This book is an attempt to think out the nature and tenability of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, an attempt animated by the conviction that even the elucidation of Kant's meaning, apart from any criticism, is impossible without a discussion on their own merits of the main issues which he raises. My obligations are many and great: to Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant and to the translations of Meiklejohn, Max Müller, and Professor Mahaffy; to Mr. J. A. Smith, Fellow of Balliol College, and to

The problem of the Critique may be stated in outline and approximately in Kant's own words as follows. Human reason is called upon to consider certain questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer. These questions relate to God, freedom of the will, and immortality. And the name for the subject which has to deal with these questions is metaphysics. At one time metaphysics was regarded as the queen of all the sciences, and the importance o

The distinction between the sensibility and the understanding [1] is to Kant fundamental both in itself and in relation to the conclusions which he reaches. An outline, therefore, of this distinction must precede any statement or examination of the details of his position. Unfortunately, in spite of its fundamental character, Kant never thinks of questioning or criticizing the distinction in the form in which he draws it, and the presence of certain confusions often renders it difficult to be su

It is the aim of the Aesthetic to deal with the a priori knowledge which relates to the sensibility. This knowledge, according to Kant, is concerned with space and time. Hence he has to show firstly that our apprehension of space and time is a priori , i. e. that it is not derived from experience but originates in our apprehending nature; and secondly that within our apprehending nature this apprehension belongs to the sensibility and not to the understanding, or, in his language, that space and

The distinction between phenomena and things in themselves can be best approached by considering Kant's formulation of the alternative views of the nature of space and time. "What are space and time? Are they real existences? Or are they merely determinations or relations of things, such, however, as would also belong to them in themselves, even if they were not perceived, or are they attached to the form of perception only, and consequently to the subjective nature of our mind, without which th

The arguments by which Kant seeks to show that time is not a determination of things in themselves but only a form of perception are, mutatis mutandis , identical with those used in his treatment of space. [1] They are, therefore, open to the same criticisms, and need no separate consideration. Time, however, according to Kant, differs from space in one important respect. It is the form not of outer but of inner sense; in other words, while space is the form under which we perceive things, time

Kant's theory of space, and, still more, his theory of time, are bewildering subjects. It is not merely that the facts with which he deals are complex; his treatment of them is also complicated by his special theories of 'sense' and of 'forms of perception'. Light, however, may be thrown upon the problems raised by the Aesthetic , and upon Kant's solution of them, in two ways. In the first place, we may attempt to vindicate the implication of the preceding criticism, that the very nature of know

The aim of the Aesthetic is to answer the first question of the Critique propounded in the Introduction, viz. 'How is pure mathematics possible?' [1] The aim of the Analytic is to answer the second question, viz. 'How is pure natural science possible?' It has previously [2] been implied that the two questions are only verbally of the same kind. Since Kant thinks of the judgements of mathematics as self-evident, and therefore as admitting of no reasonable doubt [3] , he takes their truth for gran

The aim of the Transcendental Deduction is to show that the categories, though a priori as originating in the understanding, are valid, i. e. applicable to individual things. It is the part of the Critique which has attracted most attention and which is the most difficult to follow. The difficulty of interpretation is increased rather than diminished by the complete rewriting of this portion in the second edition. For the second version, though it does not imply a change of view, is undoubtedly

The preceding account of Kant's vindication of the categories has included much criticism. But the criticism has been as far as possible restricted to details, and has dealt with matters of principle only so far as has been necessary in order to follow Kant's thought. We must now consider the position as a whole, even though this may involve some repetition. [1] The general difficulties of the position may be divided into two kinds, (1) difficulties involved in the working out of the theory, eve

As has already been pointed out, [1] the Analytic is divided into two parts, the Analytic of Conceptions , of which the aim is to discover and vindicate the validity of the categories, and the Analytic of Principles , of which the aim is to determine the use of the categories in judgement. The latter part, which has now to be considered, is subdivided into two. It has, according to Kant, firstly to determine the sensuous conditions under which the categories are used, and secondly to discover th

As has been pointed out, [1] the aim of the second part of the Analytic of Principles is to determine the a priori principles involved in the use of the categories under the necessary sensuous conditions. These principles Kant divides into four classes, corresponding to the four groups of categories, and he calls them respectively 'axioms of perception', 'anticipations of sense-perception', 'analogies of experience', and 'postulates of empirical thought'. The first two and the last two classes a

Each of the three categories of relation, i. e. those of substance and accident, of cause and effect, and of interaction between agent and patient involves, according to Kant, a special principle, and these special principles he calls 'analogies of experience'. They are stated thus: [1] (1) In all changes of phenomena the substance is permanent, and its quantity in nature is neither increased nor diminished. (2) All changes take place according to the law of the connexion of cause and effect. (3

The postulates of empirical thought, which correspond to the categories of modality, are stated as follows: "1. That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience (according to perception and conceptions) is possible . 2. That which is connected with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is actual . 3. That of which the connexion with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary (exists necessarily)." [1] These principles, described as