Analysis Of The Phenomena Of The Human Mind - free ebook by James Mill

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Analysis Of The Phenomena Of The Human Mind

James Mill

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LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER. 1878

LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER. 1878

“In order to prepare the way for a just and comprehensive system of Logic, a previous survey of our nature, considered as a great whole, is an indispensable requisite.”— Philosophical Essays ( Prelim. Dissert. ) p. lxvii. by Dugald Stewart, Esq. “Would not Education be necessarily rendered more systematical and enlightened, if the powers and faculties on which it operates were more scientifically examined, and better understood?” Ibid. p. xlviii....

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PREFACE

PREFACE

I N the study of Nature, either mental or physical, the aim of the scientific enquirer is to diminish as much as possible the catalogue of ultimate truths. When, without doing violence to facts, he is able to bring one phenomenon within the laws of another; when he can shew that a fact or agency, which seemed to be original and distinct, could have been produced by other known facts and agencies, acting according to their own laws; the enquirer who has arrived at this result, considers himself t

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

“I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.” Locke , i. 1, 3. P HILOSOPHICAL inquiries into the human mind have for their main, and ultimate object, the exposition of its more complex phenomena. It is necessary, however, that the simple should be premised; because they are the elements of which the c

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CHAPTER I. SENSATION.

CHAPTER I. SENSATION.

“I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our organs, or any Ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or no. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now u

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SECTION I. SMELL.

SECTION I. SMELL.

It is not material to the present purpose in what order we survey the subdivisions of this elementary class of the mental phenomena. It will be convenient to take those first, which can be most easily thought of by themselves; that is, of which a conception, free from the mixture of any extraneous ingredient, can be most certainly formed. For this reason we begin with SMELL. 2 2 The order of exposition of the senses is not a matter of indifference. The author, like Condillac, selected Smell to b

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SECTION II. HEARING.

SECTION II. HEARING.

In Hearing, the same three particulars, the ORGAN , the OBJECT , and the FEELING , require to be distinguished. The name of the organ is the Ear; and its nice and complicated structure has been described with minuteness and admiration by anatomists and physiologists. In vulgar discourse, the object of our Sense of Hearing is a sounding body. We say that we hear the bell, the trumpet, the cannon. This language, however, is not correct. That which precedes the feeling received through the ear, is

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SECTION III. SIGHT.

SECTION III. SIGHT.

In SIGHT , the organ is very conspicuous, and has an appropriate name, the Eye. In ordinary language, the object of sight is the body which is said to be seen. This is a similar error to those which we have detected in the vulgar language relating to the senses of smell and hearing. It is Light alone which enters the eye; and Light, with its numerous modifications, is the sole object on sight. How the particles of light affect the nerves of the eye, in the peculiar manner in which they are affec

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SECTION IV. TASTE.

SECTION IV. TASTE.

The ORGAN of TASTE is in the mouth and fauces. In ordinary language, the OBJECT of taste is any thing, which, taken into the mouth, and tasted, as it is called, produces the peculiar SENSATION of this sense. Nor has philosophy as yet enabled us to state the object of taste more correctly. There are experiments which show, that galvanism is concerned in the phenomena, but not in what way. The SENSATION , in this case, is distinguished by every body. The taste of sugar, the taste of an apple, are

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SECTION V. TOUCH.

SECTION V. TOUCH.

In discoursing about the ORGAN , the SENSATIONS , and the OBJECTS , of touch, more vagueness has been admitted, than in the case of any of the other senses. In fact, every sensation which could not properly be assigned to any other of the senses, has been allotted to the touch. The sensations classed, or rather jumbled together, under this head, form a kind of miscellany, wherein are included feelings totally unlike. The ORGAN of TOUCH is diffused over the whole surface of the body, and reaches

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SECTION VI. SENSATIONS OF DISORGANIZATION, OR OF THE APPROACH TO DISORGANIZATION, IN ANY PART OF THE BODY.

SECTION VI. SENSATIONS OF DISORGANIZATION, OR OF THE APPROACH TO DISORGANIZATION, IN ANY PART OF THE BODY.

That we have sensations in parts of the body suffering, or approaching to, disorganization, does not require illustration. The disorganizations of which we speak proceed sometimes from external, sometimes from internal, causes. Lacerations, cuts, bruises, burnings, poisonings, are of the former kind; inflammation, and other diseases in the parts, are the latter. These sensations are specifically different from those classed under the several heads of sense. The feelings themselves, if attended t

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SECTION VII. MUSCULAR SENSATIONS, OR THOSE FEELINGS WHICH ACCOMPANY THE ACTION OF THE MUSCLES.

SECTION VII. MUSCULAR SENSATIONS, OR THOSE FEELINGS WHICH ACCOMPANY THE ACTION OF THE MUSCLES.

There is no part of our Consciousness, which deserves greater attention than this; though, till lately, it has been miserably overlooked. Hartley, Darwin, and Brown, are the only philosophical inquirers into Mind, at least in our own country, who seem to have been aware that it fell within the province of their speculations. The muscles are bundles of fibres, which, by their contraction and relaxation, produce all the motions of the body. The nerves, with which they are supplied, seem to be the

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SECTION VIII. SENSATIONS IN THE ALIMENTARY CANAL.

SECTION VIII. SENSATIONS IN THE ALIMENTARY CANAL.

When the sensations in the alimentary canal become acutely painful, they are precise objects of attention to every body. There is reason to believe that a perpetual train of sensations is going on in every part of it. The food stimulates the stomach. It undergoes important changes, and, mixed with some very stimulating ingredients, passes into the lower intestines; in every part of which it is still farther changed. The degree, and even the nature, of some of the changes, are different, accordin

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CHAPTER II. IDEAS.

CHAPTER II. IDEAS.

“Hæc in genere sors esse solet humana, ut quid in quovis genere recte aut cogitari aut effici possit sentiant prius quam perspiciant. Laborem autem haud ita levem illum veriti, qui in eo impendendus erat ut, ideas operatione analytica penitus evolventes, quid tandem velint, aut quænam res agatur, sibi ipsis rationem sufficientem reddant, confusis, aut saltem haud satia explicatis rationibus, ratiocinia, et scientiarum adeo systemata superstruere solent communiter, eoque confidentius, quo ejus qu

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CHAPTER III. THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

CHAPTER III. THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

“To have a clear view of the phenomena of the mind, as mere affections or states of it, existing successively, and in a certain series, which we are able, therefore, to predict, in consequence of our knowledge of the past, is, I conceive, to have made the most important acquisition which the intellectual inquirer can make.” Brown , Lectures , i. 544. T HOUGHT succeeds thought; idea follows idea, incessantly. If our senses are awake, we are continually receiving sensations, of the eye, the ear, t

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CHAPTER IV. NAMING.

CHAPTER IV. NAMING.

“I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of, and stand for, determined ideas.”— Locke, Hum. Und. b. ii. ch. 13, § 18. W E have now surveyed the more s

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SECTION I. NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE.

SECTION I. NOUNS SUBSTANTIVE.

The power of Language essentially consists, in two things; first, in our having marks of our SENSATIONS , and IDEAS : and, secondly, in so arranging them, that they may correctly denote a TRAIN of those mental states or feelings. It is evident, that if we convey to others the ideas which pass in our own minds, and also convey them in the order in which they pass, the business of COMMUNICATION is completed. And, if we establish the means of reviving the ideas which we have formerly had, and also

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SECTION II. NOUNS ADJECTIVE.

SECTION II. NOUNS ADJECTIVE.

As the purpose of language is to denote sensations and ideas; to mark them for our own use, or to give indication of them to our fellow men; it is obvious that the names of sensations and ideas are the fundamental parts of language. But as ideas are very numerous, and the limits of the human memory admit the use of only a limited number of marks or names, various contrivances are employed to make one name serve as many purposes as possible. Of the contrivances for making the use of each word as

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SECTION III. VERBS.

SECTION III. VERBS.

1. There is one class of complex ideas, of so particular a nature, and of which we have so frequent occasion to speak, that the means of sub-dividing them require additional contrivances. Marks put upon marks are still the instrument. But the instrument, to render it more effectual to this particular purpose, is fashioned in a particular way. I allude to the class of words denominated Verbs: which are, in their essence, adjectives, and applied as marks upon marks; but receive a particular form,

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SECTION IV. PREDICATION.

SECTION IV. PREDICATION.

The purposes of language are two. We have occasion to mark sensations or ideas singly; and we have occasion to mark them in trains; in other words, we have need of contrivances to mark not only sensations and ideas; but also the order of them. The contrivances which are necessary to mark this order are the main cause of the complexity of language. If all names were names of one sort, there would be no difficulty in marking a train of the feelings which they serve to denote. Thus, if all names we

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SECTION V. PRONOUNS.

SECTION V. PRONOUNS.

The principal part of the artifice of Naming is now explained. We have considered the nature of the more necessary marks, and the manner in which they are combined so as to represent the order of a train. Beside those marks, which are the fundamental part of language, there are several classes of auxiliary words or marks, the use of which is, to abbreviate expression, and to render it, what is of great importance, a more rapid vehicle of thought. These are usually comprehended under the titles o

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SECTION VI. ADVERBS.

SECTION VI. ADVERBS.

The power of this class of words, in the great business of marking, and the extent of the service rendered by them, will be so easily seen, that a few words will suffice to explain them. Adverbs may be reduced under five heads; 1, Adverbs of Time; 2, Adverbs of Place; 3, Adverbs of Quantity; 4, Adverbs of Quality; 5, Adverbs of Relation. They are mostly abridgments, capable of being substituted for longer marks. And they are always employed for the purpose of putting a modification upon the Subj

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SECTION VII. PREPOSITIONS.

SECTION VII. PREPOSITIONS.

It is easy to see in what manner Prepositions are employed to abridge the process of discourse. They render us the same service which, we have seen, is rendered by adjectives, in affording the means of naming minor classes, taken out of larger, with a great economy of names. Thus, when we say, “a man with a black skin,” this compound name, “a man with a black skin;” is the name of a sub-class, taken out of the class man; and when we say, “a black man with a flat nose and woolly hair;” this still

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SECTION VIII. CONJUNCTIONS.

SECTION VIII. CONJUNCTIONS.

The Conjunctions are distinguished from the Prepositions, by connecting Predications; while the Prepositions connect only Words. There are seeming exceptions, however, to this description, the nature of which ought to be understood. They are all of one kind; they all belong to those cases of Predication, in which either the subject or the predicate consists of enumerated particulars; and in which the Conjunction is employed to mark the enumeration. Thus we say, “Four, and four, and two, are ten.

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CHAPTER V. CONSCIOUSNESS.

CHAPTER V. CONSCIOUSNESS.

“It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and common conversation. It requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon another. Till a man doth this in the primary and original notions of things, he builds upon float

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CHAPTER VI. CONCEPTION.

CHAPTER VI. CONCEPTION.

“The generalizations of language are already made for us, before we have ourselves begun to generalize; and our mind receives the abstract phrases without any definite analysis, almost as readily as it receives and adopts the simple names of persons and things. The separate co-existing phenomena, and the separate sequences of a long succession of words, which it has been found convenient to comprehend in a single word, are hence, from the constant use of that single word, regarded by the mind al

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CHAPTER VII. IMAGINATION.

CHAPTER VII. IMAGINATION.

T HE IMAGINATION is another term, the explanation of which will be found to be included in the expositions which have previously been given. The phenomena classed under this title are explained, by modern Philosophers, on the principles of Association. Their accounts of the mental process, to which the name Imagination is applied, include their explanation of the laws of Association, or the manner in which ideas succeed one another in a train, with little else, except remarks on the causes to wh

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CHAPTER VIII. CLASSIFICATION.

CHAPTER VIII. CLASSIFICATION.

“Dans l’ordre historique, la philosophie transcendante a devancé la philosophie élémentaire. Il ne faut point s’en étonner; les grands problèmes de la métaphysique et de la morale se présentent à l’homme, dans l’enfance même de son intelligence, avec une grandeur et une obscurité qui le séduisent et qui l’attirent. L’homme, qui se sent fait pour connoître, court d’abord à la vérité avec plus d’ardeur que de sagesse; il cherche à deviner ce qu’il ne peut comprendre, et se perd dans des conjecture

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CHAPTER IX. ABSTRACTION.

CHAPTER IX. ABSTRACTION.

“I think, too, that he (Mr. Locke) would have seen the advantage of ‘thoroughly weighing,’ not only (as he says) ‘the imperfections of Language;’ but its perfections also: For the perfections of Language, not properly understood, have been one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our knowledge.”— Diversions of Purley , by John Horne Tooke, A.M. , i. 37. T HE two cases of Consciousness, CLASSIFICATION , and ABSTRACTION , have not, generally, been well distinguished. According to the common

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CHAPTER X. MEMORY.

CHAPTER X. MEMORY.

“The science of metaphysics, as it regards the mind, is, in its most important respects, a science of analysis; and we carry on our analysis, only when we suspect that what is regarded by others as an ultimate principle, admits of still finer evolution into principles still more elementary.”— Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect , by Thomas Brown, M.D. P. iv. s. i. p. 331. I T has been already observed that if we had no other state of consciousness than sensation, we never could have an

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CHAPTER XI. BELIEF.

CHAPTER XI. BELIEF.

“Cette recherche peut infiniment contribuer aux progrès de l’art de raisonner; elle le peut seule développer jusques dans ses premiers principes. En effet, nous ne découvrirons pas une manière sûre de conduire constamment nos pensées; si nous ne savons pas comment elles se sont formées.”— Condillac , Traité des Sensations , p. 460. I T is not easy to treat of MEMORY , BELIEF , and JUDGMENT , separately. For, in the rude and unskilful manner in which naming has been performed, the states of consc

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CHAPTER XII. RATIOCINATION.

CHAPTER XII. RATIOCINATION.

“It would afford great light and clearness to the art of Logic, to determine the precise nature and composition of the ideas affixed to those words which have complex ideas; i.e. , which excite any combinations of simple ideas, united intimately by association.”— Hartley . Prop. 12, Corol. 3. R ATIOCINATION is one of the most complicated of all the mental phenomena. And it is worthy of notice, that more was accomplished towards the analysis of it, at an early period in the history of intellectua

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CHAPTER XIII. EVIDENCE.

CHAPTER XIII. EVIDENCE.

“In consequence of some very wonderful laws, which regulate the successions of our mental phenomena, the science of mind is, in all its most important respects, a science of analysis.” Brown’s Lect. , i., 108. B EFORE leaving the subject of Belief, it will be proper to shew, in a few words, what is included, under the name Evidence. Evidence, is either the same thing with Belief, or it is the antecedent, of which Belief is the consequent. Belief we have seen to be of two sorts: Belief of events;

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APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

( From “An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.” ) W E have seen Sir. W. Hamilton at work on the question of the reality of Matter, by the introspective method, and, as it seems, with little result. Let us now approach the same subject by the psychological. I proceed, therefore, to state the case of those who hold that the belief in an external world is not intuitive, but an acquired product. This theory postulates the following psychological truths, all of which are proved by exper

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE BELIEF IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE BELIEF IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD.

Setting out from these premises, the Psychological Theory maintains, that there are associations naturally and even necessarily generated by the order of our sensations and of our reminiscences of sensation, which, supposing no intuition of an external world to have existed in consciousness, would inevitably generate the belief, and would cause it to be regarded as an intuition. What is it we mean, or what is it which leads us to say, that the objects we perceive are external to us, and not a pa

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CHAPTER XIV. SOME NAMES WHICH REQUIRE A PARTICULAR EXPLANATION.

CHAPTER XIV. SOME NAMES WHICH REQUIRE A PARTICULAR EXPLANATION.

“Quam difficile sit inveteratas, eloquentissimorumque scriptorum authoritate confirmatas, opiniones, mentibus hominum excutere, non ignoro. Præsertim cum philosophia vera (id est accurata) orationis non modo fucum, sed etiam omnia fere ornamenta ex professo rejiciat: cumque scientiæ omnis fundamenta prima non modo speciosa non sint, sed etiam humilia, arida, et pene deformia videantur.”— Hobbes Comput. sive Logica , cap. i. s. I. W E have now seen that, in what we call the mental world, Consciou

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SECTION I. NAMES OF NAMES.

SECTION I. NAMES OF NAMES.

It is of great importance to distinguish this class of terms; to understand well the function which they perform, and to mark the subdivisions into which they are formed. There is not, however, such difficulty in the subject as to require great minuteness in the exposition. As we have occasion to speak of things ; animals, vegetables, minerals; so we have occasion to speak of the marks , which we are under the necessity of using, in order to record or to communicate our thoughts respecting them.

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SECTION II. RELATIVE TERMS.

SECTION II. RELATIVE TERMS.

The explanation of Relative Terms will run to a considerable length. The mode in which they are employed as marks is peculiar; and has suggested the belief of something very mysterious in that which is marked by them. It is therefore necessary to be minute in exhibiting the combinations of ideas of which they are the names. One peculiarity of Relative Terms, which it is necessary for us to begin with noticing, is, that they always exist in pairs. There is no relative without its correlate, eithe

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SECTION III. NUMBERS.

SECTION III. NUMBERS.

We have already observed, that objects exist, with respect to us, in two orders; in the synchronous order, and the successive order; and that we have great occasion for marks to represent them to us as they exist in both orders. We have also to observe, that the synchronous order, the order in which things exist together; that is, as we otherwise name it, the order of position, or the order in place; is interesting to us chiefly on account of the successive order. The order in which objects succ

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SECTION IV. PRIVATIVE TERMS.

SECTION IV. PRIVATIVE TERMS.

Privative terms are distinguished from other terms, by this; that other terms are marks for objects, as present or existent; privative terms are marks for objects, as not present or not existent. 24 24 The author gives the name of Privative terms to all those which are more commonly known by the designation of Negative; to all which signify non-existence or absence. It is usual to reserve the term Privative for names which signify not simple absence, but the absence of something usually present,

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SECTION V. TIME.

SECTION V. TIME.

As S PACE is a comprehensive word, including all Positions, or the whole of synchronous order; so T IME is a comprehensive word, including all Successions, or the whole of successive order. The difficulty of the exposition, in this case, consists not in the ideas; for they are clear and certain enough; but in finding expressions which will have even a chance of conveying to readers, who are not familiar with the analysis of mental phenomena, the ideas which it is my object to impart. As all obje

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SECTION VI. MOTION.

SECTION VI. MOTION.

It is necessary to take notice of this term, because the idea which is named by it is apt to present the appearance of something mysterious, though, after the expositions with which we are now familiar, the materials of which it is compounded, will not be difficult to find. The word Motion, is the abstract of Moving. What we have to investigate, therefore, are the sensations, on account of which, we call a body “moving;” motion being merely moving, the connotation dropped. All motion is in a Lin

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SECTION VII. IDENTITY.

SECTION VII. IDENTITY.

There is one other term, which still requires explanation; and that is, I DENTITY , about which there would not have appeared any difficulty, had it not been for Personal Identity; which is, indeed, a complicated case, and, of course, involves the obscurity which great complexity implies. We have already seen, on what account we use the marks, same, and different, when we apply them to two simple sensations, or when we apply them to two ideas, simple, or complex. In these cases, the terms are re

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CHAPTER XV. REFLECTION.

CHAPTER XV. REFLECTION.

S O much use has been made of the word R EFLECTION , and results of so much importance have been referred to it, that it is necessary to shew what state of Consciousness it denotes, in all the possible acceptations of it. Mr. Locke defines it, “That notice which the mind takes of its own operations.” When we have a sensation, we have already seen, on various occasions, that the having the state of consciousness, and taking notice of it, are not two things, but one and the same thing. When we say

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CHAPTER XVI. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INTELLECTUAL AND ACTIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

CHAPTER XVI. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INTELLECTUAL AND ACTIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

“It is the greatest triumph of philosophy to refer many, and seemingly very various, phenomena, to one, or a very few, simple principles: and the more simple and evident such a principle is, provided it be truly applicable to all the cases in question, the greater is its value and scientific beauty.”— Elements of Logic , by Dr. Whately , p. 32. T HE Phenomena of Thought have long appeared to be divisible into two great classes; which were distinguished by the names, the one of the Intellectual,

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CHAPTER XVII. PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS.

CHAPTER XVII. PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS.

T HERE is a remarkable difference of sensations, which has been mentioned before, but which must now be more particularly attended to. Some sensations, probably the greater number, are what we call indifferent. They are not considered as either painful, or pleasurable. There are sensations, however, and of frequent recurrence, some of which are painful, some pleasurable. The difference is, that which is felt. A man knows it, by feeling it; and this is the whole account of the phenomenon. I have

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CHAPTER XVIII. CAUSES OF THE PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS.

CHAPTER XVIII. CAUSES OF THE PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS.

N EXT in order to the Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, it is necessary to take notice of the causes of them. We can generally trace them to certain constant antecedents; and it is evidently of the greatest importance to us to be able to do so; as it is by those means only, we can lessen the number of the painful sensations, increase the number of the pleasurable. Of the causes of our Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, it is necessary to distinguish two classes; first, the immediate causes; s

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CHAPTER XIX. IDEAS OF THE PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, AND OF THE CAUSES OF THEM.

CHAPTER XIX. IDEAS OF THE PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, AND OF THE CAUSES OF THEM.

W E have already seen, that all sensations are capable of being revived, without that action on the organs of sense which originally produced them; and that, when so revived, we call them ideas or copies of the sensations. The sensations which are pleasurable and painful, are revived in the same manner as those which are indifferent; but, as the sensations which are pleasurable and painful form a class of sensations remarkably distinguished from sensations of the indifferent class, the ideas of

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CHAPTER XX. THE PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, CONTEMPLATED AS PASSED OR AS FUTURE.

CHAPTER XX. THE PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, CONTEMPLATED AS PASSED OR AS FUTURE.

W E have considered, what the pleasurable and painful sensations are when present; what the ideas of them, considered as present, are; and what the ideas of their causes. Those sensations, however, together with their causes, we may contemplate, either as passed, or as future: and so contemplated, they give rise to some of the most interesting states of the human mind. To contemplate any feeling as Passed, is to remember it; and the explanation of Memory we need not repeat. To contemplate any fe

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CHAPTER XXI. THE CAUSES OF PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, CONTEMPLATED AS PASSED, OR AS FUTURE. SECTION I. THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, CONTEMPLATED AS PASSED, OR AS FUTURE.

CHAPTER XXI. THE CAUSES OF PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, CONTEMPLATED AS PASSED, OR AS FUTURE. SECTION I. THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, CONTEMPLATED AS PASSED, OR AS FUTURE.

B ESIDE the Sensations, the Causes of them are capable of being contemplated, both as passed, and as future. It may be regarded as remarkable, that though the idea or thought of a disagreeable sensation, as passed, is nearly indifferent, the thought of the cause of a painful passed sensation is often a very interesting state of consciousness. This state of consciousness we sometimes call Antipathy, sometimes Hatred; though hatred, as we shall afterwards see, is more frequently the name of the Mo

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SECTION II. THE REMOTE CAUSES OF PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, CONTEMPLATED AS PAST, OR FUTURE.

SECTION II. THE REMOTE CAUSES OF PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL SENSATIONS, CONTEMPLATED AS PAST, OR FUTURE.

Before entering into the detail of this part of the subject, one important observation is to be made; that the remote causes of our Pains and Pleasures are apt to be objects, far more deeply interesting, than those which are immediate. This at first sight appears paradoxical. It is the necessary result, however, of the general Law of our nature. The immediate causes of our pleasurable and painful sensations have never any very extensive operation. The idea of any one is rarely associated with mo

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CHAPTER XXII. MOTIVES. SECTION I. PLEASURABLE OR PAINFUL STATES, CONTEMPLATED AS CONSEQUENTS OF OUR OWN ACTS.

CHAPTER XXII. MOTIVES. SECTION I. PLEASURABLE OR PAINFUL STATES, CONTEMPLATED AS CONSEQUENTS OF OUR OWN ACTS.

I N contemplating pains and pleasures as future; in other words, anticipating them, or believing in their future existence; we observe, that, in certain cases, they are independent of our actions; in other cases, that they are consequent upon something which may be done, or left undone by us. Thus, in certain cases, we foresee that a painful sensation or sensations will be given us, but that something may be done by us which will prevent it: Again, that a pleasurable sensation, or sensations wil

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SECTION II. CAUSES OF OUR PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL STATES, CONTEMPLATED AS THE CONSEQUENTS OF OUR OWN ACTS.

SECTION II. CAUSES OF OUR PLEASURABLE AND PAINFUL STATES, CONTEMPLATED AS THE CONSEQUENTS OF OUR OWN ACTS.

The motives which are formed by the association of our actions, not with our pleasures immediately, but the causes of them, are much more numerous than those which are formed by the association of them with the pleasures themselves; and give birth to a much greater number of actions. The cause of this we have already explained, and need not explain it again. The causes of our Pleasures, including as well the remote as the proximate, are so numerous, that it is necessary to speak of them in class

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CHAPTER XXIII. THE ACTS OF OUR FELLOW-CREATURES, WHICH ARE CAUSES OF OUR PAINS AND PLEASURES, CONTEMPLATED AS CONSEQUENTS OF OUR OWN ACTS.

CHAPTER XXIII. THE ACTS OF OUR FELLOW-CREATURES, WHICH ARE CAUSES OF OUR PAINS AND PLEASURES, CONTEMPLATED AS CONSEQUENTS OF OUR OWN ACTS.

W E are now in a condition to explain the Phenomena, which have been classed under the titles of Moral Sense, Moral Faculty, Sense of Right and Wrong, Moral Affection, Love of Virtue, and so on, which are all names of similar import. We have already remarked, that, of all the Causes of our Pleasures and Pains, none are to be compared in point of magnitude, with the actions of ourselves, and our Fellow-creatures. From this class of causes, a far greater amount of Pleasures and Pains proceed, than

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CHAPTER XXIV. THE WILL.

CHAPTER XXIV. THE WILL.

W E have now considered the class of sensations, called Pleasurable, and Painful. We have also considered the Ideas of those sensations, or that revival of them which is capable of taking place, when the outward action upon the senses is removed. The Idea of the pleasurable sensation, and the Desire of it; the Idea of the painful sensation, and the Aversion to it; are respectively names for one and the same state of consciousness. We have also considered the Ideas of the Causes of our Pleasurabl

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CHAPTER XXV. INTENTION.

CHAPTER XXV. INTENTION.

T HE word “intend,” the concrete, seems to be employed on two occasions. 1. We are said to intend, or not to intend, certain actions of our own. 2. And we are said to intend, or not to intend, certain consequences of our own actions. We have to examine what is the state of mind which the word designates on each of those occasions. 1. We are said to intend only a future action. When the action is immediate, we are not said to INTEND , but to WILL it; an action intended, is an action of ours conte

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