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THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE
THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE
BY L. LÉVY-BRUHL Maître de Conférences de Philosophie à la Faculté des Lettres de l’Université de Paris, Professeur à l’Ecole libre des Sciences politiques . AUTHORISED TRANSLATION TO WHICH IS PREFIXED AN INTRODUCTION BY FREDERIC HARRISON, M.A. Honorary Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford London SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. Lim. Paternoster Square 1903...
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NOTE
NOTE
BY MR. FREDERIC HARRISON The publication in 1900 of Professor Lévy-Bruhl’s volume The Philosophy of Auguste Comte was an event in the history of the Positive movement. The eminent position in the University of Paris and in recent philosophical history that is held by Prof. Lévy-Bruhl gave great interest and importance to a systematic judgment from his pen such as the present work. The commemorative festival of Comte held this year, when the statue in the Place de la Sorbonne was unveiled by the
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TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
Fifty years have now elapsed since Auguste Comte’s monumental work, the Cours de Philosophie Positive , was first introduced to English readers by Miss Harriet Martineau. But her work was much more than a translation. It was a condensed exposition of Comte’s doctrines, done with such mastery that it obtained the emphatic approval of Comte himself who, in such matters, was not very easily satisfied. In Harriet Martineau’s case, both the substance of the book and the English form in which it was o
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INTRODUCTION.
INTRODUCTION.
Every new system of philosophy, however original in appearance, is more or less directly related to the doctrines which have preceded it. But it is also connected with more general conditions in a manner no less close, if not so immediately obvious. It depends upon a whole set of social conditions. The influence of the religious, political, economical, intellectual phenomena, in a word of the contemporary milieu upon this system is as indisputable as its own influence upon the milieu . It is the
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CHAPTER I THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM
CHAPTER I THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM
According to Comte, philosophy is destined to serve as a basis for morality, for politics and for religion. It is not an end in itself but a means to reach an end not otherwise attainable. Had Comte thought it possible to reorganise society without first reorganising morals, and to reorganise morals without first reorganising beliefs, he would not perhaps have written the six volumes of the “Cours de Philosophie positive” which occupied him from 1830 to 1842. He would have gone straight to what
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CHAPTER II THE LAW OF THE THREE STATES
CHAPTER II THE LAW OF THE THREE STATES
In Comte’s system the constitution of sociology may be considered at the same time as a terminus and as a starting point. One sees the positive method attaining with it to the order of the highest, the most “noble,” the most complicated phenomena: in this sense sociology is the term reached by the positive spirit in its ascent. It thus reaches the summit of the hierarchy of the sciences, and henceforth rules over them all. On the other hand, positive philosophy, possible from this moment, will m
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CHAPTER III THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES
CHAPTER III THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES
According to the law of the three States, all our conceptions in the different orders of knowledge, begin by being theological, pass through the metaphysical transition, and end by becoming positive. If this evolution were terminated at the presented time, the philosophy which Comte wishes to found would be ipso facto established. But we are far from such a state of things. On the contrary, the three modes of thought theological, metaphysical, and positive, coexist, still to-day, even in the mos
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CHAPTER IV SCIENCE
CHAPTER IV SCIENCE
We may admit, with Aristotle, that curiosity is natural to man, and that we are inclined to inquire into things for the pleasure of knowing them. But it must be admitted, adds Comte, that this inclination is one of the least active and the least imperative in our nature. It must have been still less so in the beginning of mankind’s development; and it was, in any case, much weaker than the inclination to laziness, or than the repugnance to accept anything new. It has therefore been necessary, in
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CHAPTER V SCIENCE (CONTINUED) PHENOMENA AND LAWS
CHAPTER V SCIENCE (CONTINUED) PHENOMENA AND LAWS
The perfection of the positive system, towards which it unceasingly tends, although very probably it may never reach it, would be to represent all observable phenomena as particular cases of a single general fact, such as, for example, that of gravitation. The fundamental identity of phenomena, the reduction of particular laws to a supreme law; this is an ideal which we are free to entertain. Comte, after d’Alembert and Saint-Simon, has formulated it himself at the beginning of the Cours de phil
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CHAPTER VI SCIENCE (CONTINUED)—POSITIVE LOGIC
CHAPTER VI SCIENCE (CONTINUED)—POSITIVE LOGIC
Logic, says Comte, almost in the terms of Descartes, is the sole portion of ancient philosophy which is capable of still presenting some appearance of utility. 83 And does even this appearance correspond to a very solid reality? If we distinguish, according to custom, formal logic from applied logic, Comte in his system will find no place for the former, which establishes a priori the principles and the mechanism of reasoning. As to the principles, which are the laws of the understanding, positi
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The Philosophy of the Sciences is one of the leading parts of Comte’s work. No other brings out more clearly the essential differences which distinguish his doctrine from previous systems. In Comte’s eyes the philosophy of the sciences is inseparable from the philosophy of history and from the theory of progress. For the sciences are great sociological facts and, as such, are subject, in their evolution, to invariable laws. The method of the philosophy of the sciences could therefore only be the
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CHAPTER I MATHEMATICS
CHAPTER I MATHEMATICS
In the eyes of philosophers, mathematics has always occupied a privileged place among the sciences. Plato located their object in an intermediate region between the world of sensible phenomena and that of intelligible realities. On the one hand mathematical objects, and in particular the geometrical figures, appeal to the imagination as sensible things; on the other hand, mathematical truths like ideas and the relations between ideas, are characterised by immutable and eternal fixity. This is wh
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CHAPTER II ASTRONOMY
CHAPTER II ASTRONOMY
The object of astronomy is the discovery of the laws of the geometrical and mechanical phenomena presented by the celestial bodies; and, by the knowledge of these laws to obtain the precise and rational prevision of the state of our system at any given period whatever. It is in a word, “the application of mathematics to celestial phenomena.” 116 Mr. H. Spencer has taken occasion of this definition to criticise the place assigned by Comte to astronomy in his classification of the sciences. He mak
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CHAPTER III. THE SCIENCES OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
CHAPTER III. THE SCIENCES OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
If we do not separate chemistry from physics, their common object is the knowledge of the laws of the inorganic world. In this way they are clearly distinguished on one hand from astronomy which we may consider as an “emanation from mathematical science,” and on the other hand from biology. The distinction between physics and chemistry presents a greater difficulty. Nevertheless this distinction must be maintained, since the physical phenomena are more “general,” and the chemical phenomena more
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CHAPTER IV BIOLOGY
CHAPTER IV BIOLOGY
The passage from the inorganic world to the world of Life constitutes a critical step in natural philosophy. Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry represented successive steps in the same series. If each order of phenomena presented in itself something which was irreducible to previous orders, nevertheless all these phenomena, in a certain sense, remained homogeneous. Without rashness, Descartes could conceive that physics, like astronomy, would one day assume the mathematical form. And to-day more
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CHAPTER V PSYCHOLOGY
CHAPTER V PSYCHOLOGY
Psychology has no place in the classification of the fundamental sciences. In it Sociology immediately succeeds Biology. Use has been made of this fact in order to reproach Comte with having neglected an order of most important phenomena. A grave objection has been raised against his doctrine in general. What are we to think of a philosophy which, deliberately, omits a part, and, according to many philosophers, the chief part of reality, the world of consciousness, the spiritual nature of man? P
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CHAPTER I THE TRANSITION FROM ANIMALITY TO HUMANITY. ART AND LANGUAGE
CHAPTER I THE TRANSITION FROM ANIMALITY TO HUMANITY. ART AND LANGUAGE
Of the philosophers who flourished before the rise of the positive doctrine, the greater number assumed as a postulate in the comparative study of man and animals, that there was between them a difference of nature, and not merely one of degree. Whatever fundamental difference be attributed to reason, language, moral sense, religion, etc., the “human kingdom” is conceived for the most part as superior to the animal kingdom and as clearly separated from it. Taking their stand upon an analysis of
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CHAPTER II GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON SOCIAL SCIENCE
CHAPTER II GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON SOCIAL SCIENCE
Social science had at first been called social physics by Comte. Later on he invented the name of “sociology” 228 for it. It stands at the summit of the encyclopædic ladder of the sciences. Accordingly, it offers certain characteristics which the other sciences do not present. Undoubtedly, by the definition of its object and by its method, it is perfectly homogeneous with the rest of positive knowledge. Sociology studies the laws of social phenomena as mathematics inquires into the laws of geome
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CHAPTER III SOCIAL STATICS
CHAPTER III SOCIAL STATICS
As biology distinguishes the anatomical point of view, “relating to the ideas of organisation,” and the physiological point of view, “relating to the ideas of life,” so sociology separates the study of the conditions of existence of a society (social statics), and that of the laws of its movements (social dynamics). This distinction has the advantage of corresponding exactly to that of order and progress, from the practical point of view, while it is closely allied to the encyclopædic law called
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CHAPTER IV SOCIAL DYNAMICS
CHAPTER IV SOCIAL DYNAMICS
For Comte, social dynamics is the chief part of sociology. He tells us that it occupied his attention “in a preponderating and even almost exclusive manner.” 259 This preference is easily explained. In the first place the idea which best distinguishes sociology from biology, the idea of the gradual development of humanity belongs to social dynamics. Then, the method which particularly belongs to sociology, the historical method, applies especially to dynamics. Finally, the very conception of a s
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CHAPTER V THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
CHAPTER V THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
If social dynamics is a science, and if the law of the three states, discovered by Comte, is its fundamental law, this law (and those which proceed from it), must explain the successive phases of humanity, from the first dawn of civilisation, to the present condition of the most advanced nations. They must “introduce unity and continuity into this immense spectacle, where in general we see so much confusion and incoherence.” 286 Thus the counterpart of social science is a philosophy of history.
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CHAPTER I THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS
CHAPTER I THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS
In Comte’s system Ethics occupies an intermediate place between theoretical philosophy and politics. Ethics rests upon the philosophy as Politics rests on the principles of Ethics. Ethics is not an abstract speculative science; it does not therefore belong to the hierarchy of the fundamental sciences. It is true that, at the end of his life, Comte added a seventh to the six sciences of the early list, 322 which precisely was ethics, that is to say the science of the laws which govern the emotion
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CHAPTER II SOCIAL ETHICS
CHAPTER II SOCIAL ETHICS
“Live for others”: such is the supreme formula of positive ethics. Feeling bears witness to its justice; science discloses its far-reaching importance and its deep consequences. But this formula is not only applied in a general way to the natural society formed by men among themselves, a society in which Comte even includes animals capable of affection and of devotion, whose services deserve our gratitude. The moral law finds a precise application in the definite relations established among men
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CHAPTER III THE IDEA OF HUMANITY
CHAPTER III THE IDEA OF HUMANITY
In this world there is nothing absolute, everything is relative; Comte wrote this to his friend Valat as early as 1818. 354 But as a matter of fact, there exists a supreme reality to which all others are subordinated, the idea of which is the principle of a rational conception of the world. Comte calls this reality humanity . Instead of being the ultimate end of all thought and all action “in itself,” it is the ultimate end “for us.” But this difference simply signifies that the new philosophy l
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II.
II.
The position taken by Comte may be briefly defined in a few words. Seeing that philosophy, such at least as it had been conceived until the XIX. century, could not assume the characteristics of science, he asks himself whether one would not succeed better by endeavouring to give the characteristics of science to philosophy. Like Kant, he might have compared the revolution he was attempting to that accomplished by Copernicus in astronomy, had he not preferred to present it as prepared and gradual
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III.
III.
Every new philosophical doctrine is in general guided by a double tendency. At the same time it seeks to establish its originality and to find out its antecedents. In order to reach the former result, it criticises preceding and contemporary doctrines, and shows that, better than any of the others, it succeeds in “summing up experience.” But, at the same time, it discovers a pedigree for itself in history which is never very difficult to establish. Like the others, positive philosophy fulfils th
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IV.
IV.
If the relationship between Comte’s philosophy and the doctrines which preceded it is sufficiently evident, it does not follow that this philosophy has brought with it nothing new. On the contrary, the “transposition” of problems and the constant effort to substitute the relative to the absolute point of view, entails serious consequences with very far reaching effects. Some of these were at once apparent, and first served to characterise positive philosophy in the eyes of the public. Others, mo
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