The Pangerman Plot Unmasked - free ebook by André Chéradame

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The Pangerman Plot Unmasked

André Chéradame

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THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED BERLIN’S FORMIDABLE PEACE-TRAP OF “THE DRAWN WAR” BY ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY THE EARL OF CROMER, O.M. WITH MAPS NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 1917 Copyright, 1916, by CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS Published January, 1917 All Rights Reserved...

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PUBLISHER’S NOTE

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

As will be understood from the author’s preface, M. Chéradame’s book was published in Paris in the summer of this year, before the important occurrences in the Balkans accompanying and following Roumania’s entrance into the war. In issuing this translation no consideration of these events has been added; but their bearing on M. Chéradame’s forecast will be noted by the reader. The maps have been reproduced direct from the French edition, without translating the names into English, as they answer

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INTRODUCTION.

INTRODUCTION.

By the Earl of Cromer, O.M. My reasons for commending M. Chéradame’s most instructive work to the earnest attention of my countrymen and countrywomen are three-fold. In the first place, M. Chéradame stands conspicuous amongst that very small body of politicians who warned Europe betimes of the German danger. The fact that in the past he proved a true prophet gives him a special claim to be heard when he states his views as regards the present and the future. In the second place, I entertain a st

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PREFACE.

PREFACE.

The Pangerman plot is the only cause of the war. It is, in fact, the cause at once of its outbreak and of its prolongation till that victory of the Allies has been won which is indispensable to the liberty of the world. In this book I propose to demonstrate this truth by a series of documents, precise, clear, and intelligible to all. The fate of every man in the allied countries, and even in some of the countries which are still neutral, really depends on the issue of the formidable war now bein

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I.

I.

THE POLES IN THE EAST OF GERMANY. It might be supposed that the expression Pangermanism embodies the theory in virtue of which the Germans claim to annex only the regions inhabited by dense masses of Germans, on the borders of the Empire, which, after all, would be in accordance with the principle of nationalities. But Pangermanism has by no means such a restricted and legitimate aim. Again, it might be thought that its object was to gather within the same political fold the peoples who are more

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II.

II.

From the Pangerman doctrine the military and political Pangerman plot was bred and stage-managed by William II. Outside of Germany, the Kaiser was looked upon, for a long time, as a peace-loving monarch. It is difficult to explain how such a very serious error could have arisen. Shortly after his accession in 1888, William II. was secretly hatching that plot which so recently has caused the European conflagration, and subsequently, by his public utterances, he has clearly showed his Pangerman te

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I.

I.

The Pangerman plot in its broad outlines was laid as early as 1895, but since that date events have happened throughout the world, which encouraged Pangermans to enlarge the structure of their scheme. In 1898 the Fashoda incident almost caused a breach between France and England. In 1905 Japan compelled Russia to sign peace after a long war which exhausted all the Tsar’s military resources and disturbed the balance of power in Europe for a long time to the advantage of Germany. In 1909 the Vienn

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II.

II.

As it is necessary to open the eyes of neutrals, many of whom have been misled by the German propaganda, we must try to expose very clearly the inner workings of the Pangerman plot as it is revealed to us in the searchlight of facts. From 1892 down to the outbreak of the War, that is to say, for twenty-two years, the Pangerman movement has developed with ever growing intensity; a multitude of publications, giving full details of the plan, were scattered among the German people, in order to excit

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III.

III.

The preparation of the Pangerman plan has required for over twenty years a huge propaganda among the German masses as well as a world-wide organization. How is it that this plan has been ignored in its nature and in its extent by the diplomats of France, England and Russia? Such, however, has been the case, for otherwise the war could not have come upon these three powers as a surprise. We deal here with a matter which at first sight seems improbable and which, therefore, needs explanation. The

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I.

I.

Up to 1911, when Tannenberg published the programme of annexations, all previous great events had favoured William II.’s aims; but from 1912 onward events suddenly raised very serious and quite unexpected obstacles to the execution of the Pangerman plan. In 1912, Italy conquered Libya at the cost of Turkey and against the will and pleasure of Berlin. Again in 1912 Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria became united against the Ottoman Empire; this also was contrary to the will and pleasure of

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II.

II.

Not only were the consequences of the Bukarest treaty disastrous to Pangerman ambitions in the Balkan peninsula, they also, to the boundless fury of William II., considerably accelerated that internal political evolution of Austria-Hungary which of itself had already threatened to upset all his plans. Unfortunately the notions held about Austria-Hungary in France, and above all, in England, have far too long been of a very vague nature. Public opinion in France and England was totally unable to

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III.

III.

The Allies will, in accordance with the general principles of justice, bring Germany to account for her unheard of crimes, and will exact a full reparation for the enormous moral and material injuries which she has done them. Therefore it is necessary to set forth the causes of the war by a general survey of the facts, to the end that in the eyes of the civilized world, it may be clearly demonstrated that Germany must pay, and legitimately so, the price of a responsibility which, in all justice,

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I.

I.

The map (p. 46) sums up Prussianized Germany’s pretensions which she still expected to carry out west of the Rhine at the beginning of 1916. The best way to prove this intention is by means of extracts from the memorial sent by the most powerful German associations on May 20th, 1915, to the Imperial Chancellor (quoted by Le Temps , 12th August, 1915). I have mentioned (see page 18) why this document must be looked upon as of extremely exceptional importance. THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE WEST ( Begin

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II.

II.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 had provided for the permanent exclusion of Russia as a great power by means of two measures: 1º. To carve out of the Empire of the Tsars and annex to the German Confederation a slice of territory large enough to cut off Russia entirely from the West. 2º. To constitute at the expense of Russia, thus reduced, new States which should bow the knee to Berlin. Mr. Dietrich Schaefer, the well-known historian, in the Review Panther , affirmed, early in February, 1915: “It is

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III.

III.

The zones of absolute influence, whether direct or indirect, which Germany, in accordance with the 1911 plan, has tried to secure for herself in the South and South-East of her present frontiers, comprise three totally distinct groups of territory: Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey. It is therefore advisable to examine separately how at the beginning of 1916 Germany stood in respect of each of these three groups. THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST. 1º. Austria-Hungary. Let us m

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IV.

IV.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 ( see map, p. 12 ) included: 1º. The formation of a great German Confederation which was to put under the absolute supremacy of the present German Empire (540,858 square kilometres and 68 million inhabitants) foreign territories situated around Germany, which form a superficies of 1,182,113 square kilometres and hold 94 million inhabitants. The figures given ( pp. 52, 56 and 61 ) suffice to prove that the German seizure of these territories extended at the beginning of

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I.

I.

The very vastness of the Pangerman plan of 1911, demonstrated beyond dispute by the facts that have come to light, suffices to prove that Berlin meant to solve for her own profit, at one single blow, all the great political questions latent in the old world. THE GREAT POLITICAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE WAR. The claims of Germany on the East, shown on the accompanying map by the thinner black line, raised the question of Poland in its immense extent and in all its complexity. The claims of Germany

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II.

II.

The Pangerman plan finally gives to the struggle which it has initiated a character of sanguinary horror without parallel in history. In short, William II., after having roused by means of Pangerman propaganda amongst his people violent desires of conquest and plunder, has declared war with the fixed idea that it will lead in Europe and in Turkey to the supremacy of 77 millions of Germans, over 127 millions of non-Germans. The small but violent Prussophile Camarilla of Vienna, a group of Magyar

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III.

III.

On January 19th, 1916, in the Reichstag, Deputy Martin stated that “The German nation would be very ill-pleased if Germany were to restore the territories she now occupies” ( Le Temps , 21st January, 1916). This sentence summarizes the opinion prevalent beyond the Rhine. In their endeavours to retain the greater part of the territories occupied by them at the beginning of 1916 the Germans have combined military measures with political manœuvres. THE GERMAN FORTRESS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916. They

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I.

I.

The dodge of the “Drawn Game” will be based on the following train of reasoning, which unquestionably prevails in Berlin: “The Allied diplomats have grasped neither our plan, nor our Pangerman organization, although that has required a preparation lasting twenty years. The Allied diplomats have understood neither the true position of the Balkans after the treaty of Bukarest (though that position was so favourable to themselves), nor the importance of the Balkan forces for the issue of the war. S

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II.

II.

If we suppose for the sake of argument that the dodge of the “Drawn Game” were to succeed so far as to allow the Germans, by binding Austria-Hungary to the German Empire, to carry through their plan “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” their success would involve certain general financial consequences. These we must unfold, if we would clearly understand the full extent of the craft hidden under the cloak of that manœuvre called the “Drawn Game,” which is still to be played. The Germans having fa

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III.

III.

The menace involved in the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” creates between the Allies in Europe, a common bond of interest, which is far superior to their own individual interests, and which ought to keep them firmly united to the end. France, England, Russia and Italy have an identical and an absolutely vital interest in defeating for ever the scheme of an empire that should reach from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. This is quite apart from the purely humanitarian consideration that the

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IV.

IV.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 provides that the results of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme should be made the most of even in the furthest points of the Far East. Facts to hand and well-known Pangerman programmes enable us to form an idea of what help Germany meant to find in Asia during the war, and what profit would have accrued to her afterwards from the said scheme, if she had succeeded in finally carrying it out. William II. tried to play the Panislamic card, which is one of the leadi

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V.

V.

In order to demonstrate the really extraordinary importance of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” we have still to show how its achievement would not only make Germany mistress in Europe and preponderant in Asia, but would carry with it the accomplishment of the Pangerman plan in its world-wide form. The world-wide elements of this plan, graphically shown on the map herewith, have been set forth in the book of Otto Richard Tannenberg, The Greater Germany, the Work of the 20th Century

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I.

I.

Now that they have laid their hands on nine-tenths of the territories which they coveted (see p. 63), the Germans will only give in at the last extremity. Maximilian Harden has peremptorily declared: “Every means will be enthusiastically employed against her enemies by the German people. We will go back to the times of savagery when man was a wolf for his fellow man” (quoted by Le Temps , 9th February, 1916). In face of this firm resolution of the Germans to achieve at all costs the plan of univ

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II.

II.

In Austria-Hungary lies the crucial point of the European and even of the world-wide problem raised by the German aggression, because: 1. Austria-Hungary has entered into the struggle in very peculiar circumstances. This State is not an enemy of the Allies, except at the bidding of the Hapsburg dynasty, which, by yielding to the injunctions of Berlin, has betrayed its own peoples. In fact, Francis Joseph declared war without even daring to consult his parliament, for he knew very well that nearl

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III.

III.

Let us examine in figures what would be the result in Central Europe of the application of the principle of nationalities, which ought to form the moral base of the Allies for the reconstitution of future Europe. The French Socialist Congress at the end of 1915, in my opinion, gave an excellent definition of the principle of nationalities as we see it at work in the present war. The manifesto of the Congress declared: “No durable peace unless the small martyrized nations are restored to their po

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I.

I.

It is otherwise with Bulgaria. Indeed, the key of the whole Balkan situation lies in the plan of a Bulgarian supremacy, which, as we shall see, is closely bound up, at least in principle, with the Pangerman plan. It was said long ago that the Bulgarians are the Prussians of the East. Now it is just their fixed idea of achieving at any cost their dream of dominating the Balkans which has led the Bulgarians to throw in their lot with Berlin, without perceiving that, though they might benefit by th

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II.

II.

The evidence of the facts as they now stand appears to be bringing the Greeks to recognize, that if the Allies have committed faults in the Balkans—through excess of candour, misconception of the mental factors, and with the best intentions in the world—the government of Athens has been equally deceived as to the surest means of safeguarding Hellenic interests. According to the treaty of alliance with Serbia of 16-29th June, 1913, Greece was bound to come to the help of her ally, in case the lat

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III.

III.

The serious consequence which Germany’s alliance with Bulgaria would entail on Roumania, must ultimately oblige that country, despite the temporizing attitude of its government, to defend its vital interests. These interests now stand out more and more clearly. In the first place it is certain that the plan of Bulgarian supremacy in the Balkans (see p. 133) is as little acceptable to the Roumanians as to the Greeks. The frontier incidents, which have multiplied lately, between the Bulgarians and

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I.

I.

As regards Austria-Hungary the Berlin programme may be summed up as follows: to take advantage of the occupation of the territories of the Hapsburg Monarchy by the troops of William II. in order to impose, by all possible means, both on Hungary and on Austria, a series of measures called an economic union with Germany, which would leave Austria-Hungary an appearance of independence sufficient to throw dust in the eyes of the Allies, while at the same time it would in fact subject that empire abs

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II.

II.

A cunning manœuvre for saving the future of Pangermanism and of Enver Pasha’s gang in Turkey has already been broached by the Germans. As it will certainly be attempted again, should it be in the interest of Berlin to push it through (and everything points that way), it becomes necessary to unmask it completely beforehand. In February, 1916, numerous Turkish agents, installed in Switzerland and apparently working through spies in the Allied countries, began to set afloat a rumour that Turkey was

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III.

III.

Contemporaneously with the rumour of a separate peace with Turkey, in February, 1916, a suggestion was mysteriously made to the Western Allies that the Bulgarians also wished to treat with them. The two manœuvres, as we shall see, are in fact closely connected. If the Bulgarians were to come and say to the Allies: “We have been deceived, deluded by Berlin, we have pursued an odious policy. As a proof of our good faith we will evacuate immediately the Serbian territories which we have invaded, an

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I.

I.

The case of Portugal is typical, because here we have a small State which, in the opinion of many, seemed for a long time as if it could keep out of the conflict; whereas on the contrary the necessity of defending itself against the German schemes for swallowing it up, compelled it at last to plunge into the war. Ever since the opening of hostilities in Europe, Portugal has been the scene of German intrigues carried on with the greatest activity; indeed, even before the outbreak of the European

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II.

II.

The following words give a summary of the views and the tactics adopted by the Germans with regard to the Dutch in the Pangerman plan of 1895. “When our brothers of the Low German race shall have got over their almost childish fright at ‘annexation by the Prussians,’ they will acknowledge that the admission of Holland into Great Germany is advantageous to both parties. Moreover, in the bosom of Great Germany, the Dutch would be able to preserve, to a reasonable extent, their own particular chara

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III.

III.

The Pangerman aims with regard to Switzerland, as set forth in the plan of 1895, are summed up as follows:— “We may then leave Switzerland to choose, whether she shall enter the German Customs Union and the Pangerman Confederation bringing all her cantons or only the German ones with her, or whether she shall form part of the German Empire on equal terms as a Federal State” (see Grossdeutschland um das Jahr 1950 , p. 17). The Pangerman programme is, therefore, definitely directed against Switzer

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IV.

IV.

The accompanying map summarizes and recalls the Pangerman claims to such direct German protectorates in South America as were provided for by the plan of 1911 (see p. 105). It is important to observe that the German designs on South America began just at the time when the European nations, acquiescing in the Monroe doctrine, renounced all intentions of appropriating any part of the New World. This renunciation took place about 1898, the date of the war between Spain and America. That was the ver

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V.

V.

President Wilson, by his note to Berlin of April 20th, 1916, concerning submarine warfare, which had the character of an ultimatum, committed the United States to a first act of intervention in the European war. The fact that a consideration of their interests has compelled the Germans, at least for the moment, to bow to the mandate of the United States, seems to some people to have already closed the American intervention. Those who hold this opinion may support it by reference to the speech wh

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I.

I.

The temporary achievement of nine-tenths of the Pangerman plan in accordance with the programme of 1911 serves to refute the lies disseminated by the German propaganda as to the cause and authors of the war. The intellectual mobilization of Germany, as powerfully organized and carried out as her military organization, has enabled her utterly to deceive many neutrals in the world as to the responsibilities for the outbreak and prolongation of the war. The Allies do not yet fully understand how pr

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II.

II.

Nine-tenths of the Pangerman plan of 1911 having been for the moment achieved, the Allies can avail themselves of this fact as evidence to counteract speedily and everywhere, the effects of the German propaganda, and to prove to the civilized world the legitimacy and the necessity of their military action against Prussianized Germany. Starting from the practical proofs and the German declarations, both of them indisputable, which we have just set forth, the propaganda of the Allies should be abl

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III.

III.

Henceforth the Allies and the neutral states must bear constantly in mind not only Germany’s present gains on the East and on the West, but also her Pangerman gains as a whole. The accompanying map furnishes the justification of this conclusion. It is obvious that the German gains on the West and the East, important as they are, are relatively small by comparison with the enormous seizures which Germany has effected at the expense of Austria-Hungary, of half the Balkans, and of Turkey. We must f

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IV.

IV.

The temporary achievement, almost in its entirety, of the Pangerman scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” proves that the complete victory of the Allies is necessary for the freedom of the world. As it is no longer possible to question either the reality or the extent of the plan of universal domination pursued by the Germans, it follows that all civilized States are undoubtedly concerned in the defeat of Prussianized Germany, since a German victory would have a most detrimental effect on t

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V.

V.

The plan of slavery pursued by Germany is now so manifest that neutrals or Germanophile groups are henceforth morally responsible for their sentiments before the civilized world. The neutrals who, in the first part of the war, displayed sympathy for Germany, were excusable because they were deceived; but now they are in a different position. The facts are patent. It is no longer possible for anyone to see in Prussianized Germany anything but a ferocious burglar and assassin practising his trade

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VI.

VI.

The declarations of the Allies, the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme, and the question of Austria-Hungary. In receiving the French deputies in London, on April 11th, 1916, Mr. Asquith declared: “I have said already in November that we would not sheathe the sword till the military domination of Prussia has been destroyed once and for all. In this struggle we are the champions not only of the rights of treaties but of the independence and the free development of the weake

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VII.

VII.

The question of Austria-Hungary, being the crucial point of the whole problem to be solved after the war, may become the common ground on which all common efforts should be concentrated, not only by the present Allies, but also by the still neutral States which are virtually threatened by the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme. It is probable that Prussian militarism would have been already destroyed, or on the point of being so, if in the first part of the war the leader

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