The Basis Of Morality - free ebook by Arthur Schopenhauer

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The Basis Of Morality

Arthur Schopenhauer

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Translated with Introduction and Notes by ARTHUR BRODRICK BULLOCK, MA. TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

Translated with Introduction and Notes by ARTHUR BRODRICK BULLOCK, MA. TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

PRIZE ESSAY ON THE BASIS OF MORALITY NOT APPROVED BY THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES COPENHAGEN , 30 January , 1840. "To preach Morality is easy, to found it difficult.—" ( SCHOPENHAUER : Ueber den Willen in der Natur ; p. 128) MATRI CARISSIMAE . CONTENTS. TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION THE QUESTION PART I. INTRODUCTION . I. THE PROBLEM II. GENERAL RETROSPECT PART II. CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS. I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS II. ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

This translation was undertaken in the belief that there are many English-speaking people who feel more than a merely superficial interest in ethical research, but who may not read German with sufficient ease to make them care to take up the original. The present Essay is one of the most important contributions to Ethics since the time of Kant, and, as such, is indispensable to a thorough knowledge of the subject. Moreover, from whatever point of view it be regarded,—whether the reader find, whe

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.

Ὃν δὲ θεοὶ τιμῶσιν, ὁ καὶ μωμεύμενος αἰνεῑ. —Theognis: 169. In 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences propounded, as subject for a prize competition, the question with which this treatise opens; and Schopenhauer, who was glad to seize the opportunity of becoming better known, prepared, and sent to Copenhagen, the earliest form of "The Basis of Morality." In January, 1840, the work was pronounced unsuccessful, though there was no other candidate. In September of the same year it was published

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THE QUESTION

THE QUESTION

The question advanced by the Royal Society, together with the considerations leading up to it, is as follows:— Quum primitiva,', moralitatis idea, sive de summa lege morali principalis notio, sua quadam 'propria eaque minime logica necessitate, turn in ea disciplina appareat, cui propositum est cognitionem τοῡ ἠθικοῡ explicare, turn in vita, partim in conscientiae judicio de nostris actionibus, partim in censura morali de actionibus aliorum hominum; quumque complures, quae ab illa ider inseparab

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THE PROBLEM.

THE PROBLEM.

"Why do philosophers differ so widely as to the first principles of Morals, but agree respecting the conclusions and duties which they deduce from those principles?" This is the question which was set as subject for a prize essay by the Royal Society of Holland at Harlem, 1810, and solved by J. C. F. Meister; and in comparison with the task before us, the inquiry presented no extraordinary difficulty. For:— (1) The present question of the Royal Society has to do with nothing less important than

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GENERAL RETROSPECT.

GENERAL RETROSPECT.

For the people morality comes through, and is founded on, theology, as the express will of God. On the other hand, we see philosophers, with few exceptions, taking special pains to entirely exclude this kind of foundation; indeed, so they may but avoid it, they prefer even to find a refuge in sophistry. Whence comes this antithesis? Assuredly no more efficient basis for Ethics can be imagined than the theological; for who would be so bold as to oppose the will of the Almighty and the Omniscient?

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PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

It is Kant's great service to moral science that he purified it of all Eudaemonism. With the ancients, Ethics was a doctrine of Eudaemonism; with the moderns for the most part it has been a doctrine of salvation. The former wished to prove that virtue and happiness are identical; but this was like having two figures which never coincide with each other, no matter how they may be placed. The latter have endeavoured to connect the two, not by the principle of identity, but by that of causation, th

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ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

Kant's πρῶτον ψεῡδος (first false step) lies in his conception of Ethics itself, and this is found very clearly expressed on page 62 (R., p. 54): "In a system of practical philosophy we are not concerned with adducing reasons for that which takes place, but with formulating laws regarding that which ought to take place, even if it never does take place ." This is at once a distinct petitio principii. Who tells you that there are laws to which our conduct ought to be subject? Who tells you that t

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ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR.

ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR.

This form of the doctrine of duties was very acceptable to Kant, and in working out his position he left it untouched; for, like his predecessors, along with the duties towards others he ranged also duties towards ourselves. I, however, entirely reject this assumption, and, as there will be no better opportunity, I shall here incidentally explain my view. Duties towards ourselves must, just as all others, be based either on right or on love. Duties towards ourselves based on right are impossible

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ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

With the imperative Form of Ethics, which in Chapter II. we proved to be a petitio principii , is directly connected a favourite idea of Kant's, that may be excused, but cannot be adopted. Sometimes we see a physician, after having employed a certain remedy with conspicuous success, henceforth prescribing it for almost all diseases; to such a one Kant may be likened. By separating the a priori from the a posteriori in human knowledge he made the most brilliant and pregnant discovery that Metaphy

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ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

After having tested in the preceding chapter the actual basis of Kant's Ethics, I now turn to that which rests on it—his leading principle of Morals . The latter is very closely connected with the former; indeed, in a certain sense, they both grew up together. We have seen that the formula expressing the principle reads as follows: "Act only in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a general law for all rational beings." It is a strange proceeding for a man, who ex hypot

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ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

It is well known that Kant put the leading principle of his Ethics into another quite different shape, in which it is expressed directly; the first being indirect, indeed nothing more than an indication as to how the principle is to be sought for. Beginning at p. 63 (R., p. 55), he prepares the way for his second formula by means of very strange, ambiguous, not to say distorted, [1] definitions of the conceptions End and Means , which may be much more simply and correctly denoted thus: an End is

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KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE.

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE.

The alleged Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative, is manifestly very closely connected with Conscience, although essentially different from it in two respects. In the first place, the Categorical Imperative, as commanding, necessarily speaks before the act, whereas Conscience does not till afterwards. Before the act Conscience can at best only speak indirectly , that is, by means of reflection, which holds up to it the recollection of previous cases, in which similar acts after they

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KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE [1] AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. THEORY OF FREEDOM.

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE [1] AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. THEORY OF FREEDOM.

The attack I have made, in the cause of truth, on Kant's system of Morals, does not, like those of my predecessors, touch the surface only, but penetrates to its deepest roots. It seems, therefore, only just that, before I leave this part of my subject, I should bring to remembrance the brilliant and conspicuous service which he nevertheless rendered to ethical science. I allude to his doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity. We find it first in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (pp.

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FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN.

FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN.

Just as in Anatomy and Zoology, many things are not so obvious to the pupil in preparations and natural products as in engravings where there is some exaggeration; so if there is any one who, after the above criticism, is still not entirely satisfied as to the worthlessness of the Kantian foundation of Ethics, I would recommend him Fichte's System der Sittenlehre , as a sure means of freeing him from all doubt. In the old German Marionnettes a fool always accompanied the emperor, or hero, so tha

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CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.

CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.

Thus the foundation which Kant gave to Ethics, which for the last sixty years has been regarded as a sure basis, proves to be an inadmissible assumption, and merely theological Morals in disguise; it sinks therefore before our eyes into the deep gulf of philosophic error, which perhaps will never be filled up. That the previous attempts to lay a foundation are still less satisfactory, I take for granted, as I have already said. They consist, for the most part, of unproved assertions, drawn from

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SCEPTICAL VIEW.

SCEPTICAL VIEW.

But when we cast a retrospect over the attempts made, and made in vain, for more than two thousand years, to find a sure basis for Ethics, ought we not perhaps to think that after all there is no natural morality, independent of human institution? Shall we not conclude that all moral systems are nothing but artificial products, means invented for the better restraint of the selfish and wicked race of men; and further, that, as they have no internal credentials and no natural basis, they would fa

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ANTIMORAL[1] INCENTIVES.

ANTIMORAL[1] INCENTIVES.

The chief and fundamental incentive in man, as in animals, is Egoism , that is, the urgent impulse to exist, and exist under the best circumstances. The German word Selbstsucht (self-seeking) involves a false secondary idea of disease ( Sucht ). [2] The term Eigennutz (self-interest) denotes Egoism, so far as the latter is guided by reason, which enables it, by means of reflection, to prosecute its purposes systematically; so that animals may be called egoistic, but not self-interested ( eigennu

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CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH.

CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH.

There is first the empirical question to be settled, whether actions of voluntary justice and unselfish loving-kindness, which are capable of rising to nobleness and magnanimity, actually occur in experience. Unfortunately, this inquiry cannot be decided altogether empirically, because it is invariably only the act that experience gives, the incentives not being apparent. Hence the possibility always remains that an egoistic motive may have had weight in determining a just or good deed. In a the

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STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE.

STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE.

The preceding considerations, which were unavoidably necessary in order to clear the ground, now enable me to indicate the true incentive which underlies all acts of real moral worth. The seriousness, and indisputable genuineness, with which we shall find it is distinguished, removes it far indeed from the hair-splittings, subtleties, sophisms, assertions formulated out of airy nothings, and a priori soap-bubbles, which all systems up to the present have tried to make at once the source of moral

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THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE.

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE.

If we look more closely at this process called Compassion, which we have shown to be the primary ethical phaenomenon, we remark at once that there are two distinct degrees in which another's suffering may become directly my motive, that is, may urge me to do something, or to leave it undone. The first degree of Compassion is seen when, by counter-acting egoistic and malicious motives, it keeps me from bringing pain on another, and from becoming myself the cause of trouble, which so far does not

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THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS.

THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS.

Thus justice is the primary and essentially cardinal virtue. Ancient philosophers recognised it as such, but made it co-ordinate with three others unsuitably chosen. [1] Loving-kindness ( caritas, ἀγάπη ) was not as yet ranked as a virtue. Plato himself, who rises highest in moral science, reaches only so far as voluntary, disinterested justice. It is true that loving-kindness has existed at all times in practice and in fact; but it was reserved for Christianity,—whose greatest service is seen i

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THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE.

THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE.

The truth I have here laid down, that Compassion is the sole non-egoistic stimulus, and therefore the only really moral one, is a strange, indeed almost incomprehensible paradox. I shall hope, therefore, to render it less extraordinary to the reader, if I show that it is confirmed by experience, and by the universal testimony of human sentiment. (1) For this purpose I shall, in the first place, state an imaginary case, which in the present investigation may serve as an experimentum crucis [1] (a

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HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.

HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.

In the foregoing pages the moral incentive (Compassion) has been established as a fact, and I have shown that from it alone can proceed unselfish justice and genuine loving-kindness, and that on these two cardinal virtues all the rest depend. Now, for the purpose of supplying Ethics with a foundation, this is sufficient, in a certain sense; that is, in so far as Moral Science necessarily requires to be supported by some actual and demonstrable basis, whether existing in the external world, or in

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THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK.

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK.

So far all our steps have been supported by the firm rock of experience. But at this point it fails us, and the solid earth sinks from under our feet, as we press forward in our search after a final theoretical satisfaction, there, where no experience can ever by any possibility penetrate; and happy shall we be, if perchance we gain one hint, one transient gleam, that may bring us a certain measure of content. What, however, shall not desert us is the honesty that has hitherto attended our proce

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JUDICIUM

JUDICIUM

Quaestionem anno 1837 propositam, "utrum philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum in idea moralitatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur, et ceteris notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex ilia prodeant, explicandis quaerenda sint, an in alio cognoscendi principio," unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus est, cujus commentationem, germanico sermone compositam, et his verbis notatam : " MORAL PREDIGEN IST LEICHT, MORAL BEGRÜNDEN IST SCHWER ," praemio dignam judicare nequivimus. Omisso enim eo, q

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