The Officer's Manual: Napoleon's Maxims Of War - free ebook by Emperor of the French Napoleon I

THE OFFICER’S MANUAL. NAPOLEON’S MAXIMS OF WAR.

RICHMOND, VA.: WEST &amp; JOHNSTON. 1862. Evans &amp; Cogswell, Printers. No. 3 Broad St., Charleston, S. C....

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RECOMMENDATION.

“After refreshing my memory by looking over again ‘The Officer’s Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend the republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a circle of maxims, deduced from the highest source of military science and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the book cannot fail to set a

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PREFACE.

The publisher has reissued this little volume as a publication timely for the occasion. A collection of maxims which directed the military operations of the greatest captain of modern times, cannot fail to prove of great use to such young officers as really desire a knowledge of the art of war. The maxims are illustrated by instances drawn from the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick, and Napoleon. These great men were all governed by the same principles, and it is by applying the

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NAPOLEON’S MAXIMS OF WAR.

The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and broad rivers occupy the third place. Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon to surmount every difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion. In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished and destroyed the Mamelukes, so celebrated for their address and courage. His ge

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NOTE.

In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to circumstances—the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the topography of the theatre of action. Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this success depends generally on the ca

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NOTE.

An army which undertakes the conquest of a country, has its two wings resting either upon neutral territories, or upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some cases that only one wing is so supported; and in others that both are exposed. In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected, a general has only to protect his front from being penetrated. In the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon the supported wing.

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NOTE.

When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a principle, that the union of these different corps should never take place near the enemy; because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not only prevent this junction, but may beat the armies in detail. In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, marching to the conquest of Bohemia with two arm

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NOTE.

All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome.) It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it is necessary to have exact information of the number of troops the enemy can bring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid plan of offensive or defensive operation without an

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NOTE.

At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance , is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, it will always weaken the morale of an army, because, in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and materiel than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that in a battle the enemy

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NOTE.

An army should be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the day and night, to oppose all the resistance of which it is capable. With this view, the soldier should always be furnished completely with arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions of the army should be constantly in a state to support, to be supported, and to protect itself. The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, sho

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NOTE.

A general can, therefore, rely only on the proper arrangement of his troops, to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon the front, or flanks, or rear of his army. If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine, the whole of the cavalry may be posted with the other wing, in order to envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers. If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or infantry should be despatched to attack him in fla

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NOTE.

The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army, and increases its means of victory. Press on! “Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance in concealing the movements of an army, because it leaves no time to divulge the intention of its chief. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the enemy unexpectedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise him, and let him feel the thunder before h

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NOTE.

When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of artillery, by the nature of the manœuvres; and the inferiority in cavalry, by the choice of positions. In such circumstances, the morale of the soldier does much. The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully executed upon these principles. Napoleon, with an army inferior in number, an army discouraged by

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NOTE.

To direct operations with lines far removed from each other, and without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth to a second. The detached column has only its orders for the first day. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have happened to the main body. Thus, this column either loses time upon emergency, in waiting for orders, or it will act without them, and at hazard. Let it therefore be held as a principle, that an army should always keep its columns

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NOTE.

An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity. “The line of communication of an army,” says Montécuculli, “must be certain and well established, for every army that acts from a distant base, and is not careful to keep this line perfectly open, marches upon a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may be seen by an infinity of examples. In fact, if the road by which provisions, ammunition and reinforcements are

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NOTE.

The distances permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view. When an army moves at a distance from the enemy, the columns may be disposed along the road so as to favor the artillery and baggage. But when it is marching into action, the different corps must be formed in close columns in order of battle. The generals must take care that the heads of the columns, which are to attack together, do not outstep each oth

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NOTE.

Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only chance of success depended on concentrating his little army, neglected this precaution, and was beaten in three successive actions at the Trebia. By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures to unite the two armies in the plains of the Po useless, and his retreat, after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other arrangements, also, which the former had made to come to his support. The inactivity of Marshal Su

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NOTE.

The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means that we obtain

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NOTE.

It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what the enemy wishes you to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitred, should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to fortify and entrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is, never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning. It was without due regard to this principle, that Marshal Villeroi, on assuming the c

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NOTE.

In a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a superior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a good defensive position. Those natural positions which are ordinarily met with, are not sufficient to protect an army against superior numbers without recourse to art. The campaign of the French and Spanish army, commanded by the Duke of Berwick, against the Portuguese, in the year 1706, affords a good lesson on this subject. The two armies made almost the tour

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NOTE.

A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet the attack. By this means he disconcerts his adversary; and if the latter shows any irresolution in his movements, a skilful leader, profiting by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at least employ the day in manœuvring—at night he entrenches himself, or falls back to a better posi

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NOTE.

The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations. By studying the first campaign of Napoleon in Italy, we can learn what genius and boldness may effect in passing with an army from the defensive to the offensive . The army of the allies, commanded by General Beaulieu, was provided with every means that could render it formidable. Its force amounted to eighty thousand men, and two hundred pieces of cannon. The French army, on the contrary, could number sca

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NOTE.

It may be laid down as a principle, that the line of operation should not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skilful manœuvres in war, to know how to change it, when circumstances authorize or render this necessary. An army which changes skilfully its line of operation deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or upon what weak points it is assailable. Frederick sometimes changed his line of operation in the middle of a campaign; but he was enabled to do this, bec

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NOTE.

When an army carries with it a battering train, or large convoys of sick and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depôts. It is above all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed with woods and marshes, that it is of importance to observe this maxim; for, the convoys and means of transport being frequently embarrassed in defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily disperse the escorts, or make even a successful attack upon the whole army, when it is obliged, from the n

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NOTE.

The art of encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in order of battle in this position. To this end, the artillery should be advantageously placed, ground should be selected which is not commanded or liable to be turned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover and command the surrounding country. Frederick has remarked that, in order to be assured that your camp is well placed, you should see if, by making a small movement, you can oblige the enemy to make a greater; or, i

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NOTE.

When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace him with an offensive movement. By this manœuvre, you will prevent him from detaching and annoying your flanks in case you should judge it necessary to retire. This was the manœuvre practised by General Desaix, in 1798, near Radstadt. He made up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, and maintained himself the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous attacks of the Archd

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NOTE.

Never lose sight of this maxim: that you should establish your cantonments at the most distant and best-protected point from the enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will have time to unite all your forces before he can attack you. In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne lost the battle of Marienthal, by neglecting this principle; for if, instead of reassembling his divisions at Erbsthausen, he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim, behind the Tauber, his army would

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NOTE.

When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should show boldness, strike a decided blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of his enemy. The victory is in his hands. This was the position of the French army at the famous battle of Leipzig, which terminated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for Napoleon; for the battle of Hanau was of no consequenc

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NOTE.

It is contrary to all true principle, to make corps, which have no communication with each other, act separately against a central force whose communications are cut off. The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden by neglecting this principle. The imperial army, under the orders of the archduke John, was divided into four columns, which had to march through an immense forest, previous to their junction in the plain of Anzing, where they intended to surprise the French. But these different corp

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NOTE.

When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns should rally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen, is when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction. One great advantage which results from rallying your columns on a point far removed from the field of battle, or from the position previously occupied, is, that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean to take. If he div

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NOTE.

No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs may change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the arrival of large reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive, and counteract your previous arrangements. In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General Jourdan, effected a retreat, which was rendered still more difficult by the loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the forces of the archduke Charles were scatte

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NOTE.

When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force. Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day. I think it here desirable to observe, that it is prudent before a battle to fix upon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction of the different detachments; for if, from unforeseen circumstances, these detachments should be prevented from joining before the action has commenced, they might be exposed, in case a retrograde movement should be found neces

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NOTE.

Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile. It was by a neglect of this principle that Frederick was beaten at Kollin in the first campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies of valor, the Prussians lost fifteen thousand men and a great portion of their artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did not exceed five thousand men. The consequence of thi

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NOTE.

When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an adversary of superior talent; for if you are beaten, even in the midst of your magazines and your communications, wo to the vanquished! “We should make war,” says Marshal Saxe, “without leaving anything to hazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general. But when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to profit by the victory,

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NOTE.

The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left upon Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front covered by a large sheet of water. Frederick proposed to turn its right in order to make an attack upon the rear. For this purpose he divided his army into two corps, the one under the orders of Ziethen, with instructions to attack in front, following the edge of the water; the other under his own immediate command, with which he set out to turn the right of the Austri

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NOTE.

It is contrary to the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the other extremity. In case of retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost. They should be left in position, under a sufficient escort, until you are master of the opening. Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of baggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering train under the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroy

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NOTE.

It should be laid down as a principle, never to leave intervals by which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle, unless it be to draw him into a snare. In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of Lorraine, who was covering Prague with the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians threatening, by a flank movement, to turn his right. He immediately ordered a partial change of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing, so as to form a right angle with the rest of the line. B

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NOTE.

Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect each other. At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign of 1813, the camp of the allies, although advantageously placed upon the heights on the left bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless extremely defective, from being traversed longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated the left wing completely from the centre and the right. This vicious arrangement did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon. He instantly directed the wh

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NOTE.

When the enemy’s army is covered by a river, upon which he holds several têtes de pont , do not attack in front. This would divide your force and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In the meantime, let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across your bridge. Observe that the poi

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NOTE.

From the moment you are master of a position which commands the opposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of the river; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive to place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished, if the river is more than three hundred toises (or six hundred yards) in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank and get under cover. Hence it fo

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NOTE.

It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the campaign of 1809, the Archduke Charles compelled the French to reoccupy the isle of Lobau, after having debouched on the left bank of the Danube. The march of the Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. He menaced Grosaspern with his right, Esling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with his left. His army, with both wings resting on the Danube, formed a semicircle around Esling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke the centre of the Austrians; but afte

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NOTE.

In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was attacked with his army before Philipsburg by a very superior force. There was no bridge here over the Rhine, but he took advantage of the ground between the river and the place to establish his camp. This should serve as a lesson to engineer officers, not merely in the construction of fortresses, but of têtes de pont . A space should always be left between the fortress and the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged to throw itself into

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NOTE.

Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It is true, they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a victorious enemy. The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, has given to many military men a false idea of the real value of fortresses. The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and the Alps at this period, were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the

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NOTE.

There are only two ways of insuring the success of a siege. The first, to begin by beating the enemy’s army employed to cover the place, forcing it out of the field, and throwing its remains beyond some great natural obstacle, such as a chain of mountains, or large river. Having accomplished this object, an army of observation should be placed behind the natural obstacle, until the trenches are finished and the place taken. But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army,

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NOTE.

“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, “we should not seek to place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs we have in view.” This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berwick. Sent to form the siege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of Montalban, contrary to the advice of Vauban, and even to the orders of the king. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began by s

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NOTE.

Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, and all the assistance which the science of the engineer can afford, deprive themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary which is never injurious, almost always useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted, at the same time, that the principles of field-fortification require improvement. This important branch of the art of war has made no progress since the time of the ancients. It is even inferior at this day to what it was two thousand years ag

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NOTE.

If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend a fortified town, which contains an hospital and magazines, at least every means should be employed to secure the citadel against a coup de main . A few battalions dispersed about a town, inspire no terror; but shut up in the more narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an imposing attitude. For this reason it appears to me that such a precaution is always necessary, not only in fortresses, but wherever there are hospitals or d

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NOTE.

A fortified place can only protect the garrison and detain the enemy for a certain time. When this time has elapsed, and the defences of the place are destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All civilized nations are agreed on this point, and there never has been an argument except with reference to the greater or less degree of defence which a governor is bound to make before he capitulates. At the same time, there are generals—Villars among the number—who are of opinion that a govern

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NOTE.

The keys of a fortress are well worth the retirement of the garrison, when it is resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this principle it is always wiser to grant an honorable capitulation to a garrison which has made a vigorous resistance, than to risk an assault. Marshal Villars has justly observed, that “no governor of a place should be permitted to excuse himself for surrendering, on the ground of wishing to preserve the king’s troops. Every garrison that displays courage will escape

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NOTE.

Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing without each other; therefore, they should always be so disposed in cantonments as to assist each other in case of surprise. “A general,” says Frederick, “should direct his whole attention to the tranquility of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues. With this view, care should be taken that the troops are able to form rapidly upon ground which has been previously reconnoi

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NOTE.

The formation of infantry in line should be always in two ranks, because the length of the musket only admits of an effective fire in this formation. The discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain, but frequently dangerous to the ranks in its front. In drawing up infantry in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary behind every fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be placed twenty-five paces in rear of each flank. I am of opinion, if circumstances require a line of infantry t

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NOTE.

The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is a bad one, and attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its power of action. It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy is destroyed; even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the first movement of the cavalry it is left without support. The best mode of protecting cavalry is to cover its flank. This also was the opinion of Marshal Saxe. “The weakness of the above formation,” says he, “is sufficie

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NOTE.

Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter is engaged in front. The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry, recommends that it should be brought in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment for employing it arrives; that is to say, when it can attack with a certainty of success. As the rapidity of its movement enables cavalry to act along the wh

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NOTE.

It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent the beaten enemy from rallying. Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest importance to have a body of cavalry in reserve, either to take advantage of victory, or to secure a retreat. The most decisive battles lose half their value to the conqueror, when the want of cavalry prevents him from following up his success, and depriving the enemy of the power of rallying. When a retiring army is pursued, it is more especially upo

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NOTE.

Artillery is more essential to cavalry than to infantry, because cavalry has no fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre. It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse has been had to horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore, should never be without cannon, whether when attacking, rallying, or in position. Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time in introducing it into her armies, although in an imperfect degree. It was only in 1792 that this arm was adopted in Franc

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NOTE.

In march, or in position, the greater part of the artillery should be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in reserve. Each gun should have with it three hundred rounds, without including the limber. This is about the complement for two battles. The better infantry is, the more important it is to support it by artillery, with a view to its preservation. It is essential, also, that the batteries attached to divisions should march in the front, because this has a strong i

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NOTE.

Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions, and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible, without compromising the safety of the guns. Field batteries should command the whole country round from the level of the platform. They should on no account be masked on the right and left, but have free range in every direction. The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, which covered the centre of the Russian army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), may

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NOTE.

A General should never put his army into cantonments, when he has the means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus providing for the wants of the soldier in the field. One great advantage which results from having an army in camp is, that it is easier to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline there. The soldier in cantonments abandons himself to repose; he ends by finding a pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return to the field. The reverse takes place in a camp

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NOTE.

A good general, a well-organized system, good instructions, and severe discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make good troops, independently of the cause for which they fight. At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of national honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon young soldiers with advantage. This remark appears to me less applicable to officers than to soldiers, for as war is not a state of things natural to man, it follows that those who

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NOTE.

When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is very difficult to organize an army. This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly with reference to an army intended to act upon the system of modern war, and in which order, precision, and rapidity of movement, are the principal essentials to success....

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NOTE.

The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only the second; hardship, poverty and want, are the best school for a soldier. Valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran; but in the former it is more evanescent. It is only by habits of service, and after several campaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage which makes him support the fatigues and privations of war without a murmur. Experience by this time has instructed him

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NOTE.

There are five things the soldier should never be without—his musket, his ammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days), and his entrenching-tool. The knapsack may be reduced to the smallest size possible, if it be thought proper, but the soldier should always have it with him. It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized the advantage of giving to every soldier an entrenching-tool. His authority is the best answer to the ridicule which has been thrown upon those who proposed

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NOTE.

Every means should be taken to attach the soldier to his colors. This is best accomplished by showing consideration and respect to the old soldier. His pay likewise should increase with his length of service. It is the height of injustice not to pay a veteran more than a recruit. Some modern writers have recommended, on the other hand, to limit the period of service, in order to bring the whole youth of a country successively under arms. By this means they purpose to have the levies, en masse ,

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NOTE.

It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful, it is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to furnish materials and amusement for the bivouac. All printed orders of the day should keep in view these objects. The opinion of the general-in-chief, ener

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NOTE.

Tents are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs, because he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the ground on which he lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter him from the wind. On the other hand, tents are necessary for the superior officers, who have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should, therefore, be issued to these, with directions to them never to sleep in a house. Tents are always objects of observation to the enemy’s staff. They

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NOTE.

All information obtained from prisoners should be received with caution, and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees anything beyond his company; and an officer can afford intelligence of little more than the position and movements of the division to which his regiment belongs. On this account, the general of an army should never depend upon the information derived from prisoners, unless it agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards, in reference to the position, etc.,

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NOTE.

Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command; for this reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one chief. “Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with constancy, and executed with decision.” It rarely happens that any number of men who desire the same object are perfectly agreed as to the means of attaining it; and if

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NOTE.

The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions and councils of war, will follow at all times. They will terminate in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a general is determined courage. Prince Eugene used to say that councils of war “are only useful when you want an excuse for attempting nothing .” This was also the opinion of Villars. A general-in-chief should avoid, therefore,

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NOTE.

In war, the general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It depends on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and resolution. The officer who obeys, whatever may be the nature or extent of his command, will always stand excused for executing implicitly the orders which have been given to him. This is not the case with the general-in-chief, on whom the safety of the army and the success of the campaign depend. Occupied, without intermission, in the whole process of obse

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NOTE.

To authorize generals or other officers to lay down their arms in virtue of a particular capitulation, under any other circumstances than when they are composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even to the misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution. The more obstinate the resistance of an army, the greater the chances of assistance or of s

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NOTE.

There is no security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any general, if officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field, and to lay down their arms in virtue of conditions favorable to the contracting party, but contrary to the interests of the army at large. To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve their comrades in greater peril, is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be proscribed, declared infamous, and made punishable with death. All generals, officers and sold

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NOTE.

There is but one honorable mode of becoming prisoner of war. That is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, by being cut off entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our arms. In this case, there can be no conditions, for honor can impose none. We yield to an irresistible necessity. There is always time enough to surrender prisoner of war. This should be deferred, therefore, till the last extremity. And here I may be permitted to cite an example of rare obstinacy in defence, which

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NOTE.

The conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render the abuses and vexations, inseparable from war, the more intolerable. A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice and mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition or prevent it. Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at the command of armies after having exercise

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NOTE.

Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge acquired in the service of his country, to deliver up her frontier and her towns to foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle of religion, morality and honor. Ambitious men who, listening only to their passions, arm natives of the same land against each other (under the deceitful pretext of the public good), are still more criminal. For however arbitrary a government, the institutions which have been consolidated b

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NOTE.

A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when these are both distant from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things. Hence, it follows, that every general is culpable who undertakes the execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan, in short, to give in his resignation, rather th

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NOTE.

The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head—that is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by good news, or depressed by bad. The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is upon a just comparison and consideration of the weight due t

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NOTE.

The leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected for the head of the staff, are, to know the country thoroughly; to be able to conduct a reconnoissance with skill; to superintend the transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated movements intelligibly, but in a few words, and with simplicity. Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the necessary preparations for carrying the plan of the campaign, and the operations resolved on b

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NOTE.

A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles of each branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed. His correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the advanced posts, should put him in possession of all the movements of the army, and the disposition and management of the great park of artillery should depend upon this information. After having recognized the advantage of intr

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NOTE.

The qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts, are, to reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description; to provide guides that may be depended on; to interrogate the curé and postmaster; to establish rapidly a good understanding with the inhabitants; to send out spies; to intercept public and private letters; to translate and analyze their contents; in a word, to be able to answer every question of the general-in-chief, when he arrives with the whole army. Foragi

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NOTE.

Generals-in-chief must be guided by their own experience, or their genius. Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge of an engineer or artillery officer, may be learned in treatises, but the science of strategy is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the campaigns of all the great captains. Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These have been: to keep their forces united; to leave no weak

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NOTE.

Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders. It is in order to facilitate this object that I have formed the present collection. It is after rea

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NOTE.

Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain. Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed, except as noted below. Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed. Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained. Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. Page 32 : “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive” but changed

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