John Bell Hood....

I received at the age of Seventeen an appointment as Cadet at West Point through my maternal uncle, Judge French, who was then in Congress. I fancied a military life, although it was not my father's choice. He occupied a high position in the medical world, and preferred I should adopt his profession; he offered me every inducement-even the privilege of completing my studies in Europe. I, nevertheless, adhered to my decision. Doubtless I had inherited this predilection from my grandfathers, who w

After the battle of Seven Pines, General R. E. Lee was assigned to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia. He immediately commenced to form plans by which to free the Confederate Capital from the proximity of the enemy. His First move was to send General Whiting's Division to Staunton, as a ruse, to join General Jackson; to order the latter then to march toward Richmond, or down the north side of the Chickahominy, upon the right flank of McClellan; and, when Jackson was sufficiently near t

The latter part of October McClellan's movements determined General Lee to withdraw from the Valley of the Shenandoah, leaving his cavalry in rear, and to return to the Valley of the Rappahannock. Accordingly, my division took its place, about the 26th, in the marching columns of Longstreet's Corps, which moved in the direction of the latter point. During the previous month of quiet and rest, the troops had received a supply of shoes and clothing, and had improved in drill and discipline. This s

I very much regret I should find it incumbent upon me to discuss, at this hour, certain operations in the West; but most unjust strictures, passed upon me by General Johnston, and which are derogatory to my character, alike as a man and a soldier, compel me to speak in self-defence, or otherwise admit by silence the charges brought forth. Although I feel by reason of injustice done me in the past that I have good cause to demand of our people the privilege of a hearing upon certain matters littl

Before I relate the embarrassing circumstances under which I assumed command of the Army of Tennessee, I shall state certain facts connected with my transfer from the Virginia to the Western Army early in February, 1864, and reply to statements of General Johnston, in reference to operations near Resaca, Cassville, and New Hope Church. The War Department had been anxious that an offensive campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky be initiated in the early Spring of 1864, and made a proposition to Gen

When the preceding chapter was written, setting forth my most positive denial of General Johnston's statements in regard to that which he avers to have been said by General Polk and myself, at Polk's headquarters, during this important council; and when I charged General Johnston with the suppression of the most important part of the recommendations made to him by each of us, I was under the impression that only Johnston, Polk and I were present in the room during the discussion. Fortunately, ho

General Johnston, touching the operations of his Army near New Hope Church says : Johnston's Narrative, pages 328, 329, 330. We found, next morning, that the Federal line extended much further to our right than it had done the day before. Polk's Corps was transferred to the right of Hood's. * * * The Federal troops extended their entrenched lines so rapidly to their left, that it was found necessary in the morning of the 27th to transfer Cleburne's Division of Hardee's Corps to our right, where

General Johnston makes the following arraignment : Johnston's Narrative, Page 365. General Hood asserts in his published report, that the Army had become demoralized when he was appointed to command it, and ascribes his invariable defeats partly to that cause. The allegation is disproved by the record of the admirable conduct of those troops on every occasion in which that General sent them to battle— and inevitable disaster. Their courage and discipline were unsubdued by the slaughter to which

After General Johnston's abandonment of the mountains of Georgia, his inconsistency in maintaining that Atlanta was a position “Too strong to be carried by assault,” must indeed strike with surprise not only military men, but civilians of intelligence. From the earliest periods of history mountain fastnesses have proved, by actual test, the most secure strongholds to every people determined upon obstinate resistance. General Lee asserted shortly before the close of the war that he could continue

Notwithstanding the manifold difficulties and trials which beset me at the period I was ordered to relieve General Johnston, and which, because of unbroken silence on my part, have been the occasion of much injustice manifested in my regard, I formed no intention, till the appearance of General Sherman's Memoirs, to enter fully into the details of the siege of Atlanta, the campaign to the Alabama line, and that which followed into Tennessee. A feeling of reluctance to cause heart-burnings within

The failure on the 20th, rendered urgent the most active measures, in order to save Atlanta even for a short period. Through the vigilance of General Wheeler, I received information, during the night of the 20th, of the exposed position of McPherson's left flank; it was standing out in air, near the Georgia Railroad between Decatur and Atlanta, and a large number of the enemy's wagons had been parked in and around Decatur. The roads were in good condition, and ran in the direction to enable a la

In accordance with the valuable diary of Brigadier General Shoupe, I find naught to record after the battle of the 22d beyond the usual shelling by the enemy, till the 26th of July when the Federals were reported to be moving to our left. This movement continued during the 27th, when I received the additional information that their cavalry was turning our right, in the direction of Flat-rock, with the intention, as I supposed, of interrupting our main line of communication, the Macon Railroad. W

Having stated that our position at Atlanta was untenable, I shall now undertake to give proof of the correctness of my opinion, by demonstrating in what manner Sherman might have captured the city in less than One-Third of the time he actually devoted to that end, notwithstanding the idle assertion of General Johnston that he could have held Atlanta “Forever” ; also to demonstrate that had I ventured to remain longer than Fifteen days within the trenches around the city, Sherman could have final

About the time I exchanged with General Sherman the Two thousand (2000) prisoners above mentioned, the following correspondence passed between us, in relation to his treatment of the non-combatants of Atlanta: General:— I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who prefer it to go South, and the rest North. For the latter I can provide food and transportation to points of their election in Tennessee, Kentucky, or further

After the fall of Atlanta, this most serious question presented itself for solution: in what manner, and accompanied with the least detriment, to effect the riddance of a victorious foe, who had gained possession of the mountains in our front, and planted his standard in the heart of the Confederacy. In order to compass this end, either the Federals should be forced back by manoeuvres into the mountains, there defeated in battle, and finally driven northward; or an attempt be made to defeat them

General Beauregard's approval of a forward movement into Tennessee was soon made known to the Army. The prospect of again entering that State created great enthusiasm, and from the different encampments arose at intervals that genuine Confederate shout so familiar to every Southern soldier, and which then betokened an improved state of feeling among the troops. With Twenty days rations in the haversacks and wagons, we marched, on the 22d of October, upon all the roads leading from Gadsden in the

At early dawn the troops were put in motion in the direction of Franklin, marching as rapidly as possible to over-take the enemy before he crossed the Big Harpeth, Eighteen miles from Spring Hill. Lieutenant General Lee had crossed Duck river after dark the night previous, and, in order to reach Franklin, was obliged to march a distance of Thirty miles. The head of his column arrived at Spring Hill at 9 a. m. on the 30th, and, after a short rest, followed in the wake of the main body. A sudden c

Before closing these pages, I request the privilege of correcting a false impression which has gained ground in my regard, and which is, I may say, the outcome of inimical statements of certain writers who have followed in the wake of Pollard and Johnston. General Sherman gives color to their charge of rashness as a commander, in the following passage: I did not suppose that General Hood, though rash, would venture to attack fortified places like Allatoona, Resaca, Decatur and Nashville; but he

General:— I have the honor to submit the following Report of the operations of the Army of Tennessee, while commanded by me, from July 18th, 1864, to January 23d, 1865. The results of a campaign do not always show how the General in command has discharged his duty. Their enquiry should be not what he has done, but what he should have accomplished with the means under his control. To appreciate the operations of the Army of Tennessee, it is necessary to look at its history during the Three months