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THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
IN MEMORIAM N. F. P. + E. L. P. General Map showing POSITION of the ARMIES on the Eve of the Battle, and the central German lines of approach. German Armies. I –Von Kluck. II –Von Bülow. III –Von Hausen. IV –Duke of Würtemberg. V –Imperial Crown Prince. VI –C. Prince of Bavaria (& troops from Metz). VII –Von Heeringen. French & British Armies: 6 –Marmoury. B.E.F. British. 5 –F. d’Espérey. 9 –Foch. 4 –DeLangle de Cary. 3 –Sarrail. 2 –DeCastelnau. 1 –Dubail. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
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PREFACE
PREFACE
The great war has entered into history. The restraints, direct and indirect, which it imposed being gone with it, we return to sounder tests of what should be public knowledge—uncomfortable truths may be told, secret places explored. At the same time, the first squall of controversy in France over the opening of the land campaign in the West has subsided; this lull is the student’s opportunity. No complete history of the events culminating in the victory of the Marne is yet possible, or soon to
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
NOTES AND REFERENCES
The German Objective (p. 239 ); The Opposed Forces (p. 240 ); De Bloch’s Prophecy and French’s Confession (p. 242 ); Criticisms and Defence of the French Staff (p. 244 ); The Surprise in the North (p. 247 ); The Abandonment of Lille (p. 252 ); M. Hanotaux and the B.E.F. (p. 252 ); The Fall of Maubeuge (p. 256 ); Paris and the German Plan (p. 259 ); Some Books on the Battle (p. 263 ); General Bonnal and the British Army (p. 265 ); Scenes at Farthest South (p. 266 ); The Myth of the 42nd Division
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CHAPTER I THE DELUGE
CHAPTER I THE DELUGE
August 25, 1914: three weeks after Von Emmich opened the war before Liège; five days after the French Army of Lorraine was trapped at Sarrebourg and Morhange; two days after Namur fell, and Charleroi and Mons were abandoned. On this black day, the 25th, while Louvain was burning, the 80,000 men of the old British regular Army made an average of 20 miles under a brazen sun, pursued by the enormous mass of Von Kluck’s marching wing. The 1st Corps under Haig came into Landrecies at 10 p.m., and, af
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I. The German Plan of Campaign
I. The German Plan of Campaign
“Errors,” “vanities”? These words must be justified, however gently, however briefly. To regard the battle of the Marne without reference to the grievous beginnings that led to and shaped it would be to belittle and falsify a subject peculiarly demanding care for true perspective. The battle may be classed as negatively decisive in that it arrested the invasion long enough to enable the Allies to gain an equality of forces, and so to prevent a final German victory; it was only positively decisiv
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II. The Forces in Play
II. The Forces in Play
In every part the German war-machine was designed and fitted to deliver such a blow. Its effective force was the second great element of surprise for the Entente. It is now clear that, taking the field as a whole, France was not overwhelmed by superior numbers. True, as a French official report says, “the military effort of Germany at the outset of the war surpassed all anticipations”; but the element of surprise lay not in numbers, but in fighting quality and organisation. Of the whole mass mob
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III. The French War Doctrine
III. The French War Doctrine
It was not the fault, but the glory, of France that she lived upon a higher level, to worthier ends, than her old enemy. But if we find reason to suspect that, the nation having accepted the burden of taxation and armed service, its arms and preparation were not the best of their kind, that a superstitious fidelity to conservative sentiments and ideas was allowed to obscure the hard facts of the European situation and the changing nature of modern warfare, the fact that certain critics have plun
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IV. The Three French Offensives
IV. The Three French Offensives
Instead of an initial defensive over most of the front, with or without some carefully chosen and strongly provided manœuvre of offence—as the major conditions of the problem would seem to suggest—the French campaign opened with a general offensive, which for convenience we must divide into three parts, three adventures, all abortive, into Southern Alsace, German Lorraine, and the Belgian Ardennes. The first two of these were predetermined, even before General Joffre was designed for the chief c
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V. The Battle of Charleroi–Mons
V. The Battle of Charleroi–Mons
The completest surprise naturally fell on the west wing of the Allies; and, had not the small British force been of the hardiest stuff, an irreparable disaster might have occurred. Here, with the heaviest preponderance of the enemy, there had been least preparation for any hostilities before the crisis was reached. On or about August 10, we war correspondents received an official map of the “Present Zone of the Armies,” which was shown to end, on the north, at Orchies—16 miles S.E. of Lille, and
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I. Ecce Homo!
I. Ecce Homo!
France , land of swift action and swifter wit, was the last one would expect to take kindly to the new warfare. She looked then, as her elders had always looked, for a Man. And she found one; but he was far from being of the traditional type. Joseph Cesaire Joffre was at this time sixty-two years old, a burly figure, with large head upheld, grey hair, thick moustache and brows, clear blue eyes, and a kindly, reflective manner. His great-grandfather, a political refugee from Spain, named Gouffre,
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II. The Second New Plan
II. The Second New Plan
The first fact which had to be reckoned with was that the main weight of the enemy was bearing down across the north and north-east, and was, for the moment, irresistible. Retreat, at the outset, was not, then, within the plan, but a condition of it. There was no choice; contact with the invader must be broken if any liberty of action was to be won back. Defeat and confusion had been suffered at so many points, the force of the German offensive was so markedly superior, that an unprepared arrest
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III. Battle of the Gap of Charmes
III. Battle of the Gap of Charmes
Everything was conditional upon the defence of the eastern frontier, now at its most critical phase. 32 On the morning of August 24, Lunéville having been occupied on the previous day, the hosts of Prince Ruprecht and General Heeringen were reported to be advancing rapidly toward the entry of the Gap of Charmes by converging roads—the former, on the north, passing before the Nancy hills, southward; the latter, coming westward from around the Donon, by Baccarat. We have seen (p. 31 ) that, on the
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IV. Battles of Le Cateau, Guise, and Launois
IV. Battles of Le Cateau, Guise, and Launois
During the night of August 25—while Smith-Dorrien’s men were defending themselves at Solesmes and Haig’s at Landrecies—General Maunoury received the order to disengage his divisions, and to hurry across country to Montdidier with his Staff, there to complete the formation and undertake the command of the new 6th Army. This distinguished soldier was sixty-seven years of age. Wounded in the war of 1870, he had taken a leading part in the development of the French artillery, directed the Ecole de G
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V. End of the Long Retreat
V. End of the Long Retreat
The position along the French front on this day was, therefore, more favourable than it had been. In Lorraine, there was a slackening of the German attacks, pending the arrival of fresh forces; and Castelnau, his weakened army fully rallied, was more confident of the issue. In the west, one new army had come, and another was coming, into line. At the right-centre and left-centre, the enemy had suffered checks which must have disturbed his arrogance, and caused hesitation and divided counsels tha
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I. The Government leaves the Capital
I. The Government leaves the Capital
Retreat to the Somme was much, to the Marne so much more as was to be appreciated only in the after-years of the war. Retreat to the Seine, besides endangering the venerable fortress and pivotal place of Verdun, left in peril of capture, perhaps of destruction, Paris, the richest and most beautiful city of Continental Europe, the seat of a strongly centralised system of government and many industries, the home of two millions of people, the converging point of the chief national roads and railwa
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II. Kluck plunges South-Eastward
II. Kluck plunges South-Eastward
The German Staff had, in fact, no immediate intention of attacking Paris; and Kluck, passing beyond gunrange of the outer forts of the entrenched camp, was racing south-east toward Meaux and Château-Thierry after the British and the French 5th Armies. This unexpected change of direction was only discovered on the afternoon of September 2, and confirmed during the next twenty-four hours by successive cavalry and aviation reports brought in to the headquarters of the British Army, Maunoury’s Army,
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III. Joffre’s Opportunity
III. Joffre’s Opportunity
For it was no exaggeration to say that a rapid victory was an essential condition of the German plan. The envelopment of the west wing of the Allies might succeed if it were effected by the time they reached the Somme, or a little beyond, but not later, and that for three main reasons. In the first place, there was, south of the Somme, Maunoury’s force, not large at first, but constantly growing, a grave threat to Kluck’s west flank, whether realised or not. In the second place, there was Foch’s
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I. Gallieni’s Initiative
I. Gallieni’s Initiative
It was in the early hours of September 3 that the first definite evidence of Kluck’s divergence south-eastward was reported to the Military Government of Paris; but the officers in charge did not venture to disturb their weary chief, who received the news only when he rose in the morning. 51 At noon, he issued to the garrison the following note: “A German army corps, probably the Second, has passed from Senlis southward, but has not pursued its movement toward Paris, and seems to have diverged t
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II. General Offensive of the Allies
II. General Offensive of the Allies
General Joffre’s programme was embodied in the following series of army orders: General Headquarters , September 4 “1. Advantage must be taken of the adventurous situation of the I German Army (right wing) to concentrate upon it the efforts of the Allied armies of the extreme left. All dispositions will be taken during the 5th of September with a view to commencing the attack on the 6th. 2. The dispositions to be realised by the evening of September 5 will be: ( a ) All the available forces of t
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STRENGTH AND POSITION OF THE ARMIES
STRENGTH AND POSITION OF THE ARMIES
(On September 5–6, except where otherwise indicated, in order from West to East) 6th ARMY (General MAUNOURY ), (H.Q., Claye). Under the direction of General Gallieni till September 10. I ARMY (General von KLUCK ), (H.Q., Coulommiers). 7th Corps (General Vautier). Brought from Lorraine to the Amiens region, thence to east of Paris. Consisting of 14th Division Active (General Villaret) and 63rd Division of Reserve (General Lombard)— the latter in lieu of the 13th Division, left in the Vosges. Came
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III. Features of the Battlefield
III. Features of the Battlefield
The second advantage gained has already been indicated; it consisted in the attainment of a concave front resting upon the entrenched camps of Paris and Verdun, and by them guarded against any sudden manœuvre of envelopment. Intermediately, this front lay across the heights between the Marne and the Seine, along the chief system of main lines and highroads running eastward from the capital, those of Paris–Nancy. This 200-miles stretch of country, so typically French in character and history, loo
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IV. The Last Summons
IV. The Last Summons
We can now enter upon the details of the titanic encounter with a clear impression of its general character. As soon as the relation of forces was realised, the tactical purposes dictated by the circumstances to either side were these, and could not be other: for the French, to attack on the wings, especially the western, where there was a promise of surprise, while holding firm at the centre till the pressure there was relieved; for the Germans, to procure a swift decision at the centre, while
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I. A Premature Engagement
I. A Premature Engagement
Exactly at noon on Saturday, September 5, the divisions of General Lamaze, constituting the right (save for elements connecting it with the British) of the French 6th Army, came under fire from advanced posts of General Schwerin’s IV Corps of Reserve, hidden on the wooded hills just beyond the highroad from Dammartin to Meaux. A surprise for both sides; and with this began the battle of the Ourcq. The battlefield—a rough quadrilateral, extending from the Dammartin road eastward to the deep ditch
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II. The British Manœuvre
II. The British Manœuvre
To understand how this withdrawal, so big with results, was possible, and to do justice to Sir John French’s command in regard to it, we must leave Lamaze and Vautier at grips with the two German corps on the Ourcq, and turn for a moment to the situation south of the Marne. The OURCQ Front. Afternoon of Sept. 6. On September 3, the British Army lay just south of Meaux, from Lagny to Signy Signets, having destroyed the Marne bridges behind it at General Joffre’s request. Kluck, as we have seen, w
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III. A Race of Reinforcements
III. A Race of Reinforcements
On the Ourcq, each adversary was bringing up reserves, and was trying to turn the other by the north, with a slight advantage in time on the French, but a superiority of speed on the German, side. We left the centre of the 6th Army, on September 6, practically stationary about Marcilly and Barcy; while, moving from Brégy and Bouillancy, the 7th Corps gained Puisieux and Acy during the afternoon, and the 8th Division, thrown across the Marne, drove some enemy contingents into the woods of the riv
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IV. The Paris Taxi-Cabs
IV. The Paris Taxi-Cabs
I spent September 7 among the rear columns of the 6th Army. In the morning, the little town of Gagny, half-way between Paris and Claye (Maunoury’s headquarters), and the last point one could reach by rail from the city, was full of men of the 103rd and 104th regiments, belonging to the 4th Corps (General Boëlle), just arrived from Sarrail’s front. They sat in and before the cafés, lay on the grass of the villa gardens, lounged in the school playground, where their rifles were stacked and their k
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I. French and d’Espérey strike North
I. French and d’Espérey strike North
The unescapable dilemma of the Joffrean strategy had developed into a second and peremptory phase. In deciding to withdraw from the Brie plateau and the Marne, rather than risk his rear and communications for the chance of a victory on the Seine, Kluck, or his superiors, had, doubtless, chosen the lesser evil. The marching wing of the invasion was crippled before the offensive of the Allies had begun; but Gallieni’s precipitancy had brought a premature arrest upon the 6th Army. Beside this doubl
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II. Battle of the Marshes of St. Gond
II. Battle of the Marshes of St. Gond
While the 6th Army, within sight of the Ourcq, was suffering its great agony, while the “effect of suction” was showing itself in the Anglo-French pursuit of Kluck, very different were the first results at the centre of the long crescent of the Allied front. Kluck was saved by his quick resolution, together with Marwitz’s able work in covering the rear. Bülow was in no such imminent danger. His communications with the north were at first perfectly safe. The situation of his right wing, which mus
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III. Defence and Recapture of Mondemont
III. Defence and Recapture of Mondemont
The grand manœuvre of envelopment had failed. The alternative plan remained: to smash the French centre and roll up the lines on either side. On the morning of September 7, this effort began with a fierce onslaught across the ravine of the Petit Morin against the Sezanne plateau from Mondemont to Villeneuve. On Foch’s extreme left, nothing was gained. The 42nd Division was now receiving perceptible support from the 10th Corps of the 5th Army, which during the day, as we have seen, completed the
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IV. Foch’s Centre broken
IV. Foch’s Centre broken
Far other and graver was the course of the eastern arm of the German attack, after the loss of the marsh villages by the French 9th Corps on September 7. Dubois’ shaky line, along the south of the marshes, was continued eastward by the 11th Corps (including, now, the 18th Division) from near Morains to Normée, and this by the 60th Reserve Division, thence to Sommesous, and the 9th Cavalry Division, reaching out to the left of de Langle’s Army (the 17th Corps). These faced, respectively, the Prus
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V. Fable and Fact of a bold Manœuvre
V. Fable and Fact of a bold Manœuvre
That evening, Foch conceived a manœuvre so characteristic of the man, so evidently after his own heart, that the facts of its execution have been hidden under a mass of sparkling fable. “If, by whatever mental vision,” the master had said in one of his lectures, “we see a fissure in a dam of the defence, or a point of insufficient resistance, and if we are able to join to the regular and methodical action of the flood the effect of a blow with a ram capable of breaking the dam at a certain place
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I. The Battle of Vitry-le-François
I. The Battle of Vitry-le-François
In the original design of the whole battle, the action of the right or eastern half of the Allied crescent was to be reciprocal to that of the left—while the centre held, Sarrail was to strike out from the region of Verdun westward against the flank of the Prince Imperial, as Maunoury struck out eastward from the region of Paris against that of Kluck. Something of this intention came into effect; but it was much modified by two circumstances. In the first place, General Joffre was driven both by
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II. Sarrail Holds the Meuse Salient
II. Sarrail Holds the Meuse Salient
The French 3rd Army, when Sarrail took over its command from Ruffey on August 30, was a thing of shreds and patches. The 42nd Division of Sarrail’s own 6th Corps was being sent to Foch, leaving behind two other divisions, and a brigade of a third which had been broken up. The 4th Corps was about to leave for Paris, to take part in the battle of the Ourcq. There remained the 5th and the diminished 6th Corps, General Paul Durand’s Group of Divisions of Reserve (67, 75, and 65), formerly under Maun
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CHAPTER IX VICTORY
CHAPTER IX VICTORY
It is now apparent that a record of the battle covering the whole front day by day would give no clear view of its development. The climax came not everywhere at the same hour, or even on the same day, but in a remarkable succession—beginning on the Ourcq about noon on September 9, and immediately afterward on Foch’s front (the two areas most directly menaced by the advance of French and d’Espérey), reaching de Langle de Cary the next morning, and Sarrail only on the night of the 10th. It remain
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CHAPTER X THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST
CHAPTER X THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST
General Joffre’s Instruction of September 1 had prescribed that the whole offensive should pivot upon the right. The defence of the eastern front, as a wall protecting the western and central armies, and the pivot of their recoil—essential condition of the general success—was assigned to Generals de Castelnau and Dubail. The 2nd and 1st Armies had been severely punished at the outset of the campaign; and, evidently, a heavy task now lay before them. The second of the German princes, Ruprecht of
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CHAPTER XI SUMMING-UP
CHAPTER XI SUMMING-UP
The battle of the Marne closed a definite phase of the Great War, and perhaps—in so far as it was marked by open and rapid movement, and as it finally exposed certain gross military errors—a phase of warfare in general. A fresh examination of the plans of the preceding years and the events of the preceding month immensely enhances the interest of the whole development; for it shows the real “miracle of the Marne” to have been an uprush of intelligence and patriotic will in which grave faults of
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THE GERMAN OBJECTIVE
THE GERMAN OBJECTIVE
2 The question whether the Eastern thrust was integral in the original plan cannot be absolutely determined on the present information; but it is significant that at the outset the German forces on the East were inferior to the French. M. Gabriel Hanotaux ( Revue des Deux Mondes , November 15, 1916) thinks that the German right, centre, and left were aiming at the region of Troyes, Kluck from the north-west, Prince Ruprecht of Bavaria from the east, and the Imperial Crown Prince from the north.
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THE OPPOSED FORCES
THE OPPOSED FORCES
3 It is not necessary here to state the evidence in detail; but these figures may be accepted as substantially correct. I am indebted to a British authority for criticism and information. Besides the 4 Landwehr Divisions in course of formation during the last days of August, there were a number of Landwehr Brigades, which, however, had no artillery and were not organised for the field. By the first week of September, the XI Corps and Guard Reserve Corps had gone to the Russian front; but the 4
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DE BLOCH’S PROPHECY AND FRENCH’S CONFESSION
DE BLOCH’S PROPHECY AND FRENCH’S CONFESSION
8 De Bloch, who had been a large railway contractor in the Russo-Turkish War, and a leading Polish banker, published the results of his experiences and researches, in six volumes, under the general title La Guerre , during the last years of the nineteenth century, and afterwards established a “Museum of War and Peace” at Lucerne to illustrate the subject. His chief thesis was that, owing to the technical development of military instruments and other factors, an aggressive war between States of
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CRITICISMS AND DEFENCE OF THE FRENCH STAFF
CRITICISMS AND DEFENCE OF THE FRENCH STAFF
10 M. Victor Giraud, in his Histoire , writes: “The French troops were neither armed nor equipped as they should have been.... Neither in the liaison of arms, nor in the rôle of the artillery, nor in the possibilities of aviation or trenches, had the army very clear ideas; it believed only in the offensive, the war of movement, which precisely, to-day more than ever, calls for a superiority of armament, if not also of effectives.... France could and should have remembered that it was the countr
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THE SURPRISE IN THE NORTH
THE SURPRISE IN THE NORTH
14 Early French writers on the war found it difficult to make up their minds whether there had, or had not, been a surprise in the North. See Histoire de la Guerre de 1914 (ch. “Septembre”), by Gabriel Hanotaux. This work, the most ambitious of the kind yet attempted, is being published in fortnightly sections and periodical volumes, of which the first deals with the origins of the war, the next three with the frontier battles, and the following ones with the battles of the retreat and prelimin
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THE ABANDONMENT OF LILLE
THE ABANDONMENT OF LILLE
20 The military history of Lille, is curious. See Lille , by General Percin (Paris: Grasset). M. Engerand, in his chapter on “The Abandonment of Lille,” says that a third of the cannon had been removed earlier in the year, but that on August 21, when General Herment took command, there remained 446 pieces with enough ammunition and 25,000 men, not counting the neighbouring Territorial divisions of General d’Amade. Though Lille had been virtually declassed on the eve of the war, General Percin,
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M. HANOTAUX AND THE B.E.F.
M. HANOTAUX AND THE B.E.F.
23 For details, see Hanotaux, Histoire General and L’Enigme de Charleroi (Paris, 1917); Maurice, Thomasson, Engerand, loc. cit. ; Sir John French’s Dispatches and 1914 ; Lord Ernest Hamilton, The First Seven Divisions ; La Campagne de l’Armée Belge , from official documents (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915); L’Action de l’Armée Belge , also official; Van der Essen, L’Invasion Allemande . For some information in this chapter and the subsequent note with regard to the British Army, I am indebted to the
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THE FALL OF MAUBEUGE
THE FALL OF MAUBEUGE
26 Four years passed ere a detailed account of the defence and fall of Maubeuge was published ( La Verité sur le Siège de Maubeuge , by Commandant Paul Cassou, of the 4th Zouaves. Paris: Berger-Levrault). There are, in the case of this fortress, points of likeness to and of difference from that of Lille. In June 1910 the Ministry of War had decided that Maubeuge should be regarded as only a position of arrest, not capable of sustaining a long siege; and in 1913 the Superior War Council decreed
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PARIS AND THE GERMAN PLAN
PARIS AND THE GERMAN PLAN
44 Major-General Sir F. Maurice, in his brilliant study, Forty Days in 1914 (London: Constable. 1919), speaks, however, of the German Staff assuming “that Paris had only a moral and not a military value.” General Maurice refers to the city as being “at the mercy of the enemy,” and emphatically condemns Kluck for failing to occupy it, and so “sacrificing substantial gains in favour of a grandiose and ambitious scheme which, as events proved, could not be realised” (p. 139). Despite General Mauri
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SOME BOOKS ON THE BATTLE
SOME BOOKS ON THE BATTLE
Chaps. VI.-X. For further details of the actions traced in these chapters, see the works of Marshal French, Von Bülow, M. Hanotaux, Generals Mallaterre, Canonge, and Palat, M, Victor Giraud, Lord Ernest Hamilton, Mr. G. Campbell, and others named above, and the following: “Guides Michelin pour la visite des Champs de Bataille” (Paris: Berger-Levrault. 1917–18). Vol. I. L’Ourcq ( Meaux–Senlis–Chantilly ). Vol. II. Les Marais de Saint Gond ( Coulommiers–Provins–Sézanne ). Vol. III. La Trouée de Re
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GENERAL BONNAL AND THE BRITISH ARMY
GENERAL BONNAL AND THE BRITISH ARMY
59 Several French volumes hint the first criticism, and it is expressed very definitely by General Bonnal in the article already referred to on the battle of the Ourcq in La Renaissance of September 4, 1915. The substance of General Bonnal’s charge is as follows: “Unfortunately, the British Army, rather hesitant after its checks at Le Cateau, Landrecies, and Compiègne, lost time in displacements dictated by prudence, and did not give the 6th Army in time all the help desirable.” Maunoury had as
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SCENES AT FARTHEST SOUTH
SCENES AT FARTHEST SOUTH
60 Four days later, in the village inn at Pezarches, Madame, an upstanding woman of about thirty, told me of the following incident: “On Sunday morning my mother had gone to church, and I remained at home with my father and my little boy. My father left us to get some tobacco. Going out for a moment with the child, I saw a group of horsemen in the street, and said to myself: ‘We are saved. It is the Belgians!’ When I returned, to my surprise, they were in the house, sitting in my room and in th
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THE MYTH OF THE 42ND DIVISION
THE MYTH OF THE 42ND DIVISION
69 Canonge, after two inquiries on the spot, and with written evidence in addition, says that the 42nd Division left Broyes between 2 and 3 pm., reached Linthelles about 5 p.m., stopped there, and then bivouacked in the zone Linthes–Linthelles–Ognes–Pleurs, passing the night there “in general reserve,” and moving away only about 5 a.m. on September 10. Fère Champènoise, he adds, was evacuated by the Germans, after an orgie of 24 hours, at about 5.30 p.m. on the 9th, but was traversed during the
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