On a scale before unknown in Western Europe, and save for the coincident operations in the Eastern theatre of war, unexampled in history, the succession of events named the "Battle of the Rivers" presents illustrations of strategy and tactics of absorbing interest. Apart even from the spectacular aspects of this lurid and grandiose drama, full as it is of strange and daring episodes, the problems it affords in the science of war must appeal to every intelligent mind. An endeavour is here made to

From the strategy on the German side let us now turn to that on the side of the French. Between them a fundamental distinction at once appears. Of both the aim was similar—to compel the other side to fight under a disadvantage. In that way strategy helps to ensure victory, or to lessen the consequences of defeat. The strategy of the German General Staff, however, was from the outset obvious. The strategy of General Joffre was at the outset a mystery. Only as the campaign went on did the French s

Sept. 17, 1914. My Lord — In continuation of my despatch of Sept. 7, I have the honour to report the further progress of the operations of the forces under my command from Aug. 28. On that evening the retirement of the force was followed closely by two of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving south-east from St. Quentin. The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans

Oct. 8, 1914. My Lord — I have the honour to report the operations in which the British forces in France have been engaged since the evening of Sept. 10. 1. In the early morning of the 11th the further pursuit of the enemy was commenced, and the three corps crossed the Ourcq practically unopposed, the cavalry reaching the line of the Aisne River; the 3rd and 5th Brigades south of Soissons, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th on the high ground at Couvrelles and Cerseuil. On the afternoon of the 12th from the