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22 chapters
KANT’S CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT
KANT’S CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT
MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd . TORONTO KANT’S CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY J. H. BERNARD, D.D., D.C.L. BISHOP OF OSSORY SOMETIME FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, AND ARCHBISHOP KING’S PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN SECOND EDITION, REVISED MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON 1914 COPYRIGHT Fi
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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
There are not wanting indications that public interest in the Critical Philosophy has been quickened of recent days in these countries, as well as in America. To lighten the toil of penetrating through the wilderness of Kant’s long sentences, the English student has now many aids, which those who began their studies fifteen or twenty years ago did not enjoy. Translations, paraphrases, criticisms, have been published in considerable numbers; so that if it is not yet true that “he who runs may rea
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PREFACE
PREFACE
We may call the faculty of cognition from principles a priori , pure Reason , and the inquiry into its possibility and bounds generally the Critique of pure Reason, although by this faculty we only understand Reason in its theoretical employment, as it appears under that name in the former work; without wishing to inquire into its faculty, as practical Reason, according to its special principles. That [Critique] goes merely into our faculty of knowing things a priori , and busies itself therefor
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I. OF THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
I. OF THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
We proceed quite correctly if, as usual, we divide Philosophy, as containing the principles of the rational cognition of things by means of concepts (not merely, as logic does, principles of the form of thought in general without distinction of Objects), into theoretical and practical . But then the concepts, which furnish their Object to the principles of this rational cognition, must be specifically distinct; otherwise they would not justify a division, which always presupposes a contrast betw
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II. OF THE REALM OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL
II. OF THE REALM OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL
So far as our concepts have a priori application, so far extends the use of our cognitive faculty according to principles, and with it Philosophy. But the complex of all objects, to which those concepts are referred, in order to bring about a knowledge of them where it is possible, may be subdivided according to the adequacy or inadequacy of our [cognitive] faculty to this design. Concepts, so far as they are referred to objects, independently of the possibility or impossibility of the cognition
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III. OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT AS A MEANS OF COMBINING THE TWO PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO A WHOLE.
III. OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT AS A MEANS OF COMBINING THE TWO PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO A WHOLE.
The Critique of the cognitive faculties, as regards what they can furnish a priori , has properly speaking no realm in respect of Objects, because it is not a doctrine, but only has to investigate whether and how, in accordance with the state of these faculties, a doctrine is possible by their means. Its field extends to all their pretensions, in order to confine them within their legitimate bounds. But what cannot enter into the division of Philosophy may yet enter, as a chief part, into the Cr
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IV. OF JUDGEMENT AS A FACULTY LEGISLATING A PRIORI
IV. OF JUDGEMENT AS A FACULTY LEGISLATING A PRIORI
Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the Universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) be given, the Judgement which subsumes the particular under it (even if, as transcendental Judgement, it furnishes a priori , the conditions in conformity with which subsumption under that universal is alone possible) is determinant . But if only the particular be given for which the universal has to be found, the Judgement is merely reflective . Th
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V. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE IS A TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDGEMENT.
V. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE IS A TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDGEMENT.
A transcendental principle is one by means of which is represented, a priori , the universal condition under which alone things can be in general Objects of our cognition. On the other hand, a principle is called metaphysical if it represents the a priori condition under which alone Objects, whose concept must be empirically given, can be further determined a priori . Thus the principle of the cognition of bodies as substances, and as changeable substances, is transcendental, if thereby it is as
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VI. OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FEELING OF PLEASURE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.
VI. OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FEELING OF PLEASURE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.
The thought harmony of nature in the variety of its particular laws with our need of finding universality of principles for it, must be judged as contingent in respect of our insight, but yet at the same time as indispensable for the needs of our Understanding, and consequently as a purposiveness by which nature is harmonised with our design, which, however, has only knowledge for its aim. The universal laws of the Understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are just as necessary (
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VII. OF THE AESTHETICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.
VII. OF THE AESTHETICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.
That which in the representation of an Object is merely subjective, i.e. which decides its reference to the subject, not to the object, is its aesthetical character; but that which serves or can be used for the determination of the object (for cognition), is its logical validity. In the cognition of an object of sense both references present themselves. In the sense-representation of external things the quality of space wherein we intuite them is the merely subjective [element] of my representat
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VIII. OF THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE
VIII. OF THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE
Purposiveness may be represented in an object given in experience on a merely subjective ground, as the harmony of its form,—in the apprehension ( apprehensio ) of it prior to any concept,—with the cognitive faculties, in order to unite the intuition with concepts for a cognition generally. Or it may be represented objectively as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself, according to a concept of it which precedes and contains the ground of this form. We hav
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IX. OF THE CONNEXION OF THE LEGISLATION OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THAT OF REASON BY MEANS OF THE JUDGEMENT
IX. OF THE CONNEXION OF THE LEGISLATION OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THAT OF REASON BY MEANS OF THE JUDGEMENT
The Understanding legislates a priori for nature as an Object of sense—for a theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience. Reason legislates a priori for freedom and its peculiar casuality; as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned practical knowledge. The realm of the natural concept under the one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely removed from all mutual influence which they might have on one another (each according to its fundam
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FIRST DIVISION ANALYTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
FIRST DIVISION ANALYTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
In order to decide whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the representation, not by the Understanding to the Object for cognition but, by the Imagination (perhaps in conjunction with the Understanding) to the subject, and its feeling of pleasure or pain. The judgement of taste is therefore not a judgement of cognition, and is consequently not logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that whose determining ground can be no other than subjective . Every reference of representations
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A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime
A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime
We call that sublime which is absolutely great . But to be great, and to be a great something are quite different concepts ( magnitudo and quantitas ). In like manner to say simply ( simpliciter ) that anything is great is quite different from saying that it is absolutely great ( absolute, non comparative magnum ). The latter is what is great beyond all comparison .—What now is meant by the expression that anything is great or small or of medium size? It is not a pure concept of Understanding th
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B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature
B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature
Might is that which is superior to great hindrances. It is called dominion if it is superior to the resistance of that which itself possesses might. Nature considered in an aesthetical judgement as might that has no dominion over us, is dynamically sublime . If nature is to be judged by us as dynamically sublime, it must be represented as exciting fear (although it is not true conversely that every object which excites fear is regarded in our aesthetical judgement as sublime). For in aesthetical
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GENERAL REMARK UPON THE EXPOSITION OF THE AESTHETICAL REFLECTIVE JUDGEMENT
GENERAL REMARK UPON THE EXPOSITION OF THE AESTHETICAL REFLECTIVE JUDGEMENT
In reference to the feeling of pleasure an object is to be classified as either pleasant , or beautiful , or sublime , or good (absolutely), ( jucundum , pulchrum , sublime , honestum ). The pleasant , as motive of desire, is always of one and the same kind, no matter whence it comes and however specifically different the representation (of sense, and sensation objectively considered) may be. Hence in judging its influence on the mind, account is taken only of the number of its charms (simultane
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DEDUCTION OF [PURE64] AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENTS
DEDUCTION OF [PURE64] AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENTS
The claim of an aesthetical judgement to universal validity for every subject requires, as a judgement resting on some a priori principle, a Deduction (or legitimatising of its pretensions) in addition to its Exposition; if it is concerned with satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the form of the Object . Of this kind are judgements of taste about the Beautiful in Nature. For in that case the purposiveness has its ground in the Object and in its figure, although it does not indicate the reference
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SECOND DIVISION DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
SECOND DIVISION DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
A faculty of Judgement that is to be dialectical must in the first place be rationalising, i.e. its judgements must claim universality 99 and that a priori ; for it is in the opposition of such judgements that Dialectic consists. Hence the incompatibility of aesthetical judgements of Sense (about the pleasant and the unpleasant) is not dialectical. And again, the conflict between judgements of Taste, so far as each man depends merely on his own taste, forms no Dialectic of taste; because no one
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FIRST DIVISION ANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT
FIRST DIVISION ANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT
All geometrical figures drawn on a principle display a manifold, oft admired, objective purposiveness; i.e. in reference to their usefulness for the solution of several problems by a single principle, or of the same problem in an infinite variety of ways. The purposiveness is here obviously objective and intellectual, not merely subjective and aesthetical. For it expresses the suitability of the figure for the production of many intended figures, and is cognised through Reason. But this purposiv
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SECOND DIVISION DIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT
SECOND DIVISION DIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT
The determinant Judgement has for itself no principles which are the foundation of concepts of Objects . It has no autonomy, for it subsumes only under given laws or concepts as principles. Hence it is exposed to no danger of an antinomy of its own or to a conflict of its principles. So [we saw that] the transcendental Judgement which contains the conditions of subsuming under categories was for itself not nomothetic , but that it only indicated the conditions of sensuous intuition, under which
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METHDOLOGY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT.
METHDOLOGY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT.
Every science must have its definite position in the encyclopaedia of all the sciences. If it is a philosophical science its position must be either in the theoretical or practical part. If again it has its place in the former of these, it must be either in the doctrine of nature, so far as it concerns that which can be an object of experience (in the doctrine of bodies, the doctrine of the soul, or the universal science of the world), or in the doctrine of God (the original ground of the world
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WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY
WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY
By IMMANUEL KANT KANT’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR ENGLISH READERS. By J. P. Mahaffy , D.D., and The Right Rev. J. H. Bernard , D.D. Two vols. Crown 8vo. Vol. I. The Kritik of the Pure Reason Explained And Defended. 7s. 6d. Vol. II. Prolegomena. Translated, with Notes and Appendices. 6s. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. Translated by F. Max Müller . Second Edition, Revised. Extra Crown 8vo. 15s. net. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. Translated by F. Max Müller . Vol. 1. Containing Translator’s Preface; Historical
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