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A System Of Logic, Ratiocinative And Inductive

John Stuart Mill

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A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE, BEING A CONNECTED VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE, AND THE METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION.

A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE, BEING A CONNECTED VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE, AND THE METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION.

by JOHN STUART MILL. Eighth Edition. New York: Harper &amp; Brothers, Publishers, Franklin Square. 1882. Franklin Square. 1882. This book makes no pretense of giving to the world a new theory of the intellectual operations. Its claim to attention, if it possess any, is grounded on the fact that it is an attempt, not to supersede, but to embody and systematize, the best ideas which have been either promulgated on its subject by speculative writers, or conformed to by accurate thinkers in thei

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Preface To The First Edition.

Preface To The First Edition.

Whatever may be the value of what the author has succeeded in effecting on this branch of his subject, it is a duty to acknowledge that for much of it he has been indebted to several important treatises, partly historical and partly philosophical, on the generalities and processes of physical science, which have been published within the last few years. To these treatises, and to their authors, he has endeavored to do justice in the body of the work. But as with one of these writers, Dr. Whewell

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Preface To The Third And Fourth Editions.

Preface To The Third And Fourth Editions.

In the subsequent editions, the attempt to improve the work by additions and corrections, suggested by criticism or by thought, has been continued. The additions and corrections in the present (eighth) edition, which are not very considerable, are chiefly such as have been suggested by Professor Bain’s “Logic,” a book of great merit and value. Mr. Bain’s view of the science is essentially the same with that taken in the present treatise, the differences of opinion being few and unimportant compa

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Introduction.

Introduction.

Logic, then, comprises the science of reasoning, as well as an art, founded on that science. But the word Reasoning, again, like most other scientific terms in popular use, abounds in ambiguities. In one of its acceptations, it means syllogizing; or the mode of inference which may be called (with sufficient accuracy for the present purpose) concluding from generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to infer any assertion, from assertions already admitted: and in this

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Book I.

Book I.

“La scolastique, qui produisit dans la logique, comme dans la morale, et dans une partie de la métaphysique, une subtilité, une précision d’idées, dont l’habitude inconnue aux anciens, a contribué plus qu’on ne croit au progrès de la bonne philosophie.” — Condorcet , Vie de Turgot . “To the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what precision and analytic subtlety they possess.” — Sir W. Hamilton , Discussions in Philosophy . § 1. It is so much the established practice of w

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Chapter I. Of The Necessity Of Commencing With An Analysis Of Language.

Chapter I. Of The Necessity Of Commencing With An Analysis Of Language.

§ 2. The answer to every question which it is possible to frame, must be contained in a Proposition, or Assertion. Whatever can be an object of belief, or even of disbelief, must, when put into words, assume the form of a proposition. All truth and all error lie in propositions. What, by a convenient misapplication of an abstract term, we call a Truth, means simply a True Proposition; and errors are false propositions. To know the import of all possible propositions would be to know all question

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Chapter II. Of Names.

Chapter II. Of Names.

Are names more properly said to be the names of things, or of our ideas of things? The first is the expression in common use; the last is that of some metaphysicians, who conceived that in adopting it they were introducing a highly important distinction. The eminent thinker, just quoted, seems to countenance the latter opinion. “But seeing,” he continues, “names ordered in speech (as is defined) are signs of our conceptions, it is manifest they are not signs of the things themselves; for that th

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Chapter III. Of The Things Denoted By Names.

Chapter III. Of The Things Denoted By Names.

Οὐσία, Substantia. Ποσὸν, Quantitas. Ποιόν, Qualitas. Πρός τι, Relatio. Ποιεῖν, Actio. Πάσχειν, Passio. Ποῦ, Ubi. Πότε, Quando. Κεῖσθακ, Situs. Ἔχειν, Habitus. The imperfections of this classification are too obvious to require, and its merits are not sufficient to reward, a minute examination. It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the rationale even of those common distin

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Chapter IV. Of Propositions.

Chapter IV. Of Propositions.

It is apt to be supposed that the copula is something more than a mere sign of predication; that it also signifies existence. In the proposition, Socrates is just, it may seem to be implied not only that the quality just can be affirmed of Socrates, but moreover that Socrates is , that is to say, exists. This, however, only shows that there is an ambiguity in the word is ; a word which not only performs the function of the copula in affirmations, but has also a meaning of its own, in virtue of w

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Chapter V. Of The Import Of Propositions.

Chapter V. Of The Import Of Propositions.

The notion that what is of primary importance to the logician in a proposition, is the relation between the two ideas corresponding to the subject and predicate (instead of the relation between the two phenomena which they respectively express), seems to me one of the most fatal errors ever introduced into the philosophy of Logic; and the principal cause why the theory of the science has made such inconsiderable progress during the last two centuries. The treatises on Logic, and on the branches

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Chapter VI. Of Propositions Merely Verbal.

Chapter VI. Of Propositions Merely Verbal.

§ 2. Almost all metaphysicians prior to Locke, as well as many since his time, have made a great mystery of Essential Predication, and of predicates which are said to be of the essence of the subject. The essence of a thing, they said, was that without which the thing could neither be, nor be conceived to be. Thus, rationality was of the essence of man, because without rationality, man could not be conceived to exist. The different attributes which made up the essence of the thing were called it

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Chapter VII. Of The Nature Of Classification, And The Five Predicables.

Chapter VII. Of The Nature Of Classification, And The Five Predicables.

The principles which ought to regulate Classification, as a logical process subservient to the investigation of truth, can not be discussed to any purpose until a much later stage of our inquiry. But, of Classification as resulting from, and implied in, the fact of employing general language, we can not forbear to treat here, without leaving the theory of general names, and of their employment in predication, mutilated and formless. § 2. This portion of the theory of general language is the subj

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Chapter VIII. Of Definition.

Chapter VIII. Of Definition.

In the case of connotative names, the meaning, as has been so often observed, is the connotation; and the definition of a connotative name, is the proposition which declares its connotation. This might be done either directly or indirectly. The direct mode would be by a proposition in this form: “Man” (or whatsoever the word may be) “is a name connoting such and such attributes,” or “is a name which, when predicated of any thing, signifies the possession of such and such attributes by that thing

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Book II.

Book II.

§ 1. In the preceding Book, we have been occupied not with the nature of Proof, but with the nature of Assertion: the import conveyed by a Proposition, whether that Proposition be true or false; not the means by which to discriminate true from false Propositions. The proper subject, however, of Logic is Proof. Before we could understand what Proof is, it was necessary to understand what that is to which proof is applicable; what that is which can be a subject of belief or disbelief, of affirmati

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Chapter I. Of Inference, Or Reasoning, In General.

Chapter I. Of Inference, Or Reasoning, In General.

§ 2. In proceeding to take into consideration the cases in which inferences can legitimately be drawn, we shall first mention some cases in which the inference is apparent, not real; and which require notice chiefly that they may not be confounded with cases of inference properly so called. This occurs when the proposition ostensibly inferred from another, appears on analysis to be merely a repetition of the same, or part of the same, assertion, which was contained in the first. All the cases me

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Chapter II. Of Ratiocination, Or Syllogism.

Chapter II. Of Ratiocination, Or Syllogism.

Each figure is divided into moods , according to what are called the quantity and quality of the propositions, that is, according as they are universal or particular, affirmative or negative. The following are examples of all the legitimate moods, that is, all those in which the conclusion correctly follows from the premises. A is the minor term, C the major, B the middle term. First Figure. Second Figure. Third Figure. Fourth Figure. In these exemplars, or blank forms for making syllogisms, no

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Chapter III. Of The Functions And Logical Value Of The Syllogism.

Chapter III. Of The Functions And Logical Value Of The Syllogism.

All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal; it is unanswerably urged by the adversaries of the syllogistic theory, that the proposition, Socrates is mortal, is presupposed in the more general assumption, All men are mortal: that we can not be assured of the mortality of all men, unless we are already certain of the mortality of every individual man: that if it be still doubtful whether Socrates, or any other individual we choose to name, be mortal or not, the same degree

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Chapter IV. Of Trains Of Reasoning, And Deductive Sciences.

Chapter IV. Of Trains Of Reasoning, And Deductive Sciences.

This first example of a train of reasoning is still extremely simple, the series consisting of only two syllogisms. The following is somewhat more complicated: No government, which earnestly seeks the good of its subjects, is likely to be overthrown; some particular government earnestly seeks the good of its subjects, therefore it is not likely to be overthrown. The major premise in this argument we shall suppose not to be derived from considerations a priori , but to be a generalization from hi

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Chapter V. Of Demonstration, And Necessary Truths.

Chapter V. Of Demonstration, And Necessary Truths.

Since, then, neither in nature, nor in the human mind, do there exist any objects exactly corresponding to the definitions of geometry, while yet that science can not be supposed to be conversant about nonentities; nothing remains but to consider geometry as conversant with such lines, angles, and figures, as really exist; and the definitions, as they are called, must be regarded as some of our first and most obvious generalizations concerning those natural objects. The correctness of those gene

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Chapter VI. The Same Subject Continued.

Chapter VI. The Same Subject Continued.

§ 2. This theory attempts to solve the difficulty apparently inherent in the case, by representing the propositions of the science of numbers as merely verbal, and its processes as simple transformations of language, substitutions of one expression for another. The proposition, Two and one is equal to three, according to these writers, is not a truth, is not the assertion of a really existing fact, but a definition of the word three; a statement that mankind have agreed to use the name three as

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Chapter VII. Examination Of Some Opinions Opposed To The Preceding Doctrines.

Chapter VII. Examination Of Some Opinions Opposed To The Preceding Doctrines.

Thus far, there is no very wide difference between Mr. Spencer’s doctrine and the ordinary one of philosophers of the intuitive school, from Descartes to Dr. Whewell; but at this point Mr. Spencer diverges from them. For he does not, like them, set up the test of inconceivability as infallible. On the contrary, he holds that it may be fallacious, not from any fault in the test itself, but because “men have mistaken for inconceivable things, some things which were not inconceivable.” And he himse

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Book III.

Book III.

“ According to the doctrine now stated, the highest, or rather the only proper object of physics, is to ascertain those established conjunctions of successive events, which constitute the order of the universe; to record the phenomena which it exhibits to our observations, or which it discloses to our experiments; and to refer these phenomena to their general laws. ” — D. Stewart , Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind , vol. ii., chap. iv., sect. 1. “ In such cases the inductive and dedu

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Chapter I. Preliminary Observations On Induction In General.

Chapter I. Preliminary Observations On Induction In General.

If the identity of the logical processes which prove particular facts and those which establish general scientific truths, required any additional confirmation, it would be sufficient to consider that in many branches of science, single facts have to be proved, as well as principles; facts as completely individual as any that are debated in a court of justice; but which are proved in the same manner as the other truths of the science, and without disturbing in any degree the homogeneity of its m

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Chapter II. Of Inductions Improperly So Called.

Chapter II. Of Inductions Improperly So Called.

As we may sum up a definite number of singular propositions in one proposition, which will be apparently, but not really, general, so we may sum up a definite number of general propositions in one proposition, which will be apparently, but not really, more general. If by a separate induction applied to every distinct species of animals, it has been established that each possesses a nervous system, and we affirm thereupon that all animals have a nervous system; this looks like a generalization, t

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Chapter III. Of The Ground Of Induction.

Chapter III. Of The Ground Of Induction.

Whatever be the most proper mode of expressing it, the proposition that the course of nature is uniform, is the fundamental principle, or general axiom of Induction. It would yet be a great error to offer this large generalization as any explanation of the inductive process. On the contrary, I hold it to be itself an instance of induction, and induction by no means of the most obvious kind. Far from being the first induction we make, it is one of the last, or at all events one of those which are

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Chapter IV. Of Laws Of Nature.

Chapter IV. Of Laws Of Nature.

To substitute real examples for symbolical ones, the following are three uniformities, or call them laws of nature: the law that air has weight, the law that pressure on a fluid is propagated equally in all directions, and the law that pressure in one direction, not opposed by equal pressure in the contrary direction, produces motion, which does not cease until equilibrium is restored. From these three uniformities we should be able to predict another uniformity, namely, the rise of the mercury

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Chapter V. Of The Law Of Universal Causation.

Chapter V. Of The Law Of Universal Causation.

It is not, therefore, enough for us that the laws of space, which are only laws of simultaneous phenomenon, and the laws of number, which though true of successive phenomena do not relate to their succession, possess the rigorous certainty and universality of which we are in search. We must endeavor to find some law of succession which has those same attributes, and is therefore fit to be made the foundation of processes for discovering, and of a test for verifying, all other uniformities of suc

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Chapter VI. On The Composition Of Causes.

Chapter VI. On The Composition Of Causes.

If this be true of chemical combinations, it is still more true of those far more complex combinations of elements which constitute organized bodies; and in which those extraordinary new uniformities arise which are called the laws of life. All organized bodies are composed of parts similar to those composing inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no an

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Chapter VII. On Observation And Experiment.

Chapter VII. On Observation And Experiment.

For the purpose of varying the circumstances, we may have recourse (according to a distinction commonly made) either to observation or to experiment; we may either find an instance in nature suited to our purposes, or, by an artificial arrangement of circumstances, make one. The value of the instance depends on what it is in itself, not on the mode in which it is obtained: its employment for the purposes of induction depends on the same principles in the one case and in the other; as the uses of

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Chapter VIII. Of The Four Methods Of Experimental Inquiry.

Chapter VIII. Of The Four Methods Of Experimental Inquiry.

For example, let the antecedent A be the contact of an alkaline substance and an oil. This combination being tried under several varieties of circumstances, resembling each other in nothing else, the results agree in the production of a greasy and detersive or saponaceous substance: it is therefore concluded that the combination of an oil and an alkali causes the production of a soap. It is thus we inquire, by the Method of Agreement, into the effect of a given cause. In a similar manner we may

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Chapter IX. Miscellaneous Examples Of The Four Methods.

Chapter IX. Miscellaneous Examples Of The Four Methods.

Let us now bring our conclusion to the test of the Method of Difference. Setting out from the cases already mentioned, in which the antecedent is the presence of substances forming with the tissues a compound incapable of putrefaction, (and a fortiori incapable of the chemical actions which constitute life), and the consequent is death, either of the whole organism, or of some portion of it; let us compare with these cases other cases, as much resembling them as possible, but in which that effec

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Chapter X. Of Plurality Of Causes, And Of The Intermixture Of Effects.

Chapter X. Of Plurality Of Causes, And Of The Intermixture Of Effects.

If such were the fact, it would be comparatively an easy task to investigate the laws of nature. But the supposition does not hold in either of its parts. In the first place, it is not true that the same phenomenon is always produced by the same cause: the effect a may sometimes arise from A, sometimes from B. And, secondly, the effects of different causes are often not dissimilar, but homogeneous, and marked out by no assignable boundaries from one another: A and B may produce not a and b , but

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Chapter XI. Of The Deductive Method.

Chapter XI. Of The Deductive Method.

The mode of ascertaining those laws neither is, nor can be any other than the fourfold method of experimental inquiry, already discussed. A few remarks on the application of that method to cases of the Composition of Causes are all that is requisite. It is obvious that we can not expect to find the law of a tendency by an induction from cases in which the tendency is counteracted. The laws of motion could never have been brought to light from the observation of bodies kept at rest by the equilib

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Chapter XII. Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.

Chapter XII. Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.

It is necessary here to remark, that in this resolution of the law of a complex effect, the laws of which it is compounded are not the only elements. It is resolved into the laws of the separate causes, together with the fact of their co-existence. The one is as essential an ingredient as the other; whether the object be to discover the law of the effect, or only to explain it. To deduce the laws of the heavenly motions, we require not only to know the law of a rectilineal and that of a gravitat

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Chapter XIII. Miscellaneous Examples Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.

Chapter XIII. Miscellaneous Examples Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.

For instance, “while soluble crystalloids are always highly sapid, soluble colloids are singularly insipid,” as might be expected; for, as the sentient extremities of the nerves of the palate “are probably protected by a colloidal membrane,” impermeable to other colloids, a colloid, when tasted, probably never reaches those nerves. Again, “it has been observed that vegetable gum is not digested in the stomach; the coats of that organ dialyse the soluble food, absorbing crystalloids, and rejectin

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Chapter XIV. Of The Limits To The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature; And Of Hypotheses.

Chapter XIV. Of The Limits To The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature; And Of Hypotheses.

The ideal limit, therefore, of the explanation of natural phenomena (toward which as toward other ideal limits we are constantly tending, without the prospect of ever completely attaining it) would be to show that each distinguishable variety of our sensations, or other states of consciousness, has only one sort of cause; that, for example, whenever we perceive a white color, there is some one condition or set of conditions which is always present, and the presence of which always produces in us

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Chapter XV. Of Progressive Effects; And Of The Continued Action Of Causes.

Chapter XV. Of Progressive Effects; And Of The Continued Action Of Causes.

Let us now suppose that the original agent or cause, instead of being instantaneous, is permanent. Whatever effect has been produced up to a given time, would (unless prevented by the intervention of some new cause) subsist permanently, even if the cause were to perish. Since, however, the cause does not perish, but continues to exist and to operate, it must go on producing more and more of the effect; and instead of a uniform effect, we have a progressive series of effects, arising from the acc

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Chapter XVI. Of Empirical Laws.

Chapter XVI. Of Empirical Laws.

An empirical law, then, is an observed uniformity, presumed to be resolvable into simpler laws, but not yet resolved into them. The ascertainment of the empirical laws of phenomena often precedes by a long interval the explanation of those laws by the Deductive Method; and the verification of a deduction usually consists in the comparison of its results with empirical laws previously ascertained. § 2. From a limited number of ultimate laws of causation, there are necessarily generated a vast num

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Chapter XVII. Of Chance And Its Elimination.

Chapter XVII. Of Chance And Its Elimination.

This question may be otherwise stated in more familiar terms: After how many and what sort of instances may it be concluded that an observed coincidence between two phenomena is not the effect of chance? It is of the utmost importance for understanding the logic of induction, that we should form a distinct conception of what is meant by chance, and how the phenomena which common language ascribes to that abstraction are really produced. § 2. Chance is usually spoken of in direct antithesis to la

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Chapter XVIII. Of The Calculation Of Chances.

Chapter XVIII. Of The Calculation Of Chances.

To a calculation of chances, then, according to Laplace, two things are necessary; we must know that of several events some one will certainly happen, and no more than one; and we must not know, nor have any reason to expect, that it will be one of these events rather than another. It has been contended that these are not the only requisites, and that Laplace has overlooked, in the general theoretical statement, a necessary part of the foundation of the doctrine of chances. To be able (it has be

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Chapter XIX. Of The Extension Of Derivative Laws To Adjacent Cases.

Chapter XIX. Of The Extension Of Derivative Laws To Adjacent Cases.

Finally, even when the derivative uniformity is itself a law of causation (resulting from the combination of several causes), it is not altogether independent of collocations. If a cause supervenes, capable of wholly or partially counteracting the effect of any one of the conjoined causes, the effect will no longer conform to the derivative law. While, therefore, each ultimate law is only liable to frustration from one set of counteracting causes, the derivative law is liable to it from several.

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Chapter XX. Of Analogy.

Chapter XX. Of Analogy.

§ 2. It is on the whole more usual, however, to extend the name of analogical evidence to arguments from any sort of resemblance, provided they do not amount to a complete induction; without peculiarly distinguishing resemblance of relations. Analogical reasoning, in this sense, may be reduced to the following formula: Two things resemble each other in one or more respects; a certain proposition is true of the one; therefore it is true of the other. But we have nothing here by which to discrimin

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Chapter XXI. Of The Evidence Of The Law Of Universal Causation.

Chapter XXI. Of The Evidence Of The Law Of Universal Causation.

For this difficulty, which I have purposely stated in the strongest terms it will admit of, the school of metaphysicians who have long predominated in this country find a ready salvo. They affirm, that the universality of causation is a truth which we can not help believing; that the belief in it is an instinct, one of the laws of our believing faculty. As the proof of this, they say, and they have nothing else to say, that every body does believe it; and they number it among the propositions, r

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Chapter XXII. Of Uniformities Of Co-Existence Not Dependent On Causation.

Chapter XXII. Of Uniformities Of Co-Existence Not Dependent On Causation.

In a former place 189 it has been explained, in some detail, what is meant by the Kinds of objects; those classes which differ from one another not by a limited and definite, but by an indefinite and unknown, number of distinctions. To this we have now to add, that every proposition by which any thing is asserted of a Kind, affirms a uniformity of co-existence. Since we know nothing of Kinds but their properties, the Kind, to us, is the set of properties by which it is identified, and which must

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Chapter XXIII. Of Approximate Generalizations, And Probable Evidence.

Chapter XXIII. Of Approximate Generalizations, And Probable Evidence.

Though so little use can be made, in science, of approximate generalizations, except as a stage on the road to something better, for practical guidance they are often all we have to rely on. Even when science has really determined the universal laws of any phenomenon, not only are those laws generally too much encumbered with conditions to be adapted for everyday use, but the cases which present themselves in life are too complicated, and our decisions require to be taken too rapidly, to admit o

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Chapter XXIV. Of The Remaining Laws Of Nature.

Chapter XXIV. Of The Remaining Laws Of Nature.

The existence, therefore, of a phenomenon, is but another word for its being perceived, or for the inferred possibility of perceiving it. When the phenomenon is within the range of present observation, by present observation we assure ourselves of its existence; when it is beyond that range, and is therefore said to be absent, we infer its existence from marks or evidences. But what can these evidences be? Other phenomena; ascertained by induction to be connected with the given phenomenon, eithe

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Chapter XXV. Of The Grounds Of Disbelief.

Chapter XXV. Of The Grounds Of Disbelief.

But does not (it may be asked) the very statement of the proposition imply a contradiction? An alleged fact, according to this theory, is not to be believed if it contradict a complete induction. But it is essential to the completeness of an induction that it shall not contradict any known fact. Is it not, then, a petitio principii to say, that the fact ought to be disbelieved because the induction opposed to it is complete? How can we have a right to declare the induction complete, while facts,

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Book IV.

Book IV.

“ Clear and distinct ideas are terms which, though familiar and frequent in men’s mouths, I have reason to think every one who uses does not perfectly understand. And possibly it is but here and there one who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them; I have, therefore, in most places, chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct men’s thoughts to my meaning in this matter. ” —

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Chapter I. Of Observation And Description.

Chapter I. Of Observation And Description.

Innumerable instances might be given, and analyzed in the same manner, of what are vulgarly called errors of sense. There are none of them properly errors of sense; they are erroneous inferences from sense. When I look at a candle through a multiplying glass, I see what seems a dozen candles instead of one; and if the real circumstances of the case were skillfully disguised, I might suppose that there were really that number; there would be what is called an optical deception. In the kaleidoscop

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Chapter II. Of Abstraction, Or The Formation Of Conceptions.

Chapter II. Of Abstraction, Or The Formation Of Conceptions.

There are, then, such things as general conceptions, or conceptions by means of which we can think generally; and when we form a set of phenomena into a class, that is, when we compare them with one another to ascertain in what they agree, some general conception is implied in this mental operation. And inasmuch as such a comparison is a necessary preliminary to Induction, it is most true that Induction could not go on without general conceptions. § 2. But it does not therefore follow that these

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Chapter III. Of Naming, As Subsidiary To Induction.

Chapter III. Of Naming, As Subsidiary To Induction.

It is not, however, of the functions of Names, considered generally, that we have here to treat, but only of the manner and degree in which they are directly instrumental to the investigation of truth; in other words, to the process of induction. § 2. Observation and Abstraction, the operations which formed the subject of the two foregoing chapters, are conditions indispensable to induction; there can be no induction where they are not. It has been imagined that Naming is also a condition equall

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Chapter IV. Of The Requisites Of A Philosophical Language, And The Principles Of Definition.

Chapter IV. Of The Requisites Of A Philosophical Language, And The Principles Of Definition.

It is at this stage, probably, in the progress of a concrete name, that the corresponding abstract name generally comes into use. Under the notion that the concrete name must of course convey a meaning, or, in other words, that there is some property common to all things which it denotes, people give a name to this common property; from the concrete Civilized, they form the abstract Civilization. But since most people have never compared the different things which are called by the concrete name

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Chapter V. On The Natural History Of The Variations In The Meaning Of Terms.

Chapter V. On The Natural History Of The Variations In The Meaning Of Terms.

It continually happens that of two words, whose dictionary meanings are either the same or very slightly different, one will be the proper word to use in one set of circumstances, another in another, without its being possible to show how the custom of so employing them originally grew up. The accident that one of the words was used and not the other on a particular occasion or in a particular social circle, will be sufficient to produce so strong an association between the word and some special

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Chapter VI. The Principles Of A Philosophical Language Further Considered.

Chapter VI. The Principles Of A Philosophical Language Further Considered.

“The meaning of [descriptive] technical terms can be fixed in the first instance only by convention, and can be made intelligible only by presenting to the senses that which the terms are to signify. The knowledge of a color by its name can only be taught through the eye. No description can convey to a hearer what we mean by apple-green or French gray . It might, perhaps, be supposed that, in the first example, the term apple , referring to so familiar an object, sufficiently suggests the color

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Chapter VII. Of Classification, As Subsidiary To Induction.

Chapter VII. Of Classification, As Subsidiary To Induction.

§ 2. There is no property of objects which may not be taken, if we please, as the foundation for a classification or mental grouping of those objects; and in our first attempts we are likely to select for that purpose properties which are simple, easily conceived, and perceptible on a first view, without any previous process of thought. Thus Tournefort’s arrangement of plants was founded on the shape and divisions of the corolla; and that which is commonly called the Linnæan (though Linnæus also

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Chapter VIII. Of Classification By Series.

Chapter VIII. Of Classification By Series.

§ 2. The object being supposed to be, the investigation of the laws of animal life; the first step, after forming the most distinct conception of the phenomenon itself, possible in the existing state of our knowledge, is to erect into one great class (that of animals) all the known Kinds of beings where that phenomenon presents itself; in however various combinations with other properties, and in however different degrees. As some of these Kinds manifest the general phenomenon of animal life in

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Book V.

Book V.

“ Errare non modo affirmando et negando, sed etiam sentiendo, et in tacitâ hominum cogitatione contingit. ” — Hobbes , Computatio sive Logica , chap. v. “ Il leur semble qu’il n’y a qu’à douter par fantaisie, et qu’il n’y a qu’à dire en général que notre nature est infirme; que notre esprit est plein d’aveuglement: qu’il faut avoir un grand soin de se défaire de ses préjugés, et autres choses semblables. Ils pensent que cela suffit pour ne plus se laisser séduire à ses sens, et pour ne plus se t

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Chapter I. Of Fallacies In General.

Chapter I. Of Fallacies In General.

A catalogue of the varieties of apparent evidence which are not real evidence, is an enumeration of Fallacies. Without such an enumeration, therefore, the present work would be wanting in an essential point. And while writers who included in their theory of reasoning nothing more than ratiocination, have in consistency with this limitation, confined their remarks to the fallacies which have their seat in that portion of the process of investigation; we, who profess to treat of the whole process,

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Chapter II. Classification Of Fallacies.

Chapter II. Classification Of Fallacies.

For every property, therefore, in facts, or in our mode of considering facts, which leads us to believe that they are habitually conjoined when they are not, or that they are not when in reality they are, there is a corresponding kind of Fallacy; and an enumeration of fallacies would consist in a specification of those properties in facts, and those peculiarities in our mode of considering them, which give rise to this erroneous opinion. § 2. To begin, then; the supposed connection, or repugnanc

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Chapter III. Fallacies Of Simple Inspection; Or A Priori Fallacies.

Chapter III. Fallacies Of Simple Inspection; Or A Priori Fallacies.

As it is foreign to the purpose of the present treatise to decide between these conflicting theories, we are precluded from inquiring into the existence, or defining the extent and limits, of knowledge a priori , and from characterizing the kind of correct assumption which the fallacy of incorrect assumption, now under consideration, simulates. Yet since it is allowed on both sides that such assumptions are often made improperly, we may find it practicable, without entering into the ultimate met

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Chapter IV. Fallacies Of Observation.

Chapter IV. Fallacies Of Observation.

§ 3. First, then, it is evident that when the instances on one side of a question are more likely to be remembered and recorded than those on the other; especially if there be any strong motive to preserve the memory of the first, but not of the latter; these last are likely to be overlooked, and escape the observation of the mass of mankind. This is the recognized explanation of the credit given, in spite of reason and evidence, to many classes of impostors; to quack-doctors, and fortune-teller

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Chapter V. Fallacies Of Generalization.

Chapter V. Fallacies Of Generalization.

§ 3. It is next to be remarked that all generalizations which profess, like the theories of Thales, Democritus, and others of the early Greek speculators, to resolve all things into some one element, or like many modern theories, to resolve phenomena radically different into the same, are necessarily false. By radically different phenomena I mean impressions on our senses which differ in quality, and not merely in degree. On this subject what appeared necessary was said in the chapter on the Lim

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Chapter VI. Fallacies Of Ratiocination.

Chapter VI. Fallacies Of Ratiocination.

Again, the very frequent error in conduct, of mistaking reverse of wrong for right, is the practical form of a logical error with respect to the Opposition of Propositions. It is committed for want of the habit of distinguishing the contrary of a proposition from the contradictory of it, and of attending to the logical canon, that contrary propositions, though they can not both be true, may both be false. If the error were to express itself in words, it would run distinctly counter to this canon

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Chapter VII. Fallacies Of Confusion.

Chapter VII. Fallacies Of Confusion.

“The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or rather, perhaps, may be regarded as a branch of, that founded on etymology —viz., when a term is used, at one time in its customary, and at another in its etymological sense. Perhaps no example of this can be found that is more extensively and mischievously employed than in the case of the word representative : assuming that its right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense of the verb ‘represent,’ the sophist persuades the

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Book VI.

Book VI.

“ Si l’homme peut prédire, avec une assurance presque entière, les phénomènes dont il connaît les lois; si lors même qu’elles lui sont inconnues, il peut, d’après l’expérience, prévoir avec une grande probabilité les événements de l’avenir; pourquoi regarderait-on comme une entreprise chimérique, celle de tracer avec quelque vraisemblance le tableau des destinées futures de l’espèce humaine, d’après les résultats de son histoire? Le seul fondement de croyance dans les sciences naturelles, est ce

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Chapter I. Introductory Remarks.

Chapter I. Introductory Remarks.

If on matters so much the most important with which human intellect can occupy itself a more general agreement is ever to exist among thinkers; if what has been pronounced “the proper study of mankind” is not destined to remain the only subject which Philosophy can not succeed in rescuing from Empiricism; the same process through which the laws of many simpler phenomena have by general acknowledgment been placed beyond dispute, must be consciously and deliberately applied to those more difficult

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Chapter II. Of Liberty And Necessity.

Chapter II. Of Liberty And Necessity.

That the free-will metaphysicians, being mostly of the school which rejects Hume’s and Brown’s analysis of Cause and Effect, should miss their way for want of the light which that analysis affords, can not surprise us. The wonder is, that the necessitarians, who usually admit that philosophical theory, should in practice equally lose sight of it. The very same misconception of the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity, which prevents the opposite party from recognizing its truth, I believe to

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Chapter III. That There Is, Or May Be, A Science Of Human Nature.

Chapter III. That There Is, Or May Be, A Science Of Human Nature.

§ 2. The science of human nature is of this description. It falls far short of the standard of exactness now realized in Astronomy; but there is no reason that it should not be as much a science as Tidology is, or as Astronomy was when its calculations had only mastered the main phenomena, but not the perturbations. The phenomena with which this science is conversant being the thoughts, feelings, and actions of human beings, it would have attained the ideal perfection of a science if it enabled

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Chapter IV. Of The Laws Of Mind.

Chapter IV. Of The Laws Of Mind.

But, after all has been said which can be said, it remains incontestable that there exist uniformities of succession among states of mind, and that these can be ascertained by observation and experiment. Further, that every mental state has a nervous state for its immediate antecedent and proximate cause, though extremely probable, can not hitherto be said to be proved, in the conclusive manner in which this can be proved of sensations; and even were it certain, yet every one must admit that we

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Chapter V. Of Ethology, Or The Science Of The Formation Of Character.

Chapter V. Of Ethology, Or The Science Of The Formation Of Character.

The really scientific truths, then, are not these empirical laws, but the causal laws which explain them. The empirical laws of those phenomena which depend on known causes, and of which a general theory can therefore be constructed, have, whatever may be their value in practice, no other function in science than that of verifying the conclusions of theory. Still more must this be the case when most of the empirical laws amount, even within the limits of observation, only to approximate generali

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Chapter VI. General Considerations On The Social Science.

Chapter VI. General Considerations On The Social Science.

No wonder that, when the phenomena of society have so rarely been contemplated in the point of view characteristic of science, the philosophy of society should have made little progress; should contain few general propositions sufficiently precise and certain for common inquirers to recognize in them a scientific character. The vulgar notion accordingly is, that all pretension to lay down general truths on politics and society is quackery; that no universality and no certainty are attainable in

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Chapter VII. Of The Chemical, Or Experimental, Method In The Social Science.

Chapter VII. Of The Chemical, Or Experimental, Method In The Social Science.

But that no such attempt can have the smallest chance of success, has been abundantly shown in the tenth chapter of the Third Book. 274 We there examined whether effects which depend on a complication of causes can be made the subject of a true induction by observation and experiment; and concluded, on the most convincing grounds, that they can not. Since, of all effects, none depend on so great a complication of causes as social phenomena, we might leave our case to rest in safety on that previ

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Chapter VIII. Of The Geometrical, Or Abstract, Method.

Chapter VIII. Of The Geometrical, Or Abstract, Method.

§ 2. One numerous division of the reasoners who have treated social facts according to geometrical methods, not admitting any modification of one law by another, must for the present be left out of consideration, because in them this error is complicated with, and is the effect of, another fundamental misconception, of which we have already taken some notice, and which will be further treated of before we conclude. I speak of those who deduce political conclusions not from laws of nature, not fr

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Chapter IX. Of The Physical, Or Concrete Deductive, Method.

Chapter IX. Of The Physical, Or Concrete Deductive, Method.

But, without dissembling the necessary imperfections of the a priori method when applied to such a subject, neither ought we, on the other hand; to exaggerate them. The same objections which apply to the Method of Deduction in this its most difficult employment, apply to it, as we formerly showed, 276 in its easiest; and would even there have been insuperable, if there had not existed, as was then fully explained, an appropriate remedy. This remedy consists in the process which, under the name o

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Chapter X. Of The Inverse Deductive, Or Historical, Method.

Chapter X. Of The Inverse Deductive, Or Historical, Method.

States of society are like different constitutions or different ages in the physical frame; they are conditions not of one or a few organs or functions, but of the whole organism. Accordingly, the information which we possess respecting past ages, and respecting the various states of society now existing in different regions of the earth, does, when duly analyzed, exhibit uniformities. It is found that when one of the features of society is in a particular state, a state of many other features,

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Chapter XI. Additional Elucidations Of The Science Of History.

Chapter XI. Additional Elucidations Of The Science Of History.

The facts of statistics, since they have been made a subject of careful recordation and study, have yielded conclusions, some of which have been very startling to persons not accustomed to regard moral actions as subject to uniform laws. The very events which in their own nature appear most capricious and uncertain, and which in any individual case no attainable degree of knowledge would enable us to foresee, occur, when considerable numbers are taken into the account, with a degree of regularit

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Chapter XII. Of The Logic Of Practice, Or Art; Including Morality And Policy.

Chapter XII. Of The Logic Of Practice, Or Art; Including Morality And Policy.

§ 2. In all branches of practical business there are cases in which individuals are bound to conform their practice to a pre-established rule, while there are others in which it is part of their task to find or construct the rule by which they are to govern their conduct. The first, for example, is the case of a judge, under a definite written code. The judge is not called upon to determine what course would be intrinsically the most advisable in the particular case in hand, but only within what

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