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THE FEDERALIST. No. I.
THE FEDERALIST. No. I.
General Introduction For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the
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THE FEDERALIST. No. II.
THE FEDERALIST. No. II.
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence For the Independent Journal. JAY To the People of the State of New York: When the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident. Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it i
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THE FEDERALIST. No. III.
THE FEDERALIST. No. III.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. JAY To the People of the State of New York: It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and unif
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THE FEDERALIST. No. IV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. IV.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. JAY To the People of the State of New York: My last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by
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THE FEDERALIST. No. V.
THE FEDERALIST. No. V.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. JAY To the People of the State of New York: Queen Anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: “An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will s
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THE FEDERALIST. No. VI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. VI.
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind—those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themsel
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THE FEDERALIST. No. VII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. VII.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say—precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question
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THE FEDERALIST. No. VIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. VIII.
The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nat
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THE FEDERALIST. No. IX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. IX.
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid successi
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THE FEDERALIST. No. X.
THE FEDERALIST. No. X.
The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) From the New York Packet. Friday, November 23, 1787. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: Among the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates th
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XI.
The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other. There are appe
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XII.
The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 27, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry. The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of nat
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XIII.
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XIV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XIV.
Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered From the New York Packet. Friday, November 30, 1787. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: We have seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XV.
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York. In the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XVI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XVI.
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 4, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account,
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XVII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XVII.
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: An objection, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb th
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XVIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XVIII.
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON AND MADISON To the People of the State of New York: Among the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States. The members retaine
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XIX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XIX.
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON AND MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body. In the early ages
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XX.
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 11, 1787. HAMILTON AND MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed. The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXI.
Other Defects of the Present Confederation For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: Having in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXII.
The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) From the New York Packet. Friday, December 14, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: In addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union. The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIII.
The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 18, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived. This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches the objects to be provided for by the federal government, the
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIV.
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: To the powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor t
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXV.
The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) From the New York Packet. Friday, December 21, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: It may perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer the care of th
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVI.
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: It was a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inc
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVII.
The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 25, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: It has been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general asserti
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVIII.
The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: That there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; th
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIX.
Concerning the Militia From the Daily Advertiser. Thursday, January 10, 1788 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy. It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be atten
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXX.
Concerning the General Power of Taxation From the New York Packet. Friday, December 28, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: It has been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXI.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 1, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: In disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defe
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXII.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the Daily Advertiser. Thursday, January 3, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: Although I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments,
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIII.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the Daily Advertiser. January 3, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature “to make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into exec
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIV.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the New York Packet. Friday, January 4, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: I flatter myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be n
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXV.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: Before we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon tho
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVI.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the New York Packet. Tuesday January 8, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: We have seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of prop
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVII.
Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government From the Daily Advertiser. Friday, January 11, 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: In reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before the public, several of the most important principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of these papers is to determine clearl
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVIII.
The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 15, 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: It is not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history, in which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integr
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIX.
The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles For the Independent Journal. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking. The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form woul
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XL.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XL.
The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained From the New York Packet. Friday, January 18, 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The second point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference,
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLI.
General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution For the Independent Journal. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches. Under the FIRST
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLII.
The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 22, 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The second class of powers, lodged in the general government, consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIII.
The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) For the Independent Journal. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The fourth class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:1. A power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. “The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors ha
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIV.
Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States From the New York Packet. Friday, January 25, 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: A fifth class of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States:1. “No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of de
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLV.
The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered For the Independent Fournal. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: Having shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States. The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place w
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVI.
The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 29, 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: Resuming the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVII.
The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts From the New York Packet. Friday, February 1, 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: Having reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts. One of the principal objections inculcated by the mor
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVIII.
These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other From the New York Packet. Friday, February 1, 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: It was shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and bl
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THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIX.
Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The author of the “Notes on the State of Virginia,” quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention, expected to be called in 1783, by the legislatur
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THE FEDERALIST. No. L.
THE FEDERALIST. No. L.
Periodical Appeals to the People Considered From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: It may be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to thei
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LI.
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LII.
The House of Representatives From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: From the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same wi
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LIII.
The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, “that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. “ If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason o
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LIV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LIV.
The Apportionment of Members Among the States From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to re
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LV.
The Total Number of the House of Representatives From the New York Packet. Friday, February 15, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LVI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LVI.
The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of the
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LVII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LVII.
The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The third charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of t
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LVIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LVIII.
Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered MADISON To the People of the State of New York: The remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand. It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will show
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LIX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LIX.
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members From the New York Packet. Friday, February 22, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the national legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members. It is in these words: “The TIMES, PLACES, and MANNER of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LX.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 26, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: We have seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Un
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXI.
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 26, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXII.
The Senate For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: Having examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate;
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIII.
The Senate Continued For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON OR MADISON To the People of the State of New York: A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the wo
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIV.
The Powers of the Senate From the New York Packet. Friday, March 7, 1788. JAY To the People of the State of New York: It is a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unex
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXV.
The Powers of the Senate Continued From the New York Packet. Friday, March 7, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to i
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVI.
Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 11, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: A review of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard to this matter. The FIRST of these objections is, that the provision in question confound
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVII.
The Executive Department From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 11, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The constitution of the executive department of the proposed government, claims next our attention. There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with less candor or criticised with less judgment. Here the writers against the Cons
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVIII.
The Mode of Electing the President From the New York Packet. Friday, March 14, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIX.
The Real Character of the Executive From the New York Packet. Friday, March 14, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: I proceed now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it. The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a si
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXX.
(There are two slightly different versions of No. 70 included here.) The Executive Department Further Considered From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 18, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never a
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXX.
The Executive Department Further Considered From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 18, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation o
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXI.
The Duration in Office of the Executive From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 18, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: Duration in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the executive magistrate, in the employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXII.
The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered From the New York Packet. Friday, March 21, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise signification. It is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department.
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXIII.
The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power From the New York Packet. Friday, March 21, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that, without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXIV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXIV.
The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 25, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The President of the United States is to be “commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States WHEN CALLED INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE of the United States.” The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXV.
The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive For the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The President is to have power, “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur.” Though this provision has been assailed, on different grounds, with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my firm persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the plan. One
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXVI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXVI.
The Appointing Power of the Executive From the New York Packet. Tuesday, April 1, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The President is “to NOMINATE, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officer
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXVII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXVII.
The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered From the New York Packet. Friday, April 4, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXVIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXVIII.
The Judiciary Department From McLEAN’S Edition, New York. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: We proceed now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government. In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXIX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXIX.
The Judiciary Continued From MCLEAN’s Edition, New York. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature, A POWER OVER A MAN’s SUBSISTENCE AMOUNTS TO A POWER OVER HIS WILL. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXX.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXX.
The Powers of the Judiciary From McLEAN’s Edition, New York. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: To judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper objects. It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judicary authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXI.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXI.
The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority From McLEAN’s Edition, New York. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: Let us now return to the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other, “The judicial power of the United States is” (by the plan of the convention) “to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.” [1] That there ough
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXII.
The Judiciary Continued From McLEAN’s Edition, New York. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. ’T is time only that can mature and perfect so compound a syste
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXIII.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXIII.
The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury From MCLEAN’s Edition, New York. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is THAT RELATIVE TO THE WANT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION for the trial by jury in civil cases. The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated has been repeatedly adverted to and exposed, but continues to be pur
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXIV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXIV.
Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered From McLEAN’s Edition, New York. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: In the course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed; but
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THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXV.
THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXXV.
Concluding Remarks From MCLEAN’s Edition, New York. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: According to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points: “the analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution,” and “the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property.” But these heads have been so fully anticipated and ex
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