The measure of time is nothing else than the comparison of mutations among themselves. To us, those mutations which seem to be unalterably uniform serve as the primitive measure. For this we have taken the

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE EXPLANATION OF VELOCITY. 32. Here arises a serious difficulty: if time be nothing absolute, greater or less velocity is inexplicable. This seems to result even from what we have said, that if the relation of movements be not changed, any augmentation or diminution of velocity is impossible; because, if velocity be in necessary relation to time, and time itself be nothing but the relation of mutations, it is inconceivable how time, and consequently how velocity, can be changed

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF SUCCESSION. 38. The reasons that destroy the absolute nature of time, inasmuch as it is subject to measure, do not seem fully to obviate another difficulty, arising from the consideration of time in itself. If indeed time be succession, what is this succession? It is evident that things succeed each other; but if there be no before or after , that is, time existing before succession, since succession consists in some things coming after others, what is the meaning of s

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHAT IS CO-EXISTENCE? 51. If the succession of time involves exclusion, there must be co-existence where there is no exclusion: therefore, supposing that God has created other worlds, they must necessarily be contemporaneous with the present; for it is evident that they would not be excluded; and as they have not the mutual relation of cause and effect like the phenomena of the present world, we cannot apply to them the explanation which we gave to show that the motion of the plants of Paradise

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

PRESENT, PAST, AND FUTURE. 59. After explaining the idea of co-existence, we came to the definition of the various relations which time presents. They are principally three: present, past, and future. All others are combinations of these. 60. The present is the only absolute time: by this I mean, that it needs no relation, in order to be conceived. The present is conceived without relation to the past or to the future. Neither the past nor the future can be conceived without relation to the pres

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING DOCTRINE TO SEVERAL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. 71. This theory will be much better understood by its application to the solution of several questions. I. How long a time had passed before the creation? None. As there was no succession, there was only the present, the eternity of God. All else that we imagine is a mere illusion, contrary to sound philosophy. II. Was it possible for another world to have existed when this world's existence began? Undoubtedly it was; this wou

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF TIME CONFIRMS ITS RESEMBLANCE TO THE IDEA OF SPACE. 73. Having explained the idea of time, and applied it to the most difficult questions, we may explain this doctrine still farther, by examining what we have already intimated concerning the resemblance between time and space. [29] There is analogy in the difficulties; analogy in the definitions of both ideas; analogy in the illusions which hinder the knowledge of the truth. What we announced before with respect to th

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

RELATIONS OF THE IDEA OF TIME TO EXPERIENCE. 88. If time is nothing distinct from things, how does it happen that we conceive it in the abstract, independently of things themselves? How does it happen that it presents itself to us as an absolute being, subject to no transformation or motion, while within it every thing is moved and transformed? If it is a subjective fact, why do we apply it to things? If it is objective, why is it mingled with all our perceptions? Because it contains a necessity

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

KANT'S OPINION. 97. Kant uses the same theory to explain time that he used to explain space. Time, according to him, is nothing in itself, neither is it any thing in things; it is a subjective condition of intuition, a form of the internal sense, by means of which phenomena are presented to us as successive, just as space was the form by which they are presented as continuous. To speak frankly, it seems to me that this is saying nothing; it affirms a well-known fact, but does not explain it. Who

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY AND OF THE NECESSITY OF THE IDEA OF TIME. 103. Things in themselves, abstracted from our intuition, are susceptible of change. Where there is change, there is succession, and where there is succession, there is a certain order in the things which succeed,—an order which is really in the things themselves, although it does not subsist by itself, separated from them. Kant might object to this, that perhaps the changes are not in things, but in t

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CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

IMPORTANT COROLLARIES. 107. Is the idea of time derived from experience? This question is answered by what we said of the idea of being. It is not a type existing previous to all sensation and to all intellectual act; it is a perception of being and not-being which accompanies all our acts, but is not presented to us separately until reflection eliminates from it all that does not belong to it. This perception is the exercise of an innate activity, which is subjected to the conditions of experie

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CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVI.

PURE IDEAL TIME AND EMPYRICAL TIME. 112. Time is not only conceived as a general order of change, or as a relation of being and not-being; but also as something fixed, which can be measured with exactness. Thus, before the creation of the world, we conceive not only an abstract order, or time, but a time composed of years, of centuries, or some other terms. But this, if we closely examine it, is only an idea in which we conceive the phenomena of experience under a general view, taking them out o

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CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVII.

RELATIONS OF THE IDEA OF TIME AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION. 117. Let us explain the true meaning of the principle of contradiction. "It is impossible for any thing to be and not be at the same time." The connection of the ideas contained in this principle seems at first sight to be explained without any difficulty; so that, to raise questions as to its true sense is to place ourselves in contradiction with one of the fundamental truths on which rests the edifice of our knowledge. For, if t

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CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SUMMING UP. Let us collect together the doctrines of the preceding chapters. 131. Time is a question difficult to explain. Whoever denies this difficulty shows that he has meditated but superficially on the matter. 132. Motion is measured by time; but it is not a sufficient definition of time to call it the measure of motion. 133. It is impossible to find a primitive measure of motion; we must, at last, take some measure or another, and although arbitrarily chosen, we must refer motion to it. It

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CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XIX.

A GLANCE AT THE IDEAS OF SPACE, NUMBER, AND TIME. 157. We may now mark out and determine with perfect exactness the necessary elements which form the object of the natural and exact sciences. This is not only curious, but highly important; for it presents under the simplest aspect, an immense field of knowledge, the limits of which expand, as we advance; so that, it is impossible to assign a limit to progress. 158. Space, number, and time, are the three elements of all the natural and exact scie

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

TRANSITORY VIEW OF THE ACTUAL STATE OF PHILOSOPHY. 1. In the works on transcendental philosophy which have been published of late years, we find the words infinite, absolute, indeterminate, unconditioned, frequently repeated, and made to play a very prominent part in the explanation of the most recondite secrets which can be presented to the consideration of man. The words finite, relative, determinate, conditional, are easily combined with these; and from this combination they pretend that a ra

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

IMPORTANCE AND ANOMALY OF THE QUESTIONS ON THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE. 12. The examination of the idea of the infinite is of the highest importance, not only because we meet it in various sciences, the exact sciences among others, but because it is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish God from creatures. A finite God would be no God; an infinite creature would not be a creature. In the scale of finite beings we discover a gradation, by which they are interlinked; the less p

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

HAVE WE THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE? 16. If we had no idea of the infinite, the word would have no meaning to us, and when used it would not be understood. 17. Whatever may be the nature and perfection of our idea of the infinite, it is certain that it involves something fixed, and common to all intelligences. We apply the idea to things of very different orders, and it is always understood in the same sense by all men. Even the difficulty we find in attempting to explain it, in itself or in its ap

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

THE LIMIT. 25. The word infinite is equivalent to not finite , and seems to express a negation. But negations are not always truly such, although the terms imply it; for if that which is denied, be a negation, the denial of it is an affirmation. This is the reason why two negatives are said to be equivalent to an affirmative. If I say, it has not varied, and you deny it, you deny my negation; for it is the same thing to deny that it has not varied, as to affirm that it has varied. In order, ther

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE TO CONTINUOUS QUANTITIES, AND TO DISCRETE QUANTITIES, IN SO FAR AS THESE LAST ARE EXPRESSED IN SERIES. 31. One of the characteristic properties of the idea of the infinite is application to different orders. This gives occasion to some important considerations which greatly assist to make this idea clear in our mind. 32. From the point where I am situated I draw a line in the direction of the north; it is evident that I may prolong th

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

ORIGIN OF THE VAGUENESS AND APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE. 41. The difficulties in the application of the idea of infinity, seem on the one hand, to prove that either this idea does not exist in us, or is very confused; and on the other hand, that we possess it, and in a very perfect degree. Why do we discover that numbers are not infinite, although at first they seem to be? Why do we deny the infinity of certain dimensions, notwithstanding their infinite

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF THE INFINITE. 49. Supposing that our idea of the infinite is not intuitive but abstract, let us see how its true nature may be explained. We have the ideas of being and of its opposite, not-being; these ideas considered in themselves are general, indeter minate, and may be applied to every thing which is subjected to our experience. We may affirm and deny something of every limited being: we may affirm what it is: we may deny what it is not: the li

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DEFINITION OF INFINITY CONFIRMED BY APPLICATION TO EXTENSION. 59. We have explained the idea of infinity in general, by the indeterminate conceptions of being and the negation of limit. In order to assure ourselves that the explanation is well grounded, and that we have pointed out the essential marks of the conception, let us examine whether their application to determinate objects corresponds to what we have established in general. If the idea of infinity is what we have defined it to be,

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCEPTION OF AN INFINITE NUMBER. 69. Can we conceive an infinite number? On one side, it seems not; because we doubt its possibility, and if we possessed this idea we should have no doubt of its existence. On the other side, it seems that we can conceive an infinite number; for we know immediately when a number is not infinite, and we could not know this if we had not the idea of infinite number. Our observations on infinite series would seem to prove that the idea of infinite number is an illu

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

CONCEPTION OF INFINITE EXTENSION. 76. Is infinite extension conceivable? This conception includes two ideas: the idea of extension, and the idea of the negation of limit. The idea of extension is a general conception, referring to the intuition which, whatever may be in itself and in its object, represents extension and the union of the three dimensions, the pure form of which is space. It is evident that we can unite, in one conception, the two ideas of extension in general and the negation of

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

POSSIBILITY OF INFINITE EXTENSION. 80. What are we to think as to the possibility of the infinities which we conceive? Let us examine the question. Is an infinite extension possible? There is no incompatibility between the idea of extension and the negation of limit, at least, according to our way of conceiving them. It is more difficult for us to conceive extension absolutely limited, than to conceive it unlimited: beyond all limit, we imagine space without end. 81. Neither do we discover any i

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

SOLUTION OF VARIOUS OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INFINITE EXTENSION. 84. The discussions on the possibility of an infinite extension are of a very ancient date. How could it be otherwise? Must not the glorious spectacle of the universe, and the space which we imagine beyond the boundaries of all worlds, naturally have given rise to questions as to the existence or possibility of a limit to this immensity? Some philosophers think an infinite extension impossible. Let us see on what th

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

EXISTENCE OF INFINITE EXTENSION. 88. The question of the possibility of an infinite extension is very different from that of its existence. The first we answer in the affirmative, the second in the negative. Descartes maintained that the extension of the world is indefinite; but this is a term which, although it has a very rational meaning when it refers to the compass of our understanding, has no meaning when applied to things. There is no objection to saying that the extension of the world is

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

POSSIBILITY OF AN ACTUAL INFINITE NUMBER. 91. Is an infinite number possible? Does the union of the idea of number with the idea of the absolute negation of limit, involve any contradiction which prevents the realization of the conception? Whatever number we may conceive, we can always conceive one still greater: this seems to show that no existing number can be absolutely infinite. If we suppose this number to be realized, an intelligence may know it, and may multiply it by two, three, or any o

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CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

IDEA OF ABSOLUTELY INFINITE BEING. 110. We are entering on a difficult question. Serious difficulties are found in the idea of the infinite in general; the idea of absolutely infinite being is not less difficult. We have seen that there are different orders of infinities, each one of which is a conception formed by the association of the two ideas of a particular being and the negation of limit. But it is easy to see that none of the infinities hitherto examined can be called infinite in the str

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CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVI.

ALL THE REALITY CONTAINED IN INDETERMINATE CONCEPTIONS IS AFFIRMED OF GOD. 121. We have seen that our cognitions are of two classes: some are general and indeterminate, others intuitive. All the objects which we know, whether indeterminately or intuitively, may be affirmed of God, provided they involve no contradiction. 122. General and indeterminate conceptions are the ideas of being and not-being, substance and accidents, simple and composite, cause and effect. All that is real in these concep

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CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVII.

ALL THAT IS NOT CONTRADICTORY IN INTUITIVE IDEAS IS AFFIRMED OF GOD. 130. We have seen that all that is positive in general and indeterminate conceptions is affirmed of God. Let us see if the same is true of intuitive ideas. These ideas, in all that touches our understanding, may be reduced to these four; passive sensibility, active sensibility, intelligence, and will. 131. Passive sensibility, or the form under which the objects of the external world are presented to our senses, cannot be attri

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CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

INTELLIGENCE AND THE ABSOLUTELY INFINITE BEING. 142. The infinite being is not a vague object presented in the general idea of being, but is possessed of true properties which, without ceasing to be real, are identified with its infinite essence. A being which is not something, of which some property cannot be affirmed, is a dead being, which we conceive only under the general idea of thing, and is presented to us as something which cannot be realized. Such is not the conception which mankind fo

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CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XIX.

SUMMING UP. 149. The examination of the idea of the infinite is of the greatest importance, because it is inseparably united with the idea of God. 150. We have the idea of the infinite; but the disputes concerning its nature, and even its existence, denote its obscurity. 151. The finite is that which has limits. 152. The infinite is not the same as the indefinite. The infinite is that which has no limits—the not-finite ; the indefinite is that to which no limits are assigned—the not-defined . 15

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

NAME AND GENERAL IDEA OF SUBSTANCE. 1. What is substance? Have we a clear and distinct idea of it? The disputes of philosophers concerning the idea of substance and the continual applications which we make of it, prove two things: first, that the idea of substance exists; and secondly, that its clearness and distinctness are not all that could be desired. A mere name, containing no idea, could not so strongly draw the attention of all philosophers, nor be used so generally, even in ordinary lang

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE TO CORPOREAL OBJECTS. 7. Let us apply the ideas contained in that of substance to a corporeal object: this will help explain these ideas, and perhaps suggest others. The paper on which I am writing is susceptible of various modifications: I may write on it a thousand different things, in various characters, and in different colors; I may fold it in various ways, and give it an infinite variety of positions in relation to the objects around it, and I may move

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

DEFINITION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE. 13. What is the permanent subject of transformations in the sensible order? Is it a pure illusion? Is it a reality? What reality can it be? Does it not seem rather an abstraction? A thing which is no color, but lends itself all colors; which is none of the qualities which we experience, but the subject and cause of them all; which is no form, but accommodates itself to all forms; which is not pure extension, because this is an abstraction, and it is something w

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE TO ITS ACCIDENTS. 18. In the idea of corporeal substance the idea of permanence is perfectly included, the idea of unity only imperfectly. The unity which we conceive in every corporeal substance is a factitious unity; since that which is constant is not one but an aggregate of many, as is proved by the divisibility of matter; out of every corporeal substance we may make many which will have the same right as the first to be called substances. A piece of wood is a

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

CONSIDERATIONS ON CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE IN ITSELF. 26. The idea of substance, such as we have thus far explained it, implies a relation to accidents in general. The idea we are now examining is not that of an indeterminate substance, but of corporeal substance; and it must be confessed that it is difficult to conceive a particular corporeal substance without any accident. If I take from the paper, on which I am writing, its figure, extension, and all that relates to my senses, what is there left f

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE HUMAN ME. 31. We have not found perfect unity in corporeal substances: all that are subject to our senses may be resolved into a number of others equally substances in their turn; a body is rather an aggregate of substances, than one substance. We do not find the unity in the bodies; we attribute it to them either inasmuch as they form a common link of our sensations, or inasmuch as we consider the different substances subordinated to one being and governing substance. Thus

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

RELATION OF THE PROPOSITION, I THINK, TO THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE ME. 35. The proposition, I think , can have no sense unless we admit that the soul is a substance. Philosophy loses its resting-point, and all that experience within us is a series of unconnected phenomena, incapable of being observed, or subjected to any rule. 36. My present thought is not individually my thought of yesterday, as my thought of to-morrow will not be my thought of to-day. These thoughts, considered in themselves a

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

REMARKS ON THE SOUL'S INTUITION OF ITSELF. 43. The permanent reality of the me , considered in itself and abstracted from the things which pass within it, is a fact which we perceive in our intuition, and which we express in all our words. If this presence, this internal experience, be what is called the intuition of the soul, then we have intuition of our soul. This intuition is reproduced in every particular intuition, and in all internal affections in general; for, although they are isolated

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENTS PROVING THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SOUL. 51. The psychological arguments in favor of the substantiality of the soul are mere paralogisms, in Kant's opinion; although they prove an ideal substance, they can never lead to a real substance. Besides the arguments with which this philosopher attacks the psychological proof of the substantiality of the soul, he had also a personal argument, which, considering the weakness of the human heart, was very powerful. He had eit

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENT WHICH HE CALLS PARALOGISM OF PERSONALITY. 62. Kant attacks the argument founded on the testimony of consciousness in a particular manner in the examination of what he calls the Paralogism of Personality . He gives the argument in this form; "Whatever has the consciousness of its numerical identity at different times is, by this fact alone, a person; this is verified of the soul; therefore soul is a person." Kant uses the word person in a very incorrect sense: it no

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL. 72. I have confined myself in the preceding chapters to proving the substantiality of the soul; to do which it was only necessary to demonstrate by the testimony of consciousness that there is within us a permanent reality, the subject of the modifications which we experience. I shall now demonstrate that this substance is simple. To proceed methodically, let us fix the meaning of the word simple . When many beings are united and form a collection, the result is called a

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENT PROVING THE SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL. 79. Kant calls the argument, by which we have just proved the simplicity of the soul, the second paralogism of psychology. He gives it in these terms: "Every thing, the action of which can never be conceived as the concurrence of many agents, is simple: the soul or thinking substance is of this nature; therefore the soul is simple." The German philosopher admits that this argument is not a mere sophism, invented by some dogmatist

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

IN WHAT MANNER THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE MAY BE APPLIED TO GOD. 95. In the idea of substance as formed from the beings around us and from the testimony of our consciousness we find the relation to changes which occur in it as their subject or recipient. But we have before remarked that besides this relation there is a negation of inherence in another as the modifications are inherent in the substance; this negation implies a perfection which exempts it from the necessity of inherence to which the ch

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

AN IMPORTANT REMARK, AND SUMMARY. 105. When we say, that a substance is a being subsisting by itself, we do not mean that it is a being which has absolutely no need of another for its existence. To confound these two things would produce a frightful confusion of ideas, and is itself produced by a not less frightful confusion of the relation of cause and effect with the relation of substance and accidents. 106. The relation of cause and effect consists in the cause giving the effect its being; th

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CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF IDEAS. 109. The idea of substance and all its applications, as well to the external as to the internal world, are far from leading us to infer the existence of a single substance; on the contrary, reason according with experience forces us to acknowledge a multitude of substances. Why should we admit only one substance? This is one of the most important questions of philosophy, and from the most ancient times has given occasion to the most serious errors; it co

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CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVI.

PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF EXTERNAL FACTS. 116. If pantheism is unsustainable in the region of ideas, it is not less so in the field of experience. The latter, far from leading us to the exclusive unity of substance, shows us on all sides multiplicity. 117. There is unity where there is no division, when in the thing that is one no others can be distinguished, when it admits no negative judgment. Nothing of all this is observed in the external world; but a constant experience presents di

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CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVII.

PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF INTERNAL FACTS. 124. The multiplicity of substances is no less attested by the consciousness of ourselves, or of the internal world. Our first reflex act reveals within us something which is one, indivisible, and remaining always the same through all the transformations of our being. This unity of the me is indispensable to the connection of all the phenomena in a point; without it all memory, all combination, and all con sciousness are impossible; our own bein

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CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FICHTE'S PANTHEISTIC SYSTEM. 129. I am going to fulfil a promise made in the beginning of this work, [51] to explain and refute the system of Fichte. We have seen the cabalistic forms employed by the German philosopher to obtain a simple result, which amounted to neither more nor less than Descartes' principle, "I think, therefore, I am." The reader could never imagine that any one should attempt to found pantheism on this fact of consciousness, and that the human mind, because it finds itself,

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CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XIX.

RELATIONS OF FICHTE'S SYSTEM TO THE DOCTRINES OF KANT. 144. I have already shown [64] how Kant's system leads to Fichte's. When a dangerous principle is established, there is never wanting an author bold enough to deduce its consequences, whatever they may be. The author of the Doctrine of Science , led astray by the doctrines of Kant, establishes the most extravagant pantheism that was ever invented. In concluding his work, he says that he leaves the reader at the point where Kant takes him; he

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CHAPTER XX.

CHAPTER XX.

CONTRADICTION OF PANTHEISM TO THE PRIMARY FACTS OF THE HUMAN MIND. 150. I do not know how any philosopher who has meditated on the human mind can incline to pantheism. The deeper we go into the me from which it is pretended to deduce such an absurd system, the more we discover the contradiction in which pantheism appears in respect to the primary ideas and facts of our mind. My development of this observation will be brief, for it turns on questions largely examined in their respective places. 1

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CHAPTER XXI.

CHAPTER XXI.

RAPID GLANCES AT THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS OF PANTHEISTS. 163. The principal arguments on which pantheism rests are founded on the unity of science, the universality of the idea of being, the absoluteness and exclusiveness of the idea of substance, and the absoluteness and exclusiveness of the conception of the infinite. 164. Science must be one, say the pantheists, and it cannot be completely so, unless there is unity of being. Science must be certain, and there cannot be absolute certainty, unle

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

NECESSITY. 1. Beings are divided into two c∞∞lasses: necessary and contingent; necessary being is that which cannot but be; contingent is that which may be and cease to be. In these definitions every thing is said; but their laconism does not permit all that is expressed in them to be easily understood. Necessity and contingency may refer to different aspects and give rise to very diverse considerations. This makes a careful analysis of the ideas expressed by them necessary. 2. What is meant by

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

THE UNCONDITIONED. 12. The words, conditioned and unconditioned, are greatly used in modern philosophy; as the ideas which these terms express have a great analogy to those explained in the last chapter, I will briefly consider them here. 13. The conditioned is that which depends on a condition; that is to say, that which is supposed if another thing, which is called the condition, is supposed. If the sun is above the horizon, there is light; here the light is the conditioned, the sun the condit

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

IMMUTABILITY OF NECESSARY AND UNCONDITIONED BEING. 22. The absolutely necessary and unconditioned is immutable. For its existence is , or, to speak in modern language, is supposed absolutely, by intrinsic necessity, without any condition; and with this existence its state is also supposed. We abstract for the present the nature of this state, whether it be of this or that perfection, this or that degree, or even finite or infinite. Its existence being supposed unconditionally, its state is suppo

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

IDEAS OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 34. We have the idea of cause; the continual use which we are always making of it shows this. Philosophers do not alone possess it; it is the inheritance of mankind. But what do we understand by cause? All that makes any thing pass from not-being to being, as the effect is all that which passes from not-being to being. I am not now considering whether that which passes from not-being to being is substance or accident, nor the manner in which the cause influences this t

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

ORIGIN OF THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY. 43. Are there in the world any cause and effect? This is equivalent to asking whether there is any change in the world. All change involves a transition from not-being to being. The least change is inconceivable without this transition. Whatever is changed is, after changing, in another way than it was before the change; therefore it has this mode of being which it had not before. This mode did not exist before , it exists now ; it has passed, therefore, from n

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

FORMULA AND DEMONSTRATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY. 55. The principle of causality, or the proposition: all that commences must have a cause; has been somewhat disputed latterly; hence it is necessary for us to place it beyond the reach of attack. I believe it possible to do this, by presenting the doctrine of the preceding chapters under a clear point of view, which shall drive away all doubt and clear up all difficulty. I beg the reader's attention for a few moments to the argument which

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PRINCIPLE OF PRECEDENCY. 62. The transition from not-being to being implies succession: to conceive that something begins, we must conceive that something did not exist. The series not-A, A, has no sense if either term is wanting; and these terms, inasmuch as they are contradictory, cannot exist at the same time. 63. Let us imagine absolute nothingness. The first term, not-A, stands alone. All existence is denied: nothing can be affirmed without contradicting the supposition. Then there is n

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAUSALITY IN ITSELF.—INSUFFICIENCY AND ERROR OF SOME EXPLANATIONS. 85. Causality implies relation: if in exercise, it implies actual relation; considered not in exercise, but in potentia , it implies a possible relation. Nothing causes itself; causality always relates to another. There is no cause where there is no effect; and there is no effect where there is no transition from not-being to being. If this transition takes place in a substance which was not, but begins to be, it is called creati

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS OF TRUE ABSOLUTE CAUSALITY. 102. We have just seen that the necessary connection of two objects is not enough to establish the character of causality; what circumstances are then necessary? 103. If we conceive an object, B, which begins, and suppose that the object A was necessary to its existence, and that of itself alone it was sufficient for the existence of B, we find in the relation of A to B the true character of the relation of a cause to its effect. Fo

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

SECONDARY CAUSALITY. 109. In determining in the last chapter the conditions of true causality, I spoke only of absolute causality; the reason of this, which I shall now explain, turns on the difference between the first cause and second causes. 110. We have seen that the pure idea of absolute causality is the perception of three conditions: the necessity of one thing for the existence of another; the sufficiency of the first alone for the existence of the second; and lastly (when the cause is fr

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CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE OBSCURITY OF IDEAS IN WHAT RELATES TO CAUSALITY. 116. It may be asked, of what nature is this connection of the terms of the series; how one communicates with another; what it is which is communicated; by virtue of what quality they are placed in relation. All these questions arise from a confusion of ideas which has been the occasion of interminable disputes. In order to avoid them we must remember the difference between intuitive and discursive know

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CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

CAUSALITY OF PURE FORCE OF THE WILL. 124. In what does creation consist? How can God produce things from nothing? Such a thing is incomprehensible. This is the language of many who do not reflect that the same incomprehensibility is found in the exercise of secondary causality, both in the corporeal and in the incorporeal world. If we knew God in the intuitive manner in which, according to the Catholic dogma, the blessed see him in the mansion of glory, we might know intuitively the manner of th

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CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIII.

ACTIVITY. 129. To understand more clearly the idea of causality, it will be useful to reflect on the ideas of activity and action, as also on those of inertness, or inactivity, and inaction. 130. An absolutely inactive being is a being without intelligence, without will, without sensibility, without any kind of consciousness, containing in itself nothing which can change its own state or that of any thing else. Thus absolute inactivity or inertness requires the following conditions: I. The absol

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CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

POSSIBILITY OF THE ACTIVITY OF BODIES. 148. Having marked the limits of our intuitive knowledge with respect to causality and activity, it is easy to answer the objections against secondary causality, which arise from confounding intuitive and indeterminate ideas; but we have still to examine whether there are true second causes, that is, whether there really is in finite beings a principle of their own and others' changes. Some philosophers, among others the illustrious Malebranche, have denied

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CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

CONJECTURES AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF CORPOREAL ACTIVITY. 155. Experience, far from authorizing us to infer the absolute inertness of bodies, on the contrary inclines us to believe that they are endowed with activity. Although the senses do not give us intuition of any corporeal activity, they present a continuous series of changes in a fixed order in the phenomena of the corporeal world; and if the true ac tivity of some on others can be inferred from the coincidence of their relations in space an

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CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVI.

INTERNAL CAUSALITY. 164. Consciousness reveals the existence of a faculty within us which produces certain internal phenomena. If we concentrate our attention by means of a free act of our will, we experience the production of images and ideas. The works of the imagination are an irrefutable proof of our internal activity. Sensations furnish the materials; but the fancy builds edifices with them. Who, if not ourselves, gave them their new form? We must confess that if we are absolutely without a

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CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVII.

REMARKS ON SPONTANEITY. 176. There is nothing easier than to write a few brilliant pages on the phenomenon of spontaneity; some philosophers of our day discourse of the genius of the poets, of the artists, and of the captains of all ages, the fabulous and the heroic times, mysticism and religion, in books which are neither philosophy, nor history, nor poetry, but which can only be regarded as a flood of agreeable and harmonious words with which writers of sparkling fancy and inexhaustible eloque

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CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FINAL CAUSALITY;—MORALITY. 193. Those beings which act by intelligence must have, besides their efficient activity, a moral principle of their determinations. In order to will, the faculty of willing is not alone sufficient; it is necessary to know that which is willed, for nothing is willed without being known. Hence arises final causality , which is essentially distinct from efficient causality, and can exist only in beings endowed with intelligence. 194. Recalling what was said in the tenth c

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CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XIX.

VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS OF MORALITY. 205. There have been many disputes concerning the origin and character of the morality of actions; the same happening here as elsewhere, that the understanding becomes perplexed and confused whenever it attempts to penetrate into the first principles of things. As I am not going to write a treatise on morals, but only to analyze the foundations of this science, I shall confine myself to giving the character, as far as possible, of the primitive ideas and sentime

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CHAPTER XX.

CHAPTER XX.

FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE MORAL ORDER. 221. There must be something absolute in morality. It is not possible to conceive any thing all relative, without something absolute on which it is founded. Moreover, every relation implies a term to which it relates, and, consequently, though we suppose a series of relations, we must come to a last term. This shows why purely relative explanations of morality do not satisfy the understanding; reason, and even sentiment seek an absolute basis. Besides,

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CHAPTER XXI.

CHAPTER XXI.

A GLANCE AT THE WORK. 277. I have approached the term of my labor; and it is well to cast a glance over the long path which I have travelled. I proposed to examine the fundamental ideas of our mind, whether considered in themselves, or in their relations to the world. 278. With regard to objects, we have found in our mind two primitive facts; the intuition of extension, and the idea of being. All objective sensibility is founded on the intuition of extension; all the pure intellectual order in w

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NOTES TO BOOK SEVENTH.

NOTES TO BOOK SEVENTH.

There are not wanting those who have believed that time is a thing very easily explained. Such is the opinion of Buffier in his celebrated Traité des premières verités . [98] After explaining in his own way in what duration and time consist, he adds: "J'admire donc que tant de philosophes aient parlé du temps et de la durée comme de choses inexplicables ou incompréhensibles: si non rogas, intelligo , leur fait-on dire, et selon la paraphrase de Locke, plus je m'applique à découvrir la nature du

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NOTE TO BOOK EIGHTH.

NOTE TO BOOK EIGHTH.

(3) Perhaps some of my readers, who are not well acquainted with the history of philosophy, may think that I have extended the explanation of the idea of the infinite to too great length, and consider these questions as serving rather to subtilize, than to acquire solid knowledge. This is a great mistake. At all times the philosophical questions of the idea of the infinite have held a prominent position, and at the present time there is scarcely any which require to be more carefully examined, i

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NOTE TO BOOK NINTH.

NOTE TO BOOK NINTH.

(4) I know that some modern philosophers, and more especially M. Cousin, reject the accusation of pantheism, and explain in their own way those passages of their works in which this error is professed. As it is not possible for me to examine at any length, a question which would require the insertion of long extracts, I merely refer the reader to what I have said in the body of the work, and with respect to M. Cousin, to the extracts which I have made in my Letters to a Skeptic in Matters of Rel

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