History Of The War In The Peninsula And In The South Of France From The Year 1807 To The Year 1814 - free ebook by William Francis Patrick Napier

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History Of The War In The Peninsula And In The South Of France From The Year 1807 To The Year 1814

William Francis Patrick Napier

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HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C. B. LT. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT. VOL. I. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET. MDCCCXXVIII. TO FIELD-MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. This History I dedicate to your Grace, because I have served long enough under your command to feel, why the Soldiers of the Tenth Legion were attached to Cæsar. W. F. P. NAPIER....

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PREFACE.

PREFACE.

For six years the Peninsula was devastated by the war of independence. The blood of France, Germany, England, Portugal, and Spain, was shed in the contest; and in each of those countries, authors, desirous of recording the sufferings, or celebrating the valour of their countrymen, have written largely touching that fierce struggle. It may therefore happen that some will demand, why I should again relate “a thrice-told tale?” I answer, that two men observing the same object, will describe it dive

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NOTICE.

NOTICE.

Of the manuscript authorities consulted for this history, those marked with the letter S. the author owes to the kindness of marshal Soult. For the notes dictated by Napoleon, and the plans of campaign sketched out by king Joseph, he is indebted to his grace the duke of Wellington. The returns of the French army were extracted from the original half monthly statements presented by marshal Berthier to the emperor Napoleon. Of the other authorities it is unnecessary to say more than that the autho

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

The hostility of the European aristocracy caused the enthusiasm of republican France to take a military direction, and forced that powerful nation into a course of policy which, however outrageous it might appear, was in reality one of necessity. Up to the treaty of Tilsit, the wars of France were essentially defensive; for the bloody contest that wasted the continent so many years was not a struggle for pre-eminence between ambitious powers, not a dispute for some accession of territory, nor fo

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

For many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family of Spain was distracted with domestic quarrels; the son’s hand was against his mother, the father’s against his son, and the court was a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest forward, while they seemed to act only for the sake of the party whose cause they espoused. Nellerto. [3] Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to the intrigues of hi

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

Joseph being proclaimed king, required the council of Castile to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the constitution; but with unexpected boldness, that body, hitherto obedient, met his orders with a remonstrance. War, virtually declared on the 2d of May, was at this time raging in all parts of the Memoir of O’Farril, and Azanza. peninsula, and the council was secretly apprized that a great misfortune had befallen the French arms. It was no longer a question between Joseph and some reluct

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

The commotion of Aranjuez had undeceived the French emperor; he perceived that he was engaged in a delicate enterprise, and that the people he had to deal with were any thing but tame and quiescent under insult. Determined, however, to persevere, he pursued his political intrigues, and, without relinquishing the hope of a successful termination to the affair by such means, he arranged a profound plan of military operations, and so distributed his forces, that, at the moment when Spain was pourin

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

All the insurrections of the Spanish provinces took place nearly at the same period; the operations of the French divisions were, of course, nearly simultaneous; I shall, therefore, narrate their proceedings separately, classing them by the effect each produced upon the stability of the intrusive government in Madrid, and commencing with the That officer had scarcely fixed his quarters at Burgos when a general movement of revolt took place. On his right, the bishop of St. Ander excited the inhab

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

When Barcelona fell into the power of the French, the Spanish garrison amounted to nearly four thousand men; but Duhesme daily fearing a riot in the Cabanes, 1st Part. city, connived at their escape in parties, and even sent the regiment of Estremadura (which was eight hundred strong) entire to Lerida, where, strange to relate, the gates were shut against it; and thus, discarded by both parties, it made its way into Zaragoza during the siege of that place. Many thousand citizens also fled from B

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

While the moveable columns of Bessieres’ corps ranged over the Asturian and Biscayan mountains, and dispersed the insurgent patriots of those provinces, Cuesta, undismayed by his defeat at Cabezon, collected another army at Benevente, and, in concert with the Gallician forces, prepared to advance again towards Burgos. Filanghieri, the captain-general of Gallicia, had organised the troops in that kingdom without difficulty, because the abundant supplies poured in from England were beginning to be

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

General Dupont received orders to march against Cadiz with a column, composed of two Swiss regiments (Preux and Reding), taken from the Spanish army, a French division of infantry under general Barbou, a division of cavalry commanded by general Fresia, a marine battalion of the imperial guards, and eighteen pieces of artillery. Three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, drawn from the army of Portugal, were to join him in Andalusia, and he was to incorporate among his troops th

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

The uninterrupted success that for so many years attended the arms of Napoleon, gave him a moral influence doubling his actual force. Exciting at once terror, admiration, and hatred, he absorbed the whole attention of an astonished world, and openly or secretly all men acknowledged the power of his wonderful genius. The continent bowed before him, and even in England an increasing number of absurd and virulent libels on his person and character indicated the growth of secret fear. His proceeding

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

The first serious blow was struck at Oporto; the news of what had taken place all over Spain was known there in June. General Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable and resolute part. He made the French general Quesnel, with his staff, prisoners; after which, calling together the Portuguese authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Gallicia with his army and captives. The opinions of t

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The subjugation of Portugal was neither a recent nor a secret project of Napoleon’s. His intentions with respect to the house of Braganza were known in 1806 to Mr. Fox, who sent lord Roslyn, lord St. Parliamentary Papers, 1809. Vincent, and general Simcoe on a politico-military mission to Lisbon, instructing them not only to warn the court that a French force destined to invade Portugal was assembling at Bayonne, but to offer the assistance of an English army to repel the danger. The cabinet of

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

A few days after sailing from Cork, sir Arthur Wellesley quitting the fleet, repaired in a frigate to Coruña, where he arrived the 20th of July, and immediately held a conference with the members of Sir A. Wellesley’s Narrative. Court of Inquiry. the Gallician junta, by whom he was informed of the battle of Rio Seco; but the account was glossed over in the Spanish manner, and the issue of that contest had caused no change in their policy, if policy that may be called, which was but a desire to o

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

The day on which the combat of Roriça was fought the insurgents attacked Abrantes, and the feeble garrison being ill commanded, gave way, and was destroyed. The 19th sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position at Vimiero, a village near the sea-coast, and from thence sent a detachment to cover the march of general Anstruther’s brigade, which had, with great difficulty and some loss, been that morning landed on an open sandy beach called the bay of Maceira. The French cavalry scoured the neighbouring

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

The interview that took place at Vimiero between don Bernardim Freire d’Andrada and sir Hew Dalrymple has been already noticed as the commencement of an intrigue of some consequence. The Portuguese general objected at the time to the armistice just concluded with Kellerman, ostensibly upon general grounds, but really, as it appeared, to sir Hew, because the bishop and junta of Oporto were not named in the instrument. At the desire of Freire, one Ayres Pinto de Souza was received at the English h

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

The convention of Cintra being followed by the establishment of a regency at Lisbon, the plans of the bishop and junta of Oporto were disconcerted, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative tranquillity; for the Portuguese people being of a simple character, when they found their country relieved from the presence of a French army, readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the factious prelate and his mischievous c

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

With the military affairs thus mismanaged, the civil and political transactions proceeded step by step, and in the same crooked path. Short as the period was between the first breaking forth of the insurrection, and Mr. Stuart’s Letters. Parliamentary Papers. the arrival of Mr. Stuart at Coruña, it was sufficient to create disunion of the worst kind. The juntas of Leon, of the Asturias, and of Gallicia, were at open discord, and those provinces were again split into parties, hating each other wi

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The French emperor, although surprised and chagrined at the disgrace which, for the first time, his armies had sustained, was nothing dismayed by a resistance which he had early contemplated as not improbable. With a piercing glance he had observed the efforts of Spain, and calculated the power of foreign influence in keeping alive the spirit of resistance. Assigning a just value to the succours which England could afford, he foresaw the danger which might accrue, if he suffered an insurrection

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

In the preceding chapters I have exposed the weakness, the folly, the improvidence of Spain, and shown how the bad passions and sordid views of her leaders were encouraged by the unwise prodigality of England. I have dissected the full boast and meagre preparations of the governments in both countries; laying bare the bones and sinews of the insurrection; and by comparing their loose and feeble structure with the strongly knitted frame and large proportions of the enemy, prepared the reader for

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

The emperor overruled the offensive projects of the king, and the latter was forced to distribute the centre and right wing in a manner more consonant to the spirit of Napoleon’s instructions; but he still neglected to occupy Tudela, and covered his left wing by the Aragon river. The 18th of September the French army was posted in the following manner: Total 90,289 present under arms, exclusive of the troops in Catalonia. Hence the communication being secured, the fortresses garrisoned, and the

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

After the opening of the legislative sessions, the emperor quitted Paris, and repaired to Bayonne. He arrived there on the 3d of November. It was his intention that the presumption of the Spanish generals should be encouraged by a strict defensive system until the moment, when the blow he was prepared to strike, could fall with the greatest effect. The precipitate attack at Zornosa displeased him, and he was also dissatisfied with the subsequent measures of the king. S. Journal of the king’s ope

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

The French patroles sent towards the Somosierra ascertained, on the 21st, that above six thousand men were entrenching themselves in the gorge of the mountains; that a small camp at Sepulveda blocked the roads leading upon Segovia; and that general Heredia was preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon, however, having resolved to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue the army of the centre without intermission, and d

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The 20th of December, Napoleon became aware that sir John Moore (having relinquished his communication with Lisbon, and adopted a new one upon Coruña) was menacing the French line of operations on the side of Burgos. This intelligence obliged him to suspend all his designs against the south of Spain and Portugal, and to fix his whole attention upon The reasons which induced the English general to divide his army, and to send general Hope with one column by the Tagus, while the other marched unde

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

The forward movement of the British army commenced on the 11th of December. Sir John Moore’s first intention was to march with his own and Hope’s division to Valladolid, with a view to cover the advance of his stores and to protect the junction of sir David Baird’s troops, the rear of which was still several marches behind Astorga. The preparations for a retreat upon Portugal were, however, continued, and sir David was ordered to form magazines at Benevente, Astorga, Villa Franca, and Lugo. This

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

The duke of Dalmatia, a general, who, if the emperor be excepted, was no wise inferior to any of his nation, commenced his pursuit of the English army with a vigour that marked his eager desire to finish the campaign in a manner suitable to the brilliant opening at Gamonal. The main body of his troops followed the route of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada, a second column took S. Journal of Operations. MS. the road of Cambarros and Bembibre, and general Franceschi, with the light cavalry, entering th

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

Mr. Canning, in an official communication to the Spanish deputies in London, observed, that “the conduct of the campaign in Portugal was unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the brilliant successes with which it opened.” In the relation of that campaign it has been shown how little the activity and foresight of the cabinet contributed to those successes, and the following short analysis will prove that, with respect to the campaign in Spain, the proceedings of the ministers were marked by tardiness

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No. I.

No. I.

3 e Observation .—Si le maréchal Bessières, arrivé devant Bénavente, reste en présence sans attaquer le g al Cuesta, ou s’il est repoussé, son but sera toujours de couvrir Burgos, en tenant le plus possible l’ennemi en échec; il peut être renforcé de 3000 hommes de troupes de ligne, qui accompagnent le roi, mais alors il n’y a point à hésiter. Si le maréchal Bessières a fait une marche rétrograde sans bataille, il faut sur le champ lui envoyer 6000 hommes de renforts. S’il a fait son mouvement a

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No. II.

No. II.

S’il obtenait à Bénévent et à Léon un grand succès contre l’armée de Galice, peut-être serait-il convenable pour profiter de la victoire et de la terreur des premiers moments de se jetter dans la Galice. Toutesfois, il devrait d’abord prendre position à Léon, en s’emparant de la plaine, jettant l’ennemi dans les montagnes, et interceptant au moins à Astorga la communication de la grande route. Garnison de Burgos .—Il y a dans le château de Burgos une garnison de dépôt [28] Les détachemens et tro

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No. III.

No. III.

8 me Observation. —Le général Verdier, en Arragon, a cerné Saragosse: le 14 eme et le 44 eme de ligne partent demain pour s’y rendre. Les partis Français vont jusqu’à moitié chemin de Lerida, de Barbastro, et de Jaca. Dans dix jours toute l’artillerie sera arrivée. Cette belle et bonne brigade de troupes de ligne porte à près de quinze mille hommes l’armée du général Verdier. Il est probable que Saragosse tombera bientôt, et que les deux tiers de ces 15 milles hommes deviendrons disposibles. 9 e

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No. IV.

No. IV.

Au lieu qu’en occupant la position de Milagro, l’ennemi sera à Estella, le même jour qu’on l’apprendra au quartier général. Si on occupe Tudela, il faut s’y aider de redoutes, et s’y établir, n’y conserver aucune espèce d’embarras, et les tenir tous dans Pampelune. Si l’ennemi l’occupe, il faut l’en chasser, et s’y établir; car dans l’ordre défensif, ce serait une grande faute, qui entrainerait de fâcheuses consequences. 2 e Observation. —La position de Burgos était également importante à tenir,

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No. V.

No. V.

Il faut donc occuper Tudela. Ce point est tellement important qu’il serait à desirer qu’on put employer un mois à le fortifier et à s’y retrancher de manière qu’un millier d’hommes avec 8 à 10 pièces de canon s’y trouvassent en sûreté et à l’abri de toutes les insurrections possibles. Il ne faut pas surtout souffrir que les revoltés s’y retranchât; ce serait deux sièges au lieu d’une; et il serait impossible de prendre Sarragosse avant d’avoir Tudela, à cause du canal. On trouvera ci-joint des o

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No. VI.

No. VI.

Le corps de droite occupe le pays depuis Burgos jusqu’à Pancorvo, et Ponte de Lara. Le corps de gauche depuis Tudela jusqu’à Logroño. Le corps du centre depuis Logroño jusqu’à Haro. La reserve Miranda. La nouvelle position prise par l’armée depuis que les événemens de l’Andalousie avaient fait présager une guerre réelle en Espagne, était évidemment commandée par les simples notions de la saine raison, qui ne pouvait permettre sa séparation à plus de dix jours de marche, de trois corps d’armée, d

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No. VII.

No. VII.

EXTRAIT DE LA LETTRE, &amp;c. &amp;c. Bayonne, 18 Juillet, 1808, à dix heures du soir. Section 3. —Je reçois, général, vos lettres du 14. L’aide-de-camp du maréchal Moncey a donné à sa majesté tous les détails sur ce qui s’est passé. La conduite du maréchal a été belle. Il a bien battu les rebelles en campagne. Il est tout simple qu’il n’ait pu entrer à Valence; c’étoit une affaire de mortiers et de pièces de siège. Sa position à San Clement est bonne, de là il est à même de remarcher su

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No. VIII.

No. VIII.

Palermo, July 24th, 1808. DEAR SIR, This letter will be delivered to you by his royal highness prince Leopold, second son of the king of the Two Sicilies. This prince goes immediately to Gibraltar to communicate immediately with the loyal Spaniards, and to notify to them that his father will accept the regency, if they desire it, until his nephew Ferdinand the Seventh be delivered from captivity. Don Leopold and his cousin the duke of Orleans will offer themselves as soldiers to the Spaniards, a

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No. IX.

No. IX.

The Spanish troops retired on the 15th to Benevente, and I understand there has since been an affair between the advanced posts in that neighbourhood, but I am not certain of it; nor am I acquainted with the position of the Spanish army, or of that of the French, since the 14th July. When you will have been a short time in this country, and will have observed the degree to which the deficiency of real information is supplied by the circulation of unfounded reports, you will not be surprised at m

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No. X.

No. X.

Art. 6. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is however fully understood that the means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal of the British commanders, are very limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon. The number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed 600, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed 200. At all events every facility will be given to the French army to dis

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No. XI.

No. XI.

(Signed) Frederick Von Decken , brig. gen. 2d. DITTO TO DITTO. Oporto, August 22, 1808. Your excellency will have received the secret letter which I had the honour to send you by brigadier-general Stuart, on the 18th, respecting the communication of his excellency the bishop of Oporto relative to his resignation of the government into the hands of the regency established by the prince regent.—In addition to what I have had the honour to state upon that subject, I beg leave to add, that his excel

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No. XII.

No. XII.

(Dated) Estremos, 16th September, 1808 . To the most illustrious and most excellent sir Hew Dalrymple. EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JOHN HOPE. Head-quarters, Benefico, 25th Sept. 1808. SIR, Impediments having arisen to the fulfilment of that article of the convention which relates to the cession of Elvas by the French to the British army, in consequence of the unexpected and unaccountable conduct of the commander in chief of the army of Estremadura, in bom

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No. XIII.

No. XIII.

Sir John Moore to sir David Baird, October 22, 1808. “We are in such want of money at this place that it is with difficulty I have been able to spare 8000l., which went to you in the Champion this day.” Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, October 27. “It is upon the general assurance of the Spanish government that I am leading the army into Spain without any established magazines. In this situation nothing is more essentially requisite than money, and unfortunately we have been able to procure v

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No. XIV.

No. XIV.

Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh. Salamanca, Dec. 10, 1808. “I certainly think the cause desperate, because I see no determined spirit any where, unless it be at Zaragoza. There is however a chance, and whilst there is that I think myself bound to run all risks to support it I am now differently situated from what I was when Castaños was defeated: I have been joined by general Hope, the artillery, and all the cavalry (lord Paget, with three regiments, is at Toro); and my junction with sir Davi

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No. XV.

No. XV.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE AUTHOR. “Dans la même lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’écrire vous me priez aussi, monsieur, de vous donner quelques lumières sur la poursuite de Mr. le général sir John Moore, quand il fit sa retraite sur la Corogne en 1809. Je ne pense pas que vous désiriez des détails sur cette operation, car ils doivent vous être parfaitement connus, mais je saisirai avec empressement l’occasion que vous me procurez pour rendre à la mémoire de si

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No. XVI.

No. XVI.

LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE. London, Dec. 10, 1808. “SIR, “The messenger, Mills, arrived here yesterday with your despatches, No. 19 to No. 26 inclusive; and at the same time advices were received from lieutenant-general sir David Baird, dated on the 29th ultimo at Astorga, which state that general to have received intelligence from sir John Moore of the complete defeat of general Castaños’s army, and of the determination taken by sir John Moore, in consequence, to fall back upon Portug

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No. XVII.

No. XVII.

(Signed) “George Canning .” EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO MR. FRERE, OF THE SAME DATE AS THE ABOVE. December 10, 1808. “The timely preparation of the fleets of France and Spain, now in the harbour of Cadiz, is also a point to be pressed by you with earnestness, but at the same time with all the delicacy which belongs to it. In the event of an emigration to America it is obvious that this preparation should be made beforehand. And in the case of this project not being adopted, and of

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No. XIX.

No. XIX.

BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. RORIÇA, 17th AUG. 1808. Extracted from the adjutant-general’s states....

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No. XX.

No. XX.

BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE. VIMIERO, 21st AUG. 1808. Extracted from the adjutant-general’s states....

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No. XXI.

No. XXI.

RETURN OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE’S ARMY, OCT. 1, 1808. Head-quarters, Bemfica....

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No. XXIII.

No. XXIII.

THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE MADE BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK IN 1808 Proves that sixty thousand men could have been provided for the campaign of 1808-9 in Spain , without detriment to other services. “Of this force the 20th dragoons and 8 battalions should remain in Portugal. The disposeable force would then be “When to this you add 4 battalions of infantry, which may be spared, and the artillery, it will form a corps of above sixty thousand rank and file.” Note.—The detail of

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No. XXIV.

No. XXIV.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF SIR JOHN MOORE. Return of sir John Moore’s army, Dec. 19, 1808, extracted from the adjutant-general’s morning state of that day. Note.—Of 66 guns 42 were attached to the divisions, the remainder in reserve, with the exception of one brigade of 3 lbs....

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No. XXV.

No. XXV.

The following General Return, extracted from especial regimental reports, contains the whole number of non-commissioned officers and men, cavalry and infantry, lost during sir John Moore’s campaign: Of this number 200 were left in the wine-vaults of Bembibre, and nearly 500 were stragglers from the troops that marched to Vigo. Of the whole number above 800 contrived to escape to Portugal, and being united with the sick left by the regiments in that country, they formed a corps of 1876 men, which

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No. XXVI.

No. XXVI.

N.B.—Some errors may have crept into the regimental states, in consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining exactly where each man was lost, but the inaccuracies could not affect the total amount above fifty men more or less. The following states of the Spanish armies are not strictly accurate, because the original reports from whence they have been drawn were generally very loose, and often inconsistent and contradictory. Nevertheless, it is believed that the approximation is sufficiently clos

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No. XXVII.

No. XXVII.

SECTION I.—STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY CALLED THE FIRST PART OF THE ARMY OF SPAIN, DATED OCT. 1, 1808. Head-quarters, Vittoria. King Joseph, commander-in-chief. General Jourdan, major-general. General Belliard, chief of the staff. Recapitulation, extracted from the imperial states, signed by the prince of Neufchatel. Note.—At this period the Spaniards and the military agents always asserted that the French had only from 35 to 45,000 men of all weapons....

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No. XXVIII.

No. XXVIII.

The following letters from lord Collingwood did not come into my possession before the present volume was in the press. It will be seen that they corroborate many of the opinions and some of the facts that I have stated, and they will doubtless be read with the attention due to the observations of such an honourable and able man. TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE. Ocean, Gibraltar, 30th August, 1808. MY DEAR SIR, I have been in great expectation of hearing of your progress with the army, and hope the first a

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No. XXIX.

No. XXIX.

I am to sail to-day for Toulon, where every thing indicates an intention in the French to sail. Mr. Duff brought a million of dollars to Seville, and has instructions to communicate with the junta; but he appears to me to be too old to do it as major Cox has done: he is still there, and I conclude will wait for your instructions. Mr. Markland would accept with great thankfulness the proposal you made to him to go to Valencia. I beg my kind regards, &amp;c. Collingwood . P. S. Prince Leopold

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NOTICE.

NOTICE.

General Semelé’s journal, referred to in this volume, is only an unattested copy; the rest of the manuscript authorities quoted or consulted are original papers belonging to, and communications received from, the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, marshal Jourdan, Mr. Stuart, [1] sir J. Cradock, [2] sir John Moore, and other persons employed either in the British or French armies during the Peninsular War. The returns of the French army are taken from the emperor Napoleon’s original Muster Rolls

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

The effect produced in England by the unfortunate issue of sir John Moore’s campaign, was not proportionable to the importance of the subject. The people, trained to party politics, and possessing no real power to rebuke the folly of the cabinet, regarded disasters and triumphs with factious rather than with national feelings, and it was alike easy to draw the public attention from affairs of weight, and to fix it upon matters of little moment. In the beginning of 1809, the duke of York’s conduc

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

From the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives of O’Neil’s, and a great part of those from Castaños’s army, fled to Zaragoza and with such speed as to bring the first news of their own disaster. With the troops, also, came an immense number of carriages and the military chests, for the roads were wide and excellent and the pursuit was slack. The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry were astounded at this quick and unexpected calamity. They had, with a natural credulity, relied on the v

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The war being now carried into the streets of Zaragoza, the sound of the alarm-bell was heard over all the quarters of the city; and the people, assembling in crowds, filled the houses nearest to the lodgements made by the French. Additional traverses and barricadoes were constructed across the principal streets; mines were prepared in the more open spaces; and the communications from house to house were multiplied, until they formed a vast labyrinth, of which the intricate windings were only to

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

It will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1808, general Duhesme returned to Barcelona, and general Reille to Figueras; after which, the state of affairs obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon’s measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required. While the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with those already in Catalonia, an army of more than forty

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

Barcelona was now completely relieved, and the captured magazines supplied it for several months. There was no longer a Spanish army in the field; and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine thousand of the Spanish fugitives, from this and the former battle, had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. Cabanes. The people rose tumultuously, broke open the public stores, and laying hands on all the weapons they could find, rushed from place to place, as if searching for something to vent their f

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

When sir John Moore marched from Portugal, the regency, established by sir Hew Dalrymple, nominally governed that country; but the weak characters of the members, the listless habits engendered by the ancient system of misrule, the intrigues of the Oporto faction, and the general turbulence of the people soon produced an alarming state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the functions of government, justice was disregarded, insubordination and murder were hailed as indications of patriotism. War

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

It was the advanced guard of the fourth corps that had approached Merida with the intention of proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor was, as we have seen, preparing to follow: but, in the night of the 26th of December, an officer carrying Appendix, No. 2 , sections 1 and 2. the intelligence of Moore’s movement, reached Merida, and, next morning, the French fell back, and marching hastily to the Tagus, crossed it, and rejoined their main body, from which another powerful detachment was immediate

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal on the part of sir John Cradock. The absence of his best troops exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the regency, and to the grossest insults from the populace. With his reduced force, he could not expect to hold even a contracted position at the extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely to invade Portugal; and, as there was neither a native force nor a government to be depended upon, there remaine

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

Having described the unhappy condition of Portugal and given a general view of the transactions in Spain, I shall now resume the narrative of Soult’s operations, thus following the main stream of action, for the other marshals were appointed to tranquillize the provinces already overrun by the emperor, or to war down the remnants of the Spanish armies; but the duke of Dalmatia’s task was to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor is it difficult to trace him through the remainder of a campaig

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

The Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os Montes lying together, form the northern part of Portugal, the extreme breadth of either, when measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed seventy miles. The river Tamega, running north and south, and discharging itself into the Douro, forms the boundary line between them; but there is, to the west of this river, a succession of rugged mountain ridges, which, under the names of Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and Sierra de Santa Catalina,

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a variety of important operations, but before these are treated of, it is essential to narrate the contemporaneous events on the Tagus and the Guadiana, for the war was wide and complicated, and the result depended more upon the general combinations than upon any particular movements. It has been already related that marshal Victor, after making a futile attempt to surprize the marquis of Palacios, had retired to his former quarters at Toledo, and

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

When the bishop of Oporto beheld, from his station at Sarea, the final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north of Portugal, he fled to Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the regency, became a member of that body, and was soon after created patriarch; and, as I shall have occasion to shew, used his great influence in the most mischievous manner; discovering, on every occasion, the untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition. Meanwhile, the fall of Oporto enabled marshal

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

It will be remembered that the narrative of sir John Cradock’s proceedings was discontinued at the moment when that general, nothing shaken by the importunities of the regency, the representations of marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere, resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the promised reinforcements from England. While in this position, he made every exertion to obtain Appendix, No. 5 . transport for the supplies, remounts for the cavalry, and draught animals for the artille

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

After the victory at Amarante, Laborde was recalled to Oporto, but a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry were left to keep up the communication with Loison; and as the insurgent general Bonthielo had reappeared on the Lima, general Lorge’s dragoons were directed on that side. Mermet’s division was then pushed towards the Vouga, and thus the French army was extended by detachments from that river to the Tamega; and the wings separated by the Douro and occupying two sides of a triangle,

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, but on the 21st put his troops in motion upon Lugo, where general Fournier, of the 6th corps, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand Spaniards, under the command of general Mahi. But to explain this it is necessary to relate Romana’s operations, after his defeat at Monterey on the 6th of March. Having re-assembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the borders of Leon, he repair

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

The British army remained in the camp of Abrantes until the latter end of June. During this period, sir Arthur Wellesley, although burning to enter Spain, was kept back by a variety of difficulties. He had been reinforced with five thousand men immediately after his return from the Douro; and, in the preceding operations, the killed and hurt in battle did not exceed three hundred men, but the deaths by sickness were numerous. Four thousand men in hospital, and fifteen hundred employed in escort

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

In the foregoing book the real state of affairs in the Peninsula has been described; but it appeared with a somewhat different aspect to the English general, because false informations, egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to mislead sir John Moore, were renewed at this period; and the allied nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters, describing the enemy’s misery and fears: nor was

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

The English general’s resolution to halt at Talavera made little impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him, and Madrid, nay, the Pyrennees themselves, instantly rose on the view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to be the first in the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of military discipline and of the friendly warnings of sir Arthur; who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as possible with Venegas, and to beware how he

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The French rested the 29th at Salinas; but, in the night, the king marched with the 4th corps and the reserve to St. Ollalla, from whence he sent a division to relieve Toledo. The 31st, he halted. The 1st of August he marched to Illescas, a central position, from whence he could interpose between Venegas and the capital. The duke of Belluno, with the first corps, remained on the Alberche, having orders to fall upon the rear-guard of the allies, when the latter should be forced to retire, in cons

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

When the duke of Belluno retired from Salinas to Maqueda, the king, fearing that the allies were moving up the right bank of the Alberche, carried his reserve, in the night of the 3d, to Mostoles; but the fourth corps remained at Illescas, and sent strong patroles to Valdemoro. Wilson, however, retired, as we have seen, from Nombella on the 4th; and the king, no longer expecting the allies in that quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where he was joined by the fourth corps from Illescas.

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

During this short, but important campaign, the armies on both sides acted in violation of that maxim which condemns “ double external lines of operation ,” but the results vindicated the soundness of the rule. Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate to the number of the troops, the vastness of the combinations, or the reputation of the commanders, was achieved; yet, neither sir Arthur Wellesley nor the duke of Dalmatia can be justly censured, seeing that the last was controlled by the

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No. I.

No. I.

SECTION I.— GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS, SIGNED BY THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL. Note. —The imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and several thousand non-commissioned officers and old soldiers, wanted for the war in Austria, in all above 40,000 men, were struck off the rolls since the last returns. SECTION II.—RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY CORPS. SECTION III. 1st February, 1809. SECTION IV.—RETURN OF TROOPS UNDER THE IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF MA

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No. II.

No. II.

SECTION I.—STATE OF SPAIN. Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, December 17, 1808. “In consequence of the unfavourable news from Spain, yesterday, the populace, in Badajos, murdered a Spanish colonel, and one or two more of note.” Lieutenant Ellis (an officer employed to gain intelligence) to colonel Kemmis, Loboa, December 27. “The French entered Truxillo, yesterday, at eleven o’clock; and, from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate villages, might be expected to arrive at

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No. III.

No. III.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’s CORRESPONDENCE, MSS. SECTION I.—STATE OF PORTUGAL. Sir J. Cradock to sir R. Wilson, Oporto, December 8, 1808. “I press this measure” (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa Real) “upon your adoption, for many reasons, &amp;c. &amp;c.; but the more especially that it will give an impulse to military preparation in general, and tend to eradicate the notion that, since the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war is at

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No. IV.

No. IV.

SECTION I.—EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN CRADOCK’S INSTRUCTIONS. Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, December 24, 1808. “Upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon, in such strength as may render further resistance ineffectual, you will take care that measures be taken, in due time, for withdrawing both the British army and such Portuguese as may be desirous of accompanying it .”—“The British admiral will be directed to take effectual measures, with your assistance, for depriving the enemy of

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No. V.

No. V.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’S PAPERS. WANT OF SUPPLIES. Commissary Rawlings, deputy-commissary-general, to Cradock, December 22. “Your excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country. The difficulties encountered by sir J. Moore were of the most serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much drained as they now are.” WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES. Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 17th March. “I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and

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No. VI.

No. VI.

SECTION I.—MISCELLANEOUS. Captain Morgan, Lusitanian Legion, to sir J. Cradock, Lisbon, January 19, 1809. “I left sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been advised by colonel Guard to fall back; and, from his information, he imagines that sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops through Gallicia. On the other hand, he has received positive orders from you [9] to defend the frontiers , and pressing letters to that effect

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No. VII.

No. VII.

EXTRACTS FROM MR FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE. (N. B. The Italics are not in the original.) Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14. “Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished by the defeat of general Reding, that I should much doubt whether any reinforcements, such as we could now send there, would enable us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from the derangement of calculations which

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No. VIII.

No. VIII.

EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ. Sir John Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 16. “The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, at least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending a force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. I am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that may be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only upon the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, and whether the Spaniards will receive the forc

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No. IX.

No. IX.

NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACKENZIE’S DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ. “The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2d February, 1809, and arrived in Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately waited on rear-admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are some difficulties started by the marquis Villel (the commissioner from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on sir George Smith, on shore, where this intelligenc

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No. X.

No. X.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS—NEGLECT OF PORTUGAL. SECTION I. Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers, January 24, 1809. “You are aware, by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December, enclosing copies, &amp;c. &amp;c. that, in the event of the evacuation of Portugal, by the force under sir J. Cradock’s command, an event rendered the more probable by the transactions in Gallicia .” Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, February 6. “ Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal ,” &amp;c. Admiral B

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No. XII.

No. XII.

SECTION I. MARSHAL BERESFORD TO SIR J. CRADOCK. March 29, 1809. SIR, I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions, from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is informed is so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army, whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town. I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions which, under the existing circumstances, I

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No. XIII.

No. XIII.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF MARSHAL SOULT. Captain Brotherton to colonel Donkin, (quarter-master-general,) Lamego, March 17, 1809. “The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts which Frenchmen are so expert in—circulating proclamations and insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror, plunder, and desolation, treating the inhabitants with feigned moderation and kindness .” Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 20, 1809, Caldas. “I

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No. XIV.

No. XIV.

SIR A. WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK. Lisbon, April 23. Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria. I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor; how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portug

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No. XV.

No. XV.

Extracts of a Letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, Lisbon, April 24, 1809. “I arrived here on Saturday, and found that sir John Cradock and general Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward, with the troops under their command respectively; the former to Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to Mr. Villiers, to have in

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No. XVI.

No. XVI.

LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH. Abrantes, June 22, 1809. MY LORD, When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has also fallen back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his head-quarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am apprehensive that you will think I have delaye

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No. XVII.

No. XVII.

LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY. Badajos, October 30, 1809. I have had the honour of receiving your excellency’s despatch, (marked 1.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, in answer to your excellency, of the 3d of October. I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to attribute to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies of supplies and means of transport experie

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No. XVIII.

No. XVIII.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. Camp, August 17, 1809. SIR, I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of repeating them for your excellency’s information. My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in order to get forage for me; and afte

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HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, AND MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES. VOL. III. LONDON: THOMAS &amp; WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. MDCCCXXXI....

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NOTICE.

NOTICE.

The manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart, [1] general Graham, [2] general Pelet, [3] general Campbell, [4] captain Codrington, [5] and colonel Cox, [6] together with many private journals and letters of officers employed during the war. Before the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter from major-general Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in the descriptio

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

When Gallicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy’s principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly used. Kellerman’s division at Valladolid, and Bonet’s at San Andero, sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were colaterally, as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts the war was steadily progressi

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

The narrative of the Catalonian affairs was broken off at the moment, when St. Cyr having established his quarters at Vich, received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had been relieved by the squadron of admiral Comaso. His whole attention was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening general Reille’s preparation for the siege of that place, a second detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded to the Ampurdan. During this time Conpigny continued at Taragona, and Blake

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

Verdier, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the town; in which he was justified neither by

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CHAP. IV.

CHAP. IV.

When sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place; but the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport them to Manilla. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of this sedition, no good could

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

In the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success, which continues until the hour of battle; and then when it might be of use, generally abandons them. Now the Central Junta having, to deceive the people, affirmed that sir Arthur Wellesley retreated to the frontiers of Portugal a

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

Joseph halted at Dos Barrios, the night of the battle, and the next day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division of infantry, upon Madrilegos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St. Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena, and the fifth corps, by Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments, from Aranjuez to Consuegra. The mo

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

Napoleon, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past inactivity of the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque’s defeat on one side and Echevaria’s on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, but immediately afterwards reca

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

Lord Wellington’s plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia: but before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now meditating, it is necessary, once more to revert to the operations in the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy, the unity of narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject. Suchet, being ordered to quell the

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

While Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from France, had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand, and of these, he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder, were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, and to hold in check the Partisans, principally in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa

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CHAP. IV.

CHAP. IV.

When Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no foundation for the charge; the cause stated by Suchet is sufficient for the effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls, on the side of the attack, could not be expected, and scarcely did, offer an impediment to the French general; hence the citadel should have been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers’ force, the corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in number, it might have baffled S

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

Suchet’s preparations equally menaced Valencia, and Catalonia, and the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side of Grenada, and made excursions against the fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the course of the history leads me back to C

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

While the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville scarcely required a garrison, and in March, six hundred infantry, under colonel Remond, and two hundred cavalry, commanded by the duke D’Aremberg, were despatched from thence, against the viscount De Gand, who was still at Ayamonte, vainly demanding refuge in Portugal. He had four thousand troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left through Gibraleon into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado de Niebla. The French then occupied

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

The operations, south of the Tagus, having been described, those which occurred, north of that river, shall now be traced; for previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French, stretching in one great line across the Peninsula, from Cadiz to Gihon, eagerly discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies. It will be remembered, that the duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera in the Gata mountains, to interrupt the communication, between the Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

The defence of Portugal, was not the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor was lord Wellington moved thereto, by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and deliberately, formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then to the period, when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his military and political proceedings

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

The greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the idea of offensive operations, lord Wellington turned his whole attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its defence; yet, the majority yielding to the influence of his brother, rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and throwing the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general. The deep designs, the vast combin

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

When lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to defend Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed, rather than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was, that he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet knowing, from his experience in Spain, how passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free promises of their governors, bu

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

In resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted, in actual concert with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave, generous, and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connexion was kept up. Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military correspondent of the Junta, he was too sa

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Mahi, coming down from the Gallician mountains, menaced Astorga, and a detachment of his army, under Toboado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria; acting in concert with Silveira; and an expedition sailing from Coruña, under Porlier, seized Santona, and dismantled that and other points on the coast, near Santander. Mahi’s movements could not be well opposed by either Kellerman or Serras, during the siege, because the former had a strong detachment in Baños, and th

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

Massena’s command, extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos, and the number of his troops present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. From these must be deducted thirteen thousand in the Asturias and province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid, eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly, the reserve of Bayonne under general Drouet, nineteen thousand strong, which, organized as a ninth corps h

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

General Pack, on the 22d, destroyed the bridges over the Criz, and fell back upon the light division; but, the 23d, the enemy re-established the communications, passed the river, and obliged the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the hills behind Mortagao. Three squadrons of light and one regiment of heavy cavalry were retained there by lord Wellington; but the rest he sent over the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, whence he recalled Spencer, and at the same time cau

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

From the 1st of October until the 3d, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach the Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the city,

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CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX.

The presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed the finances, and the Regency Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS. applied to England for an additional subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself to direct the house of Sampayo to furnish provisions to the troops on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, desti

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CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER X.

The increasing strength of the works, and the report of British deserters (unhappily very numerous at this period), soon convinced Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with an obstinate pertinacity,

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

In the preceding book, Spanish affairs have been little noticed, although lord Wellington’s combinations were deeply affected by them. The general position of the allies, extending from Coruña to Cadiz, presented a great crescent, in the convex of which the French armies were operating, and it was clear that, when checked at Lisbon, the most important point, their wings, could reinforce the centre, unless the allied forces, at the horns of the crescent, acted vigorously on a system which the har

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

While the Spaniards were occupied with the debates of the Cortes, the French works were laboured with care. The chain of forts was perfected, each being complete in itself with ditch and palisades and a week’s provisions; the batteries at the Trocadero were powerful, and the flotillas at San Lucar de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and Chiclana, were ready for action. Soult repaired in person to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, thirty pinnaces and gun-boats slipping out of the Gu

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

While discord prevailed at Cadiz, the siege of Badajos continued. Early in March, the second parallel being completed and the Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches were carried by sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the counterscarp. Nevertheless, Rafael Menacho, the governor, was in no manner dismayed; his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he had begun to retrench in the streets behind the part atta

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

On the 16th the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was swollen and unfordable, partly from the extreme exhaustion of the troops who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy. The latter, following his custom, carried fifteen days’ bread; the allies depended upon a commissariat, which broke down under the difficulties; not from any deficiency in the chief (Mr. Kennedy), who was distinguished alike for zeal, probity, and talent; but from the ill conduct of the Portuguese government;

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

Massena entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men; his reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand; he repassed the frontier with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of Portugal cost him about thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand were lost during the retreat; but had lord Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Mirand

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

When Marmont had thus recovered the garrison of Almeida, he withdrew the greatest part of his army towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington then leaving the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, under general Spencer, on the Azava, directed the third and seventh divisions and the second German hussars upon Badajos: and on the 15th, hearing that Soult, although hitherto reported, by Beresford, to Appendix, No. II. Section 11. be entirely on the defensive, was actually marching into Estremadura, he

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

While the fuzileers were thus striving on the upper part of the hill, the cavalry and Harvey’s brigade continually advanced, and Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, battered by Lefebre’s guns, retired before them, yet still threatening the British with their right, and covering the flank of their own infantry from a charge of Lumley’s horse. Beresford, seeing that colonel Hardinge’s decision had brought on the critical moment of the battle, then endeavoured to secure a favourable result. Blake’s first l

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PAPERS RELATING TO THE FORMER VOLUMES.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FORMER VOLUMES.

Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby to colonel Napier. After the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself which I do not deserve. The whole of your account of the charge made by general Anson’s brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for it, and the result; but there a

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No. I.

No. I.

SECTION 1.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE PENINSULA, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER ROLLS. Note. —By this state it appears that allowance being made for casualties, the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace with Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men. These states shew a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barrosa, and Fuentes Onoro

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No. II.

No. II.

SECTION 2. “ December 7, 1809. “——I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the duke D’Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther opposition to th

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No. III.

No. III.

SECTION 3. “ June 29, 1810. “I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this would

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No. IV.

No. IV.

“ September 21, 1810. “The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, which are found in the province of Valladolid, the governor, Kellerman,

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No. V.

No. V.

Gouvea, September 6, 1810. MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR, I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon van

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No. VI.

No. VI.

SECTION 2. Intercepted Letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor, 13th July, 1810. SIRE, L’état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, major général, a pris l’initiative de tous les movemens même le plus minutieux de 5 eme corps rend ici ma presence tout à fait inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir d’excellentes troupes animées du meilleur esprit, disseminées dans toute l’Andalusie et perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni résultat. Dans cet état des c

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No. VII.

No. VII.

Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp du maréchal prince d’Essling. “1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.—Le capitaine du génie Boucherat arrive du 2 e corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, 1807. Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu’il en a dressé. Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières très encaissées, et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d’eau, doit êtr

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No. VIII.

No. VIII.

SECTION 1. Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable Henry Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811. SIR, You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late expedition. But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having been shewn to me, which, by implic

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No. IX.

No. IX.

The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the way occasioned. When the British division began its march from the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, I left the general on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it ; and, when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to be there in person.

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No. X.

No. X.

“May 17, 1811. I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, and was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made, however, no difficulties, and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at the full: our work was barely four hundred yards from Cristoval. In spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and shells, from various

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No. XI.

No. XI.

END OF VOL. III. LONDON: PRINTED BY W. MARCHANT, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. [1] Lord Stuart de Rothesay. [2] First aide-de-camp to marshal Massena. [3] Admiral sir Edward Codrington. [4] Lord Lynedoch. [5] Lieut.-gov. of Gibraltar. [6] Governor of Almeida. [7] Dupont’s proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled “ Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns .” Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was

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HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES. VOL. IV. LONDON: THOMAS &amp; WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. MDCCCXXXIV. LONDON: MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET....

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NOTICE.

NOTICE.

In addition to the manuscript authorities used for the former volumes, several memoirs, journals, and notes of officers employed in the different operations have been consulted for this volume. Amongst others, the Journal of general Harvey of the Portuguese service, and some original papers supplied by sir Howard Douglas. In a recent controversy, I have expressed my belief that the French army at Albuera, instead of being more, was less numerous, than I had represented it in my account, of that

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

While marshal Beresford followed Soult towards 1810. Llerena lord Wellington recommenced the siege of Badajos, but the relation of that operation must be delayed until the transactions which occurred in Spain, during Massena’s invasion of Portugal, have been noticed, for it is not by following one stream of action that a just idea of this war can be obtained. Many of lord Wellington’s proceedings might be called rash, and others timid, and slow, if taken separately; yet, when viewed as parts of

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

As the Spanish general knew that the French 1810. August. could at Reus find provisions for only a few days, he withdrew his division from Falcet, and while Campo Verde, coming into the Garriga, occupied the passes behind them, and other troops were placed in the defiles between Valls and Villafranca, he held the main body of his army concentrated at Taragona, ready to fall upon Macdonald whenever he should move. This done, he became extremely elated, for like all Spaniards he imagined that to s

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

Tortoza, with a population of ten thousand 1810. Dec. souls and a garrison of from eight to nine thousand regular troops, was justly considered the principal bulwark of both Catalonia and Valencia, but it was under the command of general Lilli, Conde d’Alacha, a feeble man, whose only claim was, that he had shewn less incapacity than others before the battle of Tudela in 1808. However, so confident were the Spaniards in the strength of the place that the French attack was considerably advanced e

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

When the troops of the seventh corps were incorporated 1811. March. with the army of Aragon, the preparations for the siege of Taragona, were pushed forward with Suchet’s usual activity; but previous to touching upon that subject it is necessary to notice the guerilla warfare, which Villa Campa, and others, had carried on against Aragon during the siege of Tortoza. This warfare was stimulated by the appointment of the secret juntas, and by the supplies which England furnished, especially along t

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

In Taragona, although a siege had been so long 1811. May. expected, there was a great scarcity of money and ammunition, and so many men had, as Suchet foresaw, been drawn off to succour Figueras, that the garrison, commanded by colonel Gonzalez, was not more than six thousand, including twelve hundred armed inhabitants and the seamen of the port. The town was encumbered with defensive works of all kinds, but most of them were ill-constructed, irregular, and without convenient places for making s

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

Suchet had lost in killed and wounded during 1811. June. the siege between four and five thousand men, yet scarcely had the necessary orders to efface the trenches, secure the prisoners, and establish order in the ruined city been given, than the French general was again in movement to disperse Campo Verde’s force. In the night of the 29th Frere’s division marched upon Villa Franca, Harispe’s upon Villa Nueva, being followed by Suchet himself with Abbé’s brigade and the heavy cavalry. Campo Verd

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

After the conquest of Andalusia, the intrusive 1810. monarch pursued his own system of policy with more eagerness than before. He published amnesties, granted honours and rewards to his followers, Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS. took many of the opposite party into his service, and treated the people generally with mildness. But he was guided principally by his Spanish ministers, who being tainted with the national Appendix, No. III. Section 1. weaknesses of character were, especially

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

It was very clear that merely to defend Portugal, 1811. with enormous loss of treasure and of blood, would be a ruinous policy; and that to redeem the Peninsula the Spaniards must be brought to act more reasonably than they had hitherto done. But this the national character and the extreme ignorance of public business, whether military or civil, which distinguished the generals and statesmen, rendered a very difficult task. Lord Wellington, finding the English power weak to control, and its infl

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

As the military operations were, by the defeat 1811. of the regular armies, broken into a multitude of petty and disconnected actions, so the political affairs were, by the species of anarchy which prevailed, rendered exceedingly diversified and incongruous. Notwithstanding the restoration of the captain-generals, the provincial juntas remained very powerful; and while nominally responsible, to the Cortes and the regency, acted independently of either, except when interested views urged them to

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

The power and crafty projects of the Souzas, 1811. their influence over their weak-minded prince, their cabal to place the duke of Brunswick at the head of the Portuguese army, the personal violence of the patriarch, the resignation of Das Minas, and the disputes with lord Wellington, have been Vol. III. already touched upon; but the extent of the difficulties engendered by those things, cannot be understood without a more detailed exposition. Mr. Villiers’s mission, like all those emanating fro

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

There is no operation in war so certain as a 1811. May. modern siege, provided the rules of art are strictly followed, but, unlike the ancient sieges in that particular, it is also different in this; that no operation is less open to irregular daring, because the course of the engineer can neither be hurried nor delayed without danger. Lord Wellington knew that a siege of Badajos, in form, required longer time, and better means, than were at his disposal, but he was forced to incur danger and lo

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

It will be remembered, that Soult instead of 1811. June. retiring into Andalusia, took a flank position at Llerena, and awaited the arrival of Drouet’s division, which had been detached from Massena’s army. At Llerena, although closely watched by general Hill, the French marshal, with an army, oppressed by its losses and rendered unruly by want, maintained an attitude of offence until assured of Drouet’s approach, when he again advanced to Los Santos, near which place a slight cavalry skirmish t

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

While Soult was clearing the eastern frontier of 1811. July. Andalusia, Marmont retired gradually from Badajos and quartered his troops in the valley of the Tagus, with exception of one division which he left, at Truxillo. At the same time the fifth corps retired to Zafra, and thus lord Wellington found himself relieved from the presence of the French, at the very moment when he had most reason to fear their efforts. He had by this time secured the fortresses on the frontier, his troops were beg

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

During the first arrangements, for the blockade 1811. Sept. of Ciudad Rodrigo, the garrison made some excursions, to beat up the quarters of the British cavalry, and to forage the villages; and some lancers from Salamanca drove Julian Sanchez from Ledesma. Meanwhile in Estremadura, Morillo chased the enemy from Caceres, and advancing to Montanches, menaced Truxillo, but being beaten there by general Foy, he returned to Montijo, where some French cavalry, arriving from Zafra, again defeated him a

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

Northern Provinces. The invasion of Gallicia, 1811. which had been arrested by the arrival of the allies on the Coa, would have been a most serious calamity. Abadia, a weak man, with troops, distressed for provisions and clothing, was on bad terms with the chief of his staff Moscosa, whom he feared, and on worse terms with the junta. The great road to Coruña Appendix, No. V. Section 1. was open, and although general Walker, seeing the danger, advised that Ferrol, which was indefensible, should b

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

In August, and the beginning of September, 1811. August. Suchet, while preparing for this great enterprise, had dispersed the bands of Villa Campa and the other chiefs, who during the siege of Taragona vexed Aragon. He had sent his feeble soldiers to France, receiving conscripts in their places, and although the harvest was very bad, formed large magazines in Morella and Tortoza. Eight thousand men had been left in Catalonia under general Frere, another eight thousand were placed under general M

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

Saguntum having fallen, Suchet conceived the 1811. Nov. plan of enclosing and capturing the whole of Blake’s force, together with the city of Valencia, round which it was encamped; and he was not deterred from this project by the desultory operations of the Partidas in Aragon, nor by the state of Catalonia. Blake however, reverting to his former system, called up to Valencia, all the garrisons and depôts of Murcia, and directed the conde de Montijo, who had been expelled by Soult from Grenada, t

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

The affairs of these provinces were so intimately 1811. connected, that they cannot be treated separately, wherefore, taking Soult’s position at Seville as the centre of a vast system, I will show how, from thence, he dealt his powerful blows around, and struggled, even as a consuming fire, which none could smother though many tried. Seville the base of his movements, and the storehouse of his army, was fortified with temporary citadels, which, the people being generally submissive, were tenable

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

While the events, recorded in the foregoing 1811. Nov. chapter, were passing in Estremadura, the south of Andalusia was the scene of more important operations. Soult, persisting in his design against Tarifa, had given orders to assemble a battering train, and directed general Laval with a strong division of the 4th corps to move from Antequera upon San Roque. Skerrett was then menacing the communications of general Semélé on the side of Vejer de Frontera, and Ballesteros had obtained some succes

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

Up to this period, the invasion, although diversified 1811. by occasional disasters on the part of the invaders, had been progressive. The tide, sometimes flowing, sometimes ebbing, had still gained upon the land, and wherever the Spaniards had arrested its progress, it was England that urged their labour and renovated their tired strength; no firm barrier, no solid dike, had been opposed to its ravages, save by the British general in Portugal, and even there the foundation of his work, sapped b

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

Having now brought the story of the war to 1811. that period, when, after many changes of fortune, the chances had become more equal, and the fate of the Peninsula, thrown as it were between the contending powers, became a prize for the readiest and boldest warrior, I would, ere it is shown how Wellington seized it, recal to the reader’s recollection the previous vicissitudes of the contest. I would have him remember how, when the first, or insurrectional epoch of the war, had terminated success

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

The troops disposable for the attack of Ciudad 1812. January. Rodrigo were about thirty-five thousand, including cavalry; the materials for the siege were established at Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and Espeja, on the left of the Agueda, and the ammunition was at Almeida. From those places, the hired carts and mules, were to bring up the stores to the parc, and seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected at Villa de Ponte. But from the scarcity of transports only thirty-eight guns could be brou

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

In Ciudad Rodrigo, papers were found by which 1812. January. it appeared, that many of the inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy: all these people Carlos d’España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters, who were taken, some were executed, some pardoned, and the rigour of the Spanish generals was thought to be overstrained. When order had been restored workmen were set to repair the breaches and to level the trenches, and arrangements were made to provision the place quickly, for Mar

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

The 15th the pontoons were laid over the Guadiana, 1812. March. about four miles from Elvas, at a place where the current was dull, two large Spanish boats were arranged as flying bridges; and the 16th, Beresford, who had again joined the army, crossed the river, drove in the enemy’s posts, and invested Badajos with the third, fourth, and light divisions, and a brigade of Hamilton’s Portuguese; in all fifteen thousand men. Soult was then before the Isla, Drouet’s division, of five thousand men,

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

The English general having now achieved the 1812. April. second part of his project, was desirous to fight a great battle in Andalusia, which would have been the crown of this extraordinary winter campaign; but the misconduct of others would not suffer him to do this. At Ciudad Rodrigo, the Spanish engineers had entirely ceased the repairs of the works; Carlos d’España besides neglecting to provision that place, had by his oppressive conduct alarmed all the people of the vicinity, and created a

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

In this campaign the French forces were too 1812. much scattered, and they occupied the countries bordering on Portugal rather as a conquered territory than as a field of operations. The movements of the armies of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, might have been so combined as to present a hundred thousand men on a field of battle; yet Wellington captured two great fortresses within gun-shot as it were of them all, and was never disturbed by the approach of even thirty thousand men. Th

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No. I. SECTION 1.—NORTHERN PROVINCES.

No. I. SECTION 1.—NORTHERN PROVINCES.

Captain Irby to Mr. Croft. “ H. M. S. Amelia, “ Coruña, May 6, 1810. “I have been cruizing for these two months past between Bayonne and Santona.” “In addition to the troops I have observed under arms, there has been a great proportion of armed peasantry at Baquio, a small place to the westward of Rachidaes; as our boats were returning from destroying some batteries, they were attacked by armed peasantry alone, who were dispersed by shot from the ship, and also since they have assisted the Frenc

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No. II. SECTION 1. SIEGE OF TARAGONA.

No. II. SECTION 1. SIEGE OF TARAGONA.

Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton. “ Taragona , May 15, 1811. “During the panic which seems to have prevailed upon the unexpected arrival of the French army, the greatest exertions and the most extensive sacrifices appear to have been readily submitted to. But from the present apathy and indifference in those who should set an example of activity, and from the general deficiency of ordnance stores, I by no means consider the place in that state of security which the strength of its works and p

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No. III. SECTION 1. POLITICAL STATE OF KING JOSEPH. SPANISH MINISTER’S COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH GENERALS.

No. III. SECTION 1. POLITICAL STATE OF KING JOSEPH. SPANISH MINISTER’S COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH GENERALS.

From the councillor of state, Mariano Luis Orquijo, to king Joseph. “ Madrid, 22 Juillet, 1810. “ Sire ,—Le commissaire royal de Cordoue me mande, que le duc de Dalmatie lui a fait écrire officiellement de ne remettre aucune somme d’argent à la capitale lors même que le ministre des finances le demanderait, jusqu’à ce que les dépenses de l’armée des régimens qu’on lève et des employés de la province, &amp;c., furent pleinement couverts, et que le duc prendrait les mesures convenables, dans l

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No. IV. SECTION 1. CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

No. IV. SECTION 1. CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

EXTRACT FROM MR. CANNING’S INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. STUART AND MR. DUFF, 1808. To Mr. Stuart. “You are to enter into no political engagements.” To James Duff, Esq . “ July 26, 1808. “You will embark on board his majesty’s ship, Stately; on board of that ship are embarked to the amount of one million of Spanish dollars, three-fourths in dollars and one-fourth in bars, which sum is consigned to your care and is destined by his majesty for the use of the kingdom of Andalusia and the provinces of Spain c

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No. V. SECTION 1. MARMONT AND DORSENNE’S OPERATIONS.

No. V. SECTION 1. MARMONT AND DORSENNE’S OPERATIONS.

Intercepted letter from Foy to Girard, translated from the cypher . “ Truxillo, 20 Août, 1811. “ Monsieur le général ,—Wellington bloque Rodrigo avec quarante mille hommes; son avant-garde occupe la Sierra de Francia. On assure que l’artillerie du train arrive de Porto pour faire le siège de cette place. C’est approvisionnée pour trois mois. Marmont va se porter vers le nord pour se réunir avec l’armée commandée par le général Dorsenne et attaquer l’ennemi. Ma division partira le vingt six pour

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No. VI. TARIFA.

No. VI. TARIFA.

[The anonymous extracts are from the memoirs and letters of different officers engaged in the siege. The Roman characters mark different sources of information.] SECTION 1. Number and conduct of the French. A. “As to the numbers of the French; the prisoners, the intercepted letters, the secret information from Chiclana, all accounts, in fact, concurred in stating that the troops employed exceeded nine thousand men !” Extracts from colonel Skerrett’s despatch. “The enemy’s force employed in the s

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No. VII. STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOS.

No. VII. STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOS.

[The anonymous extracts are taken from the memoirs and journals of officers engaged in, or eye-witnesses of the action described. The Roman characters mark different sources of information.] SECTION 1.—CIUDAD RODRIGO. A. “The duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the convent of Francisco, pointed out to colonel Colborne and to major Napier, [2] commanding the storming-party of the light division, the spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, ‘Now do you under

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No. VIII. SECTION 1. ENGLISH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND MARMONT’S OPERATIONS.

No. VIII. SECTION 1. ENGLISH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND MARMONT’S OPERATIONS.

Colonel Le Mesurier, commandant of Almeida, to brigadier-general Trant. “ Almeida, March 28, 1812. “When I took possession of the fortress ten days since, I found not a single gun in a state for working; either owing to the want of side-arms or the ill assortment of shot and ammunition, not a single platform was laid down, and scarcely a single embrasure opened in any part of the newly repaired fronts. My powder was partly in an outwork, partly in two buildings scarcely weather-proof, only one f

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No. IX. SECTION 1.

No. IX. SECTION 1.

SUMMARY OF THE FORCE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AT DIFFERENT PERIODS, EXCLUSIVE OF DRUMMERS AND ARTILLERY-MEN. TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS, APRIL, 1812. ALLIED COVERING CORPS IN APRIL, 1812. SECTION 2. SUMMARY OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT BADAJOS, 1812. ASSAULT. [3] These regiments were attached by companies to the third, fourth, and fifth divisions. SECTION 3.—SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS Observation. —In

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HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES. VOL. V. TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED ANSWERS TO SOME ATTACKS IN ROBINSON’S LIFE OF PICTON, AND IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW; WITH COUNTER-REMARKS TO MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S REMARKS UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME OF THE HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. LONDON: THOMAS &amp; WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-S

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LIST OF THE PLATES,

LIST OF THE PLATES,

To be placed together at Page 582...

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NOTICE

NOTICE

1º. In the present volume will be found a plan of the Peninsula on a very small scale, yet sufficient to indicate the general range of operations. A large map would be enormously expensive without any correspondent advantages to the reader; and it would only be a repetition of errors, because there are no materials for an accurate plan. The small one now furnished, together with the sketches which I have drawn and published with each volume, and which are more accurate than might be supposed, wi

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COUNTER-REMARKS

COUNTER-REMARKS

TO MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S REMARKS UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME OF HIS HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. “The evil, that men do, lives after them.” HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR....

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

1812. Great and surprising as the winter campaign had been, its importance was not understood, and therefore not duly appreciated by the English ministers. But the French generals saw with anxiety that lord Wellington, having snapped the heavy links of the chain which bound him to Lisbon, had acquired new bases of operation on the Guadiana, the Agueda, and the Douro, that he could now choose his own field of battle, and Spain would feel the tread of his conquering soldiers. Those soldiers with t

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

1812. April. While the Anglo-British army was thus cleansing and strengthening its position on the frontier of Portugal, the progress of the war in other parts had not been so favourable to the common cause. It has already been shewn that Gallicia, in the latter part of 1811, suffered from discord, poverty, and ill success in the field; that an extraordinary contribution imposed upon the province, had been resisted by all classes, and especially at Coruña the seat of Government; finally that the

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

1812. April. Suchet having recovered his health was again at the head of the troops, but the king’s military authority was so irksome to him, that he despatched an officer to represent the inconvenience of it to the Emperor, previous to that monarch’s departure for Russia. The answer in some degree restored his independence; he was desired to hold his troops concentrated, and move them in the manner most conducive to the interests of his own command. Hence, when Joseph, designing to act against

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

1812. April. A short time previous to Hill’s enterprize against Almaraz, Soult, after driving Ballesteros from the Ronda, and restoring the communication with Grenada, sent three thousand men into the Niebla; partly to interrupt the march of some Spaniards coming from Cadiz to garrison Badajos, partly to menace Penne Villemur and Morillo, who still lingered on the Odiel against the wishes of Wellington. The French arguments were more effectual. Those generals immediately filed along the frontier

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

1812. The unmatched power of Napoleon’s genius was now being displayed in a wonderful manner. His interest, his inclination, and his expectation were alike opposed to a war with Russia, but Alexander and himself, each hoping that a menacing display of strength would reduce the other to negotiation, advanced, step by step, until blows could no longer be avoided. Napoleon, a man capable of sincere friendship, had relied too much and too long on the existence of a like feeling in the Russian empero

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

1812. The internal condition of this country was not improved. The government, composed of civilians, was unable, as well as unwilling to stimulate the branches of administration connected with military affairs, and the complaints of the army, reaching the Brazils, drew reprimands from the prince; but instead of meeting the evil with suitable laws, he only increased Beresford’s authority, which was already sufficiently great. Thus while the foreigner’s power augmented, the native authorities wer

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

1812. May. In the foregoing book, the political state of the belligerents, and those great chains, which bound the war in the Peninsula to the policy of the American as well as to the European nations, have been shewn; the minor events of the war have also been narrated, and the point where the decisive struggle was to be made has been indicated; thus nought remains to tell, save the particular preparations of each adverse general ere the noble armies were dashed together in the shock of battle.

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

1812. June. On the 13th of June, the periodic rains having ceased, and the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda and marched towards the Tormes in four columns, one of which was composed of the Spanish troops. The 16th he reached the Valmusa stream, within six miles of Salamanca, and drove a French detachment across the Tormes. All the bridges, save that of Salamanca which was defended by the forts, had been destroyed, and there was a garrison in the castle of Alba de Tor

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

1812. July. When Wellington found by the intercepted letters, that the king’s orders for Drouet to cross the Tagus, were reiterated, and imperative, he directed Hill to detach troops, in the same proportion. And as this reinforcement, coming by the way of Alcantara, could reach the Duero as soon as Drouet could reach Madrid, he hoped still to maintain the Tormes, if not the Duero, notwithstanding the king’s power; for some money, long expected from England, had at last arrived in Oporto, and he

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

1812. July. During the few hours of darkness, which succeeded the cessation of the battle, Clauzel had with a wonderful diligence, passed the Tormes by the narrow bridge of Alba and the fords below it, and at day-light was in full retreat upon Peneranda, covered by an organized rear-guard. Wellington also, having brought up the German dragoons and Anson’s cavalry to the front, crossed the river with his left wing at day-light, and moving up the stream, came about ten o’clock upon the French rear

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

1812. As Wellington’s operations had now deeply affected the French affairs in the distant provinces, it is necessary again to revert to the general progress of the war, lest the true bearings of his military policy should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, by clearing all the centre of Spain, had reduced the invasion to its original lines of operation. For Palombini’s division having joined the army of the centre, the army of the Ebro was broken up; Caffarelli had concentrated the scattere

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

1812. August. Suchet found resources in Valencia to support the king’s court and army, without augmenting the pressure on the inhabitants, and a counter-stroke could have been made against the allies, if the French commanders had been of one mind and had looked well to the state of affairs; but Joseph exasperated by the previous opposition of the generals, and troubled by the distresses of the numerous families attached to his court, was only intent upon recovering Madrid as soon as he could col

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

1812. August. While the various military combinations, described in the foregoing chapter, were thickening, Wellington, as we have seen, remained in Madrid, apparently inactive, but really watching the fitting moment to push his operations, and consolidate his success in the north, preparatory to the execution of his designs in the south. The result was involved in a mixed question, of time, and of combinations dependant upon his central position, and upon the activity of the partidas in cutting

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

1812. October. When king Joseph retreated to Valencia he earnestly demanded a reinforcement of forty thousand men, from France, and, more earnestly, money. Three millions of francs he obtained from Suchet, yet his distress was greater even than that of the allies, and Wellington at one time supposed that this alone would drive the French from the Peninsula. The Anglo-Portuguese soldiers had not received pay for six months, but the French armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal, were

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

1812. October. King Joseph’s first intention was to unite a great See Plan 6. part of Suchet’s forces as well as Soult’s with his own, and Soult, probably influenced by a false report that Ballesteros had actually reached La Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted, observing that Valencia must be defended against the increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies at Alicant, and the more so that, until the French army could cross the Tagus and open a new line of communication with

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

1812. In the north, while Souham was gathering in front of Wellington, some of Mendizabel’s bands blockaded Santona by land, and Popham, after his failure at Gueteria blockaded it by sea. It was not very well provisioned, but Napoleon, always watchful, had sent an especial governor, general Lameth, and a chosen engineer, general D’Abadie, from Paris to complete the works. By their activity a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon were soon mounted, and they had including the crew of a corvette a ga

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

1812. Lord Wellington exasperated by the conduct of the army and by the many crossings he had experienced during the campaign, had no sooner taken his winter-quarters, than he gave vent to his indignation in a circular letter, addressed to the superior officers, which, being ill-received by the army at the time, has been frequently referred to since with angry denunciations of its injustice. In substance it declared, “that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign in a greater degree than

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

1812. While the armies were striving, the political affairs had become exceedingly complicated and unsteady. Their workings were little known or observed by the public, but the evils of bad government in England, Spain, and Portugal, the incongruous alliance of bigoted aristocracy with awakened democracy, and the inevitable growth of national jealousies as external danger seemed to recede, were becoming so powerful, that if relief had not been obtained from extraneous events, even the vigour of

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

1813. Nothing could be more complicated than the political state of Portugal with reference to the situation of the English general. His object, as I have repeatedly shown, was to bring the whole resources of the country to bear on the war, but to effect this he had to run counter to the habits and customs, both of the people and of the government; to detect the intrigues of the subordinate authorities as well as those of the higher powers; to oppose the violence of factious men in the local gov

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

1813. In war it is not so much the positive strength, as the relative situations of the hostile parties, which gives the victory. Joseph’s position, thus judged, was one of great weakness, principally because he was incapable of combining the materials at his disposal, or of wielding them when combined by others. France had been suddenly thrown by her failure in Russia, into a new and embarrassing attitude, more embarrassing even than it appeared to her enemies, or than her robust warlike propor

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

1813. February. In December 1812 general Copons had been appointed captain-general of Catalonia instead of Eroles, but his arrival was delayed and the province was not relieved from Lacy’s mischievous sway until February 1813, when Eroles, taking the temporary command, re-established the head-quarters at Vich. The French, being then unmolested, save by the English ships, passed an enormous convoy to France, but Eroles was not long idle. Through the medium of a double spy, he sent a forged letter

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

1813. April. On this side as in the south, one part of the French fronted lord Wellington’s forces, while the rest warred with the Partidas, watched the English fleets on the coast, and endeavoured to maintain a free intercourse with France; but the extent of country was greater, the lines of communication longer, the war altogether more difficult, and the various operations more dissevered. Four distinct bodies acted north of the Tagus. 1º. The army of Portugal, composed of six divisions under

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

1813. While the French power in Spain was being disorganized by the various circumstances related in the former chapter, Lord Wellington’s diligence and energy had reorganized the allied army with greater strength than before. Large reinforcements, especially of cavalry, had come out from England. The efficiency and the spirit of the Portuguese had been restored in a surprizing manner, and discipline had been vindicated, in both services, with a rough but salutary hand; rank had not screened off

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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

1813. In the latter part of April the Spanish troops from Estremadura being assembled on the Tormes near Almada, Carlos d’España’s division moved to Miranda del Castanar, and every thing was ready to open the campaign when an unexpected and formidable danger menacing ruin arose. Some specie sent from England had enabled the general to pay up the British soldiers’ arrears to November 1812, but the Portuguese troops were still neglected by their government, a whole year’s pay was due to them, a su

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CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER VIII.

1813. June. The basin into which the king had now poured all his troops, his parcs, convoys, and encumbrances of every kind, was about eight miles broad by ten in length, Vittoria being at the further end. The river Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after passing very near that town, runs towards the Ebro with many windings and divides the basin unequally, the largest portion being on the right bank. A traveller coming from Miranda by the royal Madrid road, would enter the basin by the pass

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No. I.

No. I.

The following extracts of letters are published to avoid any future cavils upon the points they refer to, and also to shew how difficult it is for the historian to obtain certain and accurate details, when eye-witnesses, having no wish to mislead, differ so much. BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. Extract of a memoir by sir Charles Dalbiac, who was one of Le Marchant’s brigade of heavy cavalry. “Throughout these charges upon the enemy, the heavy brigade was unsupported by any other portion of the cavalry what

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No. II.

No. II.

Copies de deux dépêches de l’empereur au ministre de la guerre relatives au duc de Raguse. Dresde, le 28 Mai, 1812. Monsieur le duc de Feltre, Je vous renvois la correspondance d’Espagne. Ecrivez au duc de Raguse que c’est le roi qui doit lui donner des directions, que je suppose qu’il s’est retiré devant lord Wellington selon les règles de la guerre, en l’obligéant à se masser, et non en se reployant devant sa cavalerie légère; qu’il aura conservé des têtes de pont sur l’Agueda, ce qui peut seu

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No. III.

No. III.

Lettre de M. le duc de Dalmatie au roi. Seville, 12 Août, 1812. Je n’avais reçu aucune nouvelle de V. M. depuis les lettres qu’elle m’a fait l’honneur m’écrire des 6 et 7 Juillet dernier. Enfin je viens de récevoir celle datée de Segovie le 29 du même mois. Les rapports publiés par les ennemis m’avaient déjà instruit des évènemens survenus en Castille lesquels étaient naturellement exagérés; V. M. a bien voulu en quelque sorte fixer à ce sujet mes idées. Je déplore les pertes que l’armée de Port

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No. IV.

No. IV.

Lettre de M. le maréchal due de Dalmatie à M. le Ministre de la guerre à Paris. Monsieur le Duc , Toute communication de l’Andalousie avec la France étant interrompue et n’ayant rien réçu depuis les premiers jours de Mai; depuis un mois le roi ayant même retiré les troupes qui étoient dans la Manche et ne pouvant communiquer avec Madrid, j’entreprens de faire parvenir mes rapports à votre excellence par la voie de mer. Si le bâtiment que je fais à cet effet partir de Malaga peut arriver à Marsei

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No. V.

No. V.

Sire , Je suis arrivé à Paris hier 21 du courant. Je me suis sur le champ présenté chez le ministre de la guerre et je lui ai remis la lettre de V. M. ainsi que celles de M. le maréchal Jourdan. S. E. m’a questionné sur les affaires d’Espagne, mais sans me demander mes dépêches pour l’empereur. Elle m’a, suivant les intentions de V. M., pourvu des ordres dont j’ai besoin pour poursuivre ma route avec célérité. Ce matin le ministre m’a fait appeler et j’ai eu avec lui une longue conférence. Il m’

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No. VI. A.

No. VI. A.

Lettre confidentielle écrite au roi par monsieur le duc de Feltre. Paris, 10 Novembre, 1812. Sire , La lettre chiffrée que V. M. m’a écrite de Requeña le 18 Octobre, m’est parvenue il y a quelques jours, et je l’ai sur le champ transmise à l’empereur qui ne la recevra toute fois que 19 jours après le départ de cette même lettre de Paris. A la distance ou l’empereur se trouve de sa capitale, il est des choses sur lesquelles la politique force à fermer les yeux: du moins momentanement. Si la condu

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No. VI. B.

No. VI. B.

Colonel Desprez to the King. Paris, 3 Janvier, 1813. Sire , J’ai eu l’honneur d’annoncer à V. M. mon arrivée à Paris. Mais j’ai dû en me servant de la voie de l’estafette user d’une extrême discrétion. La reine m’ayant conseillé de vous écrire avec quelque détail et ayant daigné m’offrir de faire partir ma lettre par le premier courier qu’elle expédierait, j’en profite pour rendre compte à V. M. de ma mission et lui faire connaître une partie des évènements dont j’ai été témoin. Je suis arrivé à

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No. VII.

No. VII.

Ghiart, le 2 Septembre, 1812. Monsieur le duc de feltre , J’ai reçu le rapport du duc de Raguse sur la bataille du 22. Il est impossible de rien lire de plus insignifiant: il y a plus de fatras et plus de rouages que dans une horloge, et pas un mot qui fasse connaître l’état réel des choses. Voici ma manière de voir sur cette affaire, et la conduite que vous devez tenir. Vous attendrez que le duc de Raguse soit arrivé, qu’il soit remis de sa blessure, et à-peu-près entièrement rétabli. Vous lui

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No. VIII. A.

No. VIII. A.

Extract from general Souham’s despatch to the minister of war, Briviesca, 2d October, 1812. Par votre lettre du 6 Octobre vous m’annoncez que le duc de Dalmatie venait de réunir son armée à Grenade et à Jaen, et que le roi alloit se mettre incessamment en communication avec ce maréchal pour marcher de concert sur Madrid. En consequence de ces mouvemens je resolus de marcher à la rencontre de l’ennemi, et de le forcer à lever le siège de Burgos. Le 18 toute mon armée se mit en mouvement sur trois

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No. VIII. B.

No. VIII. B.

Extracts from two letters written by the duke of Feltre to King Joseph, dated Paris, 8th Oct. and 19th Nov., 1812. On one of the letters is the following note, in pencil, by the duke of Wellington. “ Advantage of English newspapers. ” “Sire,—J’ai l’honneur d’adresser ci-joint à votre majesté quelques extraits des journaux Anglais les plus récents dont j’ai choisi ce qui pourrait être de quelque intérêt dans les circonstances actuels.” “Sire,—J’ai l’honneur d’adresser ci-joint à V. M. plusieurs e

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No. IX.

No. IX.

Extract of a letter from marshal Jourdan to colonel Napier. Soisy sous Etiole, 14 Janvier, 1829. Le 10 Novembre, 1812. Les armées du midi, du Portugal, et du centre se trouvaient réunies sur la Tormes. Vous connaissez la position qu’occupait l’armée des alliés. Cette position ayant été bien reconnue, dans la journée du 11, par le roi, accompagné du duc de Dalmatie, de plusieurs généraux, et de moi, je proposai de passer la Tormes, guéable prèsque partout entre Villa-Gonzala et Huerta, et de nous

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No. X.

No. X.

The duke of Feltre, minister of war, to the king of Spain. Paris, le 29 Janvier, 1813. Sire , J’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire à V. M. le 4 de ce mois pour lui faire connaître les intentions de l’empereur au sujet des affaires d’Espagne, et la necessité de transporter le quartier général de Madrid à Valladolid. Cette dépêche a été expédiée par duplicate et triplicate, et j’ignore encore si elle est parvenue à V. M. Depuis sa dépêche de Madrid du 4 Decembre je suis privé de ses lettres, et ce long sile

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No. XI.

No. XI.

The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain. Sire , Depuis la lettre que j’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire à votre majesté le 29 Janvier, l’empereur, après avoir pris connoissance des dépêches apportées par l’aide-de-camp de monsieur le maréchal Jourdan, me charge encore de réitérer son intention formelle et déjà deux fois transmise à votre majesté, qu’elle porte son quartier général à Valladolid afin de pouvoir s’occuper efficacement de soumettre et pacifier le nord; par une conséquence nécessaire de ce c

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No. XII.

No. XII.

Duke of Feltre to the king of Spain. Paris, le 12 Fevrier, (No. 2.) 1813. Sire , Par ma lettre de ce jour No. 1, j’ai eu l’honneur de faire connaître à V. M. les intentions de l’empereur sur les opérations à suivre en Espagne. La présente aura pour bût de répondre plus particulièrement à la lettre dont V. M. m’a honoré en date du 8 Janvier et que j’ai eu soin de mettre sous les yeux de l’empereur. Les plaintes qu’elle contient sur la conduite du maréchal duc de Dalmatie et du général Caffarelli

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No. XIII.

No. XIII.

The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain. Paris, le 12 Fevrier, 1813. Sire , J’ai eu l’honneur d’écrire trois fois à V. M. dans le courant de Janvier, pour lui transmettre les intentions de l’empereur sur la conduite des affaires en Espagne, et j’ai eu soin de faire expedier toutes mes dépêches au moins par triplicata, tellement que je puis et dois espérer aujourd’hui qu’elles sont parvenues à leur destination. Je reçois en ce moment le dup ta d’une lettre de V. M. en date du 8 Janvier, dont le p

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No. XIV.

No. XIV.

The duke of Feltre to the king of Spain. Paris, le 12 Mars, 1813. Sire , La difficulté toujours subsistante des communications a apporté dans ma correspondance avec V. M. des retards considérables et de longues interruptions dont les résultats ne peuvent être que très préjudiciables au service de l’empereur. Depuis plus de deux mois j’expédie sans cesse et par tous les moyens possibles ordre sur ordre pour faire exécuter les dispositions prescrites par S. M. I. et je n’ai aucune certitude que ce

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No. XV.

No. XV.

Joseph O’Donnel to general Donkin. Malaga, the 6th December, 1812. DEAR SIR , The letter you did me the honour to adress to me on the 6th of September has been mislaid all this long time on account of my being separated from the armie since the moment I gave up the command of it, and it was only last night I had the pleasure of receiving it. I feel a great comfort in seingh an officer of your reputation affected so kindly with the sorrows which so unlucky as undeservedly (I believe) fell upon me

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No. XVI.

No. XVI.

Freneda, February 15th, 1813. Sir , I have received your letter of the 12th instant, regarding the conduct of the second Italian regiment, and I entirely concur in all the measures you have adopted, and applaud the decision and firmness of your conduct. I am prepared likewise to approve of whatever you shall determine upon deliberation regarding the future state of the men of the regiment, whether to be formed into a regiment again, or not; or if so formed, whether to be kept as part of the army

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No. XVII.

No. XVII.

Extract of a letter from the marquis of Wellington to lieutenant-general sir John Murray, dated Freneda, April 6th, 1813. “In regard to feeding the Spanish troops in Spain, I have invariably set my face against it and have never consented to it or done it, even for a day in any instance. My reasons are, first that it entails upon Great Britain an expense which the country is unable to bear; secondly, that it entails upon the department of the army which undertakes it a detail of business, and a

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No. XVIII.

No. XVIII.

General state of the French army, April 15, 1812. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls. General state, May 15, 1812. General state of the French Armies, March 15, 1813. The operations and misfortunes of the French prevented any general states being sent home between the 15th of March and the 15th of August, when a new organization of the armies took place; but the numbers given in the narrative of this History are the result of calculations founded on the comparison of a variety of documents

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No. XIX.

No. XIX.

Especial state of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812. Head-quarters, Tordesillas. From these 54,550 men, present under arms, must be deducted the artillery, engineers, equipages, and garrisons, the officers and sergeants, and the losses sustained between the siege of the forts and the battle of Salamanca, the result will be about 42,000 sabres and bayonets in the battle. Note. —These troops did not join before the battle of Salamanca. Artillery of the army of Portugal, June 15 , 1812, Materiel.

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No. XX.

No. XX.

Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army under Lord Viscount Wellington, on the morning of the 22d of July, 1812. Extracted from the original morning state. Note. —The numbers are exclusive of officers, sergeants, trumpeters, artillery-men, and staff, shewing merely the sabres and bayonets in the field. No. of British, German, Portuguese, and Spanish guns at the battle of Salamanca....

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No. XXI.

No. XXI.

Official report of the loss of the allies on the Trabancos and Guarena rivers, 18th July, 1812. The British loss by infantry divisions and cavalry brigades....

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No. XXII.

No. XXII.

Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army at Vittoria. Extracted from the morning state of the 19th June, 1813. No. of Anglo-Portuguese guns at the battle of Vittoria. Colonel A. Dickson commanding. END OF VOL. V. MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. [1] In a recent number of the “Quarterly Review,” the writer of an article upon the correspondence of Louis the XVIII. quotes me as saying that Massena had one hundred and thirty-five thousand men under his orders, as if he had invaded Por

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HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES. VOL. VI. PREFIXED TO WHICH ARE SEVERAL JUSTIFICATORY PIECES IN REPLY TO COLONEL GURWOOD, MR. ALISON, SIR WALTER SCOTT, LORD BERESFORD, AND THE QUARTERLY REVIEW. LONDON: THOMAS &amp; WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET. MDCCCXL. LONDON: MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET....

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NOTICE.

NOTICE.

This volume was nearly printed when my attention was called to a passage in an article upon the duke of Wellington’s despatches, published in the last number of the “British and Foreign Quarterly Review.” After describing colonel Gurwood’s proceedings to procure the publication of the despatches the reviewer says, “ We here distinctly state , that no other person ever had access to any documents of the duke, by his grace’s permission, for any historical or other purpose, and that all inferential

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ALISON.

ALISON.

Some extracts from Alison’s History of the French Revolution reflecting upon the conduct of sir John Moore have been shewn to me by a friend. In one of them I find, in reference to the magazines at Lugo, a false quotation from my own work, not from carelessness but to sustain a miserable censure of that great man. This requires no further notice, but the following specimen of disingenuous writing shall not pass with impunity. Speaking of the prevalent opinion that England was unable to succeed i

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SIR WALTER SCOTT.

SIR WALTER SCOTT.

In the last volume of sir Walter Scott’s life by Mr. Lockhart, page 143, the following passage from sir Walter’s diary occurs:— “He (Napier) has however given a bad sample of accuracy in the case of lord Strangford, where his pointed affirmation has been as pointedly repelled.” This peremptory decision is false in respect of grammar, of logic, and of fact. Of grammar because where , an adverb of place, has no proper antecedent. Of logic, because a truth may be pointedly repelled without ceasing

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COLONEL GURWOOD.

COLONEL GURWOOD.

In the eighth volume of the Duke of Wellington’s Despatches page 531, colonel Gurwood has inserted the following note:— “Lieutenant Gurwood fifty-second regiment led the “forlorn hope” of the light division in the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards took the French governor general Barrié in the citadel; and from the hands of lord Wellington on the breach by which he had entered, he received the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by the duke of Wellington to compile this work

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VILLA MURIEL.

VILLA MURIEL.

The following statement of the operations of the fifth division at the combat of Muriel 25th October, 1812, is inserted at the desire of sir John Oswald. It proves that I have erroneously attributed to him the first and as it appeared to me unskilful disposition of the troops; but with respect to the other portions of his statement, without denying or admitting the accuracy of his recollections, I shall give the authority I chiefly followed, first printing his statement. Affair of Villa Muriel.

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A LETTER

A LETTER

TO GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD, BEING An Answer to his Lordships Assumed Refutation OF COL. NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME. My Lord , You have at last appeared in print without any disguise. Had you done so at first it might have spared us both some trouble. I should have paid more deference to your argument and would willingly have corrected any error fairly pointed out. Now having virtually acknowledged yourself the author of the two publications entitled “ Strictures ” and “ F

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REPLY

REPLY

TO THE Third Article in the Quarterly Review ON COL. NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. ‘Now there are two of them; and one has been called Crawley , and the other is Honest Iago .’— Old Play. This article is the third of its family, and like its predecessors is only remarkable for malignant imbecility and systematic violation of truth. The malice is apparent to all; it remains to show the imbecility and falseness. The writer complains of my ill-breeding, and with that valour which belongs

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

The fate of Spain was decided at Vittoria, but on 1813. June. the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon’s genius restored the general balance, and the negociations which followed those victories affected the war in the Peninsula. Lord Wellington’s first intention was to reduce Pampeluna by force, and the sudden fall of the Pancorbo forts, which opened the great Madrid road was a favourable event; but Portugal being relinquished as a place of arms, a new base of operations was required, lest a ch

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

Lord William Bentinck arrived without troops, for, 1813. June. having removed the queen from Sicily, he feared internal dissension and Napoleon had directed Murat to invade the island with twenty thousand men, the Toulon squadron being to act in concert. Sir Edward Pellew admitted that the latter might easily gain twenty-four hours’ start of his fleet, and lord William judged that ten thousand invaders would suffice to conquer. Murat however, opened a secret negociation, and thus, that monarch,

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

Turning from the war in Catalonia to the operations 1813. June. in Navarre and Guipuscoa, we shall find lord Wellington’s indomitable energy overcoming every difficulty. It has been already shown how, changing his first views, he disposed the Anglo-Portuguese divisions to cover the siege of San Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna, at the same time attacking with the Spanish divisions Santona on the coast, and the castles of Daroca, Morella, Zaragoza, and the forts of Pancorbo in the interior

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

The battle of Vittoria was fought on the 21st of June. The 1st of July marshal Soult, under a decree 1813. July. issued at Dresden, succeeded Joseph as lieutenant to the emperor, who thus shewed how little his mind had been affected by his brother’s accusations. The 12th, Soult, travelling with surprising expedition, assumed the command of the armies of the “ north ,” the “ centre ” and the “ south ” now reorganised in one body, called “ the army of Spain .” And he had secret orders to put Josep

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

Combat of Roncesvalles. —On the 23d Soult issued 1813. July. an order of the day remarkable for its force and frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the leading Plan 3. events of the past campaign, he shewed that the disasters sprung from the incapacity of the king, not from the weakness of the soldiers whose military virtue he justly extolled, and whose haughty courage he inflamed by allusions to former glories. He has been, by writers who disgrace English literature with unfounded aspersions of a

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

After the combat of Echallar Soult adopted a permanent 1813. August. position and reorganized his army. The left wing under D’Erlon occupied the hills of Ainhoa, with an advanced guard on the heights overlooking Urdax and Zuguramurdi. The centre under Clauzel was in advance of Sarre guarding the issues from Vera and Echallar, his right resting on the greatest of the Rhune mountains. The right wing under Reille composed of Maucune’s and La Martinière’s Soult’s Official Report, MSS. divisions exte

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

To assault the breaches without having destroyed 1813. August. the enemy’s defences or established a lodgment on the horn-work, was, notwithstanding the increased fire and great facilities of the besiegers, obviously a repetition of the former fatal error. And the same generals who had before so indiscreetly made their disapproval of such operations public, now even more freely and imprudently dealt out censures, which not ill-founded in themselves were most ill-timed, since there is much danger

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

While San Sebastian was being stormed Soult 1813. August. fought a battle with the covering force, not willingly nor with much hope of success, but he was averse to let San Sebastian fall without another effort, and thought a bold demeanour would best hide his real weakness. Guided however by the progress of the siege, which he knew perfectly through his sea communication, he awaited the last moment of action, striving meanwhile to improve his resources and to revive the confidence of the army a

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

Soult, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of 1813. September. an attack along the Nive, that his uneasy movements made the allies think he was again preparing for offensive operations. This double misunderstanding did not however last long, and each army resumed its former position. The fall of San Sebastian had given lord Wellington a new port and point of support, had increased the value of Passages as a depôt, and let loose a considerable body of troops for field operations; the armisti

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

Soult was apprehensive for some days that lord 1813. October. Wellington would push his offensive operations further, but when he knew by Foy’s reports, and Official Correspondence, MSS. by the numbers of the allies assembled on his right, that there was no design of attacking his left, he resumed his labours to advance the works covering St. Jean de Luz. He also kept a vigilant watch from his centre, holding his divisions in readiness to concentrate towards Sarre, and when he saw the heavy mass

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of Portugal. In this country the 1813. national jealousy which had been compressed by the force of invasion expanded again with violence as danger receded, and the influence of England sunk precisely in the measure that her army assured the safety of Portugal. When Wellington crossed the Ebro, the Souza faction, always opposed in the council to the British policy, became elate; and those members of the government who had hitherto cherished the British ascendancy because it sustai

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

While Pampeluna held out, Soult laboured to 1813. November. complete his works of defence, especially the entrenched camp of St. Jean Pied de Port, that he might be free to change the theatre of war to Aragon. He pretended to entertain this project as late as November; but he must have secretly renounced all hope before that period, because the snows of an early and severe winter had rendered even the passes of the Lower Pyrenees impracticable in October. Meanwhile his political difficulties wer

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

Soult having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to 1813. November. leave part of his forces in the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and with the remainder take a flanking position behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, securing his left by the entrenched mountain of Ursouia, and his right on the heights above Cambo, the bridge-head of which would give him the power of making offensive movements. He could thus keep his troops together and restore their confidence, while

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

To understand all the importance of the battle of 1813. December. St. Pierre, the nature of the country and the relative positions of the opposing generals before and after that action must be considered. Bayonne although a mean fortress in itself was at this period truly designated by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks of France. Covered by its entrenched camp, which the inundations and the deep country rendered impregnable while there was an army to defend it, this place could not be assail

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

Portugal. —It has been shewn that marshal 1814. Beresford’s arrival at Lisbon put a momentary check upon the intrigues of the regency relative to the command of the troops, when he rejoined the army the vexatious conduct of the government was renewed with greater violence, and its ill-will was vented upon the English residents, whose goods were arbitrarily seized and their persons imprisoned without regard to justice or international law. The supply and reinforcing of the army were the pretences

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

The force and energy of Napoleon’s system of 1813. government was evinced in a marvellous manner by the rapidity with which he returned to Germany, at the head of an enormous army, before his enemies had time even to understand the extent of his misfortunes in the Russian campaign. The victories of Lutzen and Bautzen then seemed to reinstate him as the arbiter of Europe. But those battles were fought with the heads of columns the rear of which were still filing out of France. They were fought al

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

When general Clinton succeeded lord William 1813. September. Bentinck, his whole force, composed of the Anglo-Sicilians, Whittingham’s and Sarzfield’s Spaniards, and two battalions of Roche’s division, did not furnish quite nineteen thousand men under arms. Copons, blockading Mequinenza Lerida and Monzon Appendix 6. and having garrisons in Cardona and the Seo d’Urgel, the only places in his possession, could not bring more than nine thousand men into the field. Elio had nominally twenty-five tho

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CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington’s difficulties have been described. 1814. January. Those of his adversary were even more embarrassing because the evil was at the root; it was not misapplication of power but the want of power itself which paralyzed Soult’s operations. Napoleon trusted much to the effect of his treaty with Ferdinand who, following his intentions, should have entered Spain in November, but the intrigues to retard his journey continued, and though Napoleon, when the refusal of the treaty by the Spa

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CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER II.

The French general’s various conjectures embraced 1814. February. every project but the true one of the English general. The latter did indeed design to keep him in check upon the rivers, not to obtain an opportunity of assaulting the camp of Bayonne but to throw his stupendous bridge over the Adour; yet were his combinations so made that failing in that he could still pursue his operations on the Gaves. When therefore he had established his offensive line strongly beyond the Soissons and the Bi

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CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III.

Extremely perilous and disheartening was the 1814. March. situation of the French general. His army was greatly reduced by his losses in battle and by the desertion of the conscripts, and three thousand stragglers, old soldiers who ought to have rejoined their eagles, were collected by different generals, into whose districts they had wandered, and employed to strengthen detached corps instead of being restored to the army. All his magazines were taken, discontent the natural offspring of misfor

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CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

While Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux 1814. March. Soult and Wellington remained in observation, each thinking the other stronger than himself. For the English general having intelligence of Beurman’s march, believed that his troops were intended to reinforce and had actually joined Soult. On the other hand that marshal, who knew not of Beresford’s march until the 13th, concluded Wellington still had the twelve thousand men detached to Bordeaux. The numbers on each side were however nearly eq

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CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

The two armies being now once more in presence of 1814. March. each other and with an equal resolution to fight, it is fitting to show the peculiar calculations upon which the generals founded their respective combinations. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country and chose Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south contained fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of tha

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CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

Marshal Soult and General Thouvenot have 1814. been accused of fighting with a full knowledge of Napoleon’s abdication. This charge circulated originally by the Bourbon party is utterly unfounded. The extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot through the advanced posts has been already noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to induce sir John Hope to make a formal communication, and the governor could only treat it as an idle story to insult or to deceive him, and baffle his defence by

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No. I.

No. I.

JUSTIFICATORY PIECES. Lord William Bentinck to sir E. Pellew. At sea, June 18th, 1813. Sir , Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected attack upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. It seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon, should reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land them in Sicily, or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of Naples, if the intention be, as in the last instance, to transport them to Sicily in the to

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No. II.

No. II.

Letter from general Nugent to lord William Bentinck. Vienna, January 24th, 1812. My dear lord William , I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you shortly after my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result it would have and the manner it would be considered by the emperor and the government here, and then to settle again the manner of sen

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No. III.

No. III.

Extracts from the correspondence of sir Henry Wellesley, sir Charles Stuart, and Mr. Vaughan. Mr. Vaughan to sir Charles Stuart. Cadiz, August 3d, 1813. “The Spanish troops in Catalonia and elsewhere are starving, and the government are feeding them with proclamations to intendants. Since I have known Spain I have never known the seat of government in a worse state. There is a strong feeling against the English and a miserable jacobin party which is violent beyond measure.” Ditto to Ditto. Chich

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No. IV.

No. IV.

Extract from a manuscript memoir by captain Norton, thirty-fourth regiment. The thirty-ninth regiment, commanded by the hon. col. O’Callaghan, then immediately engaged with the French and after a severe contest also retired, the fiftieth was next in succession and they also after a gallant stand retired, making way for the ninety-second which met the advancing French column first with its right wing drawn up in line, and after a most destructive fire and heavy loss on both sides the remnant of t

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No. V.

No. V.

Extracted from the Imperial Muster-Rolls. Report of the movements of the army of Arragon during the first fifteen days of September, 1813. “Le 12 eme toute l’armée d’Aragon se reunit a Molino del Rey; partie de celle de Catalonia et la garrison de Barcelonne se placent a droite a Ollessa et Martorel, pour partir tous ensemble a 8 heures du soir et se porter le droite par San Sadurni, le rest par le grande route d’Ordal sur Villa Franca, ou l’armée Anglaise etait rasemble. General Harispe rencont

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No. VI.

No. VI.

No. 1.—Extract from the official state of the allied army, commanded by lieutenant-general sir John Murray, at the Col de Balaguer, 17th June, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers. No. 2.—Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian force, commanded by lieutenant-general sir William Clinton. Head-quarters, Taragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers. No. 3.—Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division (Whittingham’

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No. VII.

No. VII.

No. 1.—Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the marquis of Wellington’s command. Extracted from the original morning state for the 24th of July, 1813. No. 2.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 15th of October, 1813. No. 3.—Anglo-Portuguese force, from the original morning state, 9th November, 1813. No. 4.—Sir Rowland Hill’s force at the battle of St. Pierre. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th December, 1813. No. 5.—Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracte

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No. VIII.

No. VIII.

No. 1.—General state of the French armies under Soult and Suchet. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July 1813. The armies of the north centre and south being by an imperial decree reorganised in one body, taking the title of the army of Spain. No. 2.—15th of September, 1813. Note. —The garrison of San Sebastian though captive is borne on this state. This is the last general state of the French army in my possession but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls. No. 3.—D

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No. IX.

No. IX.

Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the attack of the enemy’s fortified position in front of Toulouse for to-morrow, 1st April, 1814. Published in the United Service Journal, October 1838. ( Extract. ) “ St. Jory, 9th April, 1814. “The front attack of the third division is to extend from the river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban) inclusive of that road. “The light division will be immediately on the left

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