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A COMMENTARY TO K A N T’S ‘C R I T I Q U E O F P U R E R E A S O N’
A COMMENTARY TO K A N T’S ‘C R I T I Q U E O F P U R E R E A S O N’
BY NORMAN KEMP SMITH, D.Phil. McCOSH PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY AUTHOR OF ‘STUDIES IN THE CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY’ MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON 1918 COPYRIGHT TO THE MEMORY OF ROBERT ADAMSON WISE IN COUNSEL, IN FRIENDSHIP UNFAILING GRATEFULLY DEDICATED ...
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PREFACE
PREFACE
T he Critique of Pure Reason is more obscure and difficult than even a metaphysical treatise has any right to be. The difficulties are not merely due to defects of exposition; they multiply rather than diminish upon detailed study; and, as I shall endeavour to show in this Commentary , are traceable to two main causes, the composite nature of the text, written at various dates throughout the period 1772-1780, and the conflicting tendencies of Kant’s own thinking. The Commentary is both expositor
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NOTE
NOTE
In all references to the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft I have given the original pagings of both the first and second editions. References to Kant’s other works are, whenever possible, to the volumes thus far issued in the new Berlin edition. As the Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft had not been published in this edition at the time when the Commentary was completed, the numbering given is that of B. Erdmann’s edition of 1884....
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INTRODUCTION I. TEXTUAL
INTRODUCTION I. TEXTUAL
KANT’S METHOD OF COMPOSING THE ‘CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON’ S ELDOM , in the history of literature, has a work been more conscientiously and deliberately thought out, or more hastily thrown together, than the Critique of Pure Reason . The following is the account which Kant in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn (August 16, 1783) has given of its composition: ”[Though the Critique is] the outcome of reflection which had occupied me for a period of at least twelve years, I brought it to completion in the
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II. HISTORICAL
II. HISTORICAL
KANT’S RELATION TO HUME AND TO LEIBNIZ Kant’s manner of formulating his fundamental problem—How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?—may well seem to the modern reader to imply an unduly scholastic and extremely rationalistic method of approach. Kant’s reasons for adopting it have, unfortunately, been largely obscured, owing to the mistaken interpretation which has usually been given to certain of his personal utterances. They have been supposed to prove that the immediate occasion of the
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III. GENERAL
III. GENERAL
In indicating some of the main features of Kant’s general teaching, I shall limit myself to those points which seem most helpful in preliminary orientation, or which are necessary for guarding against the misunderstandings likely to result from the very radical changes in terminology and in outlook that have occurred in the hundred and thirty years since the publication of the Critique . Statements which thus attempt to present in outline, and in modern terms, the more general features of Kant’s
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A COMMENTARY TO KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”
A COMMENTARY TO KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”
TITLE: KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT T HE term critique or criticism, as employed by Kant, is of English origin. It appears in seventeenth and eighteenth century English, chiefly in adjectival form, as a literary and artistic term—for instance, in the works of Pope, who was Kant’s favourite English poet. Kant was the first to employ it in German, extending it from the field of aesthetics to that of general philosophy. A reference in Kant’s Logic [64] to Home’s Elements of Criticism [65] would seem
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DEDICATION TO FREIHERR VON ZEDLITZ
DEDICATION TO FREIHERR VON ZEDLITZ
Karl Abraham, Freiherr von Zedlitz had been entrusted, as Minister (1771-1788) to Frederick the Great, with the oversight and direction of the Prussian system of education. He held Kant in the highest esteem. [71] In February 1778 we find him writing to thank Kant for the pleasure he had found in perusing notes of his lectures on physical geography, and requesting the favour of a complete copy. [72] A week later he invited Kant to accept a professorship of philosophy in Halle, [73] which was the
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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
D etailed discussion of the Prefaces is not advisable. The problems which they raise can best be treated in the order in which they come up in the Critique itself. I shall dwell only on the minor incidental difficulties of the text, and on those features in Kant’s exposition which are peculiar to the Prefaces , or which seem helpful in the way of preliminary orientation. I shall first briefly restate the argument of the Preface to the first edition, and then add the necessary comment. Human reas
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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
I SHALL again give a brief explanatory paraphrase, before proceeding to detailed comment. The main points of the preface of the first edition are repeated. “Metaphysics soars above all teaching of experience, and rests on concepts only. In it reason has to be her own pupil.” [110] But Kant immediately proceeds to a further point. That logic should have attained the secure method of science is due to its limitation to the mere a priori form of knowledge. For metaphysics this is far more difficult
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
I SHALL first [143] give a restatement, partly historical and partly explanatory, of Kant’s main argument as contained in the enlarged Introduction of the second edition. There were two stages in the process by which Kant came to full realisation of the Critical problem. There is first the problem as formulated in his letter of 1772 to Herz: how the a priori can yield knowledge of the independently real. [144] This, as he there states it, is an essentially metaphysical problem. It is the problem
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS PART I THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS PART I THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC
T HE Aesthetic opens with a series of definitions. Intuition ( Anschauung ) is knowledge ( Erkenntnis ) which is in immediate relation to objects ( sich auf Gegenstände unmittelbar bezieht ). Each term in this definition calls for comment. Anschauung etymologically applies only to visual sensation. Kant extends it to cover sensations of all the senses. The current term was Empfindung . Kant’s reason for introducing the term intuition in place of sensation was evidently the fact that the latter c
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC SECTION I SPACE METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPTION OF SPACE[422]
THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC SECTION I SPACE METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPTION OF SPACE[422]
Space: First Argument. —“Space is not an empirical concept ( Begriff ) which has been abstracted from outer experiences. For in order that certain sensations be related to something outside me ( i.e. to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside [and alongside ] [423] one another, and accordingly as not only [qualitatively] different but as in different places, the representation of space must be
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC SECTION II TIME METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPTION OF TIME
THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC SECTION II TIME METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPTION OF TIME
Time: First Argument. —This argument is in all respects the same as the first argument on space. The thesis is that the representation [491] of time is not of empirical origin. The proof is based on the fact that this representation must be previously given in order that the perception of coexistence or succession be possible. It also runs on all fours with the first argument in the Dissertation . “ The idea of time does not originate in, but is presupposed by the senses. When a number of things
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS PART II THE TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS PART II THE TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
Introduction I. Concerning Logic in General. —This Introduction [639] which falls into four divisions, is extremely diffuse, and contributes little that is of more than merely architectonic value. It is a repetition of the last section of the general Introduction , and of the introductory paragraphs of the Aesthetic , but takes no account of the definitions given in either of those two places. It does not, therefore, seem likely that it could have been written in immediate sequence upon the Aest
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC Division I
THE TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC Division I
THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC The chief point of this section [668] lies in its insistence that, as the Analytic is concerned only with the pure understanding, the a priori concepts with which it deals must form a unity or system. Understanding is viewed as a separate faculty, and virtually hypostatised. As a separate faculty, it must, it is implied, be an independent unity, self-containing and complete. Its concepts are determined in number, constitution, and interrelation, by its inherent charac
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BOOK I THE ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS
BOOK I THE ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS
Introductory Paragraph. —Kant’s view of the understanding as a separate faculty is in evidence again in this paragraph. [669] The Analytic is a “dissection of the faculty of the understanding.” A priori concepts are to be sought nowhere but in the understanding itself, as their birthplace. There “they lie ready till at last, on the occasion of experience, they become developed.” But such statements fail to do justice to Kant’s real teaching. They would seem to reveal the persisting influence of
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CHAPTER I THE CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING
CHAPTER I THE CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING
That the understanding is “an absolute unity” is repeated. From this assertion, thus dogmatically made, without even an attempt at argument, Kant deduces the important conclusion that the pure concepts, originating from such a source, “must be connected with each other according to one concept or idea ( Begriff oder Idee ).” And he adds the equally unproved assertion: “But such a connection supplies a rule by which we are enabled to assign its proper place to each pure concept of the understandi
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CHAPTER II DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING
CHAPTER II DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING
First edition Subjective and Objective Deductions. —In dealing with the transcendental deduction, as given in the first edition, we can make use of the masterly and convincing analysis which Vaihinger [752] (building upon Adickes’ previous results, but developing an independent and quite original interpretation) has given of its inconsecutive and strangely bewildering argumentation. Vaihinger’s analysis is an excellent example of detective genius in the field of scholarship. From internal eviden
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC Book II THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES
THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC Book II THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES
The distinction which Kant here introduces for the first time between understanding (now viewed as the faculty only of concepts) and the faculty of judgment ( Urtheilskraft ) is artificial and extremely arbitrary. [1098] As we have seen, [1099] his own real position involves a complete departure from the traditional distinction between conceiving, judging, and reasoning, as separate processes. All thinking without exception finds expression in judgment. Judgment is the fundamental activity of th
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CHAPTER I THE SCHEMATISM OF PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING[1103]
CHAPTER I THE SCHEMATISM OF PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING[1103]
The more artificial aspect of Kant’s argument again appears in the reason which he assigns for the existence of a problem of schematism, namely, that pure concepts, and the sensuous intuitions which have to be subsumed under them, are completely opposite in nature. No such explanation can be accepted. For if category and sensuous intuition are really heterogeneous, no subsumption is possible; and if they are not really heterogeneous, no such problem as Kant here refers to will exist. The heterog
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CHAPTER II SYSTEM OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF PURE UNDERSTANDING
CHAPTER II SYSTEM OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF PURE UNDERSTANDING
The introductory remarks to this important chapter are again dictated by Kant’s architectonic, and set its actual contents in an extremely false light. Kant would seem to imply that as the Analytic of Concepts has determined all the various conceptual elements constitutive of experience, and has proved that they serve as predicates of possible judgments, it now remains to show in an Analytic of Principles what a priori synthetic judgments, or in other words what principles, can actually be based
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CHAPTER III ON THE GROUND OF THE DISTINCTION OF ALL OBJECTS WHATEVER INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA
CHAPTER III ON THE GROUND OF THE DISTINCTION OF ALL OBJECTS WHATEVER INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA
T HIS chapter, as Kant himself states, [1282] can yield no new results. It will serve merely to summarise those already established in the Analytic , showing how they one and all converge upon a conclusion of supreme importance for understanding the nature and scope of human experience—the conclusion, that though the objective employment of the categories can be justified only within the realm of sense-experiences, they have a wider significance whereby they define a distinction between appearan
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APPENDIX THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTS OF REFLECTION[1317]
APPENDIX THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTS OF REFLECTION[1317]
I N this appendix Kant gives a criticism of the Leibnizian rationalism—a criticism already partially stated in the section on the Postulates —and he does this in a manner which very clearly reveals the influence which that rationalism continued to exercise upon his own thinking. Thus Kant speaks of the “mere concept,” [1318] and in doing so evidently means to imply that it exists in its own right, with a nature determined solely by intrinsic factors of a strictly a priori character, in complete
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TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC DIVISION II THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC INTRODUCTORY COMMENT UPON THE COMPOSITE ORIGIN AND CONFLICTING TENDENCIES OF THE DIALECTIC.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC DIVISION II THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC INTRODUCTORY COMMENT UPON THE COMPOSITE ORIGIN AND CONFLICTING TENDENCIES OF THE DIALECTIC.
We have had constant occasion to observe the composite origin and conflicting tendencies of the Analytic . The Dialectic is hardly less composite in character, and is certainly not more uniform in its fundamental teaching. The composite nature of the text, though bewildering to the unsophisticated reader, is not, however, without its compensations. The text, as it stands, preserves the record of the manifold influences which presided over its first inception, and of the devious paths by which Ka
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TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC INTRODUCTION
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC INTRODUCTION
I. Transcendental Illusion Dialectic is a Logic of Illusion. [1367] —The meaning which Kant attaches to the term dialectic has already been considered. The passage above quoted [1368] from his Logic shows the meaning which he supposed the term historically to possess, namely, as being a sophistical art of disputation, presenting false principles in the guise of truth by means of a seeming fulfilment of the demands of strict logical proof. The incorrectness of this historical derivation hardly ne
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BOOK I THE CONCEPTS OF PURE REASON[1381]
BOOK I THE CONCEPTS OF PURE REASON[1381]
The distinction here drawn between concepts obtained by reflection and concepts gained by inference is a somewhat misleading mode of stating the fact that, whereas the categories of understanding condition experience and so make possible the unity of consciousness necessary to all reflection, or, in other words, are conditions of the material supplied for inference, the concepts of Reason are Ideal constructions which though in a certain sense resting upon experience none the less transcend it.
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BOOK II THE DIALECTICAL INFERENCES OF PURE REASON[1410] CHAPTER I THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON[1411]
BOOK II THE DIALECTICAL INFERENCES OF PURE REASON[1410] CHAPTER I THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON[1411]
As rational psychology fails to distinguish between appearances and things in themselves, it identifies mere apperception with inner sense; the self in experiencing the succession of its inner states is supposed to acquire knowledge of its own essential nature. “I, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am entitled soul,” in contrast to the body which is an object of outer sense. Empirical psychology deals with the concrete detail of inner experience; rational psychology abstracts from al
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CHAPTER II THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON[1495]
CHAPTER II THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON[1495]
This introduction summarises the preceding argument, and distinguishes the new problems of Antinomy from those of the Paralogisms . In rational psychology pure Reason attains, as it were, euthanasia; in the antinomies an entirely different situation is disclosed. For though rational cosmology is able to expound itself in a series of demonstrated theses, its teaching stands in irreconcilable conflict with the actual nature of appearances, as expressed through a series of antitheses which are demo
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CHAPTER III THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON
CHAPTER III THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON
SECTIONS I and II THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL [1601] T HE statements of the first section cannot profitably be commented upon at this stage; they are of a merely general character. [1602] I pass at once to Section II., which, as above stated, is quite the most archaic piece of rationalistic argument in the entire Critique . It is not merely Leibnizian, but Wolffian in character. For Kant the Wolffian logic had an old-time flavour and familiarity that rendered it by no means distasteful; and he is h
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APPENDIX TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
APPENDIX TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
THE REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON [1638] Before we proceed to deal with this Appendix it will be of advantage to consider the section in the Methodology on the Discipline of Pure Reason in regard to Hypotheses . [1639] That section affords a very illuminating introduction to the problems here discussed, and is extremely important for understanding Kant’s view of metaphysical science as yielding either complete certainty or else nothing at all. This is a doctrine which he from
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APPENDIX A[1684] TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHODS CHAPTER I THE DISCIPLINE[1685] OF PURE REASON
APPENDIX A[1684] TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHODS CHAPTER I THE DISCIPLINE[1685] OF PURE REASON
K ANT is neither an intellectualist nor an anti-intellectualist. Reason, the proper duty of which is to prescribe a discipline to all other endeavours, itself requires discipline; and when it is employed in the metaphysical sphere, independently of experience, it demands not merely the correction of single errors, but the eradication of their causes through “a separate negative code,” such as a Critical philosophy can alone supply. In the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements this demand has been
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CHAPTER II THE CANON[1711] OF PURE REASON
CHAPTER II THE CANON[1711] OF PURE REASON
SECTION I THE ULTIMATE END OF THE PURE USE OF OUR REASON [1712] The problems of the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul have, Kant declares, little theoretical interest. For, as he has already argued, even if we were justified in postulating God, freedom, and immortality, they would not enable us to account for the phenomena of sense-experience, the only objects of possible knowledge. But the three problems are also connected with our practical interests, a
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CHAPTER III THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON[1743]
CHAPTER III THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON[1743]
Adickes [1744] very justly remarks that “this is a section after Kant’s own heart, in which there is presented, almost unsought, the opportunity, which he elsewhere so frequently creates for himself, of indulging in his favourite hobby.” The section is of slight scientific importance, and is chiefly of interest for the light which it casts upon Kant’s personality. Moreover the distinctions which Kant here draws are for the most part not his own philosophical property, but are taken over from the
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CHAPTER IV THE HISTORY OF PURE REASON[1755]
CHAPTER IV THE HISTORY OF PURE REASON[1755]
This title, as Kant states, is inserted only to mark the place of the present chapter in a complete system of pure reason. The very cursory outline, which alone Kant here attempts to give, merely repeats the main historical distinctions of which the Critique has made use. The contrast between the sensationalism of Epicurus and the intellectualism of Plato has been developed in A 465 ff. = B 493 ff. [1756] The contrast between Locke and Leibniz is dwelt upon in A 43 ff. = B 60 ff. and A 270 ff. =
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APPENDIX B A MORE DETAILED STATEMENT OF KANT’S RELATIONS TO HIS PHILOSOPHICAL PREDECESSORS[1759]
APPENDIX B A MORE DETAILED STATEMENT OF KANT’S RELATIONS TO HIS PHILOSOPHICAL PREDECESSORS[1759]
The development of philosophy, prior to Kant, had rendered two problems especially prominent—the problem of sense-perception and the problem of judgment. The one raises the question of the interrelation of mind knowing and objects known; the other treats of the connection holding between subject and predicate in the various forms of judgment. The one enquires how it is possible to know reality; the other seeks to determine the criterion of truth. These two problems are, as Kant discovered, insep
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