A History Of The Peninsular War - free ebook by Charles Oman

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A History Of The Peninsular War

Charles Oman

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A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

BY CHARLES OMAN, M.A. FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE AND CHICHELE PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY AND CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID Vol. III Sept. 1809–Dec. 1810 OCAÑA CADIZ BUSSACO TORRES VEDRAS WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1908 HENRY FROWDE, M.A. PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD LONDON, EDINBURGH NEW YORK AND TORONTO...

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A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

BY CHARLES OMAN M.A. Oxon., Hon. LL.D. Edin. FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID, OF THE ACADEMY OF LISBON AND THE ACADEMY OF SAN LUIS OF SARAGOSSA Vol. IV Dec. 1810-Dec. 1811 MASSÉNA’S RETREAT FUENTES DE OÑORO ALBUERA TARRAGONA WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1911 HENRY FROWDE, M.A. PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD LONDON, EDINBURGH

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A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

BY CHARLES OMAN, M.A. FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE AND DEPUTY-PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY (CHICHELE) IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Vol. I 1807-1809 FROM THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU TO THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA WITH MAPS, PLANS AND PORTRAITS Enlarge OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1902 OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1902 HENRY FROWDE, M.A. PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD LONDON, EDINBURGH NEW YORK...

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A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

BY CHARLES OMAN M.A. Oxon., Hon. LL.D. Edin. FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID, OF THE ACADEMY OF LISBON AND OF THE ACADEMY OF SAN LUIS OF SARAGOSSA Vol. V Oct. 1811 – Aug. 31, 1812 VALENCIA CIUDAD RODRIGO BADAJOZ SALAMANCA MADRID WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1914 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK TO

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PREFACE

PREFACE

I n this volume are contained the annals of all the many campaigns of 1811, with the exception of those of Suchet’s Valencian expedition in the later months of the year, which for reasons of space have to be relegated to Volume V. It was impossible to exceed the bulk of 660 pages, and the operations on the Mediterranean coast of Spain can be dealt with separately without any grave breach of continuity in the narrative, though this particular Valencian campaign affected the general course of the

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PREFACE

PREFACE

T his , the third volume of the History of the Peninsular War, covers a longer period than either of its predecessors, extending over the sixteen months from Wellington’s arrival at Badajoz on his retreat from Talavera (Sept. 3, 1809) to the deadlock in front of Santarem (Dec. 1810), which marked the end of Masséna’s offensive campaign in Portugal. It thus embraces the central crisis of the whole war, the arrival of the French in front of the Lines of Torres Vedras and their first short retreat,

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PREFACE

PREFACE

I t is many years since an attempt has been made in England to deal with the general history of the Peninsular War. Several interesting and valuable diaries or memoirs of officers who took part in the great struggle have been published of late [1] , but no writer of the present generation has dared to grapple with the details of the whole of the seven years of campaigning that lie between the Dos Mayo and Toulouse. Napier’s splendid work has held the field for sixty years. Meanwhile an enormous

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PREFACE

PREFACE

I n this volume Wellington’s campaigning in 1812 is followed no further than the day (August 31st) on which he set out from Madrid to drive back Clausel from the Douro. Reasons of space make it impossible to include the siege of Burgos and the retreat which followed. I had written the narrative of them, but found it impossible to add six long chapters to the 620 pages already in print. The fact is that, from the point of view of Wellington’s army, the year 1812 was much more tightly packed with

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

In the last volume of this work the chronicle of all the campaigns of 1811 was completed, save in one corner of Spain, where, on the eastern coast, the fortunes of the French armies have only been pursued down to the recall of Marshal Macdonald to Paris on October 28th. Already, before the Duke of Tarentum had been added to the list of the generals who had been withdrawn and superseded for failure in Catalonia, another series of operations had been begun in the East, which was destined to lead d

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

Between the 20th of August, 1809, when Robert Craufurd’s Light Brigade [1] withdrew from the Bridge of Almaraz, to follow the rest of the British army across the mountains to the neighbourhood of Badajoz, and February 27, 1810, when part of that same brigade was engaged in the first skirmish of Barba del Puerco, not a shot was fired by any of Wellington’s troops. This gap of over six months in his active operations may appear extraordinary, and it was bitterly criticized at the time. Between Aug

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

‘ I am not the heir of Louis XIV, I am the heir of Charlemagne,’ wrote Napoleon, in one of those moments of epigrammatic self-revelation which are so precious to the students of the most interesting epoch and the most interesting personality of modern history [2] . There are historians who have sought for the origins of the Peninsular War far back in the eternal and inevitable conflict between democracy and privilege [3] : there are others who—accepting the Emperor’s own version of the facts—hav

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

On the 18th of November, 1810, Masséna had completed the movement to the rear which he had commenced on the 14th. His army no longer threatened the Lines of Torres Vedras: he had abandoned the offensive for the defensive. Concentrated in the triangle Santarem-Punhete-Thomar, with his three corps so disposed that a march of twenty miles would suffice to concentrate everything save outlying detachments, he waited to see whether his enemy would dare to attack him; for he still hoped for a battle in

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

In the spring of 1809 the theatres of operations of the two French army-corps entrusted with the reduction of Aragon and of Catalonia were still divided by a broad belt of territory which was in the hands of the Spaniards, around the fortresses of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa. Only once had communication been opened between Suchet and St. Cyr, and then the force which had crossed from Aragon into Catalonia found itself unable to return. The only way of getting a dispatch from Saragossa to Bar

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

After Charles O’Donnell and Obispo had been driven away from the threatening position upon Suchet’s flank, Blake found himself during the early days of October in a very unpleasant dilemma. It was clear that his own feeble efforts to molest the French army were a complete failure. Presently the message reached him that Mahy’s unlucky expedition to Cuenca had been absolutely useless. But the most disheartening news was that the attempt to overrun Aragon by means of the guerrilleros had failed; it

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

Junot’s army was nearing the Portuguese frontier, and the reserve at Bayonne was already beginning to assemble—it was now styled ‘the Second Corps of Observation of the Gironde’—when a series of startling events took place at the Spanish Court. On October 27, the very day that the treaty of Fontainebleau was signed, Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, was seized by his father and thrown into confinement, on a charge of high treason, of having plotted to dethrone or even to murder his aged parent.

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

In his original scheme for the invasion of Portugal, Napoleon had given no part to the Army of Andalusia, judging that Masséna, supported by the 9th Corps, would be amply strong enough to drive the English into the sea. It is not till the 29th of September that the imperial correspondence begins to show signs of a desire that Soult should do something to help the Army of Portugal. But the assistance which was to be given is defined, in the dispatch of that date, as no more than a diversion to be

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

After the arrival of Drouet and his division of the 9th Corps at Leiria in the early days of the New Year, there was no serious movement of any part of the French or the British armies for some weeks. The weather was bad, and the troops on both sides remained in their cantonments, save such of the French as were detailed for the perpetual marauding parties up the line of the Zezere or in the southern slopes of the Serra da Estrella by which alone the army was kept alive. The ranks of Masséna’s b

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

When Monjuich had been evacuated, the position of Gerona was undoubtedly perilous: of the two mountain summits which command the city one was now entirely in the hands of the French; for not only the great fort itself but several of the smaller works above the ravine of the Galligan—such as the fortified convent of San Daniel and the ruined tower of San Juan—had been lost. The front exposed to attack now consisted of the northern section of the old city wall, from the bastion of Santa Maria at t

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

There is certainly no example in history of a kingdom conquered in so few days and with such small trouble as was Portugal in 1807. That a nation of three million souls, which in earlier days had repeatedly defended itself with success against numbers far greater than those now employed against it, should yield without firing a single shot was astonishing. It is a testimony not only to the timidity of the Portuguese Government, but to the numbing power of Napoleon’s name. The force destined by t

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

As the result of the disastrous battle of Saguntum Blake had lost the fortress which had served him so well as an outwork: while his field army was much decreased in numbers, and still more in self-confidence. It was obviously impossible that he should ever again attempt to take the offensive with it. But he was still in possession of Valencia and all its resources, and his carefully fortified lines along the Guadalaviar were so strong that even a defeated army could make some stand behind them.

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

As early as August 30, when Wellington had not fully completed his retreat from Almaraz and Jaraicejo to Badajoz and Merida, the central Junta had already begun to pester him and his brother, the Ambassador at Seville, with plans for a resumption of the offensive in the valley of the Tagus. On that day Martin de Garay, the Secretary of State, wrote to represent to Wellesley that he had good reason to believe that the troops of Victor, Mortier, and Soult were making a general movement to the rear

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

In the second chapter of this volume we dealt with Soult’s expedition to Estremadura and its results, but had to defer for later consideration the events which brought him back in haste to Andalusia the moment that Badajoz had fallen (March 12th). These must now be explained. When his 20,000 men, collected from all the three corps which formed the Army of the South, set out on the last day of the old year 1810, Soult left behind him three problems, each of which (as he was well aware) might assu

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

When once Suchet’s long-deferred movements began, on December 26, 1812, his operations were so rapid and successful that the whole campaign was finished in fourteen days. The unexpected swiftness of his triumph had the result of rendering unnecessary the subsidiary operations which Napoleon had directed the Armies of Portugal, the Centre, and Andalusia, to carry out. D’Armagnac, with his 3,000 men of the Army of the Centre, still lay at Cuenca when Suchet’s advance began, hindered from further m

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

The ‘Affair of the Escurial’ added some complications to the situation of affairs in Spain from Napoleon’s point of view. But there was nothing in it to make him alter the plans which he was at this moment carrying out: if the Bourbons were to be evicted from Spain, it made the task somewhat easier to find that the heir to the throne was now in deep disgrace. It would be possible to urge that by his parricidal plots he had forfeited any rights to the kingdom which he had hitherto possessed. In d

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

The news of the disaster of Ocaña gave a death-blow to the Central Junta. Its attempt to win back its lost credit by an offensive campaign against Madrid having ended in such a lamentable fashion, there was nothing left for it but to acquiesce in its own supersession by the oft-discussed national Cortes. But that assembly was not to meet till March 1, 1810—a date still four months in the future,—and even its form and constitution had not yet been settled. For it would have been absurd to have ca

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

The chronicle of the obstinate and heroic defence made by the Catalans, even after the falls of Tarragona and Figueras had seemed to make all further resistance hopeless, was carried in the last volume of this work down to October 28, 1811, when Marshal Macdonald, like St. Cyr and Augereau, was recalled to Paris, having added no more to his reputation than had his predecessors while in charge of this mountainous principality. We have seen how General Lacy, hoping against hope, rallied the last r

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

The news of the abdication of Charles IV was received with universal joy. The rioters of Aranjuez dispersed after saluting the new sovereign, and allowed Godoy to be taken off, without further trouble, to the castle of Villaviciosa. Madrid, though Murat was now almost at its gates, gave itself up to feasts and processions, after having first sacked the palaces of the Prince of the Peace and some of his unpopular relations and partisans. Completely ignorant of the personal character of Ferdinand

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

On the 9th of March Wellington began at last to discover the real position of the various French corps; till their rear was well past Thomar, it had been difficult to divine the main trend of their movements, for the various columns had been crossing each other’s routes in a very puzzling fashion. But it now became clear that Masséna was intending to use all the three lines of communication which lead from the plain of the Tagus to the lower valley of the Mondego. Reynier and the 2nd Corps, afte

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

At noon on March 22nd, the day following that on which the French head quarters had reached Celorico, Masséna issued a new set of orders, entirely contradictory to those which he had been giving during the last fifteen days. Though on the 19th he had stated his intention of ‘falling back closer to his base of operations on the fortresses [Almeida and Rodrigo], and giving the army a rest after its fatigues and privations [220] ,’ he now proposed to plunge back once more into the mountains, and to

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CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

When King Ferdinand had taken his departure to Bayonne, the position of Murat in Madrid became very delicate. He might expect to hear at any moment, since the Emperor’s plans were more or less known to him, either that the Spanish king had been made a prisoner, or that he had taken the alarm, escaped from his escort, and fled into the mountains. In either case trouble at Madrid was very probable, though there was no serious military danger to be feared, for of Spanish troops there were only 3,00

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

In the south-west no less than in the south-east of Spain the month of January 1812 was to witness the last offensive movement of the French armies of invasion. But while Suchet’s advance ended, as we have seen, in a splendid success, that of Soult was to meet with a disastrous check. Neither marshal was to have another chance of taking the initiative—thanks, directly or indirectly, to the working out of Wellington’s great plan of campaign for the New Year. In the previous volume the fortunes of

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

When considering the action of the French after the victory of Ocaña, it is necessary to remember that King Joseph and Soult were not in the position of ordinary invaders, who have just succeeded in demolishing the last army of their enemy. In wars of a normal type the victor knows that the vanquished will sue for terms when further resistance appears hopeless; he proceeds to dictate the cessions of territory or payments of indemnities that he thinks proper, as the price of peace. But it was not

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

The military operations in the South during the winter of 1811-12 were inconclusive, and only important in a negative way, as showing that the initiative of the French armies was spent in this direction. But it must not be forgotten that while Soult had been brought to a standstill, Suchet’s operations were still progressing: January, indeed, saw the last great Spanish disaster of the war, the fall of Valencia, so that the spirits of government and people still ran very low. It was not till the

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

Of all the regions of Europe, the Iberian Peninsula possesses the best marked frontier. It is separated from France, its only neighbour, by one broad range of mountains, which defines its boundaries even more clearly than the Alps mark those of Italy. For the Alps are no single chain, but a system of double and triple chains running parallel to each other, and leaving between them debatable lands such as Savoy and the Southern Tyrol. Between Spain and France there is no possibility of any such c

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

While following the fortunes of Wellington and Masséna, during the first four months of 1811, we have been compelled to leave almost untouched the sequence of events in the rest of Spain; not only the doings of Suchet and Macdonald in the far east, which had no practical connexion with the campaign of Portugal, but also the minor affairs of the southern and central provinces. Only Soult’s expedition to Estremadura, which came into close touch with Wellington, has been dealt with. It is time to e

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

On the 19th of January, 1810, the unfortunate Areizaga began to receive from all quarters dispatches which left him no doubt that the fatal hour had arrived, and that the whole of his line, from Villamanrique on the east to Almaden on the west, was about to be assailed by the enemy. From every point on his front of 150 miles, his subordinates sent him in reports to the effect that strong hostile columns had come up, and had thrust in their outposts. Indeed, Zerain, from his remote cantonment on

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

It is with no small relief that we turn away from the annals of the petty warfare in the provinces and of the bickerings of politicians, to follow the doings of Wellington. All the ‘alarms and excursions’ that we have been narrating were of small import, compared with the operations on the frontiers of Portugal and Leon which began at the New Year of 1812. Here we have arrived at the true backbone of the war, the central fact which governed all the rest. Here we follow the working out of a defin

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

In the last pages of the third volume of this work we brought the history of the campaigns of Suchet and Macdonald in Aragon and Catalonia as far as December 12th, 1810, the day on which the Marshal came down to the lower Ebro at the head of the field-divisions of the 7th Corps, in order to cover the long-delayed siege of Tortosa, which his colleague, the commander of the Army of Aragon, was about to take in hand. For five months, ever since August 1810, as it will be remembered, Suchet had been

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

When the English student begins to investigate the Peninsular War in detail, he finds that, as regards the Spanish armies and their behaviour, he starts with a strong hostile prejudice. The Duke of Wellington in his dispatches, and still more in his private letters and his table-talk, was always enlarging on the folly and arrogance of the Spanish generals with whom he had to co-operate, and on the untrustworthiness of their troops. Napier, the one military classic whom most Englishmen have read,

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

The continual existence of Portugal down to the present day in face of the persistent hostility and immensely superior force of its neighbour Spain seems at first sight to be one of the most inexplicable phenomena in modern history. It appears all the more astounding when we remember that the lesser kingdom was once conquered, and held down for sixty years, by the greater power. Few states have won back and maintained their independence in such masterful fashion as did Portugal, in the long ‘War

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

As far back as September 1809, while his army still lay at Badajoz and the Talavera campaign was hardly over, Wellington had foreseen the oncoming invasion of Portugal, which did not actually begin till August 1810 [165] . Writing to his brother, then on his special mission to Seville, he had laid down his conclusions. Bonaparte would, in consequence of the cessation of the Austrian war, be enabled to pour unlimited reinforcements into Spain. The British army, even if raised to 40,000 men, would

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

The extraordinary speed with which Wellington had in twelve days reduced Ciudad Rodrigo, a fortress that had held out for twenty-four days of open trenches when besieged by Ney in 1810, surprised the captor himself, who had reckoned on taking no shorter time in its leaguer than had the French. But it absolutely appalled his two adversaries, Marmont and Dorsenne, whose whole scheme of operations had rested on the idea that they could count on some three weeks or more for preparation, when the new

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

§ 1. The Army of 1808: its Character and Organization. In dealing with the history of the imperial armies in the Peninsula, it is our first duty to point out the enormous difference between the troops who entered Spain in 1807 and 1808, under Dupont, Moncey, and Murat, and the later arrivals who came under Bonaparte’s personal guidance when the first disastrous stage of the war was over. Nothing can show more clearly the contempt which the Emperor entertained, not only for the Spanish government

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

On the 11th of March, as it will be remembered, Imaz—the deplorable successor of the gallant Menacho—surrendered Badajoz to Marshal Soult, despite of the messages which he had received that an Anglo-Portuguese corps was on its way for his relief. On the 14th the conqueror, appalled at the news of the battle of Barrosa and the danger of Seville, marched back to Andalusia, taking with him a brigade of dragoons and the greater part of Gazan’s infantry division. He left behind him in Estremadura Mor

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

In narrating the troubles of the unlucky Duke of Ragusa, engaged in fruitless strategical controversy with his master, we have been carried far into the month of March 1812. It is necessary to return to February 20th in order to take up the story of Wellington’s march to Estremadura. We have seen that he commenced his artillery preparations in January, by sending Alexander Dickson to Setubal, and dispatching a large part of his siege-train southward, partly by sea, partly across the difficult mo

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

The Army of Portugal, sullenly retiring far within the frontiers of Spain, had been lost to Wellington’s sight on April 8th, when it passed the Agueda and fell back in diverging columns towards various towns of the kingdom of Leon—Salamanca, Toro, and Zamora—where it went into cantonments. Only Drouet with the two divisions of Conroux and Claparéde remained in observation of the Allies, with his head quarters at San Muñoz. The British general was well aware of the dilapidated state in which the

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

During the summer campaign of 1809 the French Army of Spain had received hardly any reinforcements from beyond the Pyrenees. Every man that the Emperor could arm was being directed against Austria in May and June. But when Wagram had been won, and the armistice of Znaym signed, and when moreover it had been discovered that the British expedition to the Isle of Walcheren need not draw off any part of the Army of Germany, the Emperor began to turn his attention to the Peninsula. The armistice with

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

An account of the numbers and the organization of an army is of comparatively little interest, unless we understand the principles on which its leaders are accustomed to handle it on the day of battle, and its value as a fighting machine. Speaking generally, the tactics of the French infantry during the Peninsular War were those which had been developed fifteen years before, during the first struggles of the Revolution. They nearly always attacked with a thick cloud of tirailleurs covering one o

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

Masséna’s attempt to ‘take the bull by the horns’—for the phrase used at Bussaco may well be repeated for the attack on Fuentes village—had failed with loss. It was clear that he had hit upon a strong point in Wellington’s well-hidden line, and he had paid dearly for his brutal methods. It remained to be seen whether he might not also find, as at Bussaco, some way of turning his adversary’s position by a wide flank movement. Down-stream the ground looked very impracticable, and the ravine of the

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

The arrangements which Wellington made for the assault—a business which he knew would be costly, and not absolutely certain of success—were as follows. The Light and 4th Divisions were told off for the main attack at the three breaches. They were forced to make it on the narrow front west of the Rivillas, because the inundation cramped their approach on the right. The 4th Division, under Colville, was to keep nearest to that water, and to assail the breach in the Trinidad bastion and also the ne

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

While the provinces of Spain were bursting out, one after another, into open insurrection, Murat at Madrid and Bonaparte at Bayonne were still enjoying the fools’ paradise in which they had dwelt since the formal abdication of Ferdinand VII. The former was busy in forcing the Junta of Regency to perform the action which he elegantly styled ‘swallowing the pill,’ i.e. in compelling it to do homage to Napoleon and humbly crave for the appointment of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain. He imagined t

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

Masséna , as we have seen, was only appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Portugal on April 17, 1810, and did not appear at Valladolid, to take up his charge, till May. The campaign, however, had begun long before under the Emperor’s own directions. There were preliminary operations to be carried out, which could be finished before either the new General-in-Chief or the main body of the reinforcements from beyond the Pyrenees had arrived. These were the repression of the insurgent bands of

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

Having watched the failure of the expeditions by which Napoleon had hoped to complete the conquest of Southern Spain, we must turn our eyes northward, to Madrid and the long line of communications which joined the capital to the French base of operations at Vittoria, Pampeluna, and San Sebastian. At the moment when the Valencian and Andalusian expeditions were sent out from Madrid and Toledo, Murat had still under his hand a large body of troops, the second and third division of Moncey’s corps,

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

The long months of delay that followed the first operations of the French in 1810 were a time of anxious waiting for Wellington. He had moved his head quarters to Vizeu on the 12th of January, and had been lying in that bleak and lofty town all through the rest of the winter. With him there had come to the North all the old British divisions save the 2nd, which had been left with Hill, first at Abrantes and then at Portalegre, to watch the French between the Tagus and the Guadiana. The 1st Divis

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

The 6th of May went by without any sign of movement on the part of the French. Wellington watched with anxiety for the indications of an extension of the enemy’s front to north or south. But not even a cavalry picket was shown to the right of Nava de Aver, or to the left of Fort Concepcion; reconnaissance on the flank showed that the French remained concentrated in their old positions. It was clearly improbable that Masséna was about to risk another frontal attack: and if, as was more likely, he

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

Before proceeding to demonstrate the wide-spreading results of the fall of the great Estremaduran fortress, it is necessary to follow the movements of the French armies which had been responsible for its safety. Soult had been before Cadiz when, on March 11, he received news from Drouet that troops were arriving at Elvas from the North, and on March 20 the more definite information that Wellington had moved out in force on the 14th, and invested Badajoz on the 16th. The Marshal’s long absence fr

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CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

On July 10th the French had entered Ciudad Rodrigo, but ten days more elapsed before they made any further advance. Masséna, who had returned to the front, was resolved to follow his master’s orders and to act ‘methodically.’ It was clearly incumbent on him to begin the siege of Almeida as soon as possible, and, as that place is only twenty-one miles from Ciudad Rodrigo, one long march would have placed him before its walls. But since he had only a few thousand rounds of ammunition left for his

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

Soult , it will be remembered, had quitted Estremadura, and handed over the charge of the troops left therein to Mortier, on March 14th. He received the news of Beresford’s irruption into the province and of the combat of Campo Mayor on March 30th, so that from the beginning of April onward he was aware that it would be incumbent on him to support the 5th Corps and to relieve Badajoz within a few weeks. That he was not forced to march back from Seville to the north at once was due to the breakin

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

On March 16, 1812, the day on which Wellington opened his trenches before Badajoz, the Emperor Napoleon took a step of no small importance with regard to the control of his armies in Spain. He had now made up his mind that the long-threatened war with Russia must begin within a few months, and that he must leave Paris ere long, and move forward to some central point in Germany, from which he could superintend the preparations for a campaign, the greatest in scale of any which he had hitherto und

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

While Lefebvre-Desnouettes and Verdier were making their long series of attacks on Saragossa, matters were coming to a head in the north-west of Spain. The army of Galicia had at last descended into the plains, and commenced to threaten the right flank of Bessières and the communications between Burgos and Madrid. This forward movement was due neither to the Galician Junta, nor to the officer whom they had placed in command of their army, but to the obstinate persistence of Cuesta, who had not i

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

On April 24th Wellington halted his pursuing army at Fuente Guinaldo and Sabugal, on hearing that Marmont had escaped him by a margin of twenty-four hours. The French were in full march for Salamanca, and it was impossible to pursue them any further, firstly because the allied army needed a few days of rest after the forced march from Badajoz, and secondly because its train had dropped behind, food was nearly out, and convoys had to be brought up from Lamego and São João de Pesqueira. There was,

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

The short ten-day campaign of Fuentes de Oñoro had not been without important results, but it had left the general strategical aspect of affairs in the Peninsula unaltered. Almeida had fallen, and it had been demonstrated that the French Army of Portugal was not strong enough to force back Wellington from the frontier, where he had taken post. On the other hand, it was equally clear that Wellington was far too weak to dream of taking the offensive in the valley of the Douro, or marching on Salam

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

We left General Dupont at Andujar, on the upper course of the Guadalquivir, whither he had retired on June 19 after evacuating Cordova. Deeply troubled by the interruption of his communications with Madrid, and by the growing strength displayed by the Spanish army in his front, he had resolved that it was necessary to draw back to the foot of the Sierra Morena, and to recover at all costs his touch with the main French army in the capital. He kept sending to Murat (or rather to Savary, who had n

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

Though Suchet had successfully pacified the plains of Aragon during the autumn of 1809, and though Augereau in the last month of that year had received the surrender of the much-enduring garrison of Gerona, the position of the French in North-Eastern Spain was still far from satisfactory. It was not yet possible for the 3rd and the 7th Corps to combine their operations. While the broad strip of territory in Western Catalonia reaching from the foot of the Pyrenees to the sea—whose places of stren

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

Down to the moment of the general outbreak of the Spanish insurrection Junot’s task in Portugal had not been a difficult one. As long as Spain and France were still ostensibly allies, he had at his disposition a very large army. He had entered Portugal in 1807 with 25,000 French troops, and during the spring of 1808 he had received 4,000 men in drafts from Bayonne, which more than filled up the gaps made in his battalions by the dreary march from Ciudad Rodrigo to Abrantes [166] . Of the three S

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

It was not till June 13th that Wellington crossed the Agueda and began his march upon Salamanca, the first great offensive movement against the main fighting army of the French since the advance to Talavera in 1809. But for many days beforehand his troops were converging on Fuente Guinaldo and Ciudad Rodrigo from their widely-spread cantonments. Graham’s divisions quitted Portalegre on May 30th, and some of the other troops, which had been left on the western side of the Beira, had also to make

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

The situation which had been created by King Joseph’s rapid conquest of the open country of Andalusia in January and February 1810, and by his failure to capture Cadiz, was destined to remain unchanged in any of its more important details for a full year. Soult, with the three corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier, was strong enough to hold the towns and plains, strong enough also to blockade Cadiz and to spare expeditionary forces at intervals for operations outside the limits of his own sph

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

On the morning of June 17th the five divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese army which had hitherto remained on the south bank of the Guadiana crossed that river, and retired to the positions along the line Elvas, Campo Mayor, Ouguella, which Wellington had already selected for them. The water was low, and the bulk of the troops used the fords between Jerumenha and Badajoz [564] which are practicable during the summer months, except after days of exceptional rain [565] . Head quarters were moved back

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

After the fall of Almeida Masséna waited much longer than Wellington had anticipated. The reasons for his delay were the usual ones that were always forthcoming when a French army had to advance in the Peninsula—want of transport and penury of supplies. The Marshal had just discovered that the country-side in front of him had already been depopulated by Wellington’s orders, and that the only inhabitants that were to be met would be the armed Ordenança, who were already shooting at his vedettes a

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

Wellington’s conduct on reaching Salamanca was not that which might have been expected. When a general has, by a careful and well-arranged concentration, collected all his own troops into one solid mass, and then by a rapid advance has thrown himself into the midst of the scattered cantonments of an enemy who has no superiority to him in numbers, it is natural for him to press his pursuit vigorously. Far the most effective way of opening the campaign would have been to cut up the two divisions w

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

It is often forgotten by English writers that while the armies of Wellington, Soult, and Marmont faced each other near Badajoz in June-July 1811, only in the end to depart in different directions without a battle, there was a second and minor crisis going on in the north, which had important consequences. Wellington had designedly brought it about, because without it the French would have had much larger forces disposable for action against Portugal, and might have given much trouble by demonstr

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

From the first moment when the Asturian deputies arrived in London, with the news of the insurrection in Northern Spain [June 4], the English Government had been eager to intervene in the Peninsula. The history of the last fifteen years was full of the records of unfortunate expeditions sent out to aid national risings, real or imaginary, against France. They had mostly turned out disastrous failures: it is only necessary to mention the Duke of York’s miserable campaign of 1799 in Holland, Stewa

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

After his departure from the Guadiana on June 28th, Soult found himself plunged into a new series of troubles, which were to continue all through the summer and autumn. Just as he was about to set out for Seville with two cavalry regiments as escort, following in the wake of Godinot’s and Conroux’s infantry, he received the unwelcome news that Blake, of whose march he had been aware since the 24th, had crossed the lower Guadiana near Mertola on June 23 [613] , and had invaded the Condado de Nieb

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

It remains that we should describe the ground which Wellington had chosen on the 21st, and on which he fought with such splendid success upon the 27th. The ridge which takes its name from the convent of Bussaco is one of the best-marked positions in the whole Iberian Peninsula. A single continuous line of heights covered with heather and furze, with the dull-red and dull-grey granite cropping up here and there through the soil, extends from the Mondego on the right—where it ends precipitously—to

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

Junot much disliked leaving Lisbon: he greatly enjoyed his viceregal state, and was so convinced that to retain the capital was equivalent to dominating the whole of Portugal [212] , that he attached an exaggerated importance to his hold on the place, and was very reluctant to cut down its garrison. But it was clearly necessary to support Delaborde and Loison, and at last he took his departure. As a preliminary precaution he resolved to deal a blow at the Alemtejo insurgents, who, emboldened by

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

On July 2nd Wellington had arrived at the end of the first stage of his campaign. He had cleared the French out of the whole of southern Leon as far as the Douro, had taken the Salamanca forts, and had beaten off with ease Marmont’s attempts to meddle with him. All this had been accomplished with the loss of less than 500 men. But the success, though marked, was not decisive, since the enemy’s army had not been beaten in the open field, but only manœuvred out of the considerable region that it h

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CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

The decisive moment of the campaign of 1812 had now been reached—though Marmont was wholly unaware of it, and was proposing merely to continue his manœuvring of the last five days, and though Wellington hardly expected that the 22nd of July would turn out more eventful than the 21st. Both of them have left record of their intentions on the fateful morning. The Duke of Ragusa wrote to Berthier as follows: ‘My object was, in taking up this position, to prolong my movement to the left, in order to

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

In the earlier chapter of this volume, which took the affairs of Catalonia and Aragon down to the month of March, we left Suchet making vigorous preparation for the siege of Tarragona, within whose walls his master had promised him that he should ‘find his marshal’s baton.’ While munitions and food for this great enterprise were being collected, the unemployed troops of the Army of Aragon were occupied in scouring the mountains on the side of New Castile and Valencia, always driving the partidas

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

For only one single day did the incubus of Burrard rest upon the British army in Portugal, though that day was one on which he succeeded in changing a decisive victory, which might have laid a whole kingdom at his feet, into an ordinary successful defensive action. He had stopped Wellesley’s triumphant march at noon on August 21; early on the morning of the twenty-second Sir Hew Dalrymple appeared in Maceira Bay, disembarked, and took over the command. He naturally began his tenure of control by

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

The dawn of September 28 brought small comfort to Masséna. His desperate attacks of the preceding day had been repulsed with such ease and such heavy loss, that neither he nor any of his subordinates dreamed of renewing the attempt to force the line of the Serra. Only three courses were open to him—to retreat on Almeida, giving up the campaign as one too ambitious for the strength of his army, or to change his objective and strike backwards at Oporto,—if Lisbon were beyond his grasp,—or to endea

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CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VII

We must now turn from the exploits of Pakenham and the 3rd Division to deal with the great central attack of Wellington’s frontal striking force, the 5th and 4th Divisions, under Leith and Cole, upon the French left centre. They had been told to move on when Bradford’s Portuguese brigade should be sufficiently near to cover the right flank of the 5th Division, and the necessity of waiting for this support caused their attack to be delivered perceptibly later than that of Pakenham. Leith had draw

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

Suchet had marched, as has been already mentioned, from Lerida, with Harispe’s division, on April 28th, Frère’s division following. On the 29th the head of the column reached Momblanch, where half a battalion was left behind in a fortified post, to keep open the Lerida road. On May 2nd the large manufacturing town of Reus, only ten miles from Tarragona, was occupied: on May 3rd the French advanced guard, Salme’s brigade, approached the city, and drove in the Catalan advanced posts as far as the

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

We have hitherto, when speaking of Wellington’s immense scheme for fortifying the position on which he intended to bring his enemy to a standstill, refrained from entering into the details of his plan. It is now time to describe it in full, and to explain its design. The character of the peninsula on which Lisbon stands lends itself sufficiently well to defence. At a first inspection the country-side offers a rather chaotic expanse of mountain and valley, whose general features are hard to seize

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

The Convention of Cintra being once signed, the difficulties which were bound to arise from the unwisdom of some of its articles were not long in showing themselves. Indeed the first fortnight of September turned out to be a very critical time. The Portuguese authorities were furious: Dalrymple found the greatest trouble in preventing the insurgents of the Alemtejo, who had gathered opposite the mouth of the Tagus under the Conde de Castro Marim [261] , from attacking the French detachments in t

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CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

There was another and a less pleasant surprise in store for Wellesley when he landed at Plymouth. He learnt that if he himself disliked the armistice of August 22, and the Convention of Cintra, the British public had gone far beyond him, and was in a state of frantic rage concerning them. To his anger and amazement he also learnt that he himself was considered no less responsible for the two agreements than were Dalrymple and Burrard. The fact that the former had told him to set his signature op

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

The news of the fall of Tarragona, brought by the fugitive General Velasco, came as a thunderclap to Campoverde and his ‘army of succour.’ While the Captain-General had been hesitating, marching and countermarching, and sending about for further reinforcements, the great city entrusted to him had fallen. It was impossible for the simplest soldier in his ranks to fail to see that the whole responsibility for its loss lay with Campoverde, and from that moment his authority ceased, and officers and

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CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER VIII

The dawn of July 23rd revealed to Wellington that the French army had passed the Tormes at the bridge and forts of Alba, and that nothing remained on the western bank of the river save small parties of fugitives and wounded, who had lost their way in the forest. Some of these were gleaned up by Anson’s and Bock’s brigades of cavalry, who were pushed forward to search the woods and seek for the enemy. Anson’s patrols reached the bridge, and found a French rearguard watching it. This was composed

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

On the night of October 10, when Craufurd made his hasty retreat to Sobral, and went within the Lines, Montbrun had his head quarters at Alemquer, where he kept Taupin’s infantry brigade, and Lamotte’s and Sainte-Croix’s cavalry. Pierre Soult’s light horse felt towards their left, in the direction of the Tagus, and occupied Carregado, where they failed to find any British outposts, Hill’s corps having been withdrawn behind the brook which enters the Tagus near Castanheira. The main body of the a

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

There is still one corner of the Iberian Peninsula whose history, during the eventful summer months of 1808, we have not yet chronicled. The rugged and warlike province of Catalonia had already begun that heroic struggle against its French garrison which was to endure throughout the whole of the war. Far more than any other section of the Spanish nation do the Catalans deserve credit for their unswerving patriotism. Nowhere else was the war maintained with such resolution. When the struggle comm

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

While tracing the all-important Campaign of Portugal, down to the deadlock in front of Santarem, which began about the 20th of November, 1810, and was to endure till the 1st of March in the succeeding year, we have been obliged to leave untouched events, civil and military, in many other parts of the Peninsula during the autumn. Only the Andalusian campaigns have been carried down to November: in Northern Spain we have traced the course of affairs no further than September [574] : in Eastern Spa

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

When Marmont, before the end of the second week of July, had taken his departure from the valley of the Guadiana, and had begun to disperse his army in cantonments on both sides of the Tagus, Wellington was able to review his own situation at leisure, and to think out a new plan of operations. The Army of Portugal had settled down in a central position, from which it could transfer itself with equal facility to reinforce the 5th Corps in Estremadura, if the Allies should make another move agains

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CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER IX

Having thus made all his arrangements for ‘containing’ Clausel, and for dealing with what he considered the unlikely chance of an offensive move by the Army of Portugal, Wellington was at liberty to carry out his new strategical move. The mass of troops collected at Cuellar and its neighbourhood was at last set in motion, and, after his short halt and time of doubting, he himself marched against Madrid with the whole remaining force at his disposal—the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and Light Division

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

It only remains that we should deal shortly with the higher politics of Spain during the last months of 1810—the troubles of King Joseph, and the complications caused by the meeting of the Cortes at Cadiz. Of the growing friction between the King and the commanders of the ‘military governments’ created by the Emperor in February, we have already spoken [609] . Joseph did well to be angry when his dispatches to Saragossa or Barcelona were deliberately disregarded by his brother’s special orders.

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

The long-threatened advance of the French for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo began at last on September 22nd, when Marmont brought all the infantry of the Army of Portugal, save the single division of Foy, across the Sierra de Gata, and appeared with his vanguard at Tamames, the little town on the Leonese side of the mountains where del Parque had beaten Marchand in 1809. Foy alone had been left in New Castile, with orders to demonstrate from his base at Plasencia against Wellington’s posts betwee

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

For the first six weeks of the war in Catalonia Duhesme and Reille had been opposed only by the gallant somatenes . Of the handful of regular troops who had been stationed in the principality when the insurrection broke out, the greater part had drifted off to the siege of Saragossa, or to the struggle in the south. Only the Irish regiment at Gerona, and certain fragments of the disbanded battalions of the Guards from Barcelona had aided the peasantry in resisting the invader. The success of the

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CHAPTER X

CHAPTER X

Two months elapsed between Wellington’s passage of the Agueda on his offensive march into the kingdom of Leon, and his triumphal entry into Madrid. During this critical time there had been constant alarms and excursions in Andalusia and Estremadura, but nothing decisive had occurred. This was all that Wellington wanted: if employment were found for the French Army of the South, so that it got no chance of interfering with the campaign on the Douro, he was perfectly satisfied, and asked for nothi

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CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XI

It has already been made clear that the whole of Wellington’s victorious advance, from Ciudad Rodrigo to Madrid, was rendered possible by the fact that he had only to deal with the Army of Portugal, succoured when it was too late by the Army of the Centre. If Caffarelli and his 35,000 men of the Army of the North had been able to spare any help for Marmont, beyond the single cavalry brigade of Chauvel, matters must have taken a very different turn from the first, and the Douro (if not the Tormes

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

The moment that he had satisfied himself that the French were all in full retreat, and were clearly about to disperse to their old garrisons and cantonments, Wellington also broke up the army which had been lying on the Alfayates-Rendo position. On the 29th September Graham received orders to retire with the 1st and 6th Divisions to regular winter quarters in the interior of Beira, about Guarda, Celorico, and Freixadas. The 7th Division was sent southward to Penamacor. But the 3rd, 4th, and Ligh

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

While dealing with the operations of the French armies in the various provinces of Spain, we have observed that at every point the arrival of the news of Dupont’s disaster at Baylen produced notable results. It was this unexpected intelligence that drove the intrusive king out of Madrid within a week of his arrival, and ere the ceremonial of his proclamation had been completed. It brought back Bessières from the Esla to the Arlanzon, and raised the siege of Saragossa. Knowing of it Junot summone

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I

I

The original garrison under the command of Alvarez consisted of the following units. The first column gives the strength on May 6, the second the number that remained on Dec. 11, 1809, the day of the surrender. Add 1,100 irregulars of the ‘Crusade.’ Losses unknown. Of 9,371 men engaged first and last in the defence, only 4,248 survived. THE FRENCH FORCES AT THE SIEGE OF GERONA...

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II

II

The following were the losses of the three divisions which conducted the siege of Gerona during its first three months, down to Sept. 15, 1809:— (1) Reille’s Original Siege Corps: Of these 6,666 were returned as sick or wounded, and 1,495 as dead or missing. Probably 300 were deserters. Adding these figures to those of the infantry the total of the Siege Army was 17,162 men. (2) The Covering Army, under St. Cyr in person, consisted on June 1 of the following troops: On Dec. 31 the Siege Army sho

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

On August 1, Madrid had seen the last of the French: yet it was not till the thirteenth that the Spanish troops appeared before the gates of the capital. Even then it was not the victorious army of Andalusia which presented itself, but only the Valencian corps of Llamas, a mere division of 8,000 men, which would not have dared to push forward, had it not known that Joseph Bonaparte and all his train were now far on their way towards the Ebro. During the thirteen days which elapsed between his de

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CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XII

The garrison of the Retiro had surrendered on August 14th: Wellington remained for seventeen days longer in Madrid, and did not leave it, to take the field again, until August 31st. His stay in the Spanish capital was not due, in the first instance, to the causes which might seem most plausible—a desire to give his war-worn infantry a rest during the hottest weeks of the year, or a determination to reorganize the military resources of Madrid and New Castile for the profit of the allied cause [75

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I

I

Total present under arms of all ranks, 46,787 [Fririon gives only 45,131]. N.B.—The 9,064 detached include 2,854 men left at Rodrigo and Almeida, and 6,210 men left behind in Spain at Salamanca and elsewhere. Note the terrible proportion of sick in the raw divisions of Junot and Loison, as compared with the lower percentage in the old divisions of Ney’s and Reynier’s Corps. Only Conroux’s division being with the main army, its 7,592 effective men alone have to be added to Masséna’s force, making

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I

I

N.B.—Ficatier’s Brigade, 3 battalions of Palombini’s division, and two squadrons of 4th Hussars were not present at the battle of Saguntum, being on the line of communications, and blockading Peniscola and Oropesa. This return, lent me by Mr. Fortescue who found it in the Paris Archives, differs by over 2,000 men from Suchet’s figures given in his Mémoires , p. 436 of vol. ii. The Marshal has left out the 3 battalions and 2 squadrons on the line of communications, mentioned above. STRENGTH OF BL

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III

III

DEL PARQUE’S ARMY IN THE TAMAMES–ALBA DE TORMES CAMPAIGN, OCT.–NOV. 1809 MORNING STATE OF NOVEMBER 20 From this total of 41,275 men there were to be deducted, on Nov. 20, sick 5,601, absent 1,573, detached (from the 5th Division) 1,279, so that the total of efficients under arms was 32,822. * Old line regiments. † Old militia regiments. ‡ New levies. FRENCH LOSSES AT TAMAMES, OCT. 18, 1809...

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III

III

SPANISH TROOPS IN ESTREMADURA, MARCH, 1811 (A) ORIGINAL GARRISON OF THE PLACE (B) MENDIZABAL’S ARMY OF SUCCOUR [Present with the Colours, Feb. 1, 1811] N.B.—This total force of 18,111 men did not appear before Badajoz with Mendizabal on February 5th. Fernando 7º, with 800 men, was garrisoning Albuquerque. The 800 dismounted cavalry were at Valencia de Alcantara, their dépôt. 2nd of Seville, with 34 officers and 582 men, had been thrown into Badajoz in January. About 400 cavalry were detached wit

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

The provincial Juntas, when once they had consented to sacrifice their local sovereignty, made no great delay in forwarding their representatives to the chosen meeting-place at Aranjuez. The number of deputies whom they sent to the Supreme Central Junta was thirty-five, seventeen provincial Juntas each contributing two, and the Canary Islands one. The Biscayan provinces, still wholly in the possession of the French, had no local body to speak for them, and could not therefore choose deputies. Th

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II

II

General Total of the Army: 1,277 officers, 26,767 men = Total, 28,044....

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IV

IV

The detailed return of the losses of the 6th Corps at Tamames has not been preserved. Marchand merely states that he lost 1,300 men. But the subjoined list of losses of officers, taken from Martinien’s invaluable tables, shows sufficiently well which were the units that were hard hit:— Total 18 killed, 55 wounded. At the average rate of 21 men hit per officer, which prevailed during the Peninsular War, this total of 73 officers ought to imply a total loss of about 1,533 men. But Marchand’s 1,300

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IV

IV

Total of force was: Infantry, 4,533; Cavalry, 206; Artillery, 362; Engineers, &amp;c., 96 = Grand Total, 5,217. N.B.—Of these troops on the field, Dilkes’s brigade minus the 211 Coldstreamers, but plus 260 of the 2/67th and Browne’s flank battalion, formed the right column, while Wheatley’s brigade, minus one wing of the 2/67th, but plus the two Coldstream companies and Barnard’s flank battalion, was on the left. All the guns were with the latter column. Thus Dilkes’s command must have been

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

It will be remembered that one of Napoleon’s preliminary measures, in his long campaign against the freedom of Spain, had been the removal of the flower of her army to the shores of the Baltic. In the spring of 1807 the Marquis of La Romana, with fourteen battalions of infantry and five regiments of cavalry, all completed to war strength, had marched for Hamburg. After wintering in the Hanseatic towns, Mecklenburg, and Swedish Pomerania, this corps had been moved up early in 1808 into Denmark [3

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V

V

THE PARTITION OF THE ARMY OF ESTREMADURA IN SEPTEMBER 1809 [N.B.—‘b on ’ is Spanish contraction for batallón .] The way in which the old army of Cuesta was divided in September 1809 has never been worked out; nor has the composition of Areizaga’s army of La Mancha, after it had been joined by the Estremaduran reinforcements, ever been reconstructed. A search in the Madrid War Office, in which I was assisted by the kindness of Captain Figueras, has produced the following two documents:— (1) A lis

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

While the Supreme Junta was expending its energy on discussing the relative merits of benevolent despotism and representative government, and while Castaños fretted and fumed for the moving up of reinforcements that never arrived, the French Emperor was getting ready to strike. It took many weeks for the veteran divisions from Glogau and Erfurt, from Bayreuth and Berlin, to traverse the whole breadth of the French Empire and reach the Pyrenees. While they were trailing across the Rhineland and t

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III

III

SUCHET’S ARMY AT THE SIEGE OF VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF DEC. 31 N.B.—The regiments of the Army of Aragon are the same as in Appendix I. General Total of combined forces, 33,718. SURRENDER-ROLL OF BLAKE’S ARMY OF VALENCIA, JAN. 9, 1812...

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V

V

(1) TROOPS ENGAGED AGAINST THE BRITISH (2) TROOPS ENGAGED AGAINST THE SPANIARDS, IN THE COMBAT BY THE TORRE BERMEJA N.B.—There were absent from their divisions: (1) With Cassagne at Medina Sidonia—the 2/27th, 3/94th, 2/96th, 1/95th, and a battalion of voltigeur companies from the 3rd battalion of the 8th, 24th, 45th, 54th, 96th, and 6th Léger; also the 5th Chasseurs à Cheval. (2) Left in garrison in the Cadiz lines—the 1/9th Léger, 2/45th and 2/94th Ligne. (3) Taken away by Soult—the 63rd Ligne

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IV

IV

General total, 16,986 of all ranks, not including 62 officers in staff or administrative employments, 23 chaplains, and 19 surgeons. Of the remainder of Blake’s army there had rallied at Alicante by January 14 of infantry 361 officers and 5,125 men, of cavalry 164 officers and 671 men, of artillery 30 officers and 720 men—total of all arms, 7,071....

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VI

VI

BRITISH LOSSES DURING THE COMBATS 11th-15th MARCH, 1811...

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

By the middle of October the French and Spanish armies were in presence of each other along the whole line of the Ebro, and it seemed certain that one or other of them must at last take the offensive. Both were still in expectation of reinforcements, but those which the Spaniards could expect to receive within the next few weeks were comparatively unimportant, while their adversaries knew that more than 100,000 men from Germany were due at Bayonne in the last days of October. Clearly it was for

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VI

VI

AREIZAGA’S ARMY IN THE OCAÑA CAMPAIGN No detailed ‘morning state’ of this army has been preserved, but the names and gross totals of the divisions are on record in documents at the Madrid War Office. So far as I can make it out, the organization of the army must have been nearly as follows:— The materials from which the above organization has been reconstructed are: (1) Rolls of Venegas’s army, before it was joined by Eguia’s reinforcements. (2) Roll of the reinforcements led by Eguia (printed i

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V

V

FRENCH TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF TARIFA (DEC. 1811-JAN. 1812) [From the table in Belmas, iv. pp. 40-2.] In addition three battalions of the 8th and 63rd line and two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons were occupied on the lines of communications, between Vejer and Fascinas. ANGLO-SPANISH GARRISON OF TARIFA N.B.—Another return makes the total of the British part of the garrison 67 officers and 1,707 men, a total of 1,774....

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

The campaign of November 1808 was fought out upon three separate theatres of war, though every movement of the French armies which engaged in it formed part of a single plan, and was properly linked to the operations which were progressing upon other sections of the front. The working out of Napoleon’s great scheme, therefore, must be dealt with under three heads—the destruction of Blake’s ‘Army of the Left’ in the north-west; the rout of the armies of Andalusia and Aragon upon the banks of the

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VIII

VIII

ON SEPT. 15, 1810, JAN. 1, 1811, AND MARCH 15, 1811 From returns in the Archives Nationaux at Paris. Note. —On Dec. 26 General Gardanne brought up to the front the 4/86th Line originally left at Ciudad Rodrigo, and some drafts, making in all 1,393 men; these are counted in the figures of Jan. 1, 1811. On Feb. 5 General Foy brought up in a similar fashion 1,862 convalescents and drafts: these are counted in the figures of March 15, 1811. The losses of the original 65,050 men who entered Portugal

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VII

VII

BRITISH LOSSES AT SABUGAL, APRIL 3rd, 1811 N.B.—Note that of all the 594 casualties in action during the period of Masséna’s retreat all but 65 were in the Light and 3rd Divisions. All the officers killed or wounded belonged to those divisions, except two in the 4th and 6th Portuguese Caçadores wounded at Redinha. FRENCH LOSSES AT SABUGAL, APRIL 3rd, 1811...

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

After resting for only thirty-six hours at Bayonne the Emperor, as we have already seen, pushed on to Vittoria, where he arrived on November 6. He found in and about that ancient city the bulk of the Imperial Guard, his brother Joseph’s reserves, the light cavalry of Beaumont and Franceschi, and the heavy cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and Milhaud. The divisions of Marchand and Bisson, which were to complete the corps of Ney, were close behind him, so that he had under his hand a mass of at least 40

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VI

VI

CIUDAD RODRIGO A. THE FRENCH GARRISON The garrison, according to Belmas, iv. pp. 282-3, stood on the day of the investment as follows: B. BRITISH LOSSES DURING THE SIEGE The British losses between the investment and the storm were, according to the official returns at the Record Office, 1 officer and 69 men killed, 19 officers and 462 men wounded, 2 men (both Portuguese) missing, or a total of 553. These figures added to the 568 lost in the storm (for details see below), make altogether 1,121, w

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VIII

VIII

[FROM A RETURN IN THE MINISTÈRE DE LA GUERRE, PARIS] N.B.—The disproportionate number of wounded to killed among rank and file, 464 to 55, or one to eight, while the normal proportion was about one to five, suggests that some of the numerous ‘missing’ were really killed. Note the excessive loss among officers, 61 to 699 rank and file, one to eleven instead of the usual one to twenty. There is some reason to suppose that the figures are incomplete, as Martinien’s Liste des officiers tués et bless

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IX

IX

BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBAT OF THE COA, JULY 24, 1810 The total in the text, as in Wellington’s dispatch, is wrong because of the omission of the 16 wounded of the 1/52nd who are inserted from the regimental returns, Wellington made out the total to be 317....

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VII

VII

Beside the controversy alluded to on page 183 about the exact amount of co-operation by the Light Division in helping the 3rd to clear the French from behind the Greater Breach, there are several other vexed points concerning the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo. The one on which most dispute arose was that concerning the capture of General Barrié. Gurwood of the 52nd claimed to have been the first officer to enter the Castle, and to receive the surrender of the governor and his staff. He is mentioned as

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

Having narrated the misfortunes of Blake and of Belvedere, we must now turn to the eastern end of the Spanish line, where Castaños and Palafox had been enjoying a brief and treacherous interval of safety, while their friends were being hunted over the Cantabrian Mountains and the plains of Old Castile. From October 26-27—the days when Ney and Moncey drove Castaños’ advanced troops back over the Ebro—down to November 21, the French in Navarre made no further movement. We have seen that it was ess

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X

X

WELLINGTON’S ARMY AT BUSSACO, SEPT. 27, 1810 N.B.—It may be convenient to give here the list of the units of Wellington’s field army which were not present at the battle of Bussaco; these were:— Of the remaining Portuguese regiments Nos. 5 and 17 were at Elvas, No. 20 at Cadiz, No. 22 at Abrantes, No. 24 had been taken prisoner at Almeida. These are not part of the field army. The total of the fractions of the field army not present at Bussaco was 9,180. MASSÉNA’S ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF BUSSA

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IX

IX

[FROM THE RETURN OF MAY 1] N.B.—Pack’s Portuguese Brigade and the 2nd regiment from the 6th Division were absent, in charge of the blockade of Almeida. BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT FUENTES DE OÑORO...

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X

X

FIRST DAY, MAY 3rd , 1811 BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT FUENTES DE OÑORO...

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CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

After completing his arrangements for the two sweeping flank-movements that were destined to entrap Blake and Castaños, the Emperor moved forward from Burgos on November 22, along the great road to Madrid by Lerma and Aranda de Duero. His advance was completely masked by the broad screen of cavalry which had gone on in front of him. Lasalle was ahead, Milhaud on the right flank, and covered by them he moved with ease across the plain of Old Castile. He brought with him a very substantial force,

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XI

XI

Moura , 26 7 bre 1810. Demain le 27 7 bre l’armée attaquera les hauteurs en avant de Moura occupées par l’armée ennemie. Le 2 nd Corps attaquera la droite de l’armée ennemie: il tentera à cet effet de couper la ligne, en gravissant un des points de la montagne le plus accessible. Il y arrivera par une ou deux colonnes, en se faisant précéder par des tirailleurs. Une fois arrivé sur le sommet du point qu’il aura décidé d’attaquer, il se formera en colonne serrée, et descendra par la crête de la m

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VIII

VIII

ARMY OF THE SOUTH REORGANIZED AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLES AND OTHER REGIMENTS Return of March 1, 1812 [From the returns in the Archives Nationales . Lent me by Mr. Fortescue.] The regiments marked * had each one battalion in garrison at Badajoz, except the 64th, which had two companies there only [9th Léger, 28th Léger, 58th, 88th, 103rd Ligne]. The total of these 5-1/3 battalions was 2,951 officers and men. Adding these to the six divisions the total was 44,082 French infantry present unde

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XI

XI

SECOND DAY, MAY 5th, 1811 THE FRENCH ARMY AT FUENTES DE OÑORO, MAY 3-5, 1811...

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

From December 4 to December 22 the Emperor remained fixed in the neighbourhood of Madrid. He did not settle down in the royal palace, and it would seem that he made no more than one or two hurried visits of inspection to the city [526] . He established himself outside the gates, at Chamartin, a desolate and uncomfortable country house of the Duke of Infantado, and devoted himself to incessant desk-work [527] . It was here that he drew up his projects for the reorganization of the kingdom of Spai

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XIII

XIII

This return from the Archives du Ministère de la Guerre omits the État-Major, which had one officer killed and four wounded, and the Cavalry, which, though in reserve, had some slight losses, for Martinien’s Liste des Officiers shows that the 8th Dragoons and the 1st Hussars had each one officer wounded, and that Pierre Soult, the general commanding the brigade, was also hit; probably ten or a dozen casualties among the men are implied. But the casualties must have been very few in the mounted a

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IX

IX

A report of the governor at noon on April 5, found among his papers after the storm, gave the following as surviving under arms (sick excluded)—infantry 3,403, artillery 282, engineers 217, cavalry 50, Juramentados 86. This report, printed in Jones, i. p. 230, implies a higher original total than Belmas allows—the artillery and Juramentados are actually more numerous on April 5 than on March 15! And the infantry are only 458 less, despite of losses of a considerably higher figure, for another pa

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X

X

WELLINGTON’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA. STRENGTH AND LOSSES N.B.—Strength by the morning state of July 15, 1812. Losses of the British by the return annexed to Wellington’s dispatch: those of the Portuguese from the official returns at Lisbon. The fighting strength on July 22, owing to losses at Castrejon and Castrillo, and to weary men falling out during the retreat, may have been perhaps 1,000 less. I. BRITISH TROOPS STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF MARMONT’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA...

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XIV

XIV

I. BRITISH TROOPS (effective, without sick or detached) The army had at the same time 9,213 men in hospital, and 2,628 men detached, who are not counted in the above total. N.B.—Wellington, as it will be noted on page 451, says that he had only 29,000 British sabres and bayonets ready to take the offensive at this date. This appears to be an under-estimate; but it must be remembered that he (according to his custom) only counts rank and file, omitting officers. Moreover, the two battalions not b

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XII

XII

A. ARMY OF PORTUGAL, STATE OF MAY 1st B. ARMY OF THE NORTH, MARSHAL BESSIÈRES N.B.—In Koch’s Life of Masséna there is a table purporting to be the strength of the Army of Portugal at Fuentes, and making it out to be only about 40,000, excluding gunners, engineers, train, &amp;c., or presumably under 42,000 with them. This is not the May 1st return of the Imperial muster-roll at the Archives Nationales , and I do not know what authority it has. The figures given above are those of the officia

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

It will be remembered that on October 6, 1808, the command of the British forces in Portugal had passed into the hands of Sir John Moore, to the entire satisfaction of Wellesley and the other officers who had served under those slow and cautious generals Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. The moment that the news of Vimiero was received, and long before the details of the Convention of Cintra could come to hand, the Government had determined to send on the victorious British army into Spai

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XIII

XIII

DISPOSITIONS POUR LA JOURNÉE DU 5 Le 6 me Corps se mettra en mouvement demain à 2 heures du matin, à l’exception de la 3 me division, qui restera dans la position qu’elle occupe: les deux autres divisions, 1 re et 2 de , se remueront au soir, en deçà du grand mamelon de Nava de Aver, et en face de Pozzo Bello. Elles seront prêtes à marcher perpendiculairement sur la ligne de l’ennemi; les deux divisions auront leur artillerie avec elles, et se porteront à la petite pointe du jour, en colonne par

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XV

XV

THE BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1810 To match the list of the Artillery units in Wellington’s army which the late Colonel F. A. Whinyates was so good as to compile for me for the year 1809, and which forms Appendix XI of my second volume, I have compiled, with the invaluable aid of Major John H. Leslie, R.A., who is responsible for all the British section, the following appendix to cover the year 1810. Royal Horse Artillery. Two troops served in the Bussaco campaign, viz.

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

Moore’s determination to retreat on Portugal lasted just seven days. It was at midnight on November 28-29 that he wrote his orders to Baird and Hope, bidding the one to fall back on Corunna and the other on Ciudad Rodrigo. On the afternoon of December 5 he abandoned his scheme, and wrote to recall Baird from Galicia: on the tenth he set out on a very different sort of enterprise, and advanced into the plains of Old Castile with the object of striking at the communications of the French army. We

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XI

XI

To fix the fighting strength of Marmont’s army at Salamanca is comparatively easy. It consisted of the 49,636 officers and men accounted for by the return of July 15th printed on the next page, minus some 700 men lost at the combats of Castrillo and Castrejon [also called ‘combat of the Guarena’] on July 18, and such few hundreds more as may have fallen behind from fatigue during the long marches of July 20-1. Roughly speaking, it must have counted some 48,500 men, as opposed to Wellington’s 50,

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XIII

XIII

(A) REMAINS OF THE 2nd (VALENCIAN) AND 3rd (MURCIAN) ARMIES, MARCH 1 (B) JOSEPH O’DONNELL’S ARMY, JULY 21, 1812, AND ITS LOSSES AT CASTALLA [The figures of the former from Los Ejércitos españoles . The list of prisoners from Suchet’s dispatch in the Paris Archives de la Guerre .] Suchet also reports 697 wounded prisoners, of whom 56 died of their wounds. No figures are given for the detached cavalry division of Santesteban, which was not in action at Castalla....

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XIV

XIV

N.B.—I have been unable to find any detailed table by regiments in the Archives de la Guerre , or the Archives Nationales at Paris, and can only give the subjoined table of losses by corps. So far as this return can be tested by Martinien’s Liste des Officiers tués et blessés pendant les Guerres de l’Empire , it appears to be very fairly accurate; Martinien accounts for 171 casualties, the return for 179. In detail the figures compare as follows:— THE ALLIED ARMY AT ALBUERA, AND ITS LOSSES, MAY

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

We have many times had occasion in this narrative to wonder at the extreme tardiness with which news reached the Spanish and the English generals. It is now at the inefficiency of Napoleon’s intelligence department that we must express our surprise. Considering that Moore had moved forward from Salamanca as far back as December 12, and had made his existence manifest to the French on that same day by the successful skirmish at Rueda, it is astonishing to find that the Emperor did not grasp the s

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

When he found that Moore had escaped from him, Napoleon slackened down from the high speed with which he had been moving for the last ten days. He stayed at Benavente for two nights, occupying himself with desk-work of all kinds, and abandoning the pursuit of the British to Bessières and Soult. The great coup had failed: instead of capturing the expeditionary force he could but harass it on its way to the sea. Such a task was beneath his own dignity: it would compromise the imperial reputation f

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XIV

XIV

THE BRITISH FORCES ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN 1812 [A NOTE BY MR. C. T. ATKINSON] I. MAITLAND’S FORCE, EMBARKATION RETURN, JUNE 25, 1812 (War Office: Secretary of State’s Original Correspondence , Series I, vol. 311.) II. CAMPBELL’S CORPS, EMBARKATION RETURN, PALERMO, NOVEMBER 14, 1812 (Ibid., vol. 312.) III. SUBSEQUENTLY EMBARKED, DECEMBER 25 [796] It may be well to give here the garrisons of Cadiz and Gibraltar in 1812, as both of them supplied troops to the field army during that year. In

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XV

XV

I. BRITISH TROOPS II. PORTUGUESE TROOPS GRAND TOTAL OF BERESFORD’S ARMY General Total of Losses: British, 4,159; Portuguese, 389 = 4,548. III. SPANISH TROOPS [789] GRAND TOTAL OF THE ALLIED ARMY SOULT’S ARMY AT ALBUERA, AND ITS LOSSES...

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XV

XV

THE SCOVELL CIPHERS By the very great kindness of Mr. G. Scovell of Brighton, I have had placed at my disposition the papers of his great-uncle, General Sir George Scovell, G.C.B., who served during the Peninsular War in the Intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General’s department. In the beginning of 1812 the number of intercepted French dispatches in cipher which came into Wellington’s hands, through the happy activity of Julian Sanchez and other guerrillero chiefs, began to be so conside

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CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

When Sir John Moore found that the transports were not ready on the twelfth, he had recognized that he might very probably have to fight a defensive action in order to cover his retreat, for two days would allow Soult to bring up his main-body. He refused to listen to the timid proposal of certain of his officers that he should negotiate for a quiet embarkation, in return for giving up Corunna and its fortifications unharmed [715] . This would have been indeed a tame line of conduct for a genera

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XVI

XVI

[The strength from a return of May 1st, filed under June 1st, in the Archives Nationales . The losses from a return in the Archives de la Guerre , dated July 19th.] N.B.—The losses cannot be quite complete. Not only is the return for artillery and engineers, &amp;c., for all units except the 5th Corps missing, but Martinien’s lists, which are absolutely secure evidence, since they give the name and regiment of every officer hit, show much larger totals than this report, 362 casualties instea

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I

I

ESPAÑOLES! En circunstancias menos arriesgadas que las presentes han procurado los vasallos leales auxiliar á sus soberanos con dones y recursos anticipados á las necesidades; pero en esta prevision tiene el mejor lugar la generosa accion de súbdito hácia su señor. El reino de Andalucía privilegiado por la naturaleza en la produccion de caballos de guerra ligeros; la provincia de Extremadura que tantos servicios de esta clase hizo al señor Felipe V. ¿verán con paciencia que la caballería del rey

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XVI

XVI

I. ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY The following troops were serving in the Peninsula in 1812:— A, E, and I were serving with Wellington’s main army in 1812, attached respectively to the Light Division, the 7th Division, and the 1st Division of Cavalry (Stapleton Cotton). All three were present at Salamanca, but A was left at Madrid in August with the Light Division, and did not take part in the Burgos Campaign. D was attached to Erskine’s ‘2nd Cavalry Division,’ and served under Hill in Estremadura from

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XVII

XVII

By the kindness of Commandant Figueras of the Department of Archives in the War Ministry at Madrid, I am able to give the following sets of figures for the armies in the summer campaign of 1811. Unfortunately there is none for the Army of Catalonia (‘1st Army’ or ‘Army of the Right’) whose main body was destroyed at Tarragona in July. The others work out as follows:— STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, JULY 15, 1811...

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II

II

TRAITÉ SECRET ENTRE S.M.I. NAPOLÉON, EMPEREUR DES FRANÇAIS, ROI D’ITALIE, ETC., ET SA MAJESTÉ CATHOLIQUE CHARLES IV, ROI D’ESPAGNE, ETC. Art. 1 er . La province entre Minhô et Duero, la ville d’Oporto y comprise, sera donnée en toute propriété et souveraineté à S. M. le roi d’Etrurie, avec le titre de roi de la Lusitanie septentrionale. 2. La province d’Alentéjo, et le royaume des Algarves, seront donnés en toute propriété et souveraineté au prince de la Paix, dont il jouira avec le titre de pri

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XVIII

XVIII

[From the returns in the Archives Nationales , Paris.] I. ARMY OF THE SOUTH. Marshal Soult. II. ARMY OF THE CENTRE. King Joseph. III. ARMY OF PORTUGAL. [796] Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa. IV. ARMY OF ARAGON. Marshal Suchet. V. ARMY OF THE NORTH. General Dorsenne. VI. ARMY OF CATALONIA. Marshal MacDonald. GENERAL TOTAL OF FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN Not including General Monthion’s ‘Reserve of the Army of Spain’ at Bayonne, with 251 officers and 8,047 men. THE FRENCH AND SPANISH FORCES AT THE SIEGE O

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XIX

XIX

I. SUCHET’S ARMY N.B.—The divisional and brigade organization is provisional; compare for theoretical organization, p. 640 . II. THE SPANISH GARRISON There are unfortunately no figures forthcoming at Madrid for the Army of Catalonia between December 10th, 1810, and August 1811, all apparently having been lost or destroyed at the siege of Tarragona. In December the Army of Catalonia had consisted of—Sarsfield’s Division, 5,462 men present; Courten’s, 4,791 men present; Eroles’s, 2,538 men present

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III

III

LETTER OF CHARLES IV TO NAPOLEON. Monsieur mon frère , Dans le moment où je ne m’occupais que des moyens de coopérer à la destruction de notre ennemi commun; quand je croyais que tous les complots de la ci-devant reine de Naples avaient été ensevelis avec sa fille, je vois avec une horreur qui me fait frémir, que l’esprit d’intrigue le plus horrible a pénétré jusque dans le sein de mon palais. Hélas! mon cœur saigne en faisant le récit d’un attentat si affreux! mon fils aîné, l’héritier présompt

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IV

IV

ABDICATION OF CHARLES IV Como los achaques de que adolezco no me permiten soportar por mas tiempo el grave peso del gobierno de mis reinos, y me sea preciso para reparar mi salud gozar en un clima mas templado de la tranquilidad de la vida privada, he determinado despues de la mas seria deliberacion abdicar mi corona en mi heredero y mi muy caro hijo el príncipe de Asturias. Por tanto es mi real voluntad que sea reconocido y obedecido como rey y señor natural de todos mis reinos y dominios. Y pa

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XX

XX

WELLINGTON’S ARMY ON THE BEIRA FRONTIER [FROM THE RETURN OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1811.] BRITISH CAVALRY ( Stapleton Cotton ) BRITISH INFANTRY TOTAL BRITISH ARMY PORTUGUESE (officers and men together) Total Allied Army = 46,731. ALLIED LOSSES AT THE COMBAT OF EL BODON. SEPTEMBER 25, 1811...

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XXIV

XXIV

Major J. H. Leslie, R.A., the editor of the ‘Dickson Manuscripts,’ has been good enough to compile and annotate the following list of the Artillery units which served in the various campaigns of the year 1811. I. ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY The following Troops were serving in the Peninsula in 1811:— ‘A’ and ‘I’ Troops served with Wellington’s Army during Masséna’s retreat in the spring of 1811, and in the campaign of Fuentes de Oñoro. In that battle ‘A’ Troop was with the left wing, and did not come

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V

V

THE SPANISH ARMY IN 1808 [Mainly from the table in Arteche, vol. i, Appendix 9.] N.B.—The numbers are taken from returns made on various days between March and June, 1808. They include only rank and file. The officers should have been ninety-eight to a regiment of guards, seventy to a line regiment, forty-one to a light battalion, thirty-four to a militia battalion, forty-two to a cavalry regiment. But most corps were under strength in officers, no less than in men, in June, 1808, and Arteche, g

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VI

VI

1. ‘ 1st CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE’ [ARMY OF PORTUGAL]. Commander, General Junot . Chief of the Staff, General Thiébault. 2. ‘ 2nd CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE.’ Commander, General Dupont . Chief of the Staff, General Legendre. 3. ‘CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE OCEAN COAST.’ Commander, Marshal Moncey . Chief of the Staff, General Harispe. 4. ‘CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE PYRENEES.’ Commander, Marshal Bessières . Chief of the Staff, General Lefebvre-Desnouettes. Detached troops belo

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VII

VII

PROTEST OF CHARLES IV AGAINST HIS ABDICATION. Protesto y declaro que todo lo que manifiesto en mi decreto del 19 de marzo, abdicando la corona en mi hijo, fue forzado por precaver mayores males y la efusion de sangre de mis queridos vasallos, y por tanto de ningun valor. Yo el rey. Aranjuez, 21 de marzo de 1808. LETTER OF NAPOLEON TO FERDINAND VII. Mon Frère , J’ai reçu la lettre de V. A. R. Elle doit avoir acquis la preuve, dans les papiers qu’elle a eu du roi son père, de l’intérêt que je lui

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VIII

VIII

THE CAPITULATION OF BAYLEN 1. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF CASTAÑOS N.B.—* marks an old regiment of the regular army; † a militia regiment; ‡ a regiment of new levies. Commander-in-chief, Lieut.-General Francisco Xavier Castaños . Chief of the Staff, Major-General Tomas Moreno. Total of the army, 29,590: viz. infantry, 25,951; cavalry, 2,671; artillery, 602; sappers, 366, with twenty-eight guns. N.B.—The force of the two flying columns of Col. Cruz-Murgeon and the Conde de Valdecañas is not ascer

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IX

IX

THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA 1. DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY. The Generals commanding-in-chief of the British and French armies in Portugal having determined to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22nd instant for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned officers to negotiate the same in their names: viz. on the part of the General-in-chi

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X

X

THE CENTRAL JUNTA OF REGENCY LIST OF THE MEMBERS. N.B.—The notes as to individuals are extracted from Arguelles. 1. For Aragon . Don Francisco Palafox , Brigadier-General [younger brother of Joseph Palafox, the Captain-General]. Don Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas [Intendant-General of the Army of Aragon, long a banker in Madrid]. 2. For Asturias . Don Gaspar Jovellanos [Councillor of State, sometime Minister of Justice]. The Marquis of Campo Sagrado , Lieut.-General. 3. For the Canary Islands . The Marq

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XI

XI

THE SPANISH ARMIES, OCT.-NOV. 1808 N.B.—* signifies an old line or light regiment; † a militia battalion; ‡ a newly raised corps. 1. THE ARMY OF GALICIA [ Return of Oct. 31 ]. General Blake . N.B.—The four cavalry regiments from Denmark, Rey, Infante, Villaviciosa, and Almanza did not join Blake, being without horses, but marched on foot to Estremadura to get mounted. They had 147 officers and 2,252 men. 2. THE ARMY OF ARAGON. General Joseph Palafox . Total of the Army of Aragon, at least 33,674

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XII

XII

IN NOVEMBER, 1808. N.B.—The distribution of the regiments is that of November. The detailed strength of the corps, however, comes from an October return, and there had been several changes at the end of that month. 1st Corps. Marshal Victor , Duke of Belluno. The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 33,937 men, of whom 2,201 were detached, and 2,939 in hospital. The 4th Hussars, originally belonging to this corps, was transferred to the 3rd Corps by November. 2nd Corps. Marshal Bessières :

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XIII

XIII

N.B.—The first column gives the strength of each of Baird’s regiments on Oct. 2, and of Moore’s regiments on Oct. 15, deducting from the latter men left behind in Portugal. The second column gives the men present with the colours on Dec. 19, but not those in hospital or ‘on command’ on that day. These last amounted on Dec. 19 to 3,938 and 1,687 respectively. The third column gives the numbers disembarked in England in January. It will be noted that if to the 29,357 of the second column there are

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A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR

BY CHARLES OMAN, M.A. FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE AND DEPUTY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY (CHICHELE) IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID Vol. II Jan.-Sept. 1809 FROM THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA TO THE END OF THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN WITH MAPS, PLANS AND ILLUSTRATIONS OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1903 HENRY FROWDE, M.A. PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD LONDON, EDINBURGH NEW YORK...

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PREFACE

PREFACE

T he second volume of this work has swelled to an even greater bulk than its predecessor. Its size must be attributed to two main causes: the first is the fact that a much greater number of original sources, both printed and unprinted, are available for the campaigns of 1809 than for those of 1808. The second is that the war in its second year had lost the character of comparative unity which it had possessed in its first. Napoleon, on quitting Spain in January, left behind him as a legacy to hi

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ERRATA IN VOL. II

ERRATA IN VOL. II

The following facts I discovered in Madrid and Lisbon when it was too late to correct the chapters in which the mis-statements occur. (1) Page 82 , note 93 . I have found from a Madrid document that part, though not the whole, of the Regiment of Baza was present at Valls. One battalion was left behind with Wimpffen: one marched with Reding: about 800 men therefore must be added to my estimate of the Spanish infantry. (2) Page 318 , note 394 . I found in Lisbon that the regiments which marched wi

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

With the departure of Napoleon from Madrid on December 21, the offensive action of the French army in central Spain came to a stand. The Emperor had taken away with him the field army, which had been destined to deliver those blows at Lisbon and Seville that were to end the war. The troops which he had left behind him in the neighbourhood of Madrid were inadequate in numbers for any further advance, and were forced to adopt a defensive attitude. The only regions in which the invaders continued t

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

Four days after the battle of Ucles Napoleon quitted Spain. He had rested at Valladolid from January 6 to January 17, after his return from the pursuit of Sir John Moore. Though he had failed to entrap the British Army he was not discontented with his achievements. He was fully convinced that he had broken the back of the Spanish insurrection, and that he could safely return to France, leaving the completion of the work to his brother and his marshals. He was anxious to hear that Saragossa had f

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

Before we follow further the fortunes of Southern Spain, it is necessary to turn back and to take up the tale of the war on the Eastern coast at the point where it was left in Section V. The same torpor which was notable in the operations of the main armies of the Spaniards and the French during the months of September and October was to be observed in Catalonia also. On the Ter and the Llobregat the inability of the French to move was much more real, and the slackness of the Spaniards even more

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

When Rosas had fallen St. Cyr was at last able to take in hand the main operation which had been entrusted to him by Napoleon—the relief of Barcelona. While the siege was still in progress he had received two letters bidding him hasten to the relief of Duhesme without delay [63] , but he had taken upon himself the responsibility of writing back that he must clear his flank and rear before he dared move, and that he should proceed with the leaguer of Rosas, which could only last a few days longer

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

More than a month had elapsed since the battle of Molins de Rey before any important movements were made in Catalonia. Early in February St. Cyr drew in his divisions from the advanced positions in the plain of Tarragona, which they had taken up after the victory of Molins de Rey. They had eaten up the country-side, and were being much harassed by the miqueletes , who had begun to press in upon their communications with Barcelona, in spite of all the care that was taken to scour the country with

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

While Napoleon was urging on his fruitless pursuit of Sir John Moore, while St. Cyr was discomfiting the Catalans on the Besos and the Llobregat, and while Victor was dealing his last blow to the dilapidated army of Infantado, there was one point on which the war was standing still, and where the French arms had made no great progress since the battle of Tudela. Saragossa was holding out, with the same tenacity that she had displayed during the first siege in the July and August of the preceding

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

Lacoste’s first care, when the Pillar and San José had both fallen into his hands, was to connect the two works by his ‘third parallel,’ which was drawn from one to the other just above the edge of the ravine of the Huerba. In order to assail the walls of the city that stream had to be crossed, a task of some difficulty, for its bed was searched by the great batteries at Santa Engracia along the whole front between the two captured forts, while north of San José the ‘Palafox Battery’ near the Po

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

By the middle of the month of February, as we have already seen, Andalusia was once more covered by two considerable Spanish armies: Cartaojal, with the wrecks of Infantado’s host and the new levies of Del Palacio, was holding the great passes at the eastern end of the Sierra Morena. Cuesta had rallied behind the Guadiana the remains of the army of Estremadura. He was at present engaged in reducing it to order by the only method of which he was master, the shooting of any soldier who showed sign

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

While Cartaojal and his Andalusian levies were faring so ill in La Mancha, the army of Estremadura and its obstinate old general were going through experiences of an even more disastrous kind. Cuesta, it will be remembered, had rallied about Badajoz and Merida the demoralized troops that had served under San Juan and Galluzzo. He was, contrary to all expectation, allowed to remain unmolested for some weeks. The irrational movement of Lefebvre to Plasencia and Avila [163] had left him for the mom

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

After the departure of Bonaparte for Paris there were, as we have already shown, only two points in the Peninsula where the strength of the French armies was such as to allow them to continue the great movement of advance which their master had begun. We have already seen how Victor, after advancing from the Tagus to the Guadiana, found his initiative exhausted, even after his victory at Medellin. He had halted, and refused to take the offensive against Lisbon or Andalusia till he should be heav

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

Soult’s vanguard crossed the Portuguese frontier between Monterey and Chaves on March 9, 1809: it was exactly five months since the last of Junot’s troops had evacuated the realm on October 9, 1808. In the period which had elapsed between those two dates much might have been done to develop—or rather to create—a scheme of national defence and a competent army. Unhappily for Portugal the Regency had not risen to the opportunity, and when the second French invasion came upon them the military orga

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

While the Regency was wasting much of its energy on the arming of the undisciplined masses of the Ordenanza , and while Cradock sat supine at Passo d’Arcos and at Saccavem, one useful piece of work at least was being taken in hand. This was the reorganization of the Portuguese regular army, a task which the Regency determined, though only so late as February, 1809, to hand over to a British general officer. To explain the chaotic condition of the force at the moment when Soult was just about to

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

When La Romana marched off to the east, and abandoned his Portuguese allies to their own resources, the duty of defending the frontier fell upon General Francisco Silveira, the military governor of the Tras-os-Montes. He had mobilized his forces at Chaves the moment that Soult’s departure from Orense became known, and had there gathered the whole levy of his province. The total amounted to two incomplete line regiments [266] four battalions of disorderly and ill-equipped militia [267] , the skel

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

Oporto had been conquered: the unhappy levies of the Bishop had been scattered to the winds: by the captures which it had made the French army was now, for the first time since its departure from Orense, in possession of a considerable store of provisions and an adequate supply of ammunition. Soult was no longer driven forward by the imperative necessity for finding new resources to feed his troops, nor forced to hurry on the fighting by the fear that if he delayed his cartridges would run short

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CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

It will have occurred to every student of the operations of the army of Portugal during the month of April, that it was strange that Marshal Soult should have remained quiescent at Oporto, while the fate of his entire campaign was at stake during the fighting on the Tamega. His head quarters were only thirty miles from Amarante—but one day’s ride for himself and his staff—yet he never paid a single flying visit to the scene of operations, even after he had come to the conclusion that Loison was

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

On Nov. 25, 1808, Sir John Moore, in answer to a question from Lord Castlereagh, wrote the following conclusions as to the practicability of defending Portugal [339] : ‘I can say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, but all equally to be penetrated. If the French succeed in Spain it will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The Portuguese are without a military force ... no dependence can be plac

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

On arriving at Lisbon, Wellesley, as we have already seen, was overjoyed to find that the situation in Portugal remained just as it had been when he set sail from Portsmouth: Victor was still quiescent in his cantonments round Merida: Soult had not moved forward on the road toward Coimbra, and was in the midst of his unfruitful bickerings with the army of Silveira. Lapisse had disappeared from his threatening position in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, and had passed away to Estremadura. All the rumour

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

The headlong charge of Hervey’s squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons was the last molestation which fell to the lot of Soult’s retreating column on the afternoon of May 12. Marching till dark, the disordered infantry encamped at Baltar, ten miles from Oporto, where they fell in with the detached regiment of Delaborde’s division and with Caulaincourt’s dragoons, who had been guarding this half-way stage between Amarante and Oporto, ever since Loison had marched on into the Tras-os-Montes ten days

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

While following the fortunes of Soult and the 2nd Corps in Northern Portugal, we have been constrained to withdraw our attention from Galicia, where we left Marshal Ney busied in a vain attempt to beat down the insurrections which had sprung up in every corner of the kingdom, at the moment when the melting of the snows gave notice that spring was at hand. It was with no good will that the Duke of Elchingen had seen his colleague depart from Orense and plunge into the Portuguese mountains. Indeed

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

When, upon May 30, 1809, Ney arrived at Lugo, and met Soult in conference, it seemed that, now or never, the time had come when a serious endeavour might be made to subdue the Galician insurgents. The whole force of the 2nd and 6th Corps was concentrated in the narrow triangle between Ferrol, Corunna, and Lugo. The two marshals had still 33,000 men fit for service, after deducting the sick. If they set aside competent garrisons for the three towns that we have just named, they could still show s

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

When, upon February 20, the plague-stricken remnant of the much-enduring garrison of Saragossa laid down their arms at the feet of Lannes, it seemed probable that the whole of North-Eastern Spain must fall a helpless prey to the invader. The time had come when the 3rd and the 5th Corps, freed from the long strain of the siege, were once more available for field-operations. For the last two months almost every dispatch that the Emperor or King Joseph wrote, had been filled with plans and projects

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

When Wellesley’s columns, faint but pursuing, received the orders which bade them halt at Ruivaens and Montalegre, their commander was already planning out the details of their return-march to the Tagus. From the first moment of his setting forth from Lisbon, he had looked upon the expedition against Soult as no more than a necessary preliminary to the more important expedition against Victor. He would have preferred, as we have already seen [538] , to have directed his first blow against the Fr

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CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

The retreat of Victor beyond the Tagus forced Wellesley to concert yet another plan of operation with Cuesta, since the position of the French army, on which the whole of the recently adopted scheme depended, had just suffered a radical change. It was clear that every consideration now pointed to the necessity for adopting the combination which Wellesley had urged upon his colleague in his letter of June 8, viz. that the British army should move on Plasencia and Almaraz. It would now be striking

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CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

It was not till the third day of July that Wellesley had been able to cross the Spanish border. Since Victor had assumed his new position to the north of the Tagus as early as the nineteenth of the preceding month, there was a perilous fortnight during which Cuesta and his army were left alone to face the French. All through this time of waiting, the British Commander-in-chief was haunted by the dread that the old Captain-General might repeat his earlier errors, and once more—as at Rio Seco and

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CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

Having returned to his army on July 12, Wellesley gave orders for the whole force to get ready for a general advance on the morning of the eighteenth, the day which had been chosen for the commencement of operations at the conference of Almaraz. It would have been in every way desirable to have moved out at once, and not to have waited for these six days. If the march against Victor had been fixed for the thirteenth or fourteenth, the French would have been caught unprepared, for as late as the

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CHAPTER V

CHAPTER V

It is now necessary to turn to the French camp, in order to realize the course of events which had led to the concentration of such a formidable force in the environs of Toledo. Down to the twenty-second of July Joseph and his adviser Jourdan had remained in complete ignorance of the advance of Wellesley upon Plasencia, and seem to have been perfectly free from any apprehension that Madrid was in danger. Since their return from their fruitless pursuit of the army of La Mancha, they had been spen

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CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

The position which Wellesley had selected as offering far better ground for a defensive battle than any which could be found on the banks of the Alberche, extends for nearly three miles to the north of the town of Talavera. It was not a very obvious line to take up, since only at its northern end does it present any well marked features. Two-thirds of the position lie in the plain, and are only marked out by the stony bed of the Portiña, a brook almost dried up in the summer, which runs from nor

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CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VII

The informal armistice which had followed the combat of the early morning had drawn to an end, when at about 10 o’clock the British observers on the Cerro de Medellin saw a large and brilliant staff riding along the French line from right to left. It finally halted, and took post on the most commanding point of the Cascajal heights. This was the entourage of King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, who had determined to make a careful examination of the allied lines before committing themselves to any f

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CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER VIII

When the dawn of July 29 had arrived, the plain and the rolling hills in front of the allied position were seen to be absolutely deserted. No trace of the French army was visible save the heaps of dead upon the further side of the Portiña: the wounded had been carried off, with the exception of those who had fallen within the British lines, and so become prisoners of war. It was soon discovered that the enemy had left a screen of cavalry along the western bank of the Alberche: but whether his ma

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CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER IX

While King Joseph’s orders were being carried out, Wellesley and Cuesta found themselves, to their great surprise, unmolested by any hostile force. The army which had been in their front at Almaraz and Arzobispo disappeared on August 10, leaving only small detachments to watch the northern bank of the Tagus. It was soon reported to Wellesley that Victor had passed away towards Toledo, and that another corps—or perhaps two [729] —had retired to Plasencia. The object of this move however had to be

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I

I

[N.B.—From the Tables in Arteche, vol. v.] The Battalions which fought at Ucles are indicated by a star *. Estimating the 5 regiments without returns at 1,000 sabres, we get 2,814 in all. Of these the following, with a strength of 11,500 men, were present at Ucles, There is a discrepancy between this total and the numbers borne in the battalions above. It is caused by the fact that Irlanda, Ordenes Militares, and Tiradores de Cadiz were not complete on the battle-morning, but had companies detac

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II

II

THE GARRISON OF SARAGOSSA [From the return of Jan. 1, 1809, given by Ibieca, corrected by reference to Arteche iv. 550-1, and the Conde de Clonard, ii. 284-93.] All these are regularly organized corps. It is impossible to state the figures of the irregulars with any certainty. N.B.—Ibieca errs in including Doyle, La Reunion, Fieles Zaragozanos and 3rd of Valencia in the Garrison, they were detached in Aragon, the first at Jaca, the two next with the Marquis of Lazan. See the tables on pp. 284-29

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III

III

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, FEBRUARY 1, 1809 N.B.—This return includes effective men, présents sous les armes , only, not sick or detached....

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V

V

The numbers are from the first complete return available, that of Sept. 15 in the Record Office. INFANTRY OF THE LINE. N.B.—Each regiment consisted of two battalions of seven companies each, which should have numbered 770 officers and men, the regiment totalling 1,550, with staff. CAZADORES. N.B.—These were single-battalion corps with a proper effective of 770 men. The 7th, 8th, and 9th Cazadores were formed later, out of the three battalions of the Lusitanian Legion. The 10th, 11th, and 12th we

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VI

VI

I. GENERAL RICARD’S CIRCULAR. Le général Ricard, chef d’état-major du 2 e corps d’armée en Espagne, à M. le général de division Quesnel. Oporto, le 19 avril 1809. Mon général, Son Excellence M. le maréchal duc de Dalmatie m’a chargé de vous écrire pour vous faire connaître les dispositions que la grande majorité des habitants de la province du Minho manifestent. La ville de Braga, qui une des premières s’était portée à l’insurrection, a été aussi la première a se prononcer pour un changement de

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VIII

VIII

SOULT’S REPORT ON GALICIA, JUNE 25, 1809. N.B.—The first half of this report, a lengthy narrative of the Marshal’s march from Lugo to Puebla de Senabria, is omitted. Je me permettrai, avant de terminer ce rapport, de présenter à Votre Majesté quelques observations sur la situation actuelle de Galice. Cette province est toujours en état de fermentation. Les menaces de mort et d’incendie qu’employe La Romana; les nombreux agents qui agissent en son nom; les exécutions qu’il fait; les dévastations

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IX

IX

A SUCHET’S ARMY OF ARAGON [3rd CORPS], MAY 15, 1809. Total présents sous les armes. N.B.—Of the nine absent battalions the 116th and 117th with a strength of somewhat over 3,000 men rejoined Suchet on the day of Maria (June 15), thus raising this available force to about 13,000 men. The 121st never came up from Navarre. B BLAKE’S ARMY OF ARAGON, JUNE 15, 1809. Total present under arms at Maria. APPENDICES RELATING TO THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN...

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X

X

1 THE BRITISH FORCE AT TALAVERA FROM THE MORNING STATE OF JULY 25, 1809 Present and fit for Duty. The Army had also sick left in Portugal, about 3,246: sick at Plasencia and Talavera about 1,149: on detachment in Portugal about 1,396: on detachment in Spain about 107. Total absent or non-effective 5,898. The newly arrived regiments at Lisbon, and the troops on their way to the front under R. Craufurd are, of course, left out of this return. 2 THE ARMY OF ESTREMADURA AT TALAVERA [From an unpublis

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XI

XI

N.B.—I owe this Appendix to Colonel F. A. Whinyates, R.A., who has been good enough to compile it for the volume. STAFF. Brigadier-General E. Howorth arrived at Lisbon in April 1809, and took over the command of the R.A. from Lieut.-Colonel W. Robe. Brigade-Major R.A., Captain A. Dickson until appointed to the Portuguese Artillery in June, when Captain J. May took over that position. FIELD-OFFICERS IN PORTUGAL. Lieut.-Col. H. Framingham, Lieut.-Col. W. Robe, Lieut.-Col. G. B. Fisher, Major Juliu

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XII

XII

VENEGAS’S ARMY OF LA MANCHA FROM A RETURN OF JUNE 16, 1809. Total, 27,399, including sick and men on detachment....

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