Aristotle - free ebook by George Grote

SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1880.

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NOTICE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

This Edition is an exact reprint of the First Edition, with the addition of two important Essays on the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle, which were found among the author’s posthumous papers. They were originally published in 1876, in ‘Fragments on Ethical Subjects, by the late George Grote,’ but would have been included in the First Edition of this Work, had they been discovered in time. These Essays are the fruit of long and laborious study, and, so far as they extend, embody the writer’s mat

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PREFACE BY THE EDITORS TO THE FIRST EDITION.

The Historian of Greece, when closing his great narrative in the year 1856, promised to follow out in a separate work that speculative movement of the fourth century B.C. which upheld the supremacy of the Hellenic intellect long after the decline of Hellenic liberty. He had traced the beginnings of the movement in the famous chapter on Sokrates, but to do justice to its chief heroes — Plato and Aristotle — proved to be impossible within the limits of the History. When, however, the promised work

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CHAPTER I. LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.

In my preceding work, ‘Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,’ I described a band of philosophers differing much from each other, but all emanating from Sokrates as common intellectual progenitor; all manifesting themselves wholly or principally in the composition of dialogues; and all living in an atmosphere of Hellenic freedom, as yet untroubled by any over-ruling imperial ascendancy from without. From that band, among whom Plato is facilè princeps , I now proceed to another, among whom t

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CHAPTER II. ARISTOTELIAN CANON.

In the fourth and fifth chapters of my work on ‘Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,’ I investigated the question of the Platonic Canon, and attempted to determine, upon the best grounds open to us, the question, What are the real works of Plato? I now propose to discuss the like question respecting Aristotle. But the premisses for such a discussion are much less simple in regard to Aristotle than in regard to Plato. As far as the testimony of antiquity goes, we learn that the Canon of Th

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CHAPTER III. CATEGORIÆ.

Of the prodigious total of works composed by Aristotle, I have already mentioned that the larger number have perished. But there still remain about forty treatises, of authenticity not open to any reasonable suspicion, which attest the grandeur of his intelligence, in respect of speculative force, positive as well as negative, systematizing patience, comprehensive curiosity as to matters of fact, and diversified applications of detail. In taking account of these treatises, we perceive some in wh

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CHAPTER IV. DE INTERPRETATIONE.

In the preceding chapter I enumerated and discussed what Aristotle calls the Categories. We shall now proceed to the work which stands second in the aggregate called the Organon — the treatise De Interpretatione. We have already seen that the Aristotelian Ontology distinguishes one group of varieties of Ens (or different meanings of the term Ens ) as corresponding to the diversity of the ten Categories; while recognizing also another variety of Ens as Truth , with its antithesis Non-Ens as False

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CHAPTER V. ANALYTICA PRIORA I.

Reviewing the treatise De Interpretatione, we have followed Aristotle in his first attempt to define what a Proposition is, to point out its constituent elements, and to specify some of its leading varieties. The characteristic feature of the Proposition he stated to be — That it declares, in the first instance, the mental state of the speaker as to belief or disbelief, and, in its ulterior or final bearing, a state of facts to which such belief or disbelief corresponds. It is thus significant o

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CHAPTER VI. ANALYTICA PRIORA II.

The Second Book of the Analytica Priora seems conceived with a view mainly to Dialectic and Sophistic, as the First Book bore more upon Demonstration. 1 Aristotle begins the Second Book by shortly recapitulating what he had stated in the First; and then proceeds to touch upon some other properties of the Syllogism. Universal syllogisms (those in which the conclusion is universal) he says, have always more conclusions than one; particular syllogisms sometimes, but not always, have more conclusion

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CHAPTER VII. ANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.

In the two books of Analytica Priora, Aristotle has carried us through the full doctrine of the functions and varieties of the Syllogism; with an intimation that it might be applied to two purposes — Demonstration and Dialectic. We are now introduced to these two distinct applications of the Syllogism: first, in the Analytica Posteriora, to Demonstration; next, in the Topica, to Dialectic. We are indeed distinctly told that, as far as the forms and rules of Syllogism go, these are alike applicab

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ANALYTICA POSTERIORA II.

Aristotle begins the Second Book of the Analytica Posteriora by an enumeration and classification of Problems or Questions suitable for investigation. The matters knowable by us may be distributed into four classes:— Under the first head come questions of Fact; under the second head, questions of Cause or Reason; under the third, questions of Existence; under the fourth, questions of Essence. Under the first head we enquire, Whether a fact or event is so or so? Whether a given subject possesses

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I.

In treating of the Analytica Posteriora I have already adverted, in the way of contrast, to the Topica; and, in now approaching the latter work, I must again bring the same contrast before the mind of the reader. The treatise called Topica (including that which bears the separate title De Sophisticis Elenchis, but which is properly its Ninth or last Book, winding up with a brief but memorable recapitulation of the Analytica and Topica considered as one scheme) is of considerable length, longer t

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II.

The First Book of the Topica, which we have thus gone through, was entitled by some ancient commentators τὰ πρὸ τῶν Τόπων — matters preliminary to the Loci . This is quite true, as a description of its contents; for Aristotle in the last words of the book, distinctly announces that he is about to enumerate the Loci towards which the four above-mentioned Organa will be useful. 75 75 Ibid. p. 108, b. 32: οἱ δὲ τόποι πρὸς οὓς χρήσιμα τὰ λεχθέντα οἵδε εἰσίν. Locus (τόπος) is a place in which many ar

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III.

Such are the chief among the thirty-seven Loci which Aristotle indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the predication is only of Accident — not of Genus, or Proprium, or Definition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal separately with one special branch of such theses, respecting Expetenda and Fugienda : where the question put is, Of two or more distinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The cases supposed are those in which the difference

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IV.

After this long catalogue of Loci belonging to debate on propositions of Accident, Aristotle proceeds to enumerate those applicable to propositions of Genus and of Proprium. Neither Genus nor Proprium is often made subject of debate as such; but both of them are constituent elements of the debate respecting Definition, which is of frequent occurrence. 151 For that reason, both deserve to be studied. 151 Ibid. IV. i. p. 120, b. 12: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἔσ

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V.

Aristotle passes, in the Fifth book of the Topica, to those debates in which the thesis set up declares the predicate as Proprium of the subject. A Proprium may belong to its subject either per se and semper , or relatively to something else and occasionally or sometimes. It is a proprium per se of man to be an animal by nature tractable. It is a relative proprium of the soul in regard to the body, to exercise command; of the body in regard to the soul, to obey command. It is a proprium semper o

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VI.

We now enter on the Sixth Book, containing the Loci bearing on Definition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points on any of which the attack and defence may turn:— 257 1. That which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true at all, even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be defined; or at least not true of everything that bears the name of the subject. 2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that genus to which it rightly and specia

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VII.

In the Seventh Book of the Topica Aristotle continues his review of the manner of debating theses which profess to define, but enters also on a collateral question connected with that discussion: viz., By what arguments are we to determine whether two Subjects or Predicates are the same Numero ( modo maxime proprio ), as distinguished from being the same merely Specie or Genere ? To measure the extent of identity between any two subjects, is important towards the attack and defence of a definiti

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VIII.

The Eighth Book of the Topica brings our attention back to the general considerations contained in the First. In the intervening part of the treatise we have had the quadruple distribution of dialectical problems, with the enumeration of those Loci of argument which bear upon each or all: we are now invited to study the application of these distinctions in practice, and with this view to look once more both at the persons and the purposes of dialectical debate. What is the order of procedure mos

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CHAPTER X. SOPHISTICI ELENCHI.

The Sophist (according to Aristotle) is one whose professional occupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without the reality — by contriving to make others believe falsely that he possesses wisdom and knowledge. The abstract substantive noun Sophistic , with the verb to practice as a Sophist (σοφιστεύειν), expresses such profession and purpose. 1 This application of the term is derived from Plato, who has in various dialogues (Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydêmus, &amp;c.) intro

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CHAPTER XI. PHYSICA AND METAPHYSICA.

Aristotle distinguishes, in clear and explicit language, a science which he terms Wisdom, Philosophy, or First Philosophy; the subject-matter of which he declares to be Ens quatenus Ens , together with the concomitants belonging to it as such. With this Ontology the treatise entitled Metaphysica purports to deal, and the larger portion of it does really so deal. At the same time, the line that parts off Ontology from Logic (Analytic and Dialectic) on the one hand, and from Physics on the other,

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CHAPTER XII. DE ANIMÂ, ETC.

To understand Aristotle’s Psychology, we must look at it in comparison with the views of other ancient Greek philosophers on the same subject, as far as our knowledge will permit. Of these ancient philosophers, none have been preserved to us except Plato, and to a certain extent Epikurus, reckoning the poem of Lucretius as a complement to the epistolary remnants of Epikurus himself. The predecessors of Aristotle (apart from Plato) are known only through small fragments from themselves, and imper

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CHAPTER XIII. ETHICA. I.

The Ethics of Aristotle presuppose certain conditions in the persons to whom they are addressed, without which they cannot be read with profit. They presuppose a certain training, both moral and intellectual, in the pupil. First, the reason of the pupil must be so far developed, as that he shall be capable of conceiving the idea of a scheme of life and action, and of regulating his momentary impulses more or less by a reference to this standard. He must not live by passion, obeying without refle

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II.

Aristotle distributes good things into three classes — the admirable or worshipful — the praiseworthy — the potential . 1. Good — as an End: that which is worthy of being honoured and venerated in itself and from its own nature, without regard to anything ulterior: that which comes up to our idea of perfection. 2. Good — as a means: that which is good, not on its own account nor in its own nature, but on account of certain ulterior consequences which flow from it. 3. Good — as a means, but not a

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CHAPTER XIV. POLITICA.

The scheme of government proposed by Aristotle, in the two last books of his Politics, as representing his own ideas of something like perfection, is evidently founded upon the Republic of Plato: from whom he differs in the important circumstance of not admitting either community of property or community of wives and children. Each of these philosophers recognises one separate class of inhabitants, relieved from all private toil and all money-getting employments, and constituting exclusively the

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I. THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALS.

The controversy respecting Universals first obtained its place in philosophy from the colloquies of Sokrates, and the writings and teachings of Plato. We need not here touch upon their predecessors, Parmenides and Herakleitus, who, in a confused and unsystematic manner, approached this question from opposite sides, and whose speculations worked much upon the mind of Plato in determining both his aggressive dialectic, and his constructive theories. Parmenides of Elea, improving upon the ruder con

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II. FIRST PRINCIPLES. A. — Sir William Hamilton on Aristotle’s Doctrine.

In reading attentively Hamilton’s “Dissertation on the Philosophy of Common Sense” (Note A, annexed to ed. of Reid’s Works, p. 742, seq.), I find it difficult to seize accurately what he means by the term. It seems to me that he unsays in one passage what he says in another; and that what he tells us (p. 750, b.), viz. that “philosophers have rarely scrupled, on the one hand, quietly to supersede the data of consciousness, so often as these did not fall in with their pre-adopted opinions; and on

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B. — Aristotle’s Doctrine.

In regard to Aristotle, there are two points to be examined — I. What position does he take up in respect to the authority of Common Sense? II. What doctrine does he lay down about the first principia or beginnings of scientific reasoning — the ἀρχαὶ συλλογιστικαί? I. — That Aristotle did not regard Cause, Substance, Time, &amp;c., as Intuitions, is shown by the subtle and elaborate reasonings that he employs to explain them, and by the censure that he bestows on the erroneous explanations a

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Book Γ.

In this First Philosophy, Aristotle analyses and illustrates the meaning of the generalissima of language — the most general and abstract words which language includes. All these are words in common and frequent use; in the process of framing or putting together language, they have become permanently stamped and circulated as the result of many previous comparisons, gone through but afterwards forgotten, or perhaps gone through at first without any distinct consciousness. Men employ these words

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Book E.

The First Philosophy investigates the causes and principles of Entia quatenus Entia (p. 1025, b. 3). It is distinguished from other sciences, by applying to all Entia, and in so far as they are Entia; for each of the other sciences applies itself to some separate branch of Entia, and investigates the causes and principles of that branch exclusively. Each assumes either from data of perception, or avowedly by way of hypothesis, the portion or genus of Entia to which it applies; not investigating

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Book Z.

We have already stated that Ens is a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον — distinguished according to the ten figures or genera called Categories. The first is τί ἐστιν, or οὐσία ( sensu dignissimo ) — Essentia, Substantia (p. 1028, a. 15). The remaining Categories are all appendages of Essentia, presupposing it, and inseparable from it; whereas Essentia is separable from all of them, and stands first in reason, in cognition, and in time. All the other Categories are called Entia only because they are quantities

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Book Η.

In this Book, Aristotle begins by recapitulating the doctrines and discussions of the preceding. His purpose had been declared to be the investigation of the Causes, Principles, and Elements of Essences. Now Essences are diverse: some universally admitted, as the natural elements and simple bodies, also plants, animals, and the parts of each, lastly, the heaven and the parts thereof; others not universally admitted, but advocated by some philosophers, as the Ideas and Mathematical Entia; others,

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Book Θ.

In discriminating the meanings of Ens, we noticed one κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν (apart from Ens according to the Categories). We shall now proceed to discuss these two terms δύναμις and ἑντελέχεια = ἐνέργεια (p. 1045, b. 35). It is elsewhere mentioned ( Δ. p. 1019) that δύναμις has many senses, of which some (like the geometrical, &amp;c.) are equivocal or metaphorical, so that we shall pass them over here (p. 1046, a. 6). But there is one first and proper sense of δύναμις, from which many

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Book Λ.

We have to speculate respecting Essence; for that which we are in search of is the principles and causes of Essences (p. 1069, a. 18). If we look upon the universe as one whole, Essence is the first part thereof: if we look upon it as a series of distinct units (εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, a. 20), even in that view οὐσία stands first, ποιόν next, ποσόν third; indeed these last are not Entia at all, strictly speaking (a. 21) — I mean, for example, qualities and movements, and negative attributes such as not-wh

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IV. DE CŒLO. Book I.

C H . 1. — The science of Nature has for its principal object — Bodies, Magnitudes, and the various affections and movements of Bodies and Magnitudes; also the beginnings or principles of this sort of Essence. The Continuous is that which is divisible into parts perpetually divisible: and Body is that which is divisible in every direction. Of magnitudes, some (lines) are divisible only in one direction; others (planes) only in two directions; others again (bodies) in three directions. This is th

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Book II.

C H . 1. — The Heaven has not been generated nor can it be destroyed, as some (Plato) affirm: it is one and eternal, having neither beginning nor end of the whole Æon, holding and comprehending in itself infinite time. This we may believe not merely from the foregoing reasonings, but also from the opinion of opponents who suppose the Cosmos to be generated. For, since their opinion has been shown to be inadmissible, and our doctrine is at least admissible, even thus much will have great force to

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EPIKURUS

Our information from Epikurean writers respecting the doctrines of their sect is much less copious than that which we possess from Stoic writers in regard to Stoic opinions. We have no Epikurean writer on philosophy except Lucretius; whereas respecting the Stoical creed under the Roman Empire, the important writings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Antoninus, afford most valuable evidence. The standard of Virtue and Vice is referred by Epikurus to Pleasure and Pain. Pain is the only evil, Pleasu

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THE STOICS — A FRAGMENT.

The Stoics were one of the four sects of philosophy recognized and conspicuous at Athens during the three centuries preceding the Christian era and during the century or more following. Among these four sects, the most marked antithesis of ethical dogma was between the Stoics and the Epikureans. The Stoics agreed with the Peripatetics (anterior to Epikurus, not specially against him ) that the first principle of nature is (not pleasure or relief from pain, but) Self-preservation or Self-love; in

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