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IN FOUR BOOKS
IN FOUR BOOKS
Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere. —Cic. De Natur. Deor. 1. i. LONDON: Printed by Eliz. Holt, for Thomas Basset, at the George in Fleet Street, near St. Dunstan’s Church....
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MY LORD,
MY LORD,
This Treatise, which is grown up under your lordship’s eye, and has ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your lordship for that protection which you several years since promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great soever, set at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader’s fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired for
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MY LORD,
MY LORD,
Your Lordship’s most humble and most obedient servant,...
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READER,
READER,
I have put into thy hands what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy hours. If it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much pleasure in reading as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy money, as I do my pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this for a commendation of my work; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at larks and sparrows has no less sp
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INTRODUCTION.
INTRODUCTION.
1. An Inquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful. Since it is the UNDERSTANDING that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires and art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. But whate
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CHAPTER I.—NO INNATE SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES.
CHAPTER I.—NO INNATE SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES.
1. The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain INNATE PRINCIPLES; some primary notions, KOIVAI EVVOIAI, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shal
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CHAPTER II.—NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER II.—NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES
1. No moral Principles so clear and so generally received as the forementioned speculative Maxims. If those speculative Maxims, whereof we discoursed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible concerning PRACTICAL Principles, that they come short of an universal reception: and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, “What is, is”; or to be so man
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CHAPTER III.—OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL.
CHAPTER III.—OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL.
1. Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross, but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate. Since, if the IDEAS which made up those truths were not, it was impossible that the PROPOSITIONS made up of them should be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For, if the ideas be
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CHAPTER I.—OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL.
CHAPTER I.—OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL.
1. Idea is the Object of Thinking. Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the IDEAS that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas,—such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, HOW HE COMES BY THEM? I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native id
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CHAPTER II.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS.
CHAPTER II.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS.
1. Uncompounded Appearances. The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them, are SIMPLE and some COMPLEX. Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple; and unmixed. For, though the sight
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CHAPTER III.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSE.
CHAPTER III.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSE.
1. Division of simple ideas. The better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us. FIRST, then, There are some which come into our minds BY ONE SENSE ONLY. SECONDLY, There are others that convey themselves into the mind BY MORE SENSES THAN ONE. THIRDLY, Others that are had from REFLECTION ONLY. FOURTHLY, There are some that
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CHAPTER IV.—IDEA OF SOLIDITY.
CHAPTER IV.—IDEA OF SOLIDITY.
1. We receive this Idea from Touch. The idea of SOLIDITY we receive by our touch: and it arises from the resistance which we find in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no idea which we receive more constantly from sensation than solidity. Whether we move or rest, in what posture soever we are, we always feel something under us that supports us, and hinders our further sinking downwards; and the bodies which we daily handle make us pe
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CHAPTER V.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF DIVERS SENSES.
CHAPTER V.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF DIVERS SENSES.
Ideas received both by seeing and touching. The ideas we get by more than one sense are, of SPACE or EXTENSION, FIGURE, REST, and MOTION. For these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch; and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them....
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CHAPTER VI.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION.
CHAPTER VI.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION.
Simple Ideas are the Operations of Mind about its other Ideas. The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things. The Idea of Perception, and Idea of Willing, we have from Reflection. The two great and principal actions of the mind, w
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CHAPTER VII.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF BOTH SENSATION AND REFLECTION.
CHAPTER VII.—OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF BOTH SENSATION AND REFLECTION.
1. Ideas of Pleasure and Pain. There be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz. PLEASURE or DELIGHT, and its opposite, PAIN, or UNEASINESS; POWER; EXISTENCE; UNITY mix with almost all our other Ideas. 2. Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation and reflection: and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is
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CHAPTER VIII.—SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION.
CHAPTER VIII.—SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION.
1. Positive Ideas from privative causes. Concerning the simple ideas of Sensation; it is to be considered,—that whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea; which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding, as much a
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CHAPTER IX.—OF PERCEPTION.
CHAPTER IX.—OF PERCEPTION.
1. Perception the first simple Idea of Reflection. PERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection, and is by some called thinking in general. Though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with some degree of voluntary attention, considers anything. For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for t
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CHAPTER X.—OF RETENTION.
CHAPTER X.—OF RETENTION.
1. Contemplation The next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call RETENTION; or the keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways. First, by keeping the idea which is brought into it, for some time actually in view, which is called CONTEMPLATION. 2. Memory. The other way of retention is, the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, o
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CHAPTER XI.—OF DISCERNING, AND OTHER OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.
CHAPTER XI.—OF DISCERNING, AND OTHER OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.
1. No Knowledge without Discernment. Another faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that of DISCERNING and DISTINGUISHING between the several ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general. Unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge, though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this fac
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CHAPTER XII.—OF COMPLEX IDEAS.
CHAPTER XII.—OF COMPLEX IDEAS.
1. Made by the Mind out of simple Ones. We have hitherto considered those ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only passive, which are those simple ones received from sensation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea; and that not only as t
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CHAPTER XIII.—COMPLEX IDEAS OF SIMPLE MODES:—AND FIRST, OF THE SIMPLE MODES OF IDEA OF SPACE.
CHAPTER XIII.—COMPLEX IDEAS OF SIMPLE MODES:—AND FIRST, OF THE SIMPLE MODES OF IDEA OF SPACE.
1. Simple modes of simple ideas. Though in the foregoing part I have often mentioned simple ideas, which are truly the materials of all our knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration, and examine those different modifications of the SAME idea; which the mind either finds in things existing, or is able to ma
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CHAPTER XIV.—IDEA OF DURATION AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.
CHAPTER XIV.—IDEA OF DURATION AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.
1. Duration is fleeting Extension. There is another sort of distance, or length, the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession. This we call DURATION; the simple modes whereof are any different lengths of it whereof we have distinct ideas, as HOURS, DAYS, YEARS, &c., TIME and ETERNITY. 2. Its Idea from Reflection on the Train of our Ideas. The answer of a great man, to one who asked what time was: Si non
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CHAPTER XV.—IDEAS OF DURATION AND EXPANSION, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.
CHAPTER XV.—IDEAS OF DURATION AND EXPANSION, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.
1. Both capable of greater and less. Though we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration, yet, they being ideas of general concernment, that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its simple abstract conception, to avoid confus
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CHAPTER XVI.—IDEA OF NUMBER.
CHAPTER XVI.—IDEA OF NUMBER.
1. Number the simplest and most universal Idea. Amongst all the ideas we have, as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways, so there is none more simple, than that of UNITY, or one: it has no shadow of variety or composition in it: every object our senses are employed about; every idea in our understandings; every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the most un
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CHAPTER XVII.—OF INFINITY.
CHAPTER XVII.—OF INFINITY.
1. Infinity, in its original Intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number. He that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name of INFINITY, cannot do it better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed; and then how the mind comes to frame it. FINITE and INFINITE seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the MODES OF QUANTITY, and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are c
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CHAPTER XVIII.—OTHER SIMPLE MODES.
CHAPTER XVIII.—OTHER SIMPLE MODES.
1. Other simple Modes of simple Ideas of sensation. Though I have, in the foregoing chapters, shown how from simple ideas taken in by sensation, the mind comes to extend itself even to infinity; which, however it may of all others seem most remote from any sensible perception, yet at last hath nothing in it but what is made out of simple ideas: received into the mind by the senses, and afterwards there put together, by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas; —Though, I say, these might
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CHAPTER XIX.—OF THE MODES OF THINKING.
CHAPTER XIX.—OF THE MODES OF THINKING.
1. Sensation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c., modes of thinking. When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, THINKING is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas. Thus the perception or thought which actually accompanies, and is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the min
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CHAPTER XX.—OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.
CHAPTER XX.—OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.
1. Pleasure and Pain, simple Ideas. AMONGST the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection, PAIN and PLEASURE are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowin
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CHAPTER XXI.—OF POWER.
CHAPTER XXI.—OF POWER.
1. This Idea how got. The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without; and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has so con
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CHAPTER XXII.—OF MIXED MODES.
CHAPTER XXII.—OF MIXED MODES.
1. Mixed Modes, what. Having treated of SIMPLE MODES in the foregoing chapters, and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them, to show what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to consider those we call MIXED MODES; such are the complex ideas we mark by the names OBLIGATION, DRUNKENNESS, a LIE, &c.; which consisting of several combinations of simple ideas of DIFFERENT kinds, I have called mixed modes, to distinguish them from the more sim
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CHAPTER XXIII.—OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
CHAPTER XXIII.—OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward
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CHAPTER XXIV.—OF COLLECTIVE IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
CHAPTER XXIV.—OF COLLECTIVE IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
1. A collective idea is one Idea. Besides these complex ideas of several SINGLE substances, as of man, horse, gold, violet, apple, &c., the mind hath also complex COLLECTIVE ideas of substances; which I so call, because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together, as united into one idea, and which so joined; are looked on as one; v. g. the idea of such a collection of men as make an ARMY, though consisting of a great number of distinct substances, is as much
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CHAPTER XXV.—OF RELATION.
CHAPTER XXV.—OF RELATION.
1. Relation, what. BESIDES the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of anything, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry any idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another,
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CHAPTER XXVI.—OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS.
CHAPTER XXVI.—OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS.
1. Whence the Ideas of cause and effect got. In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of CAUSE and EFFECT. THAT WHICH PRODUCES ANY SIMPLE OR COMPLEX IDEA we denote by the general name, CAUSE, and THAT WHICH IS PRODUCED, EFFECT. Thu
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24.
24.
But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person as a man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both, with a justice suitable to THEIR way of knowledge;—because, in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit: and so the ignora
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CHAPTER XXVIII.—OF OTHER RELATIONS.
CHAPTER XXVIII.—OF OTHER RELATIONS.
1. Ideas of Proportional relations. BESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of time, place, and causality of comparing or referring things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention. First, The first I shall name is some one simple idea, which, being capable of parts or degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple idea, v.g. whiter, sweeter, equal, more, &c. These relations depe
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CHAPTER XXIX.—OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED IDEAS.
CHAPTER XXIX.—OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED IDEAS.
1. Ideas, some clear and distinct, others obscure and confused. Having shown the original of our ideas, and taken a view of their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex; and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes, substances, and relations—all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind, in its apprehension and knowledge of things—it will, perhaps, be thought I h
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CHAPTER XXX.—OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS.
CHAPTER XXX.—OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS.
1. Ideas considered in reference to their Archetypes. Besides what we have already mentioned concerning ideas, other considerations belong to them, in reference to THINGS FROM WHENCE THEY ARE TAKEN, or WHICH THEY MAY BE SUPPOSED TO REPRESENT; and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction, and are:—First, either real or fantastical; Secondly, adequate or inadequate; Thirdly, true or false. First, by REAL IDEAS, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity
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CHAPTER XXXI.—OF ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS.
CHAPTER XXXI.—OF ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS.
1. Adequate Ideas are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes. Of our real ideas, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call ADEQUATE, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from: which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. INADEQUATE IDEAS are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain, 2. Adequate Ideas are such as perfect
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CHAPTER XXXII.—OF TRUE AND FALSE IDEAS.
CHAPTER XXXII.—OF TRUE AND FALSE IDEAS.
1. Truth and Falsehood properly belong to Propositions, not to Ideas. Though truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to PROPOSITIONS: yet IDEAS are oftentimes termed true or false (as what words are there that are not used with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations?) Though I think that when ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that denomination: as we
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AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
[Based on the 2d Edition] CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME...
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CHAPTER I.
CHAPTER I.
1. Man fitted to form articulated Sounds. God, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. Man, therefore, had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and several other birds
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CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER II.
1. Words are sensible Signs, necessary for Communication of Ideas. Man, though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which others as well as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ide
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CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER III.
1. The greatest Part of Words are general terms. All things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so too,—I mean in their signification: but yet we find quite the contrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages are general terms: which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity. 2. That every particular Thing should have a Name for itself is impossible. First,
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CHAPTER IV.
CHAPTER IV.
1. Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar. Though all words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker; yet, upon a nearer survey, we shall find the names of SIMPLE IDEAS, MIXED MODES (under which I comprise RELATIONS too), and NATURAL SUBSTANCES, have each of them something peculiar and different from the other. For example:— 2. First, Names of simple Ideas, and of Substances intimate real Existence. First, the name
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CHAPTER V.
CHAPTER V.
1. Mixed modes stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names. The names of MIXED MODES, being general, they stand, as has been shewed, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The essences of these species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas: but if we take a little nearer survey of them, we s
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CHAPTER VI.
CHAPTER VI.
1. The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts. The common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand for SORTS: which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and signified by one name. I say do or might agree: for though there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of it being abstracted, so that more s
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CHAPTER VII.
CHAPTER VII.
1. Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together. Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the CONNEXION that the mind gives to ideas, or to propositions, one with another. The mind, in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it, but others also, to show or intimate some particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas. This it does several way
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CHAPTER VIII.
CHAPTER VIII.
1. Abstract Terms predicated one on another and why. The ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its ideas, and so they become essences, general essences, whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract idea being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive kno
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CHAPTER IX.
CHAPTER IX.
1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts. From what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use and end: for as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so they are more or less perfect.
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CHAPTER X.
CHAPTER X.
1. Woeful abuse of Words. Besides the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several WILFUL faults and neglects which men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to be. 2. First, Words are often employed without any, or without clear Ideas. FIRST, In this kind the first and most palpable abuse
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CHAPTER XI.
CHAPTER XI.
1. Remedies are worth seeking. The natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen above at large: and speech being the great bond that holds society together, and the common conduit, whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man and one generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious thoughts to consider, what remedies are to be found for the inconveniences above mentioned. 2. Are not easy to find. I am not so vain as to think that any one can preten
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BOOK IV
BOOK IV
Locke's review of the different sorts of ideas, or appearances of what exists, that can be entertained in a human understanding, and of their relations to words, leads, in the Fourth Book, to an investigation of the extent and validity of the Knowledge that our ideas bring within our reach; and into the nature of faith in Probability, by which assent is extended beyond Knowledge, for the conduct of life. He finds (ch. i, ii) that Knowledge is either an intuitive, a demonstrative, or a sensuous p
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CHAPTER I.
CHAPTER I.
1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas only. Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them. 2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas. KNOWLEDGE then seems to me to be nothing but THE PERCEPTION OF THE CONNEXION OF AND AGREEMENT, OR DISAGREEMENT AND REPUGNANCY OF ANY OF OUR IDEAS. In this alone it co
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CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER II.
1. Of the degrees, or differences in clearness, of our Knowledge: I. Intuitive All our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of, it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of
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CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER III.
1. Extent of our Knowledge. Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, That, First, it extends no further than we have Ideas. First, we can have knowledge no further than we have IDEAS. 2. Secondly, It extends no further than we can perceive their Agreement or Disagreement. Secondly, That we can have no knowledge further than we can have PERCEPTION of that agreement or disagreement. Which perception being: 1.
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CHAPTER IV. OF THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
CHAPTER IV. OF THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
1. Objection. 'Knowledge placed in our Ideas may be all unreal or chimerical' I DOUBT not but my reader, by this time, may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a castle in the air; and be ready to say to me:— 'To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but who knows what those ideas may be? Is there anything so extravagant as the imaginations of men's brains? Where is the head that has no c
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CHAPTER V. OF TRUTH IN GENERAL.
CHAPTER V. OF TRUTH IN GENERAL.
1. What Truth is. WHAT is truth? was an inquiry many ages since; and it being that which all mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists; and so acquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind distinguishes it from falsehood. 2. A right joining or separating of signs, i.e. either Ideas or Words. Truth, then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify nothing but THE JOINING OR SEPERAT
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CHAPTER VI. OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.
CHAPTER VI. OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.
1. Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge. THOUGH the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge: yet, through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and
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CHAPTER VII. OF MAXIMS
CHAPTER VII. OF MAXIMS
1. Maxims or Axioms are Self-evident Propositions. THERE are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of MAXIMS and AXIOMS, have passed for principles of science: and because they are SELF-EVIDENT, have been supposed innate, without that anybody (that I know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone; and also to examine how far th
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CHAPTER VIII. OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.
CHAPTER VIII. OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.
1. Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge. WHETHER the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to real knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there ARE universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understanding; bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are— 2. As, First, identical Propositions. First, All purely IDENTICAL PROPOSITIONS. These obviou
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CHAPTER IX. OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.
CHAPTER IX. OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.
1. General Propositions that are certain concern not Existence. HITHERTO we have only considered the essences of things; which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understandings,) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose truth or fal
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CHAPTER X. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.
CHAPTER X. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.
1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God. THOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he has stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry OURSELVES about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great po
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CHAPTER XI.
CHAPTER XI.
1. Knowledge of the existence of other Finite Beings is to be had only by actual Sensation. The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition. The existence of a God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown. The knowledge of the existence of ANY OTHER THING we can have only by SENSATION: for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any IDEA a man hath in his memory; nor of any other existence but that of God with the existence of any particular man: no particular m
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CHAPTER XII. OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER XII. OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
1. Knowledge is not got from Maxims. IT having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters, that MAXIMS were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain PRAECOGNITA, from whence the understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, the beaten road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or more GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, as foundations wher
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CHAPTER XIII.
CHAPTER XIII.
1. Our Knowledge partly necessary partly voluntary. Our knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has so great a conformity with our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all men's knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable; and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have senses cannot choose but
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CHAPTER XIV. OF JUDGMENT.
CHAPTER XIV. OF JUDGMENT.
1. Our Knowledge being short, we want something else. The understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowl
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CHAPTER XV. OF PROBABILITY.
CHAPTER XV. OF PROBABILITY.
1. Probability is the appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs. As DEMONSTRATION is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another; so PROBABILITY is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to
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CHAPTER XVI. OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT.
CHAPTER XVI. OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT.
1. Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability. The grounds of probability we have laid down in the foregoing chapter: as they are the foundations on which our ASSENT is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated: only we are to take notice, that, whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at least, in the fi
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CHAPTER XVII. OF REASON
CHAPTER XVII. OF REASON
1. Various Significations of the word Reason. THE word REASON in the English language has different significations: sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles: sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles: and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from b
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CHAPTER XVIII.
CHAPTER XVIII.
1. Necessary to know their boundaries. It has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon. From th
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CHAPTER XIX. [not in early editions] CHAPTER XX.
CHAPTER XIX. [not in early editions] CHAPTER XX.
1. Causes of Error, or how men come to give assent contrary to probability. KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of visible and certain truth, ERROR is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true. But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded HOW MEN COME TO GIVE THEIR ASSENTS CONTRARY TO PROBA
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CHAPTER XXI.
CHAPTER XXI.
1. Science may be divided into three sorts. All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, FIRST, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation: or, SECONDLY, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness: or, THIRDLY, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated; I think science
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