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THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE
THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE
To the members of The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of whose researches into the history of our Civil War the following pages form but a modest part, this volume is, with Sincere Regard, Dedicated by the author. CONTENTS THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. I. INTRODUCTION II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING VIII
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I. INTRODUCTION.
I. INTRODUCTION.
It must seem to the casual reader of the history of the war of 1861-65, that enough has already been written upon the campaign of Chancellorsville. And there are numerous brilliant essays, in the histories now before the public, which give a coup-d'oeil more or less accurate of this ten-days' passage of arms. But none of these spread before the reader facts sufficiently detailed to illustrate the particular theory advanced by each to account for the defeat of the Army of the Potomac on this fiel
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II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS.
II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS.
The first two years of civil strife had closed. The American people, which so far had shown more aptness at learning than skill in waging war, may be said to have passed through its apprenticeship in arms. The broad plan of operations, intelligently but rudely conceived at the outset by the greater spirits among our commanders, began to be more clearly grasped. The political strategy of both contestants made Virginia the field on which the left wing of the Federal armies pivoted, while the right
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III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The unfortunate course of events during the early winter of 1862-63 had resulted in a grievous loss of morale in the Army of the Potomac. The useless slaughter of Marye's Heights was, after a few weeks, succeeded by that most huge of all strategic jokes, the Mud March; and Gen. Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to the satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personal regard, of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength, but not of gallantr
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IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.
IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.
While the Army of the Potomac lay about Falmouth, awaiting orders to move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from Banks's Ford above, to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck) below Fredericksburg, a line some fifteen miles in length as the crow flies. The crests of the hills on which lay the Army of Northern Virginia were from three-quarters of a mile to a mile and a half back from, and substantially parallel to, the river. Rifle-pits commanded every available crossing, which, being f
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V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK.
V. DIFFICULTY OF AN ATTACK.
An attack of Lee's position in front, even had Burnside's experience not demonstrated its folly, seemed to promise great loss of life without corresponding success. To turn his right flank required the moving of pontoon trains and artillery over the worst of roads for at least twenty miles, through a country cut up by a multitude of streams running across the route to be taken, and emptying into either the Potomac or Rappahannock; all requiring more or less bridging. Lee's spy system was excelle
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VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID.
VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID.
Hooker proposed to open his flank attack by cutting Lee's communications. Accordingly, on April 12, Gen. Stoneman, commanding the Cavalry Corps, received orders to march at seven A.M. next day, with his whole force except one brigade. He was to ascend the Rappahannock, keeping well out of view, and masking his movement with numerous small detachments,—alleging a chase of Jones's guerillas in the Shenandoah valley, as his objective. The river was to be crossed west of the Orange and Alexandria Ra
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VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING.
VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING.
Gen. Hooker's plan embraced, besides a cavalry raid to sever the enemy's communications, a demonstration in force on the left to draw the enemy's attention, and the throwing of the main body of his forces across the river on the right. As early as April 21, Doubleday of the First Corps had been sent down the river to Port Conway with some thirty-five hundred men, to light camp-fires, and make demonstrations with pontoons, after doing which he returned to camp. On the 23d Col. Morrow, with the Tw
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VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING.
VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING.
Hooker was a master of logistics. The forethought and excellent judgment displayed in all orders under which these preliminary moves of the army-corps were made, as well as the high condition to which he had brought the army, cannot elicit higher praise than to state the fact, that, with the exception of the Cavalry Corps, all orders issued were carried out au pied de la lettre, and that each body of troops was on hand at the hour and place prescribed. This eulogy must, however, be confined to o
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IX. LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS.
IX. LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS.
Let us now turn to Lee, and see what he has been doing while Hooker thus discovered check. Pollard says: "Lee calmly watched this" (Sedgwick's) "movement, as well as the one higher up the river under Hooker, until he had penetrated the enemy's design, and seen the necessity of making a rapid division of his own forces, to confront him on two different fields, and risking the result of fighting him in detail." Lossing states Lee's object as twofold: to retain Banks's Ford, so as to divide Hooker'
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X. HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY.
X. HOOKER'S ADVANCE FRIDAY.
So far the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac had been at Falmouth, where still remained Gen. Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff. The last order from this point had been on Thursday to Gen. Sedgwick, who was therein notified that headquarters would be that night at Chancellorsville; that an advance would be made Friday morning along the plank road (meaning probably the pike) towards Fredericksburg, to uncover Banks's Ford, thus making a shorter communication through Butterfield, who would
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XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.
XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.
The position at Chancellorsville was good for neither attack nor defence. The ground was not open enough for artillery, except down the few roads, and across an occasional clearing. Cavalry was useless. Infantry could not advance steadily in line. The ground was such in Hooker's front, that Lee could manoeuvre or mass his troops unseen by him. Our own troops were so located, that to re-enforce any portion of the line, which might be attacked, with sufficient speed, was impossible. Anderson (as h
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XII. JACKSON'S MARCH, AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE.
XII. JACKSON'S MARCH, AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE.
Lee and Jackson spent Friday night under some pine-trees, on the plank road, at the point where the Confederate line crosses it. Lee saw that it was impossible for him to expect to carry the Federal lines by direct assault, and his report states that he ordered a cavalry reconnoissance towards our right flank to ascertain its position. There is, however, no mention of such a body having felt our lines on the right, in any of the Federal reports. It is not improbable that Lee received information
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XIII. HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES.
XIII. HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES.
Hooker and Sickles have both stated that the plan of the former was to allow this movement of Jackson's to develop itself: if it was a retreat, to attack the column at the proper time; if a tactical flank movement, to allow it to be completed, and then thrust himself between the two wings of Lee's army, and beat them in detail. This admirable generalization lacked the necessary concomitant of intelligent and speedy execution. Now, Hooker had his choice between two theories of this movement of Ja
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XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
Gen. Howard states that he located his command, both with reference to an attack from the south, and from the west along the old turnpike and the plank road. The whole corps lies on a ridge along which runs the turnpike, and which is the watershed of the small tributaries of the Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers. This ridge is terminated on the right by some high and easily-defended ground near Talley's. Gen. Devens, with the first division, holds the extreme right. He has less than four thousan
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XV. THE SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK.
XV. THE SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK.
It is now six o'clock of Saturday, May 2, 1863, a lovely spring evening. The Eleventh Corps lies quietly in position. Supper-time is at hand. Arms are stacked on the line; and the men, some with accoutrements hung upon the stacks, some wearing their cartridge-boxes, are mostly at the fires cooking their rations, careless of the future, in the highest spirits and most vigorous condition. Despite the general talk during the entire afternoon, among officers and rank and file alike, of a possible at
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XVI. JACKSON'S ATTACK.
XVI. JACKSON'S ATTACK.
Such is the situation at six P.M. Now Jackson gives the order to advance; and a heavy column of twenty-two thousand men, the best infantry in existence, as tough, hardy, and full of elan, as they are ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-looking, descends upon the Eleventh Corps, whose only ready force is four regiments, the section of a battery, and a weak line of pickets. The game, in which these woods still abound, startled at the unusual visitors, fly in the advance of Jackson's line towards and acr
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XVII. THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
XVII. THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
There can be no attempt to gainsay that the Eleventh Corps, on this luckless Saturday, did not do its whole duty. That it was panic-stricken, and that it decamped from a field where as a corps it had not fought, is undeniable. But portions of the corps did fight, and the entire corps would doubtless have fought well under favorable circumstances. It is but fair, after casting upon the corps the aspersion of flight from before the enemy, to do it what justice is possible, and to palliate the bad
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XVIII. HOOKER'S PARRY.
XVIII. HOOKER'S PARRY.
The position of the Army of the Potomac is critical in the extreme. But several circumstances come to the rescue. It is almost dark. The rebel lines have become inextricably mixed. Colston, who has gradually moved up to Rodes's support, is so completely huddled together with this latter's command, that there is no organization left. Still Jackson's veterans press on, determined to crush our army beyond recovery, and drive it from United-States Ford. Stuart has in fact, at his own suggestion, got
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XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK.
XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK.
When his troops had been summarily brought to a standstill by Berry's firm ranks and the heavy artillery fire, Jackson determined to withdraw his first and second lines to Dowdall's clearing to reform, and ordered A. P. Hill forward to relieve them. While this manoeuvre, rendered extremely difficult by the nature of the woods in which the fighting had been done, but which Hooker was in no condition to interfere with, was in progress, Sickles and Pleasonton, whose position was considerably compro
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XX. STONEWALL JACKSON.
XX. STONEWALL JACKSON.
It is probable that the wounding of Jackson at this juncture was the most effectual cause of the Confederate check on Saturday night. It occurred just after Jackson had concluded to withdraw his first and second lines to Dowdall's, there to re-form, and was making dispositions to move up A. P. Hill to relieve them. Orders had been issued to the troops not to fire unless at Union cavalry appearing in their front. Jackson, with some staff-officers and orderlies, had ridden out beyond his lines, as
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XXI. THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW.
XXI. THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW.
Gen. Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War comprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by him with reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a report of operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from it to some extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from Chancellorsville is thus explained. After setting forth that on the demolition of the Eleventh Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry into the gap to ar
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XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW.
XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW.
At the earliest dawn, while Rodes was issuing rations to his men, who had been many hours without food, the indefatigable Stuart gave orders for a slight advance of his right, to reduce the angle of refusal or Archer and McGowan; for at this moment it was ascertained that Sickles was being withdrawn from Hazel Grove. By some error, Stuart's order was interpreted as a command for the anticipated general attack, and the advancing columns soon provoked the fire of the expectant Federals. Seeing tha
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XXIII. THE LEFT CENTRE.
XXIII. THE LEFT CENTRE.
While the bulk of the fighting had thus been done by the right centre, Anderson was steadily forcing his way towards Chancellorsville. He had Wright's, Posey's, and Perry's brigades on the left of the plank road, and Mahone's on the right, and was under orders to press on to the Chancellor clearing as soon as he could join his left to Jackson's right. He speaks in his report as if he had little fighting to do to reach his destination. Nor does Geary, who was in his front, mention any heavy work
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XXIV. THE NEW LINES.
XXIV. THE NEW LINES.
The new lines, prepared by Gens. Warren and Comstock, in which the Army of the Potomac might seek refuge from its weaker but more active foe, lay as follows:— Birney describes the position as a flattened cone. The apex touched Bullock's, (White House or Chandler's,) where the Mineral-Spring road, along which the left wing of the army had lain, crosses the road from Chancellorsville to Ely's Ford. Bullock's lies on a commanding plateau, with open ground in its front, well covered by our artillery
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XXV. SUNDAY'S MISCARRIAGE.
XXV. SUNDAY'S MISCARRIAGE.
The operations of Sunday morning, in common with many of our battles, furnish scarcely more than a narrative of isolated combats, having more or less remote or immediate effect upon each other. The difficulty of the ground over which our armies were constantly called upon to manoeuvre explains "why the numerous bloody battles fought between the armies of the Union and of the secessionists should have been so indecisive. A proper understanding of the country, too, will help to relieve the America
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XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS.
XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS.
Let us return to the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, where operations now demanded Lee's undivided skill. This was properly the left wing of the army, which, under Sedgwick, had made the demonstration below Fredericksburg, to enable the right wing, under Hooker, to cross the river above, and establish itself at Chancellorsville. It had consisted of three corps; but, so soon as the demonstration had effected its purpose, it will be remembered that Hooker withdrew from Sedgwick's command b
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XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT.
XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT.
Now, when Sedgwick had concluded upon a general assault, he can scarcely be blamed for over-caution in his preparations for it. Four months before, a mere handful of the enemy had successfully held these defences against half the Army of the Potomac; and an attack without careful dispositions seemed to be mere waste of life. It would appear to be almost supererogatory to defend Sedgwick against reasonable time consumed in these precautions. There had been a more or less continuous artillery-fire
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XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER.
XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER.
So soon as Sedgwick had reduced the only formidable works in his front, he made dispositions to push out on the plank road. Gibbon was left in Fredericksburg to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side of the river, and to shield the bridges. "Gen. Brooks's division was now given the advance, and he was farthest in the rear, not having got moved from the crossing-place." Brooks had so extensive a force in his front, that he was constrained to withdraw with extreme caution. "This necessa
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XXIX. SALEM CHURCH.
XXIX. SALEM CHURCH.
It was about noon before Lee became aware that Sedgwick had captured his stronghold at Fredericksburg, and was where he could sever his communications, or fall upon his rear at Chancellorsville. Both Lee and Early (the former taking his cue from his lieutenant) state that at first Sedgwick advanced down the Telegraph road, with an assumed purpose to destroy the line in Lee's rear, but that he was checked by Early. The nature, however, of Sedgwick's orders precluded his doing this, and there is n
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XXX. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY.
XXX. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY.
So soon as Wilcox had retired from Banks's Ford to oppose Sedgwick's advance towards Chancellorsville, Gen. Benham threw a pontoon bridge, and established communications with the Sixth Corps. Warren, who up to this time had remained with Sedgwick, now returned to headquarters, reaching Hooker at eleven and, as a result of conference with him, telegraphed Sedgwick as follows:— "I find every thing snug here. We contracted the line a little, and repulsed the last assault with ease. Gen. Hooker wish
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XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS.
XXXI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS.
Foreseeing from the vigor of Lee's attack the necessity of contracting his lines, as soon as it was dark, Newton's and Brooks's divisions and the Light Brigade (Col. Burnham's), were ordered to fall rapidly back upon Banks's Ford, where they took position on the heights in the vicinity, and in Wilcox's rifle-pits. Howe was then quietly withdrawn, and disposed on Newton's right. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Gen. Howe appears to think that he was unfairly dealt
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XXXII. HOOKER'S CRITICISMS.
XXXII. HOOKER'S CRITICISMS.
Let us now examine into Hooker's various criticisms upon Sedgwick's conduct. Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, baldly accuses Sedgwick of neglecting to keep him advised of his movements, the inference being that he was debarred thereby from intelligently using him; and states that when he sent Sedgwick the despatch to join him at Chancellorsville, "it was written under the impression that his corps was on the north side of the Rappahannock." But could Hooke
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XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS.
XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS.
Hooker states: "Gen. Warren represented to me that Gen. Sedgwick had said he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take some position, and hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediate front. I proposed to leave troops enough where I was, to occupy the enemy there, and throw the rest of my force down the river, and re-enforce Sedgwick; then the whole of Lee's army, except that which had been left in front of Sedgwick, would be thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would be
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XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES.
XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES.
Orders were accordingly issued with a view to re-crossing the river; and during the 5th, Gen. Warren and Capt. Comstock of the engineers prepared a new and shorter line, in the rear of the one then held by the army, to secure it against any attempt by the enemy to interrupt the retreat. Capt. Comstock supervised the labor on the west side, and Gen. Warren on the east, of the United-States Ford road. "A continuous cover and abattis was constructed from the Rappahannock at Scott's Dam, around to t
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XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS.
XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS.
As was briefly related in the early part of this work, Hooker issued orders to Gen. Stoneman, the commanding-officer of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, on the 12th of April, to move the succeeding day for the purpose of cutting the communications of the enemy. The order read as follows:— I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that you will march at seven o'clock A.M., on the 13th inst., with all your available force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turni
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XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN.
XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN.
Nearly two years after this campaign, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about the general result of the movement:— "I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand." "I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost under those operations, one piece artillery, I t
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XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE.
XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE.
I would most respectfully request the privilege of sending a burial-party on the field of Chancellorsville, to bury the dead, and care for the wounded officers and soldiers of my command. General,—I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, requesting permission to send a burial-party to attend to your dead and wounded on the battle-field of Chancellorsville. I regret that their position is such, being immediately within our lines, that the necessities of war forbid my compliance w
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APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
In February and March, 1886, there was delivered at the Lowell Institute, in Boston, a series of lectures upon the late civil war, by the following gentlemen:— These lecturers were well equipped for their task. Earnest study of their respective subjects had been attested by numerous volumes published by them relating to the war. The desire to have the truth told was apparent in the presence of three Confederate officers among the number; and the special feature of the course seemed to be, that n
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