The Reality Of War: A Companion To Clausewitz - free ebook by Stewart Lygon Murray

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The Reality Of War: A Companion To Clausewitz

Stewart Lygon Murray

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THE REALITY OF WAR

THE REALITY OF WAR

THE REALITY OF WAR A COMPANION TO CLAUSEWITZ BY MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE LONDON HODDER AND STOUGHTON WARWICK SQUARE, E.C. HUGH REES, LTD. 5 REGENT STREET, S.W. Reprinted in 1914...

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

EDITOR'S PREFACE

Great books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with which they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not unlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will give them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point out the most important passages in which the author himself embodies the very essence of his argument. This is what Major Murray has done for the most important work on war that was ever written. He does not give a mere d

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CHAPTER I THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ

CHAPTER I THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ

In an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the British public in even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. The wide and varied experience which the British officer gradually gains in so many different parts of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces a certain distrust of them. Also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly one of our national characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal to the British o

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Reflections

Reflections

Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers. We may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the Continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than the realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be sufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard every foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should regard him as a ma

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CHAPTER III THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ

CHAPTER III THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ

The writings of Clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published after his death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly on his three volumes "On War," which have been translated by Colonel J. J. Graham (the last edition edited by Colonel F. N. Maude, and published by Messrs. Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls them "a collection of materials," "a mass of conceptions not brought into form," and states that he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete shape. We must lament that

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Theory and Practice

Theory and Practice

One of the things for which we are most deeply indebted to Clausewitz is that he has shown us clearly the proper place of theory in relation to practice. "It should educate the mind of the future leader in war, or, rather, guide him in his self-instruction , but not accompany him on to the battlefield; just as a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping him in leading-strings all his life." 8 Again, "In real action most men are guided by the tact o

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Rejection of Set and Geometrical Theories

Rejection of Set and Geometrical Theories

"It should educate the mind of the future leader in war" is what Clausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and unreservedly rejects every attempt at a method "by which definite plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if from a machine." 10 He mocks at Bülow's including at first in the one term "base" all sorts of things, like the supply of the army, its reinforcements and equipments, the security of its communications with the home country, and last

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A Theory to be Practically Useful

A Theory to be Practically Useful

Clausewitz insists that a useful theory cannot be more than a thorough knowledge of military history and "reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war." "What genius does must be just the best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show just how and why it is so." "It is an analytical investigation of the subject which leads to exact knowledge: and if brought to bear on the results of experience, which in our case would be military history, to a thorough familia

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Knowledge must be Thorough

Knowledge must be Thorough

This Clausewitz considers most important. He says that "Knowledge of the conduct of war ... must pass completely into the mind , and almost cease to be something objective." For in war "The moral reaction, the ever-changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor to carry in himself the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, in order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving the requisite decision from himself . Knowledge must, by this complete assimilatio

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Reflections

Reflections

The theory of war is simple, and there is no reason why any man who chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a fair knowledge thereof. He may with reasonable trouble attain to such knowledge of the theory of war as will enable him to follow with intelligent appreciation the discussions of experienced soldier or soldiers. Such knowledge as will prevent his misunderstanding the experienced soldier's argumen

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Reflections

Reflections

This is so true, that every war since the days of Clausewitz has made its truth more apparent. Since he wrote, the participation of the people in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized fact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. To-day every State except Great Britain, securely based on the system of the universal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its interests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual, and material, of its whole

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Reflections

Reflections

(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in Britain were a nation of 18,000,000, practically self-supporting, and governed by an aristocracy. To-day we are a crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw materials, for our trade, for our staying power, and we are governed by a democracy. In a modern democratic State it will only be possible to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships brought on the democracy by the war

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The Political Nature of War

The Political Nature of War

In endeavouring briefly to describe Clausewitz's method of looking at war, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant passages. However, a selection must be made. I assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy, because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical way of looking at things. This point of view is as necessary for the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for e

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The Culminating Point of Victory

The Culminating Point of Victory

Secondly, I select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory, because that is essential in order to understand his division of all wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating point, where reaction may set in. 20 "The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his adversary completely. Often, in fact almost universally, there is a culminating point of victory . Experience shows

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The Two Classes of Wars

The Two Classes of Wars

From this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the two classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars. "The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the complete overthrow of the enemy , whether it be that we aim at his destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and, next , those in which our aim is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them p

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Preparation for War

Preparation for War

The third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to Clausewitz's clear statement that— "If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal classes, into such as are only preparations for war and into the war itself . This distinction must also be made in theory." Nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater honour peace preparations. Like his doctrine of the importance

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Friction in War

Friction in War

I place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual war, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway between the two. Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. He always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be

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War Itself

War Itself

In Clausewitz's way of looking at war itself I assign at once the first place to his doctrine, " The destruction of the enemy's military force is the leading principle of war , and for the whole chapter of positive action the direct way to the aim ." 29 This dictum, repeated in many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. All the old theoretical ideas about threatening by manœuvring, conquering by manœuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manœuvring, and so forth, in which his

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Simple Plans

Simple Plans

The second place I assign to his doctrine of the simplest plans , because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions, but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have time for wide-reaching skilful combination." 32 "By this it appears to us that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are complicated is conclusively shown." "We must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the opponent will get his thrust in first. "Whenever thi

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Strategic Lines

Strategic Lines

The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation, and lines of manœuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing a part,—for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on "The Geometrical Element," 33 he says, "We therefore do not hesitate to regard it as an established truth that in strategy more depends upon the number and magni

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Friction

Friction

has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about its components....

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Danger

Danger

"An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger. "Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under notice here." 35...

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Bodily Exertion

Bodily Exertion

Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul." "Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction." 36 To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the awful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round Leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen bodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde of stragglers,

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Information in War

Information in War

" The foundation of all our ideas and actions ," but "in a few words, most reports are false ." "When in the thick of war itself one report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability." In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and groping uncertainly for

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The Moral and Physical

The Moral and Physical

"And therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in this book are composed half of physical, half of moral causes and effects , and we might say that the physical are almost no more than the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real bright polished weapon." 38 Pages might be filled with extracts showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader is already convinced of that. Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral is to the physical as thre

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Tension and Rest in War

Tension and Rest in War

In order not to weary the reader I will bring this chapter to a conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest; the suspension of the act in warfare." This is explanatory of those frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. These halts are due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty, irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc. In this connection one must remember that

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Reflections

Reflections

(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So that is how Clausewitz regards International Law, Clausewitz to whom in Germany "our most famous victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training," and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." And we must regard nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time that we should cease to pin our faith on

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Some Knowledge of War necessary for Statesmen

Some Knowledge of War necessary for Statesmen

"From this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things a necessary conflict between the political and military interests, and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as imperfect knowledge only. That policy makes demands upon the war which it cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that it knows the instrument it is going to use , therefore contrary to a natural and indispensable supposition ." " None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be

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The War Minister

The War Minister

"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the principal qualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind, strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another."...

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Policy and the means to carry out that Policy must Harmonize

Policy and the means to carry out that Policy must Harmonize

" If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy to accommodate itself to the means available for war , there is only one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are not combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an ex-officio member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions." "The influence of any military man except the gen

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Reflections

Reflections

We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree. Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy. Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of his profession; that part which deals

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Superiority in Numbers What is Required for Strategic Certainty

Superiority in Numbers What is Required for Strategic Certainty

Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception, that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and when it was impossibl

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The Decisive Point

The Decisive Point

If the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point? Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz. Jomini, even after Napoleon, confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre of war, but Clausewitz clears the air by asserting only one . "But whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against which we are to direct our ultimate operations, still the conquest and destruction of his

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The Simultaneous Use of all the Forces

The Simultaneous Use of all the Forces

"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and destined for a strategic object should be simultaneously applied to it. And this application will be all the more complete the more everything is compressed into one act and one moment." 46 This he calls " the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in strategy ." 47 "In strategy we can never employ too many forces." 48 "What can be looked upon in tactics

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Concentration

Concentration

"It is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said Napoleon. To concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the enemy will be making a similar attempt. "The calculation of time and space appears the most essential thing to this end. But the calculation of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither the most difficul

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The First Pitched Battle

The First Pitched Battle

"The more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as well as of every other contest, that he must and will conquer, the more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. Napoleon hardly ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at once in the first battle." 54 " At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the first battle , because an unfavourable issue is always a di

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Pursuit

Pursuit

"Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever else appears as a rallying point for the enemy." 58 Clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires GREAT force of WILL on the part of

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Summary of Strategic Principles

Summary of Strategic Principles

Leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical thoughts, I hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at Clausewitz's admirable summary 59 of strategic principles:— " The first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves is to employ ALL the forces which we can make available with the UTMOST ENERGY . Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it is extremely unwise not to make it perfectly certain . " The second principle is to concentrate our forc

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Reflections

Reflections

When we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of our knowledge. For principles are no use unless we apply them. On consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all apply these principles with advantage. I. It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about, to search for indications of their application in the

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The Genius for War

The Genius for War

In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius for war" 60 he sets forth the difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius, the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of war. It is impossible to abstract it adequately; I can only advise all to read it for themselves. But I will endeavour to give an idea of it. After discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general, physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength of body an

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Reflections

Reflections

(1) In connection with these difficulties I would like to put forward a suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though not exactly Clausewitz's, is a corollary from Clausewitz. It is this. In reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in the previous chapter. But we must assume that the defeated general was familiar w

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Flank Attacks

Flank Attacks

The endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own, on which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers, he regards as a NATURAL instinct, which will ALWAYS produce itself both in generals and subalterns. "From this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great and small combats, a PERFECT INSTINCT , which is the security of our own line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from the conception of victory, which, as we have se

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Reserves—Destructive and Decisive Act

Reserves—Destructive and Decisive Act

The combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of moral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops. The combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act. During the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the troops engaged gradually wear each other out, and gradually almost cease to count as factors in the decision. "After a fire combat of some hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe losses—for instanc

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Duration of the Combat

Duration of the Combat

"Even the resistance of an ordinary division of 8,000 or 10,000 men of all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in numbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not too preponderating. And if the enemy is only a little or not at all superior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. A corps of three or four divisions will prolong it to double that time; an army of 80,000 or 100,000 men to three or four times." "These calculations are the result of exper

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Attack and Defence

Attack and Defence

I have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed points in Clausewitz. In considering these I shall quote a good deal from General von Caemmerer's "Development of Strategical Science," as in such matters it is best to quote the most recent authors of established reputation. The most important of these, and the most disputed, is Clausewitz's famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war." "The defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; th

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The Inner Line

The Inner Line

A second disputed point is Clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule, for the Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary to remember that that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting on concentric lines. And he is not in any way wedded to the Inner Line, like Jomini, but only when circumstances are favourable. He has many sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and telegraph

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Frontal Attacks

Frontal Attacks

A third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic method of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. Breaking the line by a frontal attack was, of course, much easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only natural that Clausewitz in his writings should give it the full tactical importance which it then deserved. His book would not be true to the tactical conditions o

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Tactical versus Strategical Envelopment

Tactical versus Strategical Envelopment

A fourth disputed point is the preference of Clausewitz, owing to his insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged beforehand. In this matter I will again quote General v. Caemmerer, who disagrees with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims the oblique front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to say, when the whol

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The Improved Net-work of Roads

The Improved Net-work of Roads

The improved net-work of roads in Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria, or in Afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in Europe), as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now offers to the movements of armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one or two only were available," easier gradients, good bridges instead of unreliable ones, etc. So that the march-discipline of that day when concentrated for battle, artillery and train on the roads, infantry and cav

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Railways

Railways

"Railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'" remarks V. Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles, and materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired point of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating enormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his own frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. One does not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is specially prepared

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Telegraphs

Telegraphs

The telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation. The great advantage of the inner line in the day of Napoleon and of Clausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted messengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate at all, nor act in concert. This the telegraph has completely altered, for as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can advance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day arrange combined o

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Maps

Maps

We now possess complete detailed Ordnance maps of every country in Europe, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days of Clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite unreliable in comparison....

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Improved Arms

Improved Arms

Smokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles, the infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery five times what it was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be borne in mind when reading the tactical part of his writings. In consequence, also, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater importance now than then, etc., etc., etc....

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Aviation

Aviation

The recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost revolutionize "Information in War." To what extent, it is as yet impossible to say. Each year will teach us more....

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The Nation-in-Arms

The Nation-in-Arms

The nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our own), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern battle from what they were in Clausewitz's day. Compare Austerlitz, Dresden, Leipzig and Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden. It should be so with us also, for as General von der Goltz says in "The Conduct of War": "The BEST military organization is that which renders available ALL the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of war. A St

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The Moral and Spiritual Forces in War

The Moral and Spiritual Forces in War

But though these changed conditions must, of course, modify Clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete our circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, as human nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three to one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical philosopher on the actual nature of war, as the chief exponent of the moral and spiritual forces in war , will ever remain invaluable in the study of war. Consider what un

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