Tanks In The Great War, 1914-1918 - free ebook by J. F. C. (John Frederick Charles) Fuller

TANKS IN THE GREAT WAR

TANKS IN THE GREAT WAR 1914–1918 BY Brevet-Colonel J. F. C. FULLER, D.S.O. (Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry) NEW YORK E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY 1920...

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I

I dedicate this book to the modern military scientists, that small company of gentlemen who, imbued with a great idea, were willing to set all personal interest aside in order to design a machine destined to revolutionise the science of war. I dedicate this book to the modern armourers of the British factories, those men and women whose untiring patriotism and indomitable endurance in the workshops produced a weapon whereby the lives of many of their comrades were saved. I dedicate this book to

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INTRODUCTION

The following work is the story of a great and unique adventure as heroic as the exploits of the Argonauts of old, and, though the time perhaps has not yet arrived wherein to judge the part played by tanks in the Great War, I feel that, whatever may be the insight and judgment of the eventual historian of the British Tank Corps, he will probably lack that essential ingredient of all true history—the witnessing of the events concerning which he relates. I, the writer of this book, first set eyes

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CHAPTER I THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK

In war the main problem to solve is—“How to give blows without receiving them”; it has always been so and is likely always to remain so, for battles are two-act tragedies: the first act consisting in hitting and the second in securing oneself against being hit. If we look back on the 4,000 years of the known history of war, we shall find that its problems are always the same: thus in battle the soldier has to think of four main acts: (i) How to strike his opponent when at a distance from him; (i

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CHAPTER II THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

It is not proposed in this chapter to give an answer to the question: “Who first thought of the tank?” The idea of combining mobility with offensive power and armour, as the previous chapter has shown, is a very old one, so old and so universal throughout history that, when the Great War broke out in 1914, many soldiers and civilians alike must have considered ways and means of reintroducing the knight in armour and the battle car by replacing muscular energy by mechanical force—in other words,

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The Mark I Tank (see Frontispiece)

The first British tank made, and to be used, was the heavy machine, already described in the previous chapter, the Mark I tank, the general outline of which remained the standard design for the hulls of all British heavy machines up to the end of the war. As will be shown later, many mechanical improvements, making for higher efficiency and greater simplicity of control, were introduced from time to time, but the fact remains that the profile of the Mark V tank of 1918 was to all intents and pur

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The Mark II and Mark III Tanks

These machines were produced in small numbers, and their difference from Mark I lay in various minor improvements, none of a radical nature....

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The Mark IV Tank (Plate I—see p. 26)

In 1917 this tank became the standard fighting machine of the Tank Corps, and it was used in battle throughout this year and the following. As already stated, in outline it corresponded so closely with the Mark I machine that a study here of the main features of this tank will serve generally as an illustration of what had taken place in tank development up to this date. The machine was 26 ft. 5 in. long over all, whilst the width of the female over its sponsons was 10 ft. 6 in., and of the male

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The Mark V Tank (Plate V—see p. 204)

With the introduction of the Mark V tank, which represents the standard British heavy tank of to-day, great progress was made in all-round speed, ease of manœuvre, radius of action, simplicity of control and feasibility of observation. The dimensions and weight of this tank were approximately the same as those of the Mark IV, whilst the design of the hull still closely followed the lines of the original Mark I. Equipped with the 150 h.p. Ricardo 6-cylinder poppet-valved engine, specially designe

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The Mark V One Star Tank (Plate VII—see p. 220)

The Mark V star machine was 6 ft. longer than the Mark V, and the weight of the male, equipped, was approximately 33 tons. There was no change in the nature of the armament, or in the number of the crew, which consisted of eight all told. In addition to the crew, the machine was capable of carrying twenty to twenty-five other troops and would cross a 14 ft. trench, as against 10 ft. for the Mark V. The general mechanical arrangement of this tank corresponded with that of the Mark V, the same eng

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The Medium Mark A or “Whippet” Tank (Plate III—see p. 176)

The Medium A tank, known also as the “Chaser” and “Whippet,” was the British standard light-type machine, and it differed altogether from its heavier relatives. Its weight, equipped, was about 14 tons, whilst it was 20 ft. long, 9 ft. high, and 8 ft. 7 in. wide, carrying a crew of three. It could attain a maximum speed of about 8·3 m.p.h., and could span a trench approximately 7 ft. in width. On this machine the tracks were not carried “overhead” as in the case of the heavy tanks, but the two tr

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The Gun-carrying Tank (Plate VII—see p. 220)

Originally designed for carrying a 60-pounder gun or 6-in. howitzer and ammunition into action, these machines during 1918 were chiefly used for the transport of supplies across country. The engine, a 6-cylinder 105 h.p. Daimler, was placed right at the rear of the machine, and the general lay-out of the transmission corresponded with that of the Mark IV modified to suit the engine position, the primary and secondary gears, etc., being mounted forward of the engine in the case of this G.C. tank.

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CHAPTER IV THE MARK I TANK AND ITS TACTICS

The Mark I tank was the direct produce of the experimental machine which was officially tested on February 2, 1916. It may be defined as “a mechanically-propelled cross-country armoured battery,” the maximum thickness of its armour being 12 mm. 17 The main tactical characteristics of all tanks may be placed under the headings of—mobility, security, and offensive power, and as regards the Mark I machine the following is a general description of these characteristics: (i) Mobility. —The Mark I tan

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CHAPTER V THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE

On July 1, 1916, the battle of the Somme opened with a successful advance on the British right between Maricourt and Ovillers, and a check on the British left between Ovillers and Gommecourt. From that day on to the commencement of the battle of the Ancre, in November, no further attempt was made to push forward the British left, all available troops being required to maintain the forward movement of the right flank. The ground which separates the rivers Somme and Ancre is split up into valleys

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CHAPTER VI THE GROWTH OF THE TANK CORPS ORGANISATION

The word “Reorganisation” is a word which will never be forgotten by any member of the Tank Corps Headquarters Staff; it was their one persistent companion for over two years. It dogged their steps through all seasons, over training areas and battlefields in sleuth-hound fashion from the earliest days; and its pace was never stronger or its tongue more noisy than when, on November 11, 1918, it was temporarily shaken off with the armistice. Depressing as this perpetual change often was, reorganis

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CHAPTER VII TANK “ESPRIT DE CORPS”

The first “Instructions on Training” were issued to battalions of the Heavy Branch towards the end of December 1916. They are of some interest, as the esprit de corps and the efficiency of the entire formation was by degrees moulded on them. “The object of all training is to create a ‘corps d’élite,’ that is a body of men who are not only capable of helping to win this war, but are determined to do so. It cannot be emphasised too often that all training, at all times and in all places, must aim

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CHAPTER VIII TANK TACTICS

The training of the Heavy Branch having been laid down, it was next necessary to discover and decide upon a common method of tactics, 21 so that directly individual instruction had been completed collective training might be based on it; further, rumours were already afloat that the Heavy Branch might be called upon to take part in the spring offensive, so there was no time to be lost in deciding upon suitable methods and formations of attack. This was done early in February, when “Training Note

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CHAPTER IX THE BATTLE OF ARRAS

The great battles which opened the Allies’ 1917 campaign on the Western Front were the direct outcome of two main causes: (i) The strategical positions of the opposing Armies resulting from the battle of the Aisne in 1914. (ii) The tactical position of the same Armies resulting from the battle of the Somme in 1916. The former placed nine-tenths of the German Army in the west, in a huge salient Ostend-Noyon-Nancy; the latter a considerable portion of that Army in a smaller one, Arras-Gommecourt-M

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Battle History of Crew No. D.6. Tank No. 505. Date 9/4/17. Commanded by Lieutenant A——

Report of action. —Tank left starting-point at Beaurains at 6.30 a.m., on April 9, 1917, crossed our front line at 7.27 a.m., attacking Telegraph hill with the infantry at 7.30 a.m.; then worked towards Neuville Vitasse along the Hindenburg Line. At a point about 1,000 yards N.E. of Neuville Vitasse, the tank was caught in a trap consisting of a large gun-pit carefully covered with turf. I and Sergeant B—— immediately got out and went to guide other tanks clear of the trap in spite of M.G. and s

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Battle History Of Crew No. D.9. Tank No. 770. Date 9/4/17. Commanded by 2nd Lieutenant C——

Orders received. —To proceed from Mercatel to the Zoo trench system through the Cojeul switch to Nepal trench, from thence with the infantry to Wancourt. Report of action. —Owing to mechanical trouble tank was delayed in coming into action. Having rectified this, I proceeded to join D.10—D.11 as ordered. I eventually found these tanks out of action and proceeded alone to a further line of trenches, where I met with decidedly severe hostile machine-gun and shell fire. I consider we were successfu

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Battle History of Crew No. D.4. Tank No. 783. Date 23/4/17. Commanded by Lieutenant E——

Orders received. —To attack enemy strong point at 0.19.a.07 as my first objective, then to proceed to banks in 0.19.b. and return with the infantry until the Blue Line was consolidated, as my second objective. My third objective was to conform with an advance by the infantry at zero plus seven hours, and to attack a tangle of trenches in 0.21.a. &amp; b. just in advance of the Red Line. It was eventually left to my decision as to the possibility of attempting this third objective. Report of

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Battle History of Crew No. D.10. Tank No. 784. Date 23/4/17. Commanded by 2nd Lieutenant G——

Orders received. —To advance from starting-point on British front line at T.4.b.4.5 to Hindenburg Line at point T.6.a.0.5, from which point infantry were to bomb along Hindenburg Line (front and support) to river Sensée at U.7.a.4.4. Tank to assist infantry and after objective at river taken to proceed to Croisilles. Report of action. —I started from starting-point at T.4.b.4.5 at zero, and made for Hindenburg wire at T.6.a.0.5, crossing same and getting into touch with our infantry, from whom I

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Battle History of Crew No. 9. Tank No. 716. Date 23/4/17. Commanded by 2nd Lieutenant H——

Orders received. —To clear Mount Pleasant wood, Rœux, and northern edge of village. Report of action. —Time allowed for tanks from deployment point to starting-point proved to be insufficient, which delayed my start some twenty minutes. Having learnt that the other car which was operating with me was “out of action,” I made my way alone to the railway arch, where I was held up some few minutes owing to a number of stretcher cases which had to be removed, and a sand-bag barricade which I could no

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CHAPTER XI THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA

On account of the assistance rendered to the British infantry by tanks during the battle of the Somme a decision was arrived at in England to despatch a number of these machines to Egypt to assist our troops in the Sinai peninsula, especially in the neighbourhood of El Arish, south of the Turkish frontier. The number originally decided on was twelve, but this was eventually cut down to eight, and, through an unfortunate error, old experimental machines were sent out instead of new ones as intend

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CHAPTER XII STAFF WORK AND BATTLE PREPARATION

The foundations of the success or non-success of a battle rest on its organisation, that is, on the preparations made for it. This is the duty of the General and Administrative Staffs of an Army or Formation and usually entails an immense amount of careful work. The fact that success depends as much, if not more, on organisation (brain power) as on valour (nerve power) is not generally recognised, and many an officer and man in the firing line is, through ignorance of the causes and effects whic

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CHAPTER XIII THE BATTLE OF MESSINES

The situation at the end of April 1917 was a difficult one for the Allies. The failure to penetrate the Drocourt-Queant line had rendered the whole plan of the British attack east of Arras abortive; this was bad enough, but indeed a minor incident when compared with the failure of the great French attack in Champagne. It was towards making good this failure that the rest of the year’s operations had to be directed. The ambitious plan of cutting off the Arras-Soissons-Reims salient having failed,

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CHAPTER XIV A TACTICAL APPRECIATION

The battle of Messines may be looked upon as the high-water mark of the artillery attack, which was first developed by the British Army during the battle of the Somme. The time, however, was approaching when a change of tactics became imperative on account of the enemy having learnt his lesson. To appreciate what this question involves is of some interest, especially so, as in the tank was eventually discovered a means of overcoming the counter-measures now adopted by the enemy. 24 The main char

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CHAPTER XV THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

Towards the middle of May it was decided that all three Brigades of Tanks, that is, the whole Heavy Branch, should take part in the forthcoming operations of the Fifth Army east of Ypres, and that two of these brigades should assemble in Oosthoek wood and the third at Ouderdom. To initiate preparations an advanced headquarters was opened at Poperinghe early in June, and on the 22nd of this month the brigade advanced parties moved to the Ypres area. After the battle of Messines, the 2nd Brigade (

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CHAPTER XVI TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

The organisation of the “mechanical engineering” side of the Tank Corps constituted the backbone of the whole formation, for on its efficiency depended the efficiency of the fighting units in as high a degree as the fighting efficiency of a cavalry regiment depends on its horse-mastership. In this chapter it is not intended to follow the growth of this organisation in detail, but rather to look back on its evolution as a whole, and then to enter upon a few particulars of the work accomplished by

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CHAPTER XVII THE THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA

As a result of the repulse sustained by the British forces at the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917, the troops operating were withdrawn from their exposed position and the Tank Detachment was concentrated in a fig grove some 2,000 yards west of Sheikh Nebhan, at which place it was later on reinforced by three Mark IV machines. A new plan of operations was drawn up in which the Turkish defences from Outpost hill to Ali El Muntar, which had resisted the combined onslaught of several divisions,

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CHAPTER XVIII ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

The battles of 1914 were primarily infantry battles based on the power of the rifle, and it was not until 1915 that the quick-firing gun and the heavy howitzer began to replace the rifle as the reducers of resistance to the infantry attack. In 1915, as far as the British Army is concerned, it may be said that artillery was generally looked upon as an adjunct to the infantry. This idea died hard, and it was not until the battle of the Somme was half way through that it became apparent that it was

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CHAPTER XIX THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

On October 20, the project, which had been constantly in the mind of the General Staff of the Tank Corps for nearly three months and in anticipation of which preparations had already been undertaken, was approved of, and its date fixed for November 20. The battle was to be based on tanks and led by them. There was to be no preliminary artillery bombardment; the day the Tank Corps had prayed for, for nearly a year, was at last fixed, and its success depended on the following three factors: (i) Th

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CHAPTER XX AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS

During the many battles and engagements in which the Tank Corps took part many appreciative special orders and letters were received from the Higher Commanders under whose orders the Corps worked. These kindly words, always appreciated, are apt sometimes to be regarded as the inevitable “good chits” which courtesy demands should be addressed to good, indifferent, and bad alike after an operation has been successfully completed. Unsolicited testimonials, and especially such as are not meant for t

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CHAPTER XXI THE TANK CORPS TRAINING CENTRE

Early in February 1916 a Conference was held at the War Office, to decide as to the training of the personnel for the tank units it was now decided to raise. At this Conference, Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton and Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Bradley, D.S.O., were ordered to be present. At this time, Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley was Commandant of the Motor Machine Gun Training Centre at Bisley, and was in the position to select suitable men for the new arm. The number of men required for the first 150 tank

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CHAPTER XXII THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES

Tanks, like every other arm of the Army, require a highly organised supply service, and being cross-country machines they must be served by machines of similar powers of locomotion. This was probably realised before tanks were originally dispatched to France in 1916, but, during the battles of the Somme, Ancre, and Arras, it was not possible to organise any system of cross-country supply on account of every machine being required for either fighting or training purposes. In February 1917 the fir

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CHAPTER XXIII THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

With the close of the battle of Cambrai the British Army abandoned the offensive, which had been initiated on April 9, and a period of passive defence was developed. At this time all three Tank Brigades had assembled at or near Bray-sur-Somme, where extensive hutments existed and where the old devastated area offered excellent facilities for training. Towards the end of December a request was made by the Tank Corps to establish at Bray a large tank and infantry school, so that co-operation betwe

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A. D. Signals (Technical Instructions, Posting of Officers and Men, Control of all Signal Stores)

Early in 1918 the type of wireless apparatus as used in the signal tanks was changed to C.W. (continuous wave) sets, these being more compact, and greater range of action being possible with the small aerials the tanks had to use. Eight of these C.W. sets were issued to each Brigade Signal Company, and training in their use was carried out up to the commencement of the August operations. On the whole they proved a success and justified their adoption, but as experience was gained it became evide

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CHAPTER XXV THE FRENCH TANK CORPS

The existence of the French Tank Corps was due to the untiring energy of one man—Colonel (now General) Estienne. On December 1, 1915, this officer, then commanding the 6th French Divisional Artillery, addressed a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies in which he expressed his firm belief that an engine of war, mechanically propelled and protected by armour, capable of transporting infantry and guns, was the solution to the deadlock on the Western Front. The idea of the machine in

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CHAPTER XXVI PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT OFFENSIVE

As soon as the position resulting from the great German attack of March 21 began to stabilise steps were taken by the Headquarters of the Tank Corps to reorganise and refit its battalions. This work was most difficult on account of the reopening of the German offensive in the Lys area, which necessitated converting the 4th Tank Brigade into a Lewis-gun unit and dispatching it north to assist in stemming the German advance. Besides this, towards the middle of April instructions were received that

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CHAPTER XXVII THE BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL

During June and July three tank actions were fought: the first was a night raid on June 22–23, the second the battle of Hamel, and the third the battle of Moreuil or Sauvillers. The night raid is interesting in that it was the first occasion in the history of the Tank Corps in France upon which tanks were definitely allotted to work at night. The raid was carried out against the enemy’s defences near Bucquoy by five platoons of infantry and five female tanks. Its object was to capture or kill th

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CHAPTER XXVIII GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS

In spite of the fact that throughout the war the Germans never had at their disposal more than some fifteen tanks of their own manufacture and some twenty-five captured and repaired British Mark IV machines, their employment of these machines is worth recording. As already mentioned the Germans learnt little from the Mark I machine they captured and held for several days during the battle of the Somme. In fact, they appear to have treated the tanks generally, during these operations, with scorn.

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CHAPTER XXIX THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

On July 15 the renewed German offensive on the Château-Thierry—Reims front had been launched and failed. Strategically and tactically placed in as unenviable a position as any army well could be, the Crown Prince’s forces received a staggering blow on the 18th, when Marshal Foch launched his great tank counter-attack against the western flank of the Soissons salient. At the time of this attack the brigades of the Tank Corps were distributed defensively along the First, Third, and Fourth Army fro

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CHAPTER XXX THE FIGHT OF A WHIPPET TANK

In this history space has forbidden any extensive reference to individual tank actions, though when all is said and done it was on these actions that not only was the efficiency of the Tank Corps founded but victory itself. Prior to the battle of Amiens it will be remembered that the 3rd and 6th Whippet Battalions were allotted to work with the Cavalry Corps, and that this did not prove a great success owing to the difficulty of combining the action of steel mechanically driven with horseflesh.

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CHAPTER XXXI GERMAN APPRECIATION OF BRITISH TANKS

The tardy development of both tanks and anti-tank defences has been referred to; from this it is evident that the Germans did not take kindly to the tank idea. In the tank they apparently only saw a cumbersome machine, a land Merrimac; they were unable to read the writing in iron or to understand the message that this machine brought with it on to every battlefield, namely, “the doom to all muscular warfare.” Why they took so little interest in tanks may have been due to the feeling that time la

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CHAPTER XXXII AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION WITH TANKS

Prior to July 1, 1918, no definite aeroplane and tank co-operation had been organised, though the want of such co-operation had been long felt, and in one of the attacks on Bourlon wood, during the battle of Cambrai, aeroplanes had proved their value in protecting tanks from the enemy’s field guns. The assistance which aeroplanes can afford tanks falls under the two main headings of information and protection; in the future, no doubt, those of command and supply will be added. Prior to the battl

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CHAPTER XXXIII THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF ARRAS

The operations which took place between the conclusion of the great battle of Amiens and the signing of the armistice may conveniently be divided into three periods: (i) The battle of Bapaume and the Second Battle of Arras—August 21 to September 3. (ii) The battles of Epehy and Cambrai St. Quentin—September 18 to October 10. (iii) The battles of the Selle and Maubeuge—October 17 to November 11. The first comprises the fighting in the devastated area, the second the breaking through of the Hinden

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CHAPTER XXXIV GERMAN ANTI-TANK TACTICS

From September 1916 onwards to the conclusion of the war, German anti-tank tactics passed through three phases. Firstly, the enemy had no anti-tank defence at all, or what he devised he based upon a misconception of what the tank could accomplish. Secondly, having learnt but little about tanks, he considered that only a small expenditure of effort and matériel was required to deal with weapons of so limited a scope. Thirdly, from August 1918 onwards, he took panic and over-estimated their powers

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CHAPTER XXXV THE BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI—ST. QUENTIN

On September 4 all Tank Brigades were withdrawn from Armies and placed in G.H.Q. reserve to refit and reorganise. When this had been completed Tank Brigades were constituted as follows: At 7 a.m. on September 17, in a heavy storm of rain, the Fourth and Third Armies initiated the battle of Epehy by attacking on a front of some seventeen miles from Holnon to Gouzeaucourt, the First French Army co-operating south of Holnon. On September 18 the 4th and 5th Tank Brigades were released from G.H.Q. re

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CHAPTER XXXVI THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS

On April 2, 1917, the United States of America entered the Great War. Up to this date tanks had not accomplished much. British machines had taken part in the battles of the Somme and Ancre, and the first French ones had made their appearance on the training ground in October 1916. In June 1917, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Parker was detailed to inquire into the military value of tanks, and in the following month he forwarded his report on this subject to the Operation Section of the Infantry Committee

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CHAPTER XXXVII THE BATTLES OF THE SELLE AND MAUBEUGE

On October 12, the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 15th Battalions were withdrawn and placed in G.H.Q. reserve, and on the following day the 6th Battalion was transferred to the 4th Tank Brigade; meanwhile the retiring enemy endeavoured to form a defensive line on the east side of the river Selle. On this front, on October 17, the Fourth Army and the First French Army attacked from Le Cateau southwards to Vaux Andigny on a front of about twelve miles. The 4th Tank Brigade was the only brigade in action,

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CHAPTER XXXVIII THE 17TH TANK ARMOURED CAR BATTALION

In March 1918 the 17th Tank Battalion was in process of formation at the Tank Training Centre at Wool, when the German spring offensive resulted in so great a demand being made on the home resources that it was converted into an Armoured Car Battalion on April 23. On the following day the drivers were selected, and sixteen armoured cars, which were earmarked for the eastern theatre of war, were handed over to it, the Vickers machine guns being replaced by Hotchkiss ones. On April 28 the cars wer

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CHAPTER XXXIX A RETROSPECT OF WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

Like all other human energies, war may be reduced to a science, and had this, throughout history, been better understood, how many countless thousands of lives and millions of money might not have been saved, and how much sorrow and waste might not have been prevented! Science is but another name for knowledge—knowledge co-ordinated, arranged and systematised—from which art, or the application of knowledge to existing and ever-changing conditions, is derived and built up on unchanging principles

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CHAPTER XL A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

Accepting war as a science and an art, that it is founded on definite principles which are applied according to the conditions of the moment, we may scientifically reduce it to its component elements, which are: Men, weapons, and movement. A combination of these three is an army, a body of men which can fight and move. Tactics, or the art of moving armed men on the battlefield, change directly in accordance with the nature of the weapons themselves and the mobility of the means of transport. Eac

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