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THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
BY CAPTAIN A. F. B. CARPENTER, V.C., R.N. WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY AND APPRECIATIONS BY MARSHAL FOCH, REAR-ADMIRAL SIMS AND COUNT VISART (BURGOMASTER OF BRUGES) WITH ILLUSTRATIONS BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY The Riverside Press Cambridge 1922 COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER ALL RIGHTS RESERVED The Riverside Press CAMBRIDGE — MASSACHUSETTS PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. TO THE MAN-IN-THE-STREET INTRODUCTION BY ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY In appreciating the military
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CHAPTER I
CHAPTER I
THE STRATEGICAL SITUATION. THE GERMAN BASES IN FLANDERS. THE CONCEPTION OF THE PLAN. The main function of a navy in war is that of obtaining the command of the sea. The purpose for which such "command" is desired is the utilisation of the sea-lines of communication and the denial of the same to the enemy. Soon after the commencement of the war in 1914 the sea-lines of communication across the English Channel assumed considerable, if not paramount, importance for the transfer of personnel and mat
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CHAPTER II
CHAPTER II
THE LOCAL SITUATION. THE LOCAL DEFENCES. Zeebrugge Mole The village of Zeebrugge stands near the entrance to the Zeebrugge-Bruges canal. At about half a mile inland from the coast at Zeebrugge the canal lock was situated. To seaward of the lock, the entrance channel, being open to the sea, was tidal. On the eastern side of the entrance channel, about midway between the lock and the coast-line, a small tidal harbour had been constructed for the use of fishing craft. This tidal harbour was of no s
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CHAPTER III
CHAPTER III
THE OUTLYING OBSTACLES. CONSIDERATIONS OF SALVAGE. Thus far I have only dealt with the local defences of Zeebrugge. But there were many other obstacles in our way—such as the coast batteries, mines, surface patrol vessels, submarines, aircraft, and the vagaries of the weather in addition to the navigational difficulties mentioned in the first chapter. The coast-line of Flanders bristled with guns. The section of the coast from three miles west of Ostende to six miles east of Zeebrugge, approxima
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CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER IV
PAST EXPERIENCE. SMOKE SCREENS. THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. What were the chances of success? The lessons of personal experience and of past history are the chief guides when calculating the probability of success in any operation. He who ignores history acts unwisely. He who studies history and proposes to attempt something which has always failed hitherto either may be excessively foolish or may be aware of a new factor affecting the situation. He may be merely flying in the face of Providence or
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CHAPTER V
CHAPTER V
PLANNING THE OPERATION. MATTERS AFFECTING THE PLAN. ATTACKS ON THE MOLE. A war operation, such as this, passes through various stages before it can be put into execution. It emanates originally from a suggestion. If the suggestion seems to bear further consideration certain individuals are ordered to appreciate the situation, that is, to thoroughly thrash out all the arguments for and against and to weigh the chances and effects of success and failure. Should the results of such an appreciation
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CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VI
THE VESSELS INVOLVED: THEIR DUTIES. THE RESCUE WORK. In addition to the special vessels mentioned in the preceding chapter, many other vessels and craft were required to assist in the operation. One can imagine the amateur reckoning up the probable number as follows. Three blockships at Zeebrugge and two at Ostende, three storming ships and two submarines at the former place. That makes ten vessels of sorts. Allow a few more for other purposes—say, fifteen altogether. As a matter of fact, there
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CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VII
MATTERS AFFECTING THE PASSAGE. THE SUPPORTING FORCES. THE GERMAN SEA-FORCES. THE PREPARATORY WORK Safe passage across the seas, especially from the navigational point of view, provided much food for thought. The liability of new shoals to form and of old shoals to move their position, the consequent lack of dependence on the charts, and the absence of the usual navigational aids have already been mentioned. These navigational difficulties, increased by the low visibility which obtains at night,
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CHAPTER VIII
CHAPTER VIII
THE PERSONNEL. SECRECY. TRAINING. SOME PERSONALITIES. No naval or military training is necessary to realise that the success of any war operation is mainly dependent upon the personnel. In these days of machinery and munitions, however, we are apt to become ultra-materialistic in our imagination. We read of so many million rounds of ammunition, so many thousand tons of merchant shipping, such and such new-fangled weapons. But the necessity for efficient personnel is, after all, the crux of the w
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CHAPTER IX
CHAPTER IX
THE WAITING PERIOD. THE VOLUNTEERING SPIRIT. At last all constructive preparations were completed; the various ships and small craft were commissioned and concentrated at their respective starting-points. The blockships and Vindictive steamed out to the loneliest of anchorages in the Swin Deep, situated about eight miles south of Clacton, Essex. It was a curious looking squadron that steamed down the Medway that day, the blockships with their funnels looming extra large in the absence of masts a
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CHAPTER X
CHAPTER X
METEOROLOGICAL AND TIDAL CONDITIONS. VISIBILITY The periods during which the conditions would be favourable for our enterprise depended upon various factors. The extent to which we could make use of any particular date during one of those periods depended, in turn, upon meteorological conditions. It has been shown elsewhere that, for the purpose of utilising the artificial fog, we required a wind blowing more or less toward the Belgian coast from seaward. It was also necessary for the wind to be
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CHAPTER XI
CHAPTER XI
THE ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS. THE TIME FACTOR The work of drafting, reproducing, and distributing the necessary orders and instructions to the large number of craft concerned was not so simple as it may sound. The amount of instructions required in an operation of this sort can only be appreciated by those who have had experience of staff work during war. The command to "carry on" is only applicable when the means have been provided and the manner of its use has been made known. Synchronizing the
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CHAPTER XII
CHAPTER XII
THE FIRST ATTEMPT. THE RETURN TO HARBOUR The first period, during which the tidal and astronomical conditions would be favourable, approached. The period was limited to about half a dozen days for the reasons stated in a previous chapter. The weather looked ominous; none of us were very hopeful of an early start. Those last few days of waiting were rather trying. So many things might happen to prevent the operation from taking place. Some of us were inclined to be apprehensive, not of the result
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CHAPTER XIII
CHAPTER XIII
THE SECOND ATTEMPT AND RETURN. PREPARING FOR THE THIRD ATTEMPT. REWRITING THE ORDERS. GERMAN OPTIMISM I will not weary the reader with a repetition of our life at the Swin—the second edition differed little from the first. There were still chances of a new start during the present period. The weather, however, was most unkind. We summoned up all the patience that we could muster. The news from the battle front in France was becoming increasingly serious. We felt that somehow or other, we didn't
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FOREWORD
FOREWORD
A brief introduction to Part II of this book may assist the reader. The previous chapters have dealt with the general idea of the operation, the more important details of the plan, and the preparatory work involved. We are now approaching the actual events which occurred during the operation itself as carried out at the third attempt. For reasons stated in Part I, Chapter III, I do not propose to deal further with the enterprise at Ostende; the preparatory work for the blocking of that place has
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CHAPTER I
CHAPTER I
THE START. THE OVERSEA PASSAGE The break of dawn on April 22, 1918, the first of the seven days of our tabulated period, found many anxious individuals on deck discussing the chances. There was an almost entire absence of wind; the sea was consequently as smooth as the proverbial mill-pond. The general feeling amongst us was that of straining-at-the-leash. We had suffered two major disappointments during the previous period, but we instinctively felt that we had now arrived at a period of maximu
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CHAPTER II
CHAPTER II
THE APPROACH. After zero time the remaining units kept in close company until such times as each, according to their respective instructions, was deputed to proceed independently to carry out its particular duty. The force was preceded by the Vice-Admiral in Warwick with some half a dozen other craft in company ready to fall upon and destroy any enemy patrol vessels which might be encountered. We were now steaming through the German mined areas and were hoping against hope that no mines would be
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CHAPTER III
CHAPTER III
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ATTACK. A few seconds before the schedule time for the last alteration of course—designed to take us alongside the outer wall—the smoke screen, which had been drifting northwards before the new wind, suddenly cleared. Barely three hundred yards distant, dead ahead of us, appeared a long low dark object which was immediately recognised as the Mole itself with the lighthouse at its extremity. We had turned up heading direct for the six-gun battery exactly as arranged in the
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CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER IV
THE FIGHT ON THE MOLE. H.M.S. IRIS . As soon as the two foremost gangways reached the wall a party of seamen led by Lieutenant-Commander Adams had commenced the storming of the Mole. Lieutenant-Commander A. L. Harrison, the senior officer of the seamen storming parties, had been wounded in the head and was too dazed to land on the Mole until later. Commander Brock, having completed his duties in the aft flamethrower hut, also stormed the Mole. Adams and a handful of men made their way along the
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CHAPTER V
CHAPTER V
THE ATTACK ON THE RAILWAY VIADUCT. In the previous chapter I mentioned that the explosion of the submarine took place shortly after the storming of the Mole had commenced. The immediate purpose in destroying the railway viaduct connecting the Mole to the mainland was twofold: firstly, that of preventing the Germans from sending reënforcements across to the help of the Mole garrison; secondly, that of augmenting the main diversion. There were, however, ulterior objects also. Firstly, the destruct
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CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VI
THE SMOKE SCREENING. SUBSIDIARY ATTACKS. The author is particularly anxious that each phase of the operation and the work of each class of vessel should be clearly understood, so that the reader may fully appreciate the work of the blockships, the latter forming the crux of the whole operation. It will be convenient, therefore, to describe in this chapter the proceedings of those small craft whose work was not carried out in actual company of the blockships themselves. The general idea of the sm
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CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VII
THE WORK OF THE BLOCKSHIPS. The blockships had eased down soon after passing through position G so as to drop astern of Vindictive sufficiently far to enable that vessel and her consorts to create the necessary diversion. The conning and steering positions in each ship were triplicated and fully manned so that, in the event of one position being destroyed, the handling of the ship could immediately be taken over by another party. Guns' crews were standing by their guns ready to defend their vess
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CHAPTER VIII
CHAPTER VIII
THE RETIREMENT It had been arranged that the storming parties on the Mole should have twenty minutes' warning of Vindictive leaving the outer wall. A maximum length of stay alongside had also been laid down so that, under certain circumstances, watches would provide some guide as to the amount of time available. The warning signal for leaving the Mole was to consist of a succession of long and short blasts on the siren, or a particular method of waving the searchlight beams, or, if all other mea
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CHAPTER IX
CHAPTER IX
THE MATERIAL RESULTS The results of the operations on the night of April 22-23, 1918, were undoubtedly important. They can be classified under the two headings of "material" and "moral." The degree of moral effect cannot usually be assessed until long after an operation has been completed. Recognisable evidence comes to hand very gradually. The actual results of moral effect may be early experienced without being recognised, especially in the case of effect on the enemy's morale. Material result
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CHAPTER X
CHAPTER X
THE MORAL EFFECT The moral effect on the enemy was shown, to a certain degree, almost at once. The fact that they thought it necessary to indulge in falsehood to appease their own countrymen, although they must have realised that the truth would inevitably become known, was clear enough proof that their morale was badly shaken. Their earliest report stated that the attack had failed and that three British cruisers had been sunk at Zeebrugge. The latter portion of the statement was correct. The s
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CHAPTER XI
CHAPTER XI
SOME REMARKS ON THE ENTERPRISE This book would be incomplete if I omitted to append some general remarks on the operation and on the factors which led to success. First and foremost, it is necessary to indulge in comparisons. The enterprise described in this book attracted attention owing to its somewhat unusual type as far as the Navy was concerned. Nevertheless, there are many points of similarity between the attack on Zeebrugge and the military trench raids which took place night after night
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX
The following vessels and craft took part in the simultaneous blocking operations at Zeebrugge and Ostende. THE ZEEBRUGGE ENTERPRISE ( a ) Special services during the oversea voyage Aerial Escort— 61st Wing of Royal Air Force. Other services— Special service vessel Lingfield. Motor Launches Nos. 555, 557. ( b ) Off shore forces Outer Patrol— Scout— Attentive . Destroyers— Scott, Ulleswater, Teazer, Stork . Long-range Bombardment— Monitors— Erebus, Terror . Destroyer
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