An author who publishes a book having any reference to Irish affairs may, not unnaturally, be supposed either to possess some special knowledge of Ireland, or else to be the advocate of some new specific for the cure of Irish discontent. Of neither of these suppositions can I claim the benefit. My knowledge of Ireland is merely the knowledge—perhaps it were better to say the ignorance—of an educated Englishman. It is derived from conversation with better informed friends, from careful attention

My aim is to criticise from a purely English point of view the policy of Home Rule, or the proposal to create a more or less independent Parliament in Ireland; and as a result of such criticism to establish the truth, and develop the consequences, of this proposition—namely, that any system of Home Rule, whatever be the form it takes, is less beneficial to Great Britain, or (to use popular language) to England, than is the maintenance of the Union, and is at least as much opposed to the vital in

"Home Rule" is a term which, like all current and popular phrases, is, though intelligible, wanting in precision. Hence it is well, before we investigate the different forms which schemes of Home Rule may assume, to fix in our minds precisely what Home Rule does mean and what it does not mean. "Home Rule"—or, to speak more accurately, the policy of Home Rule—means, if we may use language with which we are all familiar in relation to the Colonies, the endowment of Ireland with representative inst

A dispassionate observer will easily convince himself that in Great Britain the movement in favour of Home Rule is stronger than is believed by its opponents. Patent facts show that this is so. In 1880 no single English statesman had avowed himself its supporter; not fifty English or Scotch members of Parliament could have been found to vote for an enquiry into the admissibility of Mr. Parnell's policy. It may well be doubted whether at that date ten British constituencies would have returned to

To lay stress upon the consideration that the Home Rule movement in England derives its force from the condition of public feeling is not, be it remarked, equivalent to showing that the policy of Home Rule is unwise; still less that the policy of defended. Home Rule is unlikely to be adopted by the nation. Masses of human beings must generally, as individuals must often, trust to the guidance of feeling. The difference between the sentiment which ought and the sentiment which ought not to determ

Eighty-six years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Union between England and Ireland. The two countries do not yet form an united nation. The Irish people are, if not more wretched (for the whole European world has made progress, and Ireland with it), yet more conscious of wretchedness; and Irish disaffection to England is, if not deeper, more wide-spread than in 1800. An Act meant by its authors to be the source of the prosperity and concord which, though slowly, followed upon

Englishmen are so firmly and with such good reason convinced that the independence of Ireland would be fatal to the greatness and security of Great Britain, that they rarely attempt to weigh accurately the grounds of reason which may be adduced in support of a conviction which has acquired the character of a political instinct. The evils, however, to England which may be reasonably anticipated from the political separation of the two countries may be summed up under three heads. First .—The acqu

The proposals for giving Ireland Home Rule, in so far as they have taken any definite shape whatever, have assumed four forms:— I. Home Rule as Federalism. II. Home Rule as Colonial Independence. III. Home Rule as the revival of Grattan's Constitution. IV. Home Rule under the proposed Gladstonian Constitution. How far Home Rule under these forms, or any one of them, is compatible with the interests of the English people must be determined by considering what are the conditions which an acceptabl

Let us here review and summarise our argument. The demand for Home Rule is a demand for a change in the Constitution so fundamental as to amount to a legal and pacific revolution; such a demand requires for its support cogent, we may almost say conclusive, reasons. The positive arguments in favour of Home Rule are not easy to grasp. Their strength lies in their correspondence with the prevailing opinions of the day. But though public opinion under any form of government, and especially under the

CLAUSE. 1. Establishment of Irish Legislature. 2. Powers of Irish Legislature. 3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature. 4. Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature. 5. Prerogatives of Her Majesty as to Irish Legislative Body. 6. Duration of the Irish Legislative Body. 7. Constitution of the Executive Authority. 8. Use of Crown lands by Irish Government. 9. Constitution of Irish Legislative Body. 10. First order. 11. Second order. 12. Taxes and separate Consolidated Fund. 13. Annual con

22. Powers over certain lands reserved to Her Majesty. 23. Veto by first order of Legislative Body, how over-ruled. 24. Cesser of power of Ireland to return members to Parliament. 25. Constitutional questions to be submitted to Judicial Committee . 26. Office of Lord-Lieutenant. 27. Judges to be removable only on address. 28. Provision as to judges and other persons having salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund. 29. As to persons holding civil service appointments. 30. Provision for existing

1. On and after the appointed day there shall be established in Ireland a Legislature consisting of Her Majesty the Queen and an Irish Legislative Body. 2. With the exceptions and subject to the restrictions in this Act mentioned, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen, by and with the advice of the Irish Legislative Body, to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, and by any such law to alter and repeal any law in Ireland. 3. The Legislature of Ireland shall not ma

22. On and after the appointed day there shall be reserved to Her Majesty— (1.) The power of erecting forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other buildings for military or naval purposes; (2.) The power of taking waste land, and, on making due compensation, any other land, for the purpose of erecting such forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, or other buildings as aforesaid, and for any other military or naval purpose, or the defence of the realm. 23. If a Bill or any provision of a Bill i